Глава 1. Выгоды финансовой системы: только для богатых?

¹ Tom Wolfe, The Bonfire of the Vanities. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1987. P. 229. [Вулф Т. Костры амбиций: Роман. Кн. 1. М.: Иностранка: Б.С.Г.-Пресс, 2001. С. 351-352.]

Примечания

427

² Цит. по: Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money. Washington, DC: National Home Library Foundation, 1933. P. 1.

³ См.: J. Stiglitz and A. Weiss, "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information", American Economic Review 71 (1981): 393 — 410.

⁴ О залоге см.: Yuk Shee Chan, Ajan V. Thakor, "Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information", Journal of Finance 42 (1987): 345-364 и D. Besanko, A. Thakor, "Col­ lateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets", International Economic Review 28 (1987): 671-689.

⁵ Важно то, что Шейлок ненавидит купца, в противном случае он бы не захотел забрать фунт его плоти, и сама эта угроза была бы неправдоподобной.

⁶ Jappelli Т., Pagano М., Bianco М. "Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement of Credit Markets", CEPR working paper no. 3347, April 2002. Среди схожих исследований: M. Chiuri and Т. Jap­ pelli, "Credit Market Imperfections and Home Ownership: A Compara­ tive Study", CEPR discussion paper no. 2717, 2001; D. Fabbri and Mario Padula, "Judicial Costs and Household Debt", working paper, Center for Studies in Economics and Finance, University of Salerno, It­ aly, 2001; Lee Alston, "Farm Foreclosure Moratorium Legislation: A Les­ son from the Past", American Economic Review 74, no. 3 (1984): 445- 458; R. Gropp, J. Scholz, and M. White, "Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand", Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997): 217-251.

⁷ Gropp, Scholz, and White, "Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand", 217 — 251.

⁸ Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Tri­ umphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books, 2000. [Сото Э. де. Загадка капитала: почему капитализм торжествует на Западе и терпит поражение во всем остальном мире. М.: Олимп- бизнес, 2001.]

⁹ См., например: М. Petersen and R. Rajan, "The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data", Journal of Finance 49 (1994): 3-37.

428

¹⁰ Luigi Guiso and Luigi Zingales, "The Rise of Bank Relation­ ships", University of Chicago, working paper, 1999.

¹¹ Naomi Lamoreaux, Insider Lending: Banks, Personal Connections and Economic Development in Industrial New England. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

¹² См.: Rajan R.G. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's Length Debt," Journal of Finance 47 (1992): 1367 — 1400.

¹³ Доклад комиссии Пуджо, цит. по: Brandeis, Other People's Money. P. 31.

¹⁴ E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1885. New York: New American Library, 1979. P. 242.

¹⁵ См.: Harris Corporation, Business History Review, "Founding Dates of the 1994 Fortune 500 U.S. Companies", spring 1996, 69-90.

¹⁶ См.: J. Fear, "German Capitalism", in: Creating Modern Capi­ talism: How Entrepreneurs, Companies, and Countries Triumphed in Three Industrial Revolutions, ed, T. McCraw. Cambridge, Mass.: Har­ vard University Press, 1997. P. 181.

¹⁷ См.: R.W. Fogel, The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. P. 112. См. также ссылки в данной работе.

¹⁸ Т. McCraw, "American Capitalism", in: Creating Modern Capi­ talism. P. 320.

¹⁹ A. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capi­ talism. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1990. P. 18.

²⁰ R. Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller. New York: Random House, 1998. P. 226.

²¹ Chandler. Scale and Scope. P. 25.

²² Chernow. Titan. P. 288.

²³ Chandler. Scale and Scope. P. 25.

²⁴ Chernow. Titan. P. 265.

²⁵ David Blau, "A Time Series Analysis of Self-Employment in the United States", Journal of Political Economy 95, no. 3 (1987): 445 — 468.

Примечания

429

²⁶ Модель данного явления см.: R. Rajan, L. Zingales, "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms", Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2001): 805 — 852.

²⁷ Chandler. Scale and Scope. P. 598.

²⁸ Описание модели раздувания штата владельцами компаний с целью не допустить роста заработной платы см.: L. Stole and J. Zwic- bel, "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intra-Firm Bargaining", American Economic Review 86 (1996): 195 — 223.

²⁹ Вкратце, вертикально интегрированные компании используют несколько источников мотивации. Внутренняя конкуренция и бюро­ кратизация гарантировала, что работники не станут незаменимыми, в то время как возможность продвижения по служебной лестнице не да­ вала им утратить мотивацию. См.: Rajan and Zingales, "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy".

³⁰ Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, "The Returns to Skill in the United States across the Twentieth Century", NBER working paper 7126,1999.

^3! Dani Rodrik. "Democracies Pay Higher Wages", NBER working paper 6364, 1998.