- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
56 • Chapter 1 • The Power of Principles: An Historical Perspective
enjoyed only by vertically integrated corporate giants. Rapid improvements in transportation and communication make it easier for independent firms to do business with each other. As a result, modern businesses are more “focused” on a narrower range of activities. At the same time, changes in the financial sector speed the rate at which established firms may grow, but also speed the rate at which new firms can enter and challenge incumbents for market superiority.
Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
The technologies that have revolutionized modern infrastructure are widely accessible, yet infrastructure hinders economic development in many emerging markets. The quality of transportation systems varies from nation to nation. Central Africa, for example, has few highways, and its rails have deteriorated since colonial days. Southeast Asian nations often boast ultramodern rail lines and seaports. But even there, transportation within urban business centers can be excruciatingly difficult.
Developing nations often lack other forms of infrastructure. Their businesses and consumers have limited access to the Internet, particularly through high-speed ISDN or broadband connections. They lack a diligent independent banking sector that
EXAMPLE 1.4 THE GAIZHI PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN CHINA
The modern privatization movement in China started in 1992, after President Deng Xiaoping gave a speech encouraging the development of private enterprises and a market economy. By the mid-1990s, most local governments began to privatize their small state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but some cities went further by privatizing almost all their state and collective firms. In 1995, the central Chinese government decided to keep 500 to 1,000 large state firms and allow smaller firms to be leased or sold, mainly through management buyouts. This process came to be known as gaizhi, or “restructuring.” By the end of the decade, nearly half of China’s 87,000 industrial SOEs had been through gaizhi or were being prepared for sale.
Managers who acquired their firms through the gaizhi process stood to reap substantial profits if their firms improved their performance. And gaizhi gave the managers considerable opportunities for such improvements. Managers could more easily hire and fire workers as well as decide how to deploy their staff. Managers also obtained greater control over investments and research and development.
A key feature of gaizhi is the purchasing process. Managers could purchase their firms
at a price determined by independent accounting firms. By law, the accountants valued assets according to the earnings they can bring in or their current market value. China has poorly developed capital markets, however, so the latter option is usually not available. As a result, accountants often valued firms according to their current profitability.
Feng Susan Lu and David Dranove observed that the valuation process created a perverse incentive for managers.16 If they could reduce profitability prior to gaizhi, say by easing off on workers or purposefully ignoring market opportunities, that would depress the purchase price. Once managers acquired their firms, they could renew their efforts and restore (or even increase) profits to pre-gaizhi levels. In this way, managers could obtain profitable firms at bargain prices. Lu and Dranove found evidence consistent with such behavior. They examined profitability trends preand post-gaizhi while also examining a matched set of firms that were not privatized. The gaizhi firms saw profits drop in the year before privatization and then return to pre-gaizhi levels immediately afterwards.
Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies • 57
provides financial capital and management oversight. Entrepreneurs must rely instead on microlending for seed capital but are hard pressed to obtain substantial loans to facilitate growth. The economies of many developing nations have been crippled by their own governments. Businesses have been reluctant to invest in central and east Africa, for example, because of the lack of established contract law, government corruption, cronyism, and civil war.
THREE DIFFERENT WORLDS: CONSISTENT PRINCIPLES,
CHANGING CONDITIONS, AND ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES
Businesses in 1840 focused on one or two activities. By 1910, integration was the name of the game, with many corporate giants extending their reach throughout the vertical chain. Modern businesses are once again narrowing their scope. Business gurus write about current trends as if they have just now discovered the virtues of focus. In doing so, they criticize the business practices of earlier generations of managers. Such criticism is unwarranted. The enormous differences in business practices among the three periods we surveyed illustrate a key premise of this book: Successful strategy results from applying consistent principles to constantly changing business conditions.
Strategies are—and should be—the adaptive, but principled, responses of firms to their surroundings.
The infrastructure and market conditions of business do not uniquely determine the strategies that firms choose. In all three of our periods, there was considerable experimentation by firms, and various types of firms succeeded and failed. But market conditions and infrastructure do constrain how business can be conducted and the strategic choices that most managers can make. As these conditions change, so too do optimal business strategies. The world of factors, agents, and brokers was undone by the development of the railroad, telegraph, and telephone. Computers and the Internet reduced the need for vertical integration. If the past is prologue, then by 2050 if not sooner, some as yet unimagined innovations will once again transform business infrastructure, and firms will reinvent themselves yet again.
Because circumstances change, one might conclude that an education in business strategy will soon become obsolete. Indeed, the survey in this chapter suggests that specific strategies that purport to work under a given set of market conditions (e.g., “Divest any business that does not have the largest or second-largest share in its market”) are bound to fail eventually. Principles, however, are different from recipes. Principles are economic and behavioral relationships that apply to wide classes of circumstances. Because principles are robust, organizing the study of strategy around principles allows us to understand why certain strategies, business practices, and organizational arrangements are appropriate under one set of conditions but not others.
In the remaining chapters, we develop principles that pertain to the boundaries of the firm, the nature of industry structure and competition, the firm’s strategic position within an industry, and the internal organization and management of the firm. Through the study of these principles, we believe that students of management can understand why firms and industries are organized the way they are and operate the way they do. We also believe that by judiciously applying these principles, managers can enhance the odds of successfully adapting their firms’ strategies to the environments in which they compete.
58 • Chapter 1 • The Power of Principles: An Historical Perspective
CHAPTER SUMMARY
A historical perspective demonstrates that while the nature of business has changed dramatically since 1840, successful businesses have always applied consistent principles to their business conditions.
