- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts • 201
millions of dollars of sunk investments in construction facilities, tools, and training. To a newcomer, these would represent incremental costs rather than sunk costs.
Asymmetries also arise from relationships with customers and suppliers that can take years to build. United Airlines spent many years establishing good relationships with its Mileage Plus travelers, employees, government agencies, and Star Alliance partners. These relationships are somewhat specific to Chicago, Denver, and United’s other hub cities. An upstart carrier could establish the same relationships, but this would take time, during which it could suffer significant losses. From United’s point of view, these costs are sunk. But a new carrier has yet to incur them, creating an asymmetry that deters entry. Of course, United can destroy these relationships, for example, by making dramatic changes to its Mileage Plus program, and if it does, it will lose any advantage it may have over upstart firms and might be better off selling its assets to another carrier, even a newcomer.
As we discuss entry barriers, bear in mind that entrants may enjoy many of the attributes that we normally associate with the incumbent firm. Diversifying entrants are particularly likely to have sunk investments in facilities, tools and training, and have established relationships in the vertical chain of production. If so, entrants can turn these attributes to their own advantage, turning entry-deterring strategies into “incumbent-removing” strategies.
Structural Entry Barriers
To assess entry conditions, the incumbent firm must understand the magnitude of structural entry barriers and consider the likely consequences of strategic entry barriers. We discuss structural entry barriers in this section and strategic entry barriers in the next section.
The three main types of structural entry barriers are:
•Control of essential resources
•Economies of scale and scope
•Marketing advantages of incumbency
Control of Essential Resources
An incumbent is protected from entry if it controls a resource or channel in the vertical chain and can use that resource more effectively than newcomers. One reason why Nintendo dominated the video gaming market in the early 1990s is that its Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) was a superior platform for gaming programmers, who naturally devoted most of their energies to developing games for the NES. This stranglehold was broken when Sony introduced the Playstation system, which proved to be an especially attractive platform for sports games.
Some firms attempt to purchase the resources and channels in the vertical chain, preventing potential entrants from acquiring raw materials and/or getting final goods to market. The International Tin Council, DeBeers diamonds, and Ocean Spray cranberries all maintained or continue to maintain monopolies by controlling the raw materials at their source. Firms that attempt to secure their incumbency by tying up the vertical chain face several risks. First, substitutes can emerge. For example, International Tin succumbed to technological advances in aluminum packaging. Second, new channels can open. For example, several diamond finds in northwest Canada loosened DeBeers’s grip on the worldwide diamond market. Third, the price to acquire other firms in the vertical
202 • Chapter 6 • Entry and Exit
chain can be excessive. DeBeers has tried to buy much of the Canadian diamonds, but the high price cut into the cartel’s profits. Finally, firms that attempt to tie up channels via acquisition may face antitrust challenges. In 2002, Northland Cranberries filed an antitrust lawsuit against Ocean Spray, alleging that Ocean Spray had used its dominant position to prevent rivals from having access to retailers. (This is an allegation of vertical foreclosure, which was discussed in Chapter 3.) The private litigation ended in 2004, when Ocean Spray acquired Northland Cranberries’ production facilities.
Incumbents can legally erect entry barriers by obtaining patents to novel and nonobvious products or production processes. An individual or firm that develops a marketable new product or process usually applies for a patent in its home country. In Europe, Japan, and India, the patent rights go to the first person to apply for the patent. In the United States the first person to invent the idea gets the patent (although this rule is currently up for debate). As might be expected, firms seeking U.S. patents often go to considerable expense to document precedence of discovery. Once the patent is approved (which usually takes one to two years, during which time the invention is protected from imitation), anyone who wishes to use the process or make the product must obtain permission from the patent holder, at a price determined by the patent holder. Patent lives are currently 20 years in most developed nations. Patent laws in some countries, such as China, are very weak.
Entrants can try to “invent around” existing patents. This strategy can succeed because a government patent office sometimes cannot fully distinguish between a new product and an imitation of a protected product and also because courts may be reluctant to limit competition. As a result, some innovations, such as rollerblades and the personal computer, seem to have had no patent protection whatsoever. Conversely, incumbents may file patent-infringement lawsuits against entrants whose products are seemingly different from the incumbent’s. Some observers claim that Intel used this strategy to protect its microprocessors from entry by Advanced Micro Devices. It took a pair of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the late 1990s to loosen Intel’s grip on this market. Firms often stockpile patents so that they can countersue in patent infringement cases. Considering that mobile phone networks involve tens of thousands of patents, it is easy to believe that a lawsuit between Google and Apple could last longer than Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, the inheritance case in Dickens’s Bleak House that takes several decades to wind its way through Chancery court.
Incumbents may not require patents to protect specialized know-how. CocaCola has zealously guarded its cola syrup formula for more than a century, and no one has learned how to duplicate the sound of a Steinway piano or the beauty of Daum crystal. Rivals may turn to the legally and ethically questionable practice of industrial espionage to steal such information. In 2006, Korean manufacturer Kolon Industries hired a disgruntled former DuPont employee Michael Mitchell, who allegedly provided his new employer with confidential information about DuPont’s Kevlar products. When Mitchell started asking his former colleagues at DuPont for more information, his former employer got suspicious and notified the FBI. Mitchell was sentenced to 18 months in prison. DuPont subsequently sued Kolon for allegedly stealing trade secrets; the trial in U.S. district court began in the summer of 2011.
