- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
Endnotes • 331
and braking capabilities. By examining how automobile prices vary with different combinations of attributes, analysts can determine how much consumers are willing to pay for each individual attribute. Hedonic pricing has been used to identify the value of innovations in automobiles and computerized axial tomography, the value of spreadsheet compatibility, and the benefits of improving job safety.
Hedonic pricing requires multiple regression analysis to estimate the impact of product attributes on a product’s price. The dependent variable in the regression is the product’s price. The predictors are variables measuring the presence and extent of different product attributes. If you were studying the automobile market, hedonic pricing analysis could identify the extent to which a 1 percent increase in horsepower or chassis length, or the addition of side-impact air bags, translates into automobile prices. This analysis generates implicit “hedonic prices” for individual product attributes.
Conjoint Analysis
Hedonic pricing analysis uses market prices for existing combinations of product attributes. This is inadequate for studying the value of new features. To do this, market researchers use conjoint analysis. Like hedonic pricing, conjoint analysis estimates the relative benefits of different product attributes. Its principal value is in estimating these benefits for hypothetical combinations of attributes. Although conjoint analysis can take several different forms, consumers are usually asked to rank a product with different features at different prices. Researchers then use regression analysis to estimate the impact of price and product features on the rankings. From this, researchers can estimate the market value of different features.
Alternatively, consumers may be asked to state how much they are willing to pay for different combinations of features. Researchers then treat the responses as if they were actual market prices and use regression techniques to estimate the value of each attribute. This approach closely mirrors hedonic pricing, except that the prices and products are hypothetical.
ENDNOTES
1Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation. Airline Financial Data and Airline Traffic Data. http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data56, accessed July 21, 2011.
2The data for this example comes from “Sports and Suds: The Beer Business and the Sports World Have Brewed Up a Potent Partnership,” Sports Illustrated, August 8, 1988, pp. 68–82.
3For interested readers, here is how this number was derived. Total (as opposed to per-unit) consumer surplus can be shown to equal the area under the demand curve above the price. For a linear demand curve given by the formula P 5 a 2 bQ (where Q is total demand), this area is given by 0.5bQ2. Consumer surplus per unit is thus given by 0.5bQ2 4 Q 5 0.5bQ 5 0.5P(bQ/P). But the term in parentheses is the reciprocal of the price elasticity of demand (i.e., 5 P/bQ). Thus, per-unit consumer surplus is given by 0.5P/ . To estimate , we proceed as follows. The stadium concessionaire, Cincinnati Sports Service, pays the distributor $0.20 per 20-ounce cup of beer, pays royalties to the city of Cincinnati of $0.24 per cup, pays royalties to the Cincinnati Reds of $0.54 per cup, and an excise tax of $0.14 per cup. The concessionaire’s marginal cost is thus at least $1.12 per cup of beer. If we assume that $2.50 is the profit-maximizing monopoly price, then the price elasticity of demand at $2.50 must be at least 1.8 (we’ll see why in just a moment). Using the preceding formula for per-unit consumer surplus, we conclude that the average consumer surplus for a 20-ounce cup
332 • Chapter 9 • Strategic Positioning for Competitive Advantage
of beer is no greater than $0.69. The reason that the price elasticity of demand must be at least 1.8 is as follows: from the Economics Primer, the optimal monopoly price is given by (P 2 MC)/P 5 1/ . Thus, if $2.50 is the monopoly price, (2.50 2 MC)/2.50 5 1/ . Since MC 5 $1.12, straightforward algebra implies 5 1.8.
4Without knowing the production costs of Sports Service or the distributor, we cannot pin down the actual amount of value that is created through the vertical chain. Whatever it is, however, the brewer captures only a small portion of it.
5Here is a proof. Suppose firm 1 creates more value than firm 2, so that B1 2 C1 . B2 2 C2. The most aggressive bid firm 2 can offer is P1* 5 C2, leaving you with consumer surplus of B2 2 C2. Firm 1 can offer you a slightly more favorable bid than this by offering a price slightly lower than P1* 5 C2 1 (B1 2 B2). At this price, firm 1’s profit is slightly less than P1* 2 C1 which equals C2 1 (B1 2 B2) 2 C1. After rearranging terms, we can write this as (B1 2 C1) 2 (B2 2 C2), which is positive. Thus, firm 1 can always profitably outbid firm 2 for your business.
6Rumelt, R., “The Evaluation of Business Strategy,” in Glueck, W. F., Business Policy and Strategic Management, 3rd ed., New York, McGraw-Hill, 1980.
