- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
Market Structure and Competition • 177
profit-maximizing price and quantity for a monopolist that faces demand given by P 5 100 2 Q and has constant marginal cost of production of 10 per unit. As a benchmark, note that price in a competitive market would equal marginal cost, or 10, and total industry output would be 90.
The monopolist’s total revenue is price times quantity, or 100Q 2 Q2. The corresponding marginal revenue is 100 2 2Q (see the Economics Primer for further discussion of marginal revenue). The monopolist maximizes profits by producing up to the point where the additional revenue just equals the additional cost, or where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. This occurs here when 100 – 2Q 5 10, or Q 5 45. It follows that the profit-maximizing price P 5 $55, and profits (total revenues minus total costs) equal $2,025. Note that the monopolist’s price is well above its marginal cost and its output is well below the competitive level.
This analysis shows that a monopolist’s profits may come at the expense of consumers. Policy makers often propose reining in monopolies through taxes or aggressive antitrust enforcement. The economist Harold Demsetz cautions that monopolies often result when firms discover more efficient manufacturing techniques or create new products that fulfill unmet consumer needs.9 Even at monopoly prices, the benefits that these innovations bring to consumers may be enormous. (Think of blockbuster prescription drugs, the iPad, or Google.) Demsetz argues that policies that limit monopoly profits may discourage all firms from innovating and harm consumers in the long run.
Several firms acting in concert so as to mimic the behavior of a monopolist are known as a cartel. Most developed nations have antitrust laws prohibiting private organizations from cartelizing an industry, but there are many international cartels. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is perhaps the best known cartel even though it accounts for only 40 percent of world oil production. Efforts have been made to cartelize other international commodities industries, including copper, tin, coffee, tea, and cocoa. A few cartels have had short-term success, such as bauxite and uranium, and one or two, such as the DeBeers diamond cartel, appear to have enjoyed long-term success. In general, most international cartels are unable to substantially affect pricing for long.
Monopolistic Competition
The term monopolistic competition was introduced by Edward Chamberlin in 1933 to characterize markets with two main features that are important to understanding pricing:10
1.There are many sellers. Each seller reasonably supposes that its actions will not materially affect others. For example, there are hundreds of retailers of women’s clothing in Chicago. If any one seller were to lower its prices, it is doubtful that other sellers would react. Even if some sellers did notice a small dropoff in sales, they would probably not alter their prices just to respond to a single competitor.
2.Each seller offers a differentiated product. Products A and B are differentiated if there is some price at which some consumers prefer to purchase A and others prefer to purchase B. The notion of product differentiation captures the idea that consumers make choices among competing products on the basis of factors other than just price. Chicago apparel retailing offers a good example. Different women tend to frequent different clothing stores, based on factors such as location and style. Unlike under perfect competition, where products are homogeneous, a differentiated seller that raises its price will not lose all its customers.
178 • Chapter 5 • Competitors and Competition
Economists distinguish between vertical differentiation and horizontal differentiation. A product is vertically differentiated when it is unambiguously better or worse than competing products. A clothing manufacturer engages in vertical differentiation when it uses stronger stitching to enhance durability. All consumers will value this enhancement, although they may disagree about how much they are willing to pay for it. A product is horizontally differentiated when only some consumers prefer it to competing products (holding price equal). The popularity of many different brands of blue jeans, at different price points, is a testament to widely diverging consumer tastes for fashion.
Demand for Differentiated Goods
Figure 5.1 illustrates horizontal differentiation based on location. The figure shows the town of Linesville. The only road in Linesville—Straight Street—is exactly 10 miles long. There is a sandwich shop at each end of Straight Street. Jimmy Johns is at the left end of town (denoted by L in the figure); Quiznos is at the right end (denoted by R). There are hungry consumers in Linesville whose homes are equally spaced along Straight Street so that 50 consumers live closer to Jimmy Johns and 50 live closer to Quiznos. For simplicity, we will assume that all 100 consumers buy exactly one sandwich, regardless of price. We also assume that consumers view the two sandwiches to be of identical taste and quality. Thus, we can focus our attention on the role of geographic differentiation as a driver of market share.
