- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
Make versus Buy • 99
MAKE VERSUS BUY
A firm’s decision to perform an activity itself or to purchase it from an independent firm is called a make-or-buy decision. “Make” means that the firm performs the activity itself; “buy” means it relies on an independent firm to perform the activity, perhaps under contract. A firm that acquires an input supplier is now “making” the input, because it is performing the activity in-house. Typical make-or-buy decisions for a manufacturer include whether to develop its own source of raw materials, provide its own shipping services, or operate its own retail web site. Some firms are highly integrated. Kimberly Clark’s Scott Paper division owns forest land, mills timber, and produces consumer paper products. Italian fashion icon Benetton dyes fabrics, designs and assembles clothing, and operates retail stores. Other firms perform a narrow set of activities. Leo Burnett, which created Tony the Tiger, focuses on creating brand icons for consumer products companies. DHL distributes products to customers of many manufacturers and retailers. Korn/Ferry is a successful corporate “headhunting” firm. When other firms buy the services of these specialists, they can obtain a superior marketing program, secure rapid, low-cost distribution, and identify candidates for senior executive positions without having to perform any of these tasks themselves.
Make and buy are two extremes along a continuum of possibilities for vertical integration. Figure 3.1 fills in some of the intermediate choices. Close to “make,” integrated firms can spin off partly or wholly owned subsidiaries. Close to “buy,” market firms can enter into a long-term contract, tying their interests for several years. In between are joint ventures and strategic alliances, in which two or more firms establish an independent entity that relies on resources from both parents. To illustrate the key economic trade-offs associated with integration decisions, we will focus on the extreme choices of “make” and “buy.” As we will discuss in Chapter 4, intermediate solutions share many of the benefits and costs of both the make-and-buy extremes.
Upstream, Downstream
In general, goods in a production process “flow” along a vertical chain from raw materials and component parts to manufacturing, through distribution and retailing. Economists say that early steps in the vertical chain are upstream and later steps are downstream, much as lumber used to make wooden furniture flows from upstream timber forests to downstream mills. Thinking about these terms more generally,
FIGURE 3.1
Make-or-Buy Continuum
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Different ways of organizing production lie on a make/buy continuum.
100 • Chapter 3 • The Vertical Boundaries of the Firm
EXAMPLE 3.1 LICENSING BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS
The biotechnology sector remains one of the bright stars of the global economy, providing investors with big returns and consumers with life-saving products. It may come as a surprise, but few biotechnology companies actually commercialize and market their products. Over two-thirds of biotechnology products that make it to the early stages of the regulatory approval process are marketed by traditional “big pharma” companies under licensing arrangements. This reflects a broader pattern of industry “disintegration.”
John Hagel III and Marc Singer argue that traditional pharmaceutical firms actually comprise three core businesses.3 These three core businesses consist of a product innovation business, an infrastructure business, and a customer relationship business. The infrastructure business builds and manages facilities for highvolume, repetitive operational tasks such as manufacturing and communications. The customer relationship business is responsible for finding customers and building relationships with them. These businesses remain the province of pharmaceutical firms, which have production and sales experience that start-up biotech research companies cannot hope to match. Hagel and Singer might have added a fourth core business—obtaining regulatory approval. This requires a working relationship with regulatory agencies such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and is also largely the province of big pharma, although a substantial percentage of the actual clinical trials have been outsourced to independent “contract research organizations.”
Big pharma no longer dominates the business of innovation. A few decades ago, large pharmaceutical firms used an uneconomical
trial-and-error process to screen new drug leads. However, the landmark sequencing of the human genome allows the genes themselves to become the new targets of disease research, resulting in more focused and economical approaches to drug discovery. Although technological breakthroughs like genomics may expedite the drug discovery process, they have also, paradoxically, increased its complexity. Smaller biotech companies are more adept in understanding and adapting to changes in technology than are larger pharmaceutical companies. Companies like Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Celera, Incyte Genomics, and Human Genome Sciences are examples of biotechnology companies that have thrived in the New World.
With biotech companies taking the lead in developing new drugs and big pharma shepherding these discoveries through regulatory approval, production, sales, and marketing, an interesting question is how biotech companies are matched to their big pharma partners. A recent study by economist Anna Levine provides some answers.4 Levine analyzed a sample of 149 biotech drugs approved for marketing in the United States since 1982. She finds that pharma firms are more likely to enter into a licensing arrangement for a biotech product if they already sell products in the same therapeutic category. This allows the pharma firm to exploit its expertise in the core business of sale, by taking advantage of relationships with physicians and scale economies in selling expense. Levine also finds that the terms of the licensing arrangement benefit the pharma company to the extent that the therapeutic category is fairly narrow, so that other potential licensees are unable to develop similar relationships and scale economies.
Cemex cement production is upstream to its concrete production, and cable sports channel ESPN, which assembles a package of sports entertainment programming, is downstream from the National Football League (a content “producer”) but upstream to Comcast and other cable companies (content “retailers”).
The specific steps required in a vertical chain do not usually depend on the extent of vertical integration. Making and selling wooden chairs begins with chopping down
Make versus Buy • 101
trees and ends with a customer taking delivery of an order, regardless of the extent of vertical integration. In between, someone has to mill the timber, design the chair, assemble it, distribute it, and sell it. And someone will probably be involved in raising capital to support fixed investments while others handle accounting and marketing. Two identical chairs may well go through the same production steps, but the organization of the firms involved in production might be very different. One chair might be made by a fully integrated firm that performs every step in the vertical chain, while another seemingly identical chair might have passed through a series of independent firms, each of which was responsible for one or two specific steps. The make-or-buy decision is not about trying to eliminate steps from the vertical chain. Instead, it is about deciding which firms should perform which steps.
In order to understand the importance of the make-or-buy decision, it is helpful to think about competition between vertical chains. Consider that when consumers choose one of the two chairs discussed above, they are effectively giving their business to all of the firms involved in the vertical chain that made that chair—the timber mill, the designer, and so forth. Consumers will usually choose the finished good produced by the most efficient vertical chain. Thus, if vertical integration improves the efficiency of production of wooden chairs, then the fully integrated chair producer will prosper while the firms in the “independent” vertical chain will struggle. Conversely, if vertical integration is counterproductive, then the independent firms will prosper and the integrated firm will lose out. It follows that firms will want to be part of most successful vertical chains, and the success of the vertical chain requires the right make- or-buy decisions.
Defining Boundaries
Regardless of a firm’s position along the vertical chain, it needs to define its boundaries. To resolve the associated make-or-buy decisions, the firm must compare the benefits and costs of using the market as opposed to performing the activity in-house. Table 3.1 summarizes the key benefits and costs of using market firms. These are discussed in detail in the remainder of this chapter.
TABLE 3.1
Benefits and Costs of Using the Market
Benefits
•Market firms can achieve economies of scale that in-house departments producing only for their own needs cannot.
•Market firms are subject to the discipline of the market and must be efficient and innovative to survive. Overall corporate success may hide the inefficiencies and lack of innovativeness of in-house departments.
Costs
•Coordination of production flows through the vertical chain may be compromised when an activity is purchased from an independent market firm rather than performed in-house.
•Private information may be leaked when an activity is performed by an independent market firm.
•There may be costs of transacting with independent market firms that can be avoided by performing the activity in-house.