In 1840, communications and transportation infrastructures were poor. This increased the risk to businesses of operating in too large a market and mitigated against large-scale production.
Business in 1840 was dominated by small, family-operated firms that relied on specialists in distribution as well as market makers who matched the needs of buyers and suppliers.
By 1910, improvements in transportation and communications made large-scale national markets possible and innovations in production technology made it possible to greatly reduce unit costs through large-scale production. Mass distribution firms developed along with the growth in mass production.
Businesses in 1910 that invested in these new technologies needed to assure a sufficient throughput to keep production levels high. This led them to vertically integrate into raw materials acquisition, distribution, and retailing.
Manufacturing firms also expanded their product offerings, creating new divisions that were managed within an “M-form” organization.
These large hierarchical organizations required a professional managerial class. Unlike managers in 1840, professional managers in 1910 generally had little or no ownership interest in their firms.
Continued improvements in communications and transportation have made the modern marketplace global. New technologies have reduced the advantages of large-scale production and vertical integration and promoted the growth of market specialists.
In many industries, small manufacturers can meet the changing needs of their clients better than large hierarchical firms. In other industries, market specialists use the Internet and telecommunication to coordinate activities that used to require a single integrated firm.
Limited infrastructure hinders growth in many developing economies. The growing interconnectedness of firms in developed economies makes them increasingly vulnerable to global events and discontinuities beyond their normal scope of business.
QUESTIONS
1.Why is infrastructure essential to economic development?
2.What was the role of the factor in the mid-nineteenth century economy? Does such a role exist in the modern economy?
3.How would John Burrows’s life been different if he had access to the Internet? What if farmers and retailers also had access to the Internet?
4.What is throughput? Is throughput as important today as it was 100 years ago?
Endnotes • 59
5.If nineteenth-century Americans had the benefit of modern technology as they expanded westward, would Chicago, with its close access to the Great Lakes and Mississippi River system, still have emerged as the business center of the Midwest?
6.Two features of developing nations are an absence of strong contract law and limited transportation networks. How might these factors affect the vertical and horizontal boundaries of firms within these nations?
7.Fifteenth-century Florence was the birthplace of the Renaissance, home to artists such as Donatello, Botticelli, and Michelangelo. Why did so many great artists emerge from just this one city-state? Do you believe that a single city could become the Florence of the twenty-first century?
8.The advent of professional managers was accompanied by skepticism regarding their trustworthiness and ethics in controlling large corporate assets on behalf of the shareholders. Today, this skepticism remains and has changed little since the founding of the managerial class a century ago, and new laws concerning appropriate governance, such as Sarbanes-Oxley, continue to be introduced. Why has this skepticism remained so strong?
9.There is considerable disagreement as to whether government regulation has largely positive or negative influences on economic growth. Compare and contrast the ways in which government involvement in particular industries may positively or negatively influence the evolution of those industries.
10. Some firms seem to last forever. (For an extreme example go to www.hbc.com.) In some industries, however, even the most effective firms may expect short lifetimes (lawn crews; Thai restaurants). Size certainly has something to do with longevity, but are there other factors involved? How does size help larger firms or imperil smaller ones? What other factors besides size contribute to longevity?
11. How might a persistent global credit crisis affect the scale and scope of modern firms?
ENDNOTES
1We use the term businessmen literally. Few, if any, women were involved in business in 1840. This had not changed much by 1910.
2This example comes from William Cronon’s excellent history of the city of Chicago, Nature’s Metropolis, New York, Norton, 1991.
3This example draws from Cronon, W., Nature’s Metropolis, New York, Norton, 1991.
4Cochran, T. C., and W. Miller, The Age of Enterprise: A Social History of Industrial America, New York, Harper & Row, 1961, p. 45.
5Cochran and Miller, The Age of Enterprise, p. 42.
6Yates, J., Control through Communication: The Rise of System in American Management, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, pp. 160–161.
7Yates, Control through Communication, pp. 22–23.
8This example is based on information from Ambrose, S. E., Nothing Like It in the World, New York, Touchstone, 2000; and Bain, D. H., Empire Express, New York, Penguin, 1999.
9Kanigel, R., The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency, New York, Viking, 1997.
60 • Chapter 1 • The Power of Principles: An Historical Perspective
10Chandler, A. D., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, Cambridge, MA, Belknap, 1990.
11For details, see Garnet, R. W., The Telephone Enterprise: The Evolution of the Bell System’s Horizontal Structure, 1876–1909, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. Also see Smith, G. D., The Anatomy of a Business Strategy: Bell, Western Electric, and the Origins of the American Telephone Industry, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
12John, Richard R., “Recasting the Information Infrastructure for the Industrial Age,” in A. D. Chandler Jr. and J. W. Cortada (eds.), A Nation Transformed by Information: How Information Has Shaped the United States from Colonial Times to the Present, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 55–105.
13Adams, W., and H. Mueller, “The Steel Industry,” in W. Adams (ed.), The Structure of American Industry, 8th ed., New York, Macmillan, 1988, p. 90.
14Wallis, J. J., and D. C. North, “Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870–1970,” Chap. 3 in Engerman, S. L. and R. E. Gallman (eds.), Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986, pp. 95–161.
15Friedman, T. L., The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, New York, Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2005.
16Lu, F., and D. Dranove, 2008, “The Gaizhi Privatization Process in China,” Northwestern University, Unpublished Mimeo.