- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
312 • Chapter 9 • Strategic Positioning for Competitive Advantage
FIGURE 9.10
The Economic Logic of Benefit Leadership
P, C
(Price, unit cost) Indifference curve
F
PF
E
PE
CF
C
CE
|
q |
qE |
q (Quality) |
qF |
All firms except the benefit leader offer a product with a cost CE and price–quality position at point E. The benefit leader offers a product with a higher-quality level, qF, and in so doing, incurs a higher cost CF, resulting in a cost disadvantage of DC. Consumer surplus parity is achieved when the cost leader operates at point F by charging a price PF. At point F, PF 2 PE . CF 2 CE, or, rearranging terms, PF 2 CF . PE 2 CE. This tells us that despite its cost disadvantage, the benefit leader achieves a higher profit margin than its lower-benefit competitors.
Figure 9.10 illustrates the economic logic of benefit leadership using a value map. For simplicity, let’s consider an industry in which all firms except the benefit leader offer a product with a cost CE and price–quality position at point E. Suppose the benefit leader offers a product with a higher-quality level, qF, and in so doing, incurs a somewhat higher cost CF, resulting in a cost disadvantage of DC. Market shares in the industry will be stable when the benefit leader and its lower-quality competitors attain consumer surplus parity. Consumer surplus parity is achieved when the benefit leader operates at point F by charging a price PF. From the figure, notice that PF 2 PE . CF 2 CE, or rearranging terms, PF 2 CF . PE 2 CE. Given consumer surplus parity between the benefit leader and its lower-quality competitors, the benefit leader achieves a higher profit margin. In essence, the leader’s benefit advantage gives it the “wiggle room” to charge a price premium relative to its lower-benefit, lower-cost rivals without sacrificing market share.
Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
A firm that creates more value than its competitors would like to capture as much as possible of that value for itself in the form of profits. If consumers have identical preferences (i.e., the same value map applies to all consumers in the market), value
Strategic Positioning: Cost Advantage and Benefit Advantage • 313
extraction takes an especially stark form. When a firm increases its consumer surplus “bid” slightly above competitors, it captures the entire market. This leads to two clear recipes for retaining profits for a firm that creates more value than its competitors. Both involve making consumer surplus bids that the firm’s rivals cannot match:
1.A cost leader that has benefit parity with its rivals can lower its price just below the unit cost of the firm with the next lowest unit cost. This makes it unprofitable for higher-cost competitors to respond with price cuts of their own and thus allows the firm to capture the entire market.
2.A benefit leader that has cost parity with its rivals can raise its price just below the sum of the following: (1) its unit cost, plus (2) the additional benefit DB creates relative to the competitor with the next highest B. To top this consumer surplus bid, a competitor would have to cut price below its unit cost, which would be unprofitable. At this price, then, the firm with the benefit advantage captures the entire market.
What happens if one firm is a cost leader and the other is a benefit leader? If consumers have identical preferences, then the firm that offers the higher B 2 C can capture the entire market, by setting price at the point where the other firm cannot make a better consumer surplus bid and still cover its costs.
These extreme scenarios, in which one firm captures the entire market, result because consumers are assumed to have identical preferences. This would not happen in a market characterized by horizontal differentiation. As we discuss in Chapters 5 and 10, horizontal differentiation is likely to be strong when there are many product attributes that consumers weigh in assessing overall benefit B, and consumers disagree about the desirability of those attributes. In markets where there is horizontal differentiation, lowering price or boosting quality will attract some consumers, but others will not switch unless the differential in price or quality is large enough. In these markets, the price elasticity of demand an individual firm faces becomes a key determinant of a seller’s ability to extract profits from its competitive advantage. Table 9.2 summarizes how the price elasticity of demand facing a firm influences the choice between two polar strategies for exploiting competitive advantage: a margin strategy and a share strategy.
Consider, first, a firm that has a cost advantage. When the firm’s product has a low price elasticity of demand (i.e., when consumers are not very price-sensitive because of strong horizontal differentiation among competitors’ products), even deep price cuts will not increase the firm’s market share much. In this case, the optimal way for a firm to exploit its cost advantage is through a margin strategy: the firm maintains price parity with its competitors and profits from its cost advantage primarily through high price–cost margins rather than through higher market shares. By contrast, when the firm’s product has a high price elasticity of demand (i.e., when consumers are price sensitive because horizontal differentiation is weak), modest price cuts can lead to significant increases in market share. In this case, the firm should exploit its cost advantage through a share strategy: the firm underprices its competitors to gain market share at their expense. In practice, the distinction between a margin strategy and a share strategy is one of degree and firms with cost advantages will often pursue mixed strategies: cutting price to gain share but also “banking” some of the cost advantage through higher margins.
Table 9.2 illustrates the notion that the logic governing the exploitation of a benefit advantage is analogous to that governing the exploitation of a cost advantage.
