- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
10 • Economics Primer: Basic Principles
more profitable to keep its price high (letting Pepsi steal some of its market) than to respond with a price cut of its own.2 Finally, whether Pepsi’s higher sales revenue translates into higher profit depends on the economic relationship between the additional sales revenue that Pepsi’s price cut generated and the additional cost of producing more Pepsi-Cola. That profits rose rapidly after the price reduction suggests that the additional sales revenue far exceeded the additional costs of production.
This chapter lays out basic microeconomic tools for business strategy. Most of the elements that contributed to Pepsi’s successful price-cutting strategy in the 1930s will be on display here. An understanding of the language and concepts in this chapter will, we believe, “level the playing field,” so that students with little or no background in microeconomics can navigate most of this book just as well as students with extensive economics training. The chapter has five main parts: (1) costs; (2) demand, prices, and revenues; (3) the theory of price and output determination by a profit-maximizing firm; (4) the theory of perfectly competitive markets; and (5) game theory.3
COSTS
A firm’s profit equals its revenues minus its costs. We begin our economics primer by focusing on the cost side of this equation. We discuss four specific concepts in this section: cost functions; long-run versus short-run costs; sunk costs; and economic versus accounting costs.
Cost Functions
Total Cost Functions
Managers are most familiar with costs when they are presented as in Tables P.1 and P.2, which show, respectively, an income statement and a statement of costs of goods manufactured for a hypothetical producer during the year 2008.4 The information in these tables is essentially retrospective. It tells managers what happened during the past year. But what if management is interested in determining whether a price
TABLE P.1
Income Statement: 2008
(1) |
Sales Revenue |
|
$35,600 |
(2) |
Cost of Goods Sold |
|
|
|
Cost of Goods Manufactured |
$13,740 |
|
|
Add: Finished Goods Inventory 12/31/07 |
$ |
3,300 |
|
Less: Finished Goods Inventory 12/31/08 |
$ |
2,950 |
|
|
|
$14,090 |
(3) |
Gross Profit: (1) minus (2) |
|
$21,510 |
(4) |
Selling and General Administrative Expenses |
|
$8,540 |
(5) |
Income from Operations: (3) minus (4) |
|
$12,970 |
Interest Expenses |
|
$1,210 |
|
Net Income Before Taxes |
|
$11,760 |
|
Income Taxes |
|
$4,100 |
|
Net Income |
|
$7,660 |
|
|
|
|
|
All amounts in thousands.
Costs • 11
TABLE P.2
Statement of Cost of Goods Manufactured: 2008
Materials: |
|
|
Materials Purchases |
$8,700 |
|
Add: Materials Inventory 12/31/07 |
$1,400 |
|
Less: Materials Inventory 12/31/08 |
$1,200 |
|
(1) Cost of Materials |
$8,900 |
|
(2) Direct Labor |
$2,300 |
|
Manufacturing Overhead |
|
|
Indirect Labor |
$700 |
|
Heat, Light, and Power |
$400 |
|
Repairs and Maintenance |
$200 |
|
Depreciation |
$1,100 |
|
Insurance |
$50 |
|
Property Taxes |
$80 |
|
Miscellaneous Factory Expenses |
$140 |
|
(3) Total Manufacturing Overhead |
$2,670 |
|
Total Cost of Manufacturing: (1) 1 (2) 1 (3) |
$13,870 |
|
Add: Work-in-Process Inventory 12/31/07 |
$2,100 |
|
Less: Work-in-Process Inventory 12/31/08 |
$2,230 |
|
Cost of Goods Manufactured |
|
$13,740 |
|
|
|
All amounts in thousands.
reduction will increase profits, as with Pepsi? The price drop will probably stimulate additional sales, so a firm needs to know how its total costs would change if it increased production above the previous year’s level.
This is what a total cost function tells us. It represents the relationship between a firm’s total costs, denoted by TC, and the total amount of output it produces in a given time period, denoted by Q. Figure P.1 shows a graph of a total cost function. For each level of output the firm might produce, the graph associates a unique level of total
FIGURE P.1
Total Cost Function
The total cost function TC(Q) shows the total costs that the firm would incur for a level of output Q. The total cost function is an efficiency relationship in that it shows the lowest possible total cost the firm would incur to produce a level of output, given the firm’s technological capabilities and the prices of factors of production, such as labor and capital.