7In 2002, the average household income of the Kmart shopper was $35,000, while the average household incomes for the Wal-Mart and Target shoppers were $37,000 and $45,000, respectively. “Wal-Mart Discount King, Eyes the BMW Crowd,” The New York Times, February 24, 2002, pp. A1, A24.
8The concept of the value chain was developed by Michael Porter. See Chapter 2 of Competitive Advantage, New York, Free Press, 1985.
9The term Airport 7 was coined by Andrew Taylor, the current CEO of Enterprise, to describe the seven airport-based rental car firms. Actually, three pairs of the “Airport 7” operate under common ownership: Vanguard Rental owns both National and Alamo; Cendant Corporation owns both Avis and Budget; and Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group owns both Dollar and Thrifty.
10This example was developed by Jesus Syjuco and Li Liu, Kellogg School of Management, MBA class of 2002.
11“Bloomberg Business Week 100 Best Global Brands,” http://www.businessweek.com/ interactive_reports/best_global_brands_2009.html, accessed July 21, 2011.
12Other terms for this concept include distinctive competencies and core competencies. 13C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel emphasize this type of capability in their notion of
“core competence.” See “The Core Competence of the Corporation,” Harvard Business Review, May–June 1990, pp. 79–91.
14Henderson, R., and I. Cockburn, “Measuring Competence? Exploring Firm Effects in Pharmaceutical Research,” Strategic Management Journal, 15, Winter 1994, pp. 63–84.
15Nelson, R. R., and S. G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge, MA, Belknap, 1982.
16Porter, Michael, Competitive Strategy, New York, Free Press, 1980.
17Porter uses the term differentiation to describe what we have called benefit leadership. 18See Chapter 2 of Porter, Competitive Strategy.
19Michael Porter makes this point most forcefully in his article, “What Is Strategy?,” Harvard Business Review, November–December, 1996, pp. 61–78.
20Miller, D., and P. H. Friesen, “Porter’s (1980) Generic Strategies and Quality: An Empirical Examination with American Data—Part I: Testing Porter,” Organization Studies, 7, 1986, pp. 37–55.
21Thompson and Strickland’s Strategic Management (Homewood, IL: Irwin Publishers) provides a nice example of activity cost analysis for the beer industry.
22Any point system will do.
This figure is adapted from Hall, W. K., “Survival Strategies in a Hostile Environment,” Harvard Business Review, September–October 1980, pp. 75–85.
23See Chapter 7 of Porter, Competitive Advantage.
INFORMATION AND |
10 |
VALUE CREATION |
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Chapter 9 describes how firms can succeed by creating value for their customers by either decreasing costs or increasing perceived benefits. In this chapter we continue our examination of a benefit strategy. Roughly speaking, benefit enhancement comes in two varieties:
•Firms may enhance the benefit of their product for all consumers. This is known as vertical differentiation, a concept originally introduced in Chapter 5. BMWs and Fiats are vertically differentiated; all or virtually all consumers would prefer a BMW to a Fiat if price was not a factor.
•Firms may alter certain aspects of their product so that some consumers perceive that it offers more benefits, while others perceive that it offers less. This is known as horizontal differentiation. BMWs are horizontally differentiated from Lexus; BMWs appeal to drivers who prefer a sportier ride and can forgive the somewhat Spartan interior; Lexus is known for its luxurious ride and appointments but also offers above-average acceleration and handling.
Firms pursuing a benefit strategy may rely on both vertical and horizontal differentiation to outposition their rivals and fill product niches. But any discussion of benefit strategy must come to terms with a simple but powerful principle: a benefit strategy cannot succeed unless consumers know about the product’s benefits. Informing consumers about a product’s benefits is known as disclosure and is an essential component of any benefit strategy. Firms may disclose information about their own products, or disclosure may be performed by third-party certifiers.
Whoever discloses product information creates value for consumers, and potentially profits for themselves, by making it easier for consumers to solve the shopping problem, that is, to find the goods and services that best meet their needs.
This chapter begins by describing the various ways that consumers may solve the shopping problem.1 We examine incentives for firms to disclose information about their own products and the alternative methods available to them. We then explore third-party disclosure by organizations and web sites such as Consumers Union (publisher of Consumer Reports) and HealthGrades.com. Most of the chapter is concerned with disclosure of vertically differentiated goods and services. The chapter concludes by considering disclosure in horizontally differentiated markets
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