314 • Chapter 9 • Strategic Positioning for Competitive Advantage
TABLE 9.2
Exploiting a Competitive Advantage through Pricing
|
|
|
Type of Advantage |
|
|
|
Cost Advantage |
Benefit Advantage |
|
|
|
(lower C than competitors) |
(higher B than competitors) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
High price |
• Modest price cuts gain lots |
• Modest price hikes lose lots |
|
|
elasticity of |
|
of market share. |
of market share. |
|
demand (weak |
• Exploit advantage through |
• Exploit advantage through |
|
|
horizontal |
|
higher market share than |
higher market share than |
|
differentiation) |
|
competitors. |
competitors. |
|
|
• Share strategy: Underprice |
• Share strategy: Maintain |
|
|
|
|
competitors to gain share. |
price parity with competitors |
Firm’s Price |
|
|
|
(let benefit advantage drive |
|
|
|
share increases). |
|
Elasticity of |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Demand |
Low price |
• |
Big price cuts gain little |
• Big price hikes lose little |
|
elasticity of |
|
share. |
share. |
|
demand |
• Exploit advantage through |
• Exploit advantage through |
|
|
(strong horizontal |
|
higher profit margins. |
higher profit margins. |
|
differentiation) |
• |
Margin strategy: Maintain |
• Margin strategy: Charge |
|
|
|
price parity with |
price premium relative to |
|
|
|
competitors (let lower costs |
competitors. |
|
|
|
drive higher margins). |
|
|
|
|
|
|
When a firm has a benefit advantage in a market in which consumers are price sensitive, even a modest price hike could offset the firm’s benefit advantage and nullify the increase in market share that the benefit advantage would otherwise lead to. In this case, the best way for the firm to exploit its benefit advantage is through a share strategy. A share strategy involves charging the same price as competitors and exploiting the firm’s benefit advantage by capturing a higher market share than competitors. By contrast, when consumers are not price sensitive, large price hikes will not completely erode the market share gains that the firm’s benefit advantage creates. The best way for the firm to exploit its benefit advantage is through a margin strategy: it charges a price premium relative to competitors (sacrificing some market share in the process), and it exploits its advantage mainly through higher profit margins.
The prospect of competitor reactions can alter the broad recommendations in Table 9.2. For instance, in markets with price-sensitive consumers, a share strategy of cutting price to exploit a cost advantage would be attractive if competitors’ prices remained unchanged. However, it would probably be unattractive if the firm’s competitors quickly matched the price cut because the net result will be lower margins with little or no net gain in the firm’s market share. In this case, a margin strategy might well be a more attractive option.
Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
Under what circumstances is one source of advantage likely to be more profitable than the other? Though no definitive rules can be formulated, the underlying economics of the firm’s product market and the current positions of firms in the industry
Strategic Positioning: Cost Advantage and Benefit Advantage • 315
can sometimes create conditions that are more hospitable to one kind of advantage versus another.
An advantage based on lower cost is likely to be more profitable than an advantage built on superior benefits when:
•The nature of the product limits opportunities for enhancing its perceived benefit B. This might be the case for commodity products, such as chemicals and paper. If so, then, more opportunities for creating additional value may come from lowering C rather than from increasing B. Still, we must bear in mind that the drivers of differentiation include far more than just the physical attributes of the product and that opportunities may exist for differentiation through better after-sale service, superior location, or more rapid delivery than competitors offer.
•Consumers are relatively price sensitive and will not pay much of a premium for enhanced product quality, performance, or image. This would occur when most consumers are much more price sensitive than quality sensitive. Graphically, this corresponds to the case in which consumer indifference curves are relatively flat, indicating that a consumer will not pay much more for enhanced quality. Opportunities for additional value creation are much more likely to arise through cost reductions than through benefit enhancements.
•The product is a search good. As detailed in Chapter 10, a search good is one whose objective quality attributes the typical buyer can assess prior to the point of purchase. Examples include commodity products as well as items such as stationery and office furniture. With search goods, the potential for differentiation lies largely in enhancing the product’s observable features. But if buyers can discern among different offerings, so can competitors, which raises the risk that the enhancements will be imitated.
An advantage based on superior benefits is likely to be relatively more profitable than an advantage based on cost efficiency when:
•The typical consumer will pay a significant price premium for attributes that enhance B. This corresponds to the case in which the typical consumer’s indifference curve is relatively steep. A firm that can differentiate its product by offering even a few additional features may command a significant price premium.
•Economies of scale or learning are significant, and firms are already exploiting them. In this case, opportunities for achieving a cost advantage over these larger firms are limited, and the best route toward value creation would be to offer a product that is especially well tailored to a particular niche of the market. Microbreweries, such as the Boston Beer Company, have attempted to build a competitive advantage in this way.
•The product is an experience good. An experience good is a product whose quality can be assessed only after the consumer has purchased it and used it for a while. Examples include automobiles, appliances, and consumer packaged goods. As we discuss in Chapter 10, consumers often judge experience goods on the basis of a firm’s image, reputation, or credibility, which can be difficult for rivals to imitate or neutralize. In the early 2000s, Sony’s strong reputation in consumer electronics helped it become a dominant player in the widescreen television market despite the fact that its LCD technology was inferior to the DLP technology offered by Samsung, a Korean firm with a weaker reputation at that time.