TC(Q)
Total cost
Q Output
12 • Economics Primer: Basic Principles
cost. Why is the association between output and total cost unique? A firm may currently be producing 100 units of output per year at a total cost of $5,000,000, but if it were to streamline its operations, it might be able to lower costs, so that those 100 units could be produced for only $4,500,000. We resolve this ambiguity by defining the total cost function as an efficiency relationship. It represents the relationship between total cost and output, assuming that the firm produces in the most efficient manner possible given its current technological capabilities. Of course, firms do not always produce as efficiently as they theoretically could. The substantial literature on total quality management and reengineering attests to the attention managers give to improving efficiency. This is why we stress that the total cost function reflects the current capabilities of the firm. If the firm is producing as efficiently as it knows how, then the total cost function must slope upward: the only way to achieve more output is to use more factors of production (labor, machinery, materials), which will raise total costs.5
Fixed and Variable Costs
The information contained in the accounting statements in Tables P.1 and P.2 allows us to identify the total cost for one particular level of annual output. To map out the total cost function more completely, we must distinguish between fixed costs and variable costs. Variable costs, such as direct labor and commissions to salespeople, increase as output increases. Fixed costs, such as general and administrative expenses and property taxes, remain constant as output increases.
Three important points should be stressed when discussing fixed and variable costs. First, the line dividing fixed and variable costs is often fuzzy. Some costs, such as maintenance or advertising and promotional expenses, may have both fixed and variable components. Other costs may be semifixed: fixed over certain ranges of output but variable over other ranges.6 For example, a beer distributor may be able to deliver up to 5,000 barrels of beer a week using a single truck. But when it must deliver between 5,000 and 10,000 barrels, it needs two trucks, between 10,000 and 15,000, three trucks, and so forth. The cost of trucks is fixed within the intervals (0, 5,000), (5,000, 10,000), (10,000, 15,000), and so forth, but is variable between these intervals.
Second, when we say that a cost is fixed, we mean that it is invariant to the firm’s output. It does not mean that it cannot be affected by other dimensions of the firm’s operations or decisions the firm might make. For example, for an electric utility, the cost of stringing wires to hook up houses to the local grid depends primarily on the number of subscribers to the system, and not on the total amount of kilowatt-hours of electricity the utility generates. Other fixed costs, such as the money spent on marketing promotions or advertising campaigns, arise from management decisions and can be eliminated should management so desire.7
Third, whether costs are fixed or variable depends on the time period in which decisions regarding output are contemplated. Consider, for example, an airline that is contemplating a one-week-long fare cut. Its workers have already been hired, its schedule has been set, and its fleet has been purchased. Within a one-week period, none of these decisions can be reversed. For this particular decision, then, the airline should regard a significant fraction of its costs as fixed. By contrast, if the airline contemplates committing to a year-long reduction in fares, with the expectation that ticket sales will increase accordingly, schedules can be altered, planes
Costs • 13
can be leased or purchased, and workers can be hired. In this case, the airline should regard most of its expenses as variable. Whether the firm has the freedom to alter its physical capital or other elements of its operations has important implications for its cost structure and the nature of its decision making. This issue will be covered in more detail below when we analyze the distinction between long-run and short-run costs.
Average and Marginal Cost Functions
Associated with the total cost function are two other cost functions: the average cost function, AC(Q), and the marginal cost function, MC(Q). The average cost function describes how the firm’s average or per-unit-of-output costs vary with the amount of output it produces. It is given by the formula
AC(Q) 5
TC(Q)
Q
If total costs were directly proportional to output—for example, if they were given by a formula, such as TC(Q) 5 5Q or TC(Q) 5 37,000Q, or more generally, by TC(Q) 5 cQ, where c is a constant—then average cost would be a constant. This is because
cQ AC(Q) 5 Q 5 c
Often, however, average cost will vary with output. As Figure P.2 shows, average cost may rise, fall, or remain constant as output goes up. When average cost decreases as output increases, there are economies of scale. When average cost increases as output increases, there are diseconomies of scale. When average cost remains unchanged with respect to output, we have constant returns to scale. A production process may exhibit economies of scale over one range of output and diseconomies of scale over another.
