- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
Chapter Summary • 327
of product specialization focus rests on the ability of the focuser to exploit economies of scale or learning economies within the service or the product in which the focuser specializes.
A third common basis of a focus strategy is geographic specialization. Here the firm offers a variety of related products within a narrowly defined geographic market. Breweries such as Pittsburgh Brewing Company (brewer of Iron City beer) and Heileman’s (brewer of Chicago favorite Old Style) rely on strong local brands, enhanced through promotional activities linked to local sports teams, to offset the economies of scale of national marketing enjoyed by Anheuser-Busch.
In addition to exploiting economies of scale or better serving underserved or overserved customers, focus strategies have another significant potential advantage: they can insulate the focusing firm from competition. In some segments, customer demand may only be large enough to allow just one or two firms to operate profitably. This implies that a firm may be far more profitable as a focused seller in a low-demand segment than as one of several competitors in high-demand segments. For example, Kubota has dominated the Japanese agricultural machinery market by producing lightweight, compact tractors that are especially well suited to small Japanese farms. Because that market is limited, Kubota faces little competition from U.S. giants such as Deere & Company, Case, and Caterpillar.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
A firm achieves a competitive advantage if it can earn higher rates of profitability than rival firms. A firm’s profitability depends jointly on industry conditions and the amount of value the firm can create relative to its rivals.
Consumer surplus is the difference between the perceived benefit B of a product and its monetary price P. A consumer will purchase a product only if its consumer surplus is positive. A consumer will purchase the product from a particular seller only if that seller offers a higher consumer surplus than rival sellers offer.
A value map illustrates the competitive implications of consumer surplus. An indifference curve shows the price–quality combinations that yield the same level of consumer surplus.
Value-created is the difference between the perceived benefit B and the unit cost C of the product. Equivalently, it is equal to the sum of consumer surplus and economic profit.
To achieve a competitive advantage, a firm must create not only positive value, but also more value than rival firms. If it does so, it can outcompete other firms by offering a higher consumer surplus than rivals.
The bases of competitive advantage are superior resources and organizational capabilities. Resources are firm-specific assets that other firms cannot easily acquire. Organizational capabilities refer to clusters of activities that the firm does especially well compared to rivals.
There are three generic strategies: cost leadership, benefit leadership, and focus.
328 • Chapter 9 • Strategic Positioning for Competitive Advantage
A firm that follows a strategy of cost leadership seeks to achieve a cost advantage over rival firms by offering a product with a lower C for the same, or perhaps lower, B.
A firm that follows a strategy of benefit leadership seeks to achieve a benefit advantage over rivals by offering products with a higher B for the same, or perhaps higher C.
Building a competitive advantage based on superior cost position is likely to be attractive when there are unexploited opportunities for achieving scale, scope, or learning economies; the product’s nature limits opportunities for enhancing its perceived benefit; consumers are relatively price sensitive and are unwilling to pay a premium for enhanced quality or performance; and the product is a search good rather than an experience good.
Building a competitive advantage based on a superior benefit position is likely to be attractive when the typical consumer is willing to pay a significant price premium for attributes that enhance B; existing firms are already exploiting significant economies of scale or learning; and the product is an experience good rather than a search good.
A firm is “stuck in the middle” when it pursues elements of a cost leadership strategy and a benefit leadership strategy at the same time, and in the process, fails to achieve either a cost advantage or a benefit advantage.
Under a broad-coverage strategy, a firm offers a full line of related products to most or all customer groups in the market. Under a focus strategy, a firm either offers a narrow set of product varieties or serves a narrow set of customers, or does both.
Focus strategies can often insulate a firm from competition. If the focuser’s industry segment is small, it may face little competition and earn substantial returns.
QUESTIONS
1.A firm can outperform its rivals through cost leadership or benefit leadership, but not through price leadership. Explain.
2.This chapter describes the importance of B 2 C in a competitive industry. Is B 2 C equally important in other market structures?
3.How do economies of scale affect positioning?
4.How can the value chain help a firm identify its strategic position?
5.Two firms, Alpha and Beta, are competing in a market in which consumer preferences are identical. Alpha offers a product whose benefit B is equal to $75 per unit. Alpha’s average cost C is equal to $60 per unit, while Beta’s average cost is equal to $50 per unit.
(a)Which firm’s product provides the greatest value-created?
(b)In an industry equilibrium in which the firms achieve consumer surplus parity, by what dollar amount will the profit margin, P 2 C, of the firm that creates the greatest amount of value exceed the profit margin of the firm that creates the smaller amount of value? Compare this amount to the difference between the value-created of each firm. What explains the relationship between the difference in profit margins and the difference in value-created between the two firms?