Consumers will base their sandwich purchase on two factors: price and transportation costs. Let the cost of traveling one mile equal 50 cents for all consumers (this includes gasoline and time costs). Because travel is costly, some but not all consumers will seek out the lowest price sandwich. For example, suppose that both stores initially charge $5 per sandwich so that the two stores split the market. In this case, each store will have 50 customers. Now suppose that Jimmy Johns lowers its price per sandwich from $5 to $4, while Quiznos keeps its price at $5. To determine how this will affect sales at both stores, we need to identify the location on Straight Street at which a consumer would be indifferent between purchasing from Jimmy Johns and Quiznos. Because travel is costly, all consumers living to the left of that location will visit Jimmy Johns and all living to the right will visit Quiznos.
A consumer will be indifferent between the two shops if total purchase costs (i.e., sandwich plus transportation costs) are identical. Consider a consumer living M miles from Jimmy Johns and 10 2 M miles from Quiznos. For this consumer, the total cost of visiting Jimmy Johns is 4 1 .50M. The total cost of visiting Quiznos is 5 1 .50(10 – M).
FIGURE 5.1
Sandwich Retailers in Linesville
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If store L and store R both charge $5 per sandwich, then all consumers living to the left of C1 shop at store L and all consumers living to the right of C1 shop at store R. If store L lowers its price to $4 per sandwich, then some customers living to the right of C1 may wish to travel the extra distance to buy from store L. If travel costs $.50 per mile, then all customers living between C1 and C2 will travel the extra distance to save a dollar.
Market Structure and Competition • 179
These costs are equal if M 5 6; a consumer located at M 5 6 will have total purchase costs of $7 at both shops. It follows that 60 consumers will visit Jimmy Johns and 40 will visit Quiznos.
Jimmy Johns gains 10 customers from Quiznos by charging $1 less per sandwich. One would intuitively expect that as product differentiation declines in importance— in this case, as transportation costs decrease—Jimmy Johns would gain even more customers. The model bears this out. If the transportation costs equal 20 cents per mile, the indifferent consumer would live at M 5 7.5 and Jimmy Johns would get 75 customers. If the transportation cost is 1 cent, then Jimmy Johns can win all 100 customers by setting a price of $4.90.
This example shows that horizontal differentiation results when consumers have idiosyncratic preferences, that is, if tastes differ markedly from one person to the next. Location is not the only source of idiosyncratic preferences. Some consumers prefer conservative business suits, whereas others want Italian styling. Some want the biggest sports utility vehicle they can find, whereas others want good mileage. In these and countless other ways, firms can differentiate their products, raise their prices, and yet find that many of their customers remain loyal.
Of course, consumers may not switch away from a high-priced seller unless they are aware of another seller offering a better value. The degree of horizontal differentiation therefore depends on the magnitude of consumer search costs, that is, how easy or hard it is for consumers to learn about alternatives. Retailers like Jimmy Johns often rely on advertising to reduce consumer search costs. Low-price sellers usually want to minimize search costs, for this would likely boost their market shares. But low search costs reduce horizontal differentiation, leading to lower prices and lower profits for all firms. Chapter 10 describes how firms can exploit consumer search to create value and gain competitive advantage.
Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
The theory of optimal pricing implies that firms in differentiated product markets set prices in excess of marginal costs. This creates a powerful competitive dynamic. If prices are high enough to more than cover fixed costs, firms will earn positive economic profits, inviting entry. Entry reduces prices and erodes market shares until economic profits equal zero. If prices are insufficient to cover fixed costs, firms will earn negative economic profits. Exit by some firms will restore the survivors to profitability.
These forces can be understood with a numerical example. Consider a market that currently has 10 firms, called incumbents. Each of the 10 incumbents has a constant marginal cost of $10 per unit and a fixed cost of $120. Each incumbent sells a horizontally differentiated product and faces a price elasticity of demand 5 2, so that the profit-maximizing price for each incumbent firm is $20.11 Suppose that at this price the total market demand is 240, which is evenly divided among all sellers in the market—each incumbent sells 24 units. This implies that each incumbent has revenues of $480 and total costs of $360, for profits of $120. These facts are summarized in Table 5.4 in the column labeled “Before Entry.”
Profits attract entry. Suppose that entrants’ and incumbents’ costs are identical and that each entrant can differentiate its product, so that all sellers have the same market share. To further streamline the analysis, suppose that after entry the price elasticity of demand facing all sellers remains constant at 2. All firms, entrants and incumbents alike, will continue to set a price of $20. Entry continues until there are no more profits to be earned. This occurs when there are 20 firms in the market, each with sales of 12. The last column of Table 5.4 summarizes these results.