Economies of Scale and Scope
When economies of scale are significant, established firms operating at or beyond the minimum efficient scale (MES) will have a substantial cost advantage over smaller entrants. The average cost curve in Figure 6.1 illustrates the problem facing a potential
Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts • 203
FIGURE 6.1
Economies of Scale May Be a Barrier to Entry
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The incumbent firm producing at minimum |
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efficient scale of 1,000 units per year has average |
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costs ACMES. If the potential entrant can only |
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hope to produce a volume of output equal to 200 |
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Market price must be at least this high for the |
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potential entrant to realize profits from entry. |
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EXAMPLE 6.2 EMIRATES AIR7
Most major airlines earn a disproportionate share of their profits on international routes, where competition is limited and fares are high. Even frequent price wars on domestic routes have failed to put much of a dent in the profits of transoceanic travel. A recent upheaval in a relatively small corner of the industry may subvert this status quo. Emirates Group is a government-owned enterprise that operates international flights out of its hub in Dubai. Emirates has grown rapidly in recent years, with low prices that remind analysts of the no-frills carriers that shook up the U.S. airline industry in the 1980s. Smaller state-owned carriers in Abu Dhabi and Qatar are also slashing prices by as much as a third while expanding capacity by buying dozens of brand-new superjumbo jets including the Airbus A380.
The growth of these Arab-flag carriers is taking a toll on established carriers to the Middle East such as Air France and Qantas, which rely on high margins from international travel for the bulk of their profits. The incumbents have complained that carriers like Emirates are taking advantage of an unfair “home-field advantage” whereby the United Arab Emirates (UAE) not only subsidizes Emirates but also owns and subsidizes the hub in Dubai. Among other benefits, the UAE does not ban late-
night flights, as is customary at other hubs where there is concern about noise pollution. This has allowed Emirates to make fuller use of its planes as well as to offer flight schedules that are especially attractive to travelers from the Pacific Rim. Emirates and other Arab-flag carriers point out that British Airways, Qantas, and other carriers that are complaining are themselves subsidized by their governments and enjoy similar home-field advantages in their own nations. The Arab-flag carriers also benefit from being able to pay lower wages.
Thus far, none of the Arab carriers competes directly with U.S. carriers—there are no overlapping origin/destination pairs. But the U.S. carriers are feeling the impact nonetheless. As Emirates and others expand, there is less room in the market for incumbents. The result is that incumbents are reducing flights to the area and shifting planes to other routes, including transoceanic flights to the United States. Such mobility is commonplace in the airline industry because there are few sunk costs associated with expanding capacity on established routes. Unless global demand along traditional transoceanic routes keeps pace, there could be a glut of capacity, triggering a global price war and killing the goose that has laid the airline’s golden egg.
204 • Chapter 6 • Entry and Exit
entrant in an industry where the MES is 1,000 units and total industry sales are 10,000 units. An incumbent with a market share of 10 percent or higher reaches the MES and has an average cost of ACMES. If the entrant only achieves a market share of, say, 2 percent, it will have a much higher average cost of ACE. The market price would have to be at least as high as ACE for entry to be profitable.
This analysis presumes that there is some asymmetry giving the incumbent the advantage in market share. We can easily imagine this advantage to be the incumbent’s brand reputation, built up through years of operation. The entrant might try to overcome the incumbent’s cost advantage by spending to boost its market share. For example, it could advertise heavily or recruit a large sales force. Although this strategy may allow the entrant to achieve a market share greater than 2 percent and average production costs below ACE in Figure 6.1, it involves two important costs. The first is the direct cost of advertising and creating the sales force, costs that the incumbent may have already incurred. Second, the entrant must also be concerned that if it ramps up production, the incumbent may not cut back its own output, as many of the incumbent’s costs associated with procuring inputs and paying for labor are sunk. Recall from Chapter 5 that when overall industry output increases, prices and individual firm profits fall. The entrant thus faces a dilemma: to overcome its cost disadvantage, it must increase its market share. But if its share increases, prices will fall.
Fierce price competition frequently results from large-scale entry into capitalintensive industries where capital costs are largely sunk. The U.S. gunpowder industry in the nineteenth century offers an interesting example. In 1889, eight firms, including the industry leader DuPont, formed a “gunpowder pool” to fix price and output. In the early 1890s, three new firms entered the industry. Their growth challenged the continued success of the pool. DuPont’s response to one entrant was to “put the Chattanooga Powder Company out of business by selling at lower prices.”8 In this way, the gunpowder pool survived until antitrust enforcers broke it up. In an infamous recent example, rapid entry by fiber-optic telecom providers intensified price competition, saddling market leader WorldCom with over $20 billion in debt and driving it into bankruptcy.
Incumbents may also derive a cost advantage from economies of scope. The U.S. ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry provides a good example.9 For several decades, the industry has been dominated by a few firms, including Kellogg, General Mills, General Foods, and Quaker Oats. Although dozens of new cereals have been launched over the years, nearly all are products of the big incumbents, who increased the number of cereals offered for sale from 88 in 1980 to over 200 in 2005. New entrants have had a difficult time gaining even a toehold in the market.
Diversified incumbents may also enjoy scope economies. For example, there are significant economies of scope in producing cereal, stemming from the flexibility in materials handling and scheduling that arises from having multiple production lines within the same plant. These economies make it relatively inexpensive for an incumbent to devote part of an existing production line to a new formulation. A newcomer might have to build an entire new production line, putting much more capital at risk.
Incumbents have established brand names that give them marketing economies (such as Kellogg’s Bite-Size Mini-Wheats, a spinoff of Original Frosted MiniWheats). Entrants would have to build brand awareness from scratch, and it has been estimated that for entry to be worthwhile, a newcomer would need to introduce 6 to 12 successful brands.10 Even when incumbents enjoy advantages, the principle that profits attract entrants remains in effect. By the mid-1990s, gross