Questions • 329
6. The following table summarizes information about U.S. pancake syrup products:
|
Average Consumer |
|
|
|
Willingness to Pay |
Price |
Average Costs |
Brand |
(Cents/Ounce) |
(Cents/Ounce) |
(Cents/Ounce) |
|
|
|
|
Hungry Jack |
20 |
15 |
14 |
Aunt Jemima |
21 |
19 |
17 |
Log Cabin |
28 |
24 |
20 |
Mrs. Buttersworth |
21 |
18 |
14 |
|
|
|
|
Assume the following apply to the time period relevant for the question:
•Demand remains stable.
•No new firms enter and no new products are introduced.
•No changes in advertising are made.
•Firms have constant returns to scale and input prices are constant.
(a)Given current prices, which brand do you expect to gain share in the next few months?
(b)Which brand can earn the highest profits in the longer run (assuming prices can be changed)?
7.Consider a market in which consumer indifference curves are relatively steep. Firms in the industry are pursuing two positioning strategies: some firms are producing a “basic” product that provides satisfactory performance; others are producing an enhanced product that provides performance superior to that of the basic product. Consumer surplus parity currently exists in the industry. Are the prices of the basic and the enhanced product likely to be significantly different or about the same? Why? How would the answer change if consumer indifference curves were relatively flat?
8.In the value-creation model presented in this chapter, it is implicitly assumed that all consumers get the identical value (e.g., identical B) from a given product. Do the main conclusions in this chapter change if consumer tastes differ, so that some get more value than others?
9.Identify one or more experience goods. Identify one or more search goods. How does the retailing of experience goods differ from the retailing of search goods? Do these differences help consumers?
10. Identify successful firms that offer good but not outstanding products at reasonable but not especially low prices. Do these firms disprove Porter’s ideas about being “stuck in the middle?”
11. Recall from Chapter 2 Adam Smith’s dictum, “The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.” How does market growth affect the viability of a focus (i.e., niche) strategy?
12. “Niche strategies are generally more profitable than “mass-market” strategies because they usually imply weaker price competition.” Comment.
13.“Firms that seek a cost advantage should adopt a learning curve strategy; firms that seek to differentiate their products should not.” Comment on both of these statements.
14. Suppose that two firms compete in a market where consumers have identical preferences. The benefits and costs of the two firms are B1, C1 and B2, C2, respectively, where B1 2 C1 . B2 2 C2. What price should firm 1 set so that it can capture the entire market and maximize profits?
330 • Chapter 9 • Strategic Positioning for Competitive Advantage
15. Consumers often identify brand names with quality. Do you think branded products usually are of higher quality than generic products and therefore justify their higher prices? If so, why don’t all generic product makers invest to establish a brand identity, thereby enabling them to raise price?
APPENDIX: METHODS FOR MEASURING
A FIRM’S BENEFIT POSITION
Four approaches might be used to estimate a firm’s benefit position relative to its competitors and the importance of benefit drivers. These methods require advanced statistical techniques, so we will only provide a brief description of each.
1.Reservation price method
2.Attribute-rating method
3.Hedonic pricing analysis
4.Conjoint analysis
Reservation Price Method
Because a consumer purchases a product if and only if B 2 P . 0, it follows that the perceived benefit B represents a consumer’s reservation price—the maximum monetary price the consumer will pay for a unit of the product or service. One approach to estimating B, then, is simply to ask consumers the highest price they would pay. Marketing survey research that precedes the introduction of new products often includes such a question.
Attribute-Rating Method
Attribute rating is a technique for estimating benefit drivers directly from survey responses and then calculating overall benefits on the basis of attribute scores. Target consumers are asked to rate products in terms of attributes. For example, for each attribute consumers might be given a fixed number of points to allocate among each product. Each attribute is then assigned an “importance weight,” and relative perceived benefits are determined by calculating the weighted average of the product ratings. Weighted scores can be divided by costs to construct “B/C ratios.” Recall that a firm’s strategic position is determined by the amount of B 2 C it generates versus its competitors. As long as products have cost and/or benefit proximity, the ranking of B/C ratios across firms will be similar (though not necessarily equal) to the rankings of B 2 C differences. Thus, products with high B/C ratios will generally enjoy a superior strategic position to their lower B/C rivals.
Hedonic Pricing Analysis
Hedonic pricing uses data about actual consumer purchases to determine the value of particular product attributes. (The term hedonic comes from hedonism and is meant to convey the idea that the pleasure or happiness a consumer derives from a good depends on the attributes that the good embodies.) For example, consumers purchase automobiles according to a variety of attributes, including horsepower, interior room,