- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
308 • Chapter 9 • Strategic Positioning for Competitive Advantage
Chapter 2 discussed the implication of point 1 for the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the firm. Points 2 and 3 have important implications for the sustainability of competitive advantages built on organizational capabilities and will be discussed more fully in Chapter 11.
STRATEGIC POSITIONING: COST ADVANTAGE
AND BENEFIT ADVANTAGE
Generic Strategies
Competitive advantage cannot be reduced to a formula or an algorithm. Even if such formulas or algorithms could be concocted, describing them in a textbook such as this would make them valueless to firms because they would be accessible to everyone. Although there is no single formula for success, we can discern broad commonalities across industries in the different ways that firms position themselves to compete. For example, in sporting goods retailing, Sports Authority is a broad-based competitor, whereas Second Wind Fitness specializes in exercise equipment such as treadmills and weight benches. To take another example, Dell computer serves a wide array of customers, including business, government, and individual buyers, whereas Alienware specializes in high-end computers for hard-core gamers.
In the language of strategic management, Sports Authority and Dell on the one hand, and Second Wind Fitness and Alienware on the other, represent different types of generic strategies, a concept first introduced by Michael Porter.16 A firm’s generic strategy describes, in broad terms, how it positions itself to compete in the market it serves. Figure 9.8 illustrates Porter’s generic strategies—benefit leadership, cost leadership, and focus—and briefly describes their economic logic.17
In the remainder of this chapter, we explore the economic logic of these generic strategies. We first consider the logic of positions based on cost leadership and benefit leadership. We then discuss the logic of focus strategies.
The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
A firm that follows a strategy of cost leadership creates more value (i.e., B 2 C) than its competitors by offering products that have a lower C than its rivals. This can happen in three qualitatively different ways. First, the cost leader can achieve benefit parity by making products with the same B but at a lower C than its rivals. The competitive advantage achieved by low-cost producers in commodity markets (e.g., Mittal Steel in the global steel industry) is an example of this. Second, the cost leader can achieve benefit proximity, which involves offering a B that is not much less than competitors. This could occur if the low-cost firm automates processes that are better performed by hand, hires fewer skilled workers, purchases less expensive components, or maintains lower standards of quality control. Yamaha’s cost advantage over traditional piano producers, such as Steinway, is a good example of this. Finally, a cost leader may offer a product that is qualitatively different from that of its rivals. Firms can sometimes build a competitive advantage by redefining the product to yield substantial differences in benefits or costs relative to how the product is traditionally defined. For example, a formerly high-margin product may be redefined to allow for economies of scale in production and distribution while still providing benefits to consumers. The Timex watch and the 19-cent Bic crystal pen are well-known historical examples.
Strategic Positioning: Cost Advantage and Benefit Advantage • 309
FIGURE 9.8
Porter’s Generic Strategies
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Position? |
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Company’s products |
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can be produced |
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at lower cost per unit than |
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competitors’ products |
Broad |
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Company’s products are |
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capable of commanding a |
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price premium relative to |
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competitors |
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Scope?
Narrow
Type of |
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Strategic |
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advantage? |
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logic? |
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Company can either . . . |
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Cost |
• |
Undercut rivals’ prices and sell |
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leadership |
• |
more than they do or . . . |
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Match rivals’ prices and |
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attain higher price–cost |
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margins than they can |
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Company can either . . . |
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Benefit |
• |
Match rivals’ prices and sell |
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more than they do or . . . |
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leadership |
• |
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Charge price premium |
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and attain higher price–cost |
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margins than they can |
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Company configures its value |
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chain so as to create superior |
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economic value within a narrow |
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set of industry segments. Within these |
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segments, the firm may have lower cost per |
||
Focus |
unit than its broad-scope competitor, or |
it may be capable of commanding a price premium relative to these competitors, or both.
This figure depicts Michael Porter’s generic strategies: benefit leadership, cost leadership, and focus. These strategies are distinguished by the breadth of a firm’s product or customer scope and by whether the firm seeks competitive advantage by having the lowest costs in its industry or by offering products/services that deliver superior customer benefits.
Figure 9.9 illustrates the economic logic of cost leadership using a value map. For simplicity, let’s consider an industry in which all firms except the cost leader offer a product with a cost CE and price–quality position at point E. Through a combination of automation and cheaper components, suppose that the cost leader offers a product with a lower-quality level, qF, but a substantially lower cost, CF, resulting in a cost advantage of DC. Market shares in the industry will be stable when the cost leader and its higher-cost competitors attain consumer surplus parity. Consumer surplus parity is achieved when the cost leader operates at point F by charging a price PF. From the figure, notice that PE 2 PF , CE 2 CF, or rearranging terms, PF 2 CF . PE 2 CE. Given consumer surplus parity between the cost leader and its higher-cost competitors, the cost leader achieves a higher profit margin. In essence, the leader’s cost advantage gives it the ability to charge a price that is lower than that of its higher-cost, higher-quality rivals, while at the same time allowing it to “bank” some of its cost advantage in the form of a higher price–cost margin.
