Глава 7. Препятствия на пути финансового развития

¹ Описание ситуации основано на следующей работе: Е. Glaeser, S. Johnson, and A. Shleifer, "Coase vs. the Coasians", Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, no. 3 (2001): 853-899.

² Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison", NBER working paper no. 8711, 2002.

³ Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer. "Coase vs. the Coasians".

⁴ Dyck and Zingales. "Private Benefits of Control".

⁵ Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer. "Coase vs. the Coasians".

⁶ Carol J. Simon, "The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Inves­ tor Information and the Performance of New Issues", American Economic Review 79, no. 3 (1989): 295-318.

⁷ R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, "In­ vestor Protection and Corporate Valuation", Journal of Finance 57, no. 3 (2002): 1147-1171.

450

⁸ U. Bhattacharya and H. Daouk, "The World Price of Insider Trading", Journal of Finance 57 (2002): 75-108.

⁹ Цит. no: Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock, and Stuart Turnbull, "An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporate Law", Univer­ sity of Toronto Law Review 117 (1980): 30.

¹⁰ Mancur Olson. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971; G. Stigler, "Theory of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Eco­ nomics 2 (1971): 3-21.

¹¹ В изучение данной проблемы внесли значительный вклад три выдающихся экономиста: Сэм Пельтцман (Sam Peltzman "Toward а More General Theory of Regulation", Journal of Law and Economics 19, no. 2 [1976]: 211—240), Ричард Познер (Richard Posner "Taxation by Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics 2 [1971]: 22 — 50), и Гэри Бекер (Gary Becker "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Po­ litical Influence", Quarterly Journal of Finance 98, no. 3 [1983]: 371 — 400).

¹² Данные Комиссии по такси и лимузинам за 1977 г., доступные на сайте www.schallerconsult.com/taxi/intro.htm.

¹³ Термин «разумное неведение» был впервые употреблен Энтони Даунсом в кн.: Anthony Downs. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957.

¹⁴ Более подробно об этом см.: R. Rajan and L. Zingales, "The Tyranny of Inequality: An Inquiry into the Adverse Consequences of Power Struggles", Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000): 521—558.

¹⁵ Цит. no: Randall Morck, David Strangeland, and Bernard Ye- ung, "Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease?" in: Concentrated Capital Ownership, ed. R. K. Morck. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. P. 347.

¹⁶ Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu, "Is Group Affiliation Profit­ able in Emerging Markets?" Journal of Finance 55, no. 2 (2000): 867 — 891.

¹⁷ Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, "The Regulation of Entry", NBER working paper no. 7892, 2000.

Примечания

451

¹⁸ Эта отрицательная зависимость статистически значима, а регрессионные оценки подтверждают, что она сохраняется после учета уровня ВВП на душу населения и константы.