FIGURE P.2
Average Cost Function
AC(Q)
|
Average cost |
|
The average cost function AC(Q) shows the firm’s |
|
|
average, or per-unit, cost for any level of output Q. |
|
|
Average costs are not necessarily the same at each |
|
|
|
Q Output |
|
level of output. |
|
|
|
|
|
14 • Economics Primer: Basic Principles
FIGURE P.3
Economies of Scale and Minimum Efficient Scale
This average cost function exhibits economies of scale at output levels up to Q9. It exhibits constant returns to scale between Q9 and Q0. It exhibits diseconomies of scale at output levels above Q0. The smallest output level at which economies of scale are exhausted is Q9. It is thus known as the minimum efficient scale.
Average cost
AC(Q)
Q′ Q′′
Q Output
Figure P.3 shows an average cost function that exhibits economies of scale, diseconomies of scale, and constant returns to scale. Output level Q9 is the smallest level of output at which economies of scale are exhausted and is thus known as the minimum efficient scale. The concepts of economies of scale and minimum efficient scale are extremely important for understanding the size and scope of firms and the structure of industries. We devote all of Chapter 2 to analyzing economies of scale.
Marginal cost refers to the rate of change of total cost with respect to output. Marginal cost may be thought of as the incremental cost of producing exactly one more unit of output. When output is initially Q and changes by DQ units and one knows the total cost at each output level, marginal cost may be calculated as follows:
MC(Q) 5
TC(Q 1 DQ) 2 TC(Q)
DQ
For example, suppose when Q 5 100 units, TC 5 $400,000, and when Q 5 150 units, TC 5 $500,000. Then DQ 5 50, and MC 5 ($500,000 2 $400,000)/50 5 $2,000. Thus, total cost increases at a rate of $2,000 per unit of output when output increases over the range 100 to 150 units.
Marginal cost often depends on the total volume of output. Figure P.4 shows the marginal cost function associated with a particular total cost function. At low levels of output, such as Q9, increasing output by one unit does not change total cost much, as reflected by the low marginal cost. At higher levels of output, such as Q9, a one-unit increase in output has a greater impact on total cost, and the corresponding marginal cost is higher.
Businesses frequently treat average cost and marginal cost as if they were identical, and use average cost when making decisions that should be based on marginal cost. But average cost is generally different from marginal cost. The exception is when total costs vary in direct proportion to output, TC(Q) 5 cQ. In that case,
MC(Q) 5 |
c(Q 1 DQ) 2 cQ |
|
|
5 c |
|
|
||
|
DQ |
|
Costs • 15
FIGURE P.4
Relationship between Total Cost and Marginal Cost
Total cost
TC(Q′′ + 1)
TC(Q′′ )
TC(Q′ + 1)
TC(Q′ )
TC(Q)
Marginal cost
Q′ Q′ + 1 Q′′ Q′′ + 1
MC(Q)
MC(Q′′)
MC(Q′ )
Q′ |
Q′′ |
|
Q Output |
The marginal cost function MC(Q) on the right graph is based on the total cost function TC(Q) shown in the left graph. At output level Q9, a one-unit increase in output changes costs by TC (Q9 1 1) 2 TC(Q9), which equals the marginal cost at Q9, MC(Q9). Since this change is not large, the marginal cost is small (i.e., the height of the marginal cost curve from the horizontal axis is small). At output level Q0, a one-unit increase in output changes costs by TC(Q0 1 1) 2 TC (Q0), which equals the marginal cost at Q0. This change is larger than the one-unit change from Q9, so MC(Q0) . MC(Q9). Because the total cost function becomes steeper as Q gets larger, the marginal cost curve must increase in output.
which, of course, is also average cost. This result reflects a more general relationship between marginal and average cost (illustrated in Figure P.5):
•When average cost is a decreasing function of output, marginal cost is less than average cost.
•When average cost neither increases nor decreases in output—because it is either constant (independent of output) or at a minimum point—marginal cost is equal to average cost.
FIGURE P.5
Relationship between Marginal Cost and Average Cost
When average cost is decreasing (e.g., at output Q9), AC . MC (i.e., the average cost curve lies above the marginal cost curve). When average cost is increasing (e.g., at output Q0), AC , MC (i.e., the average cost curve lies below the marginal cost curve). When average cost is at a minimum, AC 5 MC, so the two curves must intersect.
Average cost, marginal cost
AC decreases |
MC(Q) |
|||
AC increases |
||||
MC < AC |
|
|||
|
MC > AC |
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
AC(Q) |
||
|
|
AC at |
||
|
|
minimum |
||
|
|
MC = AC |
||
|
|
|
|
|
Q′ |
|
Q″ |
||
|
Q Output |
|||
