- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
Power • 473
those of the firm, however, which decreases the chance for serious agency problems. Even so, the interests of owners and managers almost never coincide.
One would think that controls could be designed to integrate individual behaviors into unified organizational action. As we have observed in Chapters 12 and 13, however, this is difficult. The goals pursued by different actors may be grossly divergent and not amenable to compromise. Managers may need to coordinate among themselves over matters that may be much more important to some of them than to others. The firm can address the resulting agency problems using an array of incentives, such as pay for performance or efficiency wages, but these tools often have limited effectiveness. Finally, because of the limitations of formal structures and controls, many activities within and between organizations must occur outside of their boundaries. Managers from different units may need to cooperate but are not required to do so. In such situations of goal conflict, differential motivation, and incomplete authority, formal controls are inadequate, and cost-effective contracts are hard to fashion. As a result, power and culture become important as alternative means for accomplishing goals.
POWER
Because “power” and related terms like “influence” or “authority” are so widely used, the meanings associated with them are often confusing. We take power to be an individual actor’s ability to accomplish his or her goals by using resources obtained through noncontractual exchange relationships. By this we mean exchanges of goods, services, or promises on terms that take place outside of traditional economic markets and that are not enforceable in court. For example, someone in need of emergency assistance may receive help from an individual and have little to offer that particular individual in return immediately. The individual providing assistance may never have need of reciprocation in kind. Nevertheless, there may still be an implied promise that the favor would be returned if needed. The terms of the agreement are not specified, since it is not known in advance when or how the favor can be best returned. A failure to provide future assistance when requested would not give cause to legal action either, because there was no contract. Still, one can consider such an arrangement as an exchange whose obligations many people would fulfill out of a felt need to reciprocate. There are, of course, limits to these obligations. For example, it is unlikely that many would agree to provide assistance that was illegal, put one’s employment at risk, or entailed significant extended commitments.
Power is different from authority, which stems from the explicit contractual decision-making and dispute-resolution rights that a firm (or another source) grants to an individual. A manager exercises power by redirecting the activities of other actors away from their immediate goals and toward accomplishing the manager’s own goals. Others follow, not because they are contractually or morally obligated to do so, but because they perceive it is in their best interest to do so. In this sense, power is the ability to get things done in the absence of contracts. Influence, a related term, refers to the use of power in a given situation by an individual. The influence a person has over others is thus an effect of his or her broader power.
Power exists at many levels in a firm. Individual managers, such as the CEO, may be powerful relative to others on the management team. It is also common to discuss the power of units or subgroups of an organization. In universities, academic departments continually vie with each other for budgetary resources and view their success in obtaining such resources as evidence of their power, which stems from their popularity
474 • Chapter 14 • Environment, Power, and Culture
with students, the research productivity of their faculty, or their success in securing government and foundation grants. Firms also exercise power in their product markets, factor markets (such as for raw materials or labor), or in relations with suppliers, competitors, or other actors in the firm’s environment. For example, Disney’s Pixar Animation Studios may obtain a more favorable distribution of a new animated film than would a rival studio. It would also have power in negotiations with toy companies seeking to develop products based on Pixar characters.
The Sources of Power
Power is often exerted in an economic market, as when a firm with a patent for a popular new drug uses its market power to set a high price–cost margin. Not surprisingly, this is often referred to as pricing power. Our interest here is in power that cannot be exerted in the market; that is, power that cannot be easily priced. Individuals attain this power when they possess resources that others value but are not readily bought and sold in a market. This includes the power to control the allocation of resources within firms or other administrative domains, where internal markets for such resources are virtually nonexistent, often by design.
One way to look at sources of power is in terms of power bases—by which we mean attributes of the individual that convey resources that help an individual gain power. Power can stem from an individual’s position within a hierarchy. This is known as legitimate power or formal power. An individual who possesses formal power has reason to expect compliance, at least on those matters that are of moderate or little importance to others. Chester Barnard uses the term zone of indifference to define the set of issues over which the powerful individual with formal authority usually prevails. For example, an individual hired to teach classes at a professional school would be unlikely to question the right of a superior to assign the individual to teach particular classes at particular times. The employee, however, would cease being indifferent to the actions of the superior if they went beyond expectations for what the job entailed, such as by scheduling the individual to teach on holidays or on Saturday nights. The employee would also likely take issue with demands that were not related to the general nature of the work that was agreed to at the time of employment—for example, if the new instructor was assigned to bring coffee and doughnuts for the other instructors. Because this view of compliance involves managers acting within agreed-on boundaries, it is sometimes discussed in terms of a “psychological contract” with employees.6
Power can also stem from an ability to grant rewards or administer punishments, or from the possession of specialized knowledge valued by other actors. In academic and research bureaucracies, examples of individuals possessing this power are the key editors of top journals, such as the Journal of the American Medical Association, or the grants officers of major funding agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health. The decisions of these individuals can make or break careers, and as a result, these individuals wield considerable power in their professions.
Power can be based on one’s position in a social order, due to status, image, or reputation. For example, an individual with a well-known history of winning in prior conflicts will have reputation-based power that could lead potential adversaries to comply with future demands. This last type of power is rooted not only in individuals and their attributes, but also in the relationships that develop among individuals as they participate in networks of tasks, exchange, or information sharing. For example, the successes of ascendant executives in a business community are regularly announced by corporate press releases, reported on by the business press, and enshrined in various listings of “up and
Power • 475
coming” executives by the business press and local institutions. Reputations may also be put at risk by significant or poorly timed failures. An example of this is seen in the ups and downs of the career and reputation of Jon Corzine, from his leadership of Goldman Sachs, to his election to the U.S. Senate in 2000, to his election as governor of New Jersey in 2005, to his leadership of the failed firm MF Global in 2011.
