- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium • 383
Beatles to a record contract in the early 1960s. EMI lacked the production and marketing know-how to successfully commercialize the CT scanner developed in its R&D laboratory, and it sold this business to GE in the late 1970s. Early movers may also fail to establish a competitive advantage because they bet on the wrong technologies or products. Wang Laboratories bet that the “office of the future” would be organized around networks of dedicated word processors. Given the uncertainty about demand or technology that exists when an early mover enters a market, these bets may be good ones; that is, the expected present value of profits exceeds the cost of entering the market. But an inherent property of decision making under uncertainty is that good decisions do not always translate into good outcomes. In the 1970s, Wang could not have known that the personal computer would destroy the market for dedicated word processors.
IMPERFECT IMITABILITY AND INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM
Steven Lippman and Richard Rumelt point out that when there is imperfect imitability, firms in an otherwise perfectly competitive market may be able to sustain positive economic profits over long periods, but some