All firms except the cost leader offer a product with a cost CE and price–quality position at point E. The cost leader offers a product with a lower-quality level, qF, but a substantially lower cost, CF, resulting in a cost advantage of DC. Consumer surplus
310 • Chapter 9 • Strategic Positioning for Competitive Advantage
FIGURE 9.9
The Economic Logic of Cost Leadership
P, C
(Price, unit cost) Indifference curve
E
PE
F
PF
CE
C
q
CF
q (Quality)
qF qE
All firms except the cost leader offer a product with a cost CE and price–quality position at point E. The cost leader offers a product with a lower-quality level, qF, but a substantially lower cost, CF, resulting in a cost advantage of DC. Consumer surplus parity is achieved when the cost leader operates at point F by charging a price PF. At point F, PE 2 PF , CE 2 CF, or, rearranging terms, PF 2 CF . PE 2 CE. This tells us that despite its quality disadvantage, the cost leader achieves a higher profit margin than its higher-cost competitors.
parity is achieved when the cost leader operates at point F by charging a price PF. At point F, PE 2 PF , CE 2 CF, or rearranging terms, PF 2 CF . PE 2 CE. This tells us that despite its quality disadvantage, the cost leader achieves a higher profit margin than its higher-cost competitors.
The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
A firm that follows a strategy of benefit leadership creates more value (i.e., B 2 C) than its competitors by offering products that have a higher B than its rivals. This can happen in three qualitatively different ways. First, the benefit leader can achieve benefit parity by making products with the same C but at a higher B than its rivals. A good example is the Japanese automakers in the 1980s, whose family sedans (e.g., Honda Accord) were no more costly to produce than American-made models but offered superior performance and reliability. Second, the benefit leader might achieve cost proximity, which entails a C that is not too much higher than competitors. This characterizes the Japanese car makers today relative to their Korean competitors. Finally, a firm could offer substantially higher B and C, which arguably describes BMW’s and Audi’s compact sports sedans.
Strategic Positioning: Cost Advantage and Benefit Advantage • 311
EXAMPLE 9.5 “HAUTE POT” CUISINE IN CHINA
“Hot pot” dining is very popular in China. A server brings a simmering metal pot of stock to the center of the table where it is placed over a heat source. While the hot pot is simmering, the server places the desired ingredients into the pot where they are cooked and served. For a long time, most Chinese consider hot pot restaurants to be a place where they could get a cheap meal. But low prices meant low-quality ingredients, shaky service, and a relatively uninviting ambience. All this changed in the 1990s when a small, private hot pot restaurant with only four tables opened in Sichuan province with a totally new idea about hot pot cuisine. Haidilao has since grown into one of China’s top hot pot restaurants, noted for elevating the hot pot dining experience; it is almost possible to describe it as “haute pot.”
Almost everything about Haidilao stands out from other hot pot chains. Although there is usually a wait for a table, the wait is orderly thanks to a video display of the wait list. While waiting, customers get free drinks and snacks and have access to computers with free Internet. Waiting customers can even get a free manicure and shoe shine! Once seated, everything needed to enjoy hot pot is close at hand: hot towels, aprons, hair bands for those with untied long hair, cleaning cloths for customers wearing glasses, even little plastic bags to wrap and protect cell phones that are placed next to the pot on the table. Hot pot ingredients are fresh and of high quality; the restaurants are clean. Servers offer to feed small children and even play with them in a separate recreational area. Customers finish the dinner with free and delicious desserts. Haidilao has also become the first restaurant that provides hot pot takeout. The takeout package includes a trash can, trash bags, and even the pot of stock, induction oven, and power strip that are needed for cooking at the table!
Yong Zhang, the president of Haidilao, takes pride in the customer service offered by
his employees. The company has made a huge investment in training and retaining top staff. It also pays much better than other hot pot chains. While most workers of other restaurants can only afford living in a shabby basement, Haidilao’s employees get nice apartments with air conditioning and Internet, free nanny services, and four free meals each day. The company also built a boarding school in its home city to assure managers a good education for their children. In exchange, employees are expected to work hard to maximize service. Performance evaluations are based on customer satisfaction rates, and a large portion of income is tied to bonuses and promotion.
Haidilao’s stunningly good customer service has helped it deal with unexpected troubles. Customers are shocked by the passion and considerateness of Haidilao’s staff and enjoy sharing their dining experience on the Internet. Here is a sampling of stories: “I had a little fight with my boyfriend during the dinner, and we soon got a bouquet and a hand-written card from Haidilao to wish us happy,” “I complained a bit why there was no free ice cream as dessert, and three minutes later I got a free cone that the waitress ran to buy from the supermarket next door!” “We are served with a wrong dish, but at the end of the dinner, we get a huge pancake with ‘we are sorry!’( Some customers wonder if Haidilao is responsible for posting some of these stories.)
Haidilao’s strategy of benefit leadership has not translated into industry-leading profitability. Despite being one of the largest hot pot chains, the firm’s profit margin is no better than the industry average. This is not surprising because much of Haidilao’s strategy could be imitated by other firms. Even so, the company is opening 6 to 10 new branch restaurants every year, and some fans of the chain worry whether a bigger Haidilao can maintain the same level of care for every customer.