Relational views of power are often based on social exchange. Social exchange is a transfer between two or more parties of resources, or rights to control resources, that occurs outside of a market.7 Power arises in future social exchanges as a result of persistent inequalities in past social exchanges. To illustrate how power might arise out of social exchanges, suppose that Amy and Beth are exchange partners. If an acceptable exchange occurs between them, their transaction is complete. Suppose, however, that they cannot complete an exchange in a mutually acceptable manner, and as a result, Amy provides more of value to Beth than Beth can provide to Amy. In effect, Beth “owes” Amy the deficit of the exchange. Unless it is explicitly considered as such, this is not a formal debt, and Amy cannot sue Beth to recover the deficit. If Beth’s deficit to Amy increases over successive exchanges, Beth is said to be increasingly dependent on Amy. Conversely, Amy is said to have power over Beth to the extent that Beth is dependent on Amy. The dependence of Beth on Amy would be mitigated to the extent that Amy depends on Beth for some other matter or in some other set of exchanges.
Such a pattern could develop in the workplace if a junior employee asked a senior colleague for advice on some matter that is unimportant to the senior. How does the junior repay the senior colleague for providing assistance? Sometimes deference and respect from the recipient might suffice. When deference and respect do not suffice, it might lead to inappropriate demands on the junior or to the estrangement of the senior colleague or even the creation of an enemy. That is why such informal exchanges are constrained in many organizational settings. Informal exchanges can pose significant costs to the firm if they become too involved, time consuming, or distracting. It is even possible that individuals will arrange personally favorable exchanges that detract from the work of the firm. (This would be an example of influence activities that we described in Chapter 3.) As a result, in settings where such exchanges are often necessary, firms may promote strong norms among employees that both encourage cooperative exchanges across the organization and impose sanctions for individuals who refuse requests for assistance. Firms often supplement these norms with individual incentives, knowledge databases (for example, the collected work product of professional colleagues that others could consult), and increased formal training, development, and recognition for consultants who excel at both knowledge generation and knowledge sharing.8
In an economic exchange, contracts and the rule of law dictate the transfer of resources and dollars between trading partners. Voluntary exchanges resulting from power relationships seem harder to explain. Why would Beth choose to become dependent on Amy and presumably commit future resources to Amy’s discretion? Why would Amy provide resources in the present in return for the uncertain future obligations of Beth? After all, despite Beth’s “debt,” Amy cannot use formal means, such as the courts, to force compensation from Beth. Several explanations come to mind. An individual actor choosing a dependence relation may lack a better alternative. The resources controlled by the other actor may be important, with no clear substitutes or alternative sources. Finally, it just may be too costly to write a formal contract. This is the resource dependence view of power, expressed by Jeffrey Pfeffer. Individuals and firms seek to gain power by reducing their dependence on other actors, while increasing the dependence of others on them. This is
476 • Chapter 14 • Environment, Power, and Culture
EXAMPLE 14.1 THE SOURCES OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER12
One of the most famous studies of the bases of power was Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt’s 1960 examination of how Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower dealt with power and influence during their administrations. The book was widely read at the beginning of the Kennedy administration and has remained important to sitting presidents, their staffs, and policy analysts.
The important issue for Neustadt is the conflict between the image of the president as powerful and the reality of the presidency as institutionally weak. Presidential power does not consist of the president taking direct action on some front, such as Truman’s recall of General Douglas MacArthur or his seizure of the steel mills in 1952, or Eisenhower’s decision to send troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957 to assist in desegregation. These command decisions were more exceptions than typical uses of power. Nor did any of them solve the president’s policy problems. Instead, they used up scarce presidential power and, at best, allowed the president and others involved in the situation more time to search for a lasting solution. Neustadt suggests that decisions made by command or fiat are more likely to be evidence of a lack of power than of its effective use. In a given situation, however, there may have been no other choice than to command. For example, whatever problems Truman encountered in recalling MacArthur, the cost of not recalling him and thus allowing civilian authority to be flouted would probably have been higher.
Presidential power is the ability to influence the people who make and implement government policies. It has three sources. The first is the bargaining advantage that comes with the office that enables the president to persuade others to work in his interest—the formal powers and authority of the president. The second source is professional reputation, which comprises the expectations of professional politicians, bureaucrats, and others in the political community regarding the president’s power and his willingness to use it. This
is related to the ability to control the votes of Congress on key issues. Once the president loses control of a majority in Congress, he cannot guarantee that his programs will be enacted and will lose power as a result. A third source of presidential power is his prestige among the public, specifically how the political community assesses his support among different constituencies and the consequences that failure to support the president will have for politicians.
Although the political situations facing the president of the United States are different from those facing the CEOs of large firms, Neustadt’s three sources are consistent with those discussed earlier. The formal powers of the job, whether stemming from the Constitution, laws, or customs, along with the institutional routines that have grown up around it, provide a basis for incumbent power, a basis that can be used well or poorly. Professional reputation in a firm refers to how observers expect the powerholder to act in a given situation, based on their accumulated experience with the powerholder. Finally, prestige for politicians is analogous to control over critical resources. For the president and professional politicians, that resource is public sentiment, which translates into votes.
Looking back to 1990, in light of the six presidents who had served since Presidential Power was first published, Neustadt saw little reason to change his fundamental conclusions. For example, the experience of Nixon and Watergate, on the one hand, and Johnson and Vietnam, on the other, showed the importance of credibility and perceived legitimacy for both public prestige and professional reputation. Similarly, although Neustadt still emphasizes the importance of political skills for the president, the experiences of Johnson and Nixon also emphasize the relevance of individual temperament for success in office. The president needs to be patient enough to tolerate a complex political system that rarely allows him to successfully implement major policy initiatives immediately. Neustadt still sees political skills