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External Context, Institutions, and Strategies 493

The lobby of the firm’s Mountain View, California, offices features lava lamps, a piano, and projectors showing live search queries from around the world. Corporate hierarchy is disdained, break rooms feature free granola bars and lattes, and dogs and bicycles are welcomed.

While these workplace flourishes are standard in Silicon Valley, there does seem to be something a bit deeper about the Google ethos. Among the “Ten Things about Google’s Philosophy” listed on its corporate web page is this: “You can make money without doing evil.” And while most other businesses figure out the revenue model prior to making investments, Google’s strategy seems to be to first make investments in offering services that users want and then see if it’s possible to earn revenue from those services.

Given this philosophy, Google faced a tricky set of issues when going public. It addressed these issues smartly by focusing on one set of problems: those related to how the IPO would be priced. Many IPOs, such as its fellow Internet firm eBay, are “underpriced.” This means that the initial price at which the firm offers to sell shares is well below the price that obtains after the first day of trading. When eBay went public in 1998, the firm sold its shares for just $18. By the end of the first day of trading, however, the market price of shares was $54.

Underpricing is a problem for two reasons. First, if eBay’s shares were “worth” $54 (as evidenced by the market price at the end of the first day of trading), then the company would have been better off selling the shares for $54 than for $18. For each share it sold, eBay left $36 on the table. Second, given the market price of $54, there was clearly excess demand for these shares at a price of $18. This then raises the question of which buyers are allowed

to buy at this low price. Some observers have argued that IPO underwriters—the investment banks that manage the process of selling shares to the public—use IPO underpricing to reward favored clients. An underwriter might allow a client to purchase underpriced IPO shares, which the client can immediately flip at a large profit, in order to reward the client for past business. This backroom dealing cuts small investors out of the IPO market.

Given Google’s evil-free culture, it was important that the firm’s IPO avoid the possibility of underpricing and backroom dealing. To do this, Google employed a novel IPO technique. In a standard IPO, the offering firm commits to sell a certain number of shares at a set price and allows the underwriter to determine which buyers are allowed to purchase at that price. In contrast, Google’s “dutch auction” method avoided specifying a price. Instead, the firm asked each buyer to submit a list of how many shares the buyer was willing to buy at what price. A sample list might say “I’ll buy 200 shares if the price is $50, and 400 shares if the price is $40.” Google then allocated the shares according to which buyers had the highest willingness to pay. Buyers did not pay the prices on their list; rather, all buyers paid the same price. This price was determined so that the total number of shares demanded at that price was equal to the total number of shares Google was offering.

This plan did not allow an underwriter to allocate shares using favoritism, and it put individual investors on an equal footing with big institutions. The plan also meant that the IPO was not greatly underpriced. On August 19, 2004, Google sold 22.5 million shares for $85 each. Shares rose about 20 percent in the first day of trading, compared to 200 percent in the case of eBay.

Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms

As firms in an industry or sector interact over time, they tend to develop shared conceptions about the nature of the business, how they serve customer needs, the most effective ways to conduct their operations, and other matters. The extent to which these common beliefs develop will be influenced by the stability of the industry’s environment and its relationships to other industries. Sectors with long and fairly continuous histories (for

494 Chapter 14 Environment, Power, and Culture

example, higher education) will develop stronger sets of common beliefs than sectors subject to continual regulatory and technological change or constant combination with other sectors (for example, entertainment). Out of these common beliefs come common ideas and practices regarding what managers should do, how changes should occur, how business should be transacted, and what types of innovations are worthwhile. These interrelated beliefs, values, material practices, and norms of behavior that exist in an industry at any given time are referred to as industry logics.

Paradoxically, to the extent that they are commonly held in stable contexts, industry logics have relatively little strategic importance since they concern what firms take for granted. If most firms share a common logic, then that logic does not provide a basis for competition advantage among the firms but is more of an implied requirement for reaching consensus performance expectations. Competitive advantage must come on some other dimension. Given the dynamic nature of markets, it is common for some firms not to share the industry logic. Fairly continual changes, even if small, in competitive dynamics, technologies, and regulations can lead to situations in which competitors see alternative logics as plausible. Alternative logics can also stem from the entry of foreign firms into an industry or the experience of an industry incumbent in a foreign market. There may be strategic advantage to be had in such situations, and the innovators and entrepreneurs present in many industries are those that are pursuing alternative logics.

In start-up industries, all of the logics are alternative logics, at least until a dominant logic is established. This was the case with the rise of various Internet-related industries in the late 1990s. Michael Lewis’s account of serial entrepreneur Jim Clark captures this perfectly when he notes that Clark’s strategy was to compete in a new industry aggressively until Microsoft showed up, after which time he would exit the industry, suggesting that Microsoft was going to impose a new dominant logic on the industry that the start-ups would not be able to match.44

At some point, the alternative logics may prove themselves to be successful and may even lead their adherents to aspire to industry dominance. If that shift in logic occurs, then other competitors may view it as necessary to adopt the new logic or risk being left behind. This is akin to the processes by which structural and process innovations diffuse through industries. For example, as M-form structures proved their efficiency for large industrial firms, they diffused throughout affected industries, neutralizing the competitive advantage in adopting the structure but making all firms adopters more efficient.

Changes in industry logics can stem from changes in industry regulations or conditions that force incumbents to dramatically alter their routines and develop new logics. The subprime mortgage lending business, and the related securitization of the resultant mortgages into more complex financial products such as leveraged buyout deals (LBOs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), provides a good example of the rush to adopt new industry logics. When these products were originally introduced into the market, they were seen as a fringe product that respectable institutions would not sell. This attitude changed rapidly as the market for these products developed. Large and well-established institutions, such as Citigroup, came to compete aggressively by initiating these securities to distribute to structured security markets rather than initiating them to hold, as had been traditional industry practice. In November 2007, Citigroup’s CEO Chuck Prince stepped down at a special board meeting in response to Citi’s continuing billion dollar write-downs of assets as a result of losses in the escalating financial crisis that was engulfing the U.S. financial industry. Earlier that year, Prince had given an interview to the Financial Times in which he

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