- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
294 • Chapter 9 • Strategic Positioning for Competitive Advantage
FIGURE 9.1
Unit Costs, Profit Margins, and Market Shares (in parentheses) for Major U.S. Airlines, 2010
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percentage of revenue) |
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Alaska (2.6%) |
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JetBlue (3.6%) |
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10% |
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Southwest (9.9%) |
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Delta (20.7%) |
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United (12.7%) |
US Airways (7.4%) |
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AirTran (2.4%) |
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5% |
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Continental (10.0%) |
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American (15.8%) |
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Unit Cost |
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(percent difference from industry average)
Unit costs are expressed as a percentage difference from the industry average.1
This chapter develops a conceptual framework for characterizing and analyzing a firm’s strategic position within an industry. This framework employs simple economic concepts to identify conditions necessary for competitive advantage in a market. The chapter is organized in four sections. The first defines the concept of competitive advantage and argues that to achieve it a firm must create more value than its rivals. The ability to create value is shaped by how firms position themselves to compete in an industry. The second section discusses the economic and organizational logic of two broad alternative approaches to positioning: cost leadership and benefit leadership. The third section presents specific tools for diagnosing a firm’s cost and benefit position in its market. The final section explores broad coverage versus focus strategies.
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND VALUE CREATION:
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS
Competitive Advantage Defined
The five-forces framework presented in Chapter 8 is based on the idea that industry conditions are an important determinant of a firm’s profitability. Profitability does not only vary across industries; it also varies within a particular industry, and in the
Competitive Advantage and Value Creation: Conceptual Foundations • 295
FIGURE 9.2
Framework for Competitive Advantage
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profitability |
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relative to |
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A firm’s profitability depends jointly on the economics of its market and its success in creating more value than its competitors. The amount of value the firm creates compared to competitors depends on its cost and benefits position relative to competitors.
Introduction we described research evidence showing that intra-industry variability in profits is at least as large as inter-industry variability. When a firm earns a higher rate of economic profit than the average rate of economic profit of other firms competing within the same market, the firm has a competitive advantage in that market. (Careful application of this definition, of course, requires an economically sensible definition of the firm’s market, a topic taken up in Chapter 5.) The main premise of this chapter is that firms achieve a competitive advantage by creating and delivering more economic value than their rivals and capture a portion of this value in the form of profits.
Figure 9.2 summarizes the framework that we develop in this chapter. According to this framework, a firm’s economic profitability within a particular market depends on the economic attractiveness or unattractiveness of the market in which it competes (as summarized by a five-forces analysis) and on its competitive position in that market (i.e., whether it has a competitive advantage or disadvantage). Whether a firm has a competitive advantage or disadvantage depends on whether it is more or less successful than rivals at creating and delivering economic value. As we will see, a firm that can create and deliver more economic value than its competitors can simultaneously earn higher profits and offer higher net benefits to consumers than its competitors can.
Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
Businesses that create more value than competitors will hold an advantaged position in the marketplace. To illustrate why, we need to define value creation and show how it relates to competitive advantage. Before defining value creation, we must first discuss maximum willingness-to-pay and consumer surplus.
Suppose that a particular software package is worth $150 to you. If its market price was $80, you would buy it. The purchase makes you better off because you have given up $80 to receive something more valuable—a software package that you feel is worth $150. The extent by which you are better off—in this case $150 2 $80, or $70—is your consumer surplus.
296 • Chapter 9 • Strategic Positioning for Competitive Advantage
More formally, let B denote a dollar measure of what one unit of a product is worth to a particular consumer, or equivalently, the consumer’s maximum willingness- to-pay for the product. It might be better to call B the perceived benefit because the consumer may not know the actual value of a product until after purchase. For now, we will consider B without regard to the availability of substitute products. To understand what maximum willingness-to-pay means, let’s see how we might assess a consumer’s maximum willingness-to-pay for a Honda Accord. Our consumer starts off with no automobile of any kind and is then given, free of charge, a Honda Accord. She is certainly better off than before. Now, let’s successively take money away from her. At some point, perhaps after we’ve taken away $30,500, she deems her situation (owning a Honda but with $30,500 less wealth) completely equivalent to her original situation (no Honda and no other automobile, but with her wealth intact). That dollar amount—$30,500—represents our consumer’s maximum willingness-to-pay for a Honda Accord and would be her assessment of the Accord’s B.
A consumer’s willingness-to-pay for a good or service is somewhat intangible, as it depends on that consumer’s tastes. A firm’s willingness-to-pay for an input is easier to quantify because it is related to the impact of that input on the profitability of the firm, and profits are easier to measure than tastes. One way to measure a firm’s willingness-to-pay is with value-added analysis. Consider, for example, a producer of soft drinks—say Cadbury Schweppes, the producer of 7-Up and Dr Pepper—that uses corn syrup sold by Archer Daniel’s Midland (ADM) as a sweetener for its products. Cadbury Schweppes would like to determine the maximum amount it should be willing to pay for ADM’s corn syrup. Suppose that Cadbury Schweppes’s best available alternative to using corn syrup is to use sugar. As far as the end consumer of soft drinks is concerned, Cadbury Schweppes’s choice of sugar or corn syrup is immaterial; the final product tastes exactly the same. Given this, the Cadbury Schweppes’s maximum willingness-to-pay for ADM’s corn syrup (i.e., the B for ADM’s corn syrup) depends on the overall cost of production using corn syrup versus the cost using sugar.
The left-hand side of Figure 9.3 shows the economics of production when Cadbury Schweppes uses sugar to manufacture its soft drinks. In particular, when the cost of sugar is 3 euros per hundredweight, the “all-in” production cost using sugar (the sum of the costs of sugar, other materials, processing, and packaging) is 17 euros per hundredweight of soft drink. Cadbury Schweppes will prefer corn syrup provided that the “all-in” production costs are less than 17 euros. The right-hand side shows that by using corn syrup, Cadbury Schweppes incurs a somewhat higher processing cost and a somewhat higher cost of other materials, which limits the amount that Cadbury Schweppes would be willing to pay for corn syrup. Figure 9.3 shows that it would be willing to pay at most 2 euros per hundredweight. This is the value added of ADM’s corn syrup and equals the price of corn syrup at which Cadbury Schweppes’s “all-in” production cost using ADM’s corn syrup is the same as its “all-in” production cost using sugar. If the price of ADM’s corn syrup was any higher than 2 euros per hundredweight, Cadbury Schweppes would save money by switching to sugar as its sweetener.
From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
Recall that B represents the benefit that a consumer expects to derive from a product. If we let P denote the product’s monetary price, the consumer surplus is the difference B 2 P. For example, if the price of the Honda Accord is $21,000, the consumer surplus of our hypothetical consumer would be $30,500 2 $21,000 5 $9,500. Suppose that
Competitive Advantage and Value Creation: Conceptual Foundations • 297
FIGURE 9.3
A Soft-Drink Producer’s Maximum Willingness-to-Pay for Corn Syrup
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A soft-drink maker’s maximum willingness-to-pay for corn syrup (i.e., its B) is represented by the height of the shaded bar at the far right. At this price of corn syrup, the soft-drink producer is just indifferent between producing a soft drink with corn syrup and producing a soft drink with the best available substitute for corn syrup, namely, sugar. If the price of corn syrup were any higher, the soft-drink maker would not purchase corn syrup and would use sugar instead.
the same consumer values a Nissan Leaf at B $38,000 and the price of the Leaf is P $31,000, creating a consumer surplus of $7,000. This individual will purchase the Accord because it provides the higher surplus. This example suggests a simple model of consumer behavior: a consumer will purchase a product only if the product’s consumer surplus is positive. Moreover, given a choice between two or more competing products, the consumer will purchase the one for which consumer surplus, B 2 P, is largest.
Whether its customers are firms or individuals, a seller must deliver consumer surplus to compete successfully. The value map in Figure 9.4 illustrates the competitive implications of consumer surplus. The vertical axis shows the monetary price P of the product. Each point in the value map corresponds to a particular price–quality combination. The solid upward-sloping line in Figure 9.4 is called an indifference curve.
For a given consumer, any price–quality combination along the indifference curve yields the same consumer surplus (i.e., has the same B 2 P ). In Figure 9.4, products A and B offer the same B 2 P. A consumer choosing among products located along the indifference curve would thus be indifferent among the offerings. A product offering a price–quality combination located below a given indifference curve (e.g., product C) yields a higher consumer surplus than that yielded by products along the indifference curve. From the consumer’s perspective, product C provides superior value to products A and B (and, as we will soon see, product D as well). A product offering a price–quality combination located above a given indifference curve (e.g., product D) yields a consumer surplus lower than that yielded by products
298 • Chapter 9 • Strategic Positioning for Competitive Advantage
FIGURE 9.4
The Value Map
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The value map illustrates the price–quality positions of firms in a market. The solid line is an indifference curve. It illustrates price–quality combinations that yield the same consumer surplus. Price–quality positions located below a given indifference curve yield a consumer surplus that is higher than that yielded by positions along the indifference curve. Price–quality positions located above an indifference curve yield consumer surplus that is lower than that yielded by positions along the indifference curve. When some products are positioned on a given indifference curve while others are positioned off the curve, consumers will flock to the firms providing the higher consumer surplus.
along the indifference curve. From the consumer’s perspective, such products provide inferior value. From the consumer’s perspective, product D provides inferior value to products A and B (and also C).
Competition among firms in a market can be thought of as a process whereby firms, through their prices and product attributes, submit consumer surplus “bids” to consumers. Consumers then choose the firm that offers the greatest amount of consumer surplus. A firm that offers a consumer less surplus than its rivals (e.g., the firm producing product D) will lose the fight for that consumer’s business. When firms’ price–quality positions line up along the same indifference curve—that is, when firms are offering a consumer the same amount of consumer surplus—we say that the firms have achieved consumer surplus parity. (In Figure 9.3, the firms selling products A and B have attained consumer surplus parity.) If firms achieve consumer surplus parity in a market in which consumers have identical preferences (i.e., the same indifference curves), no consumer within that market has an incentive to switch from one seller to another, and market shares will thus be stable. If all firms in the market have the same quality, then consumer surplus parity means that each firm charges the same price.
When a firm moves from a position of consumer surplus parity or consumer surplus advantage to one in which its consumer surplus is less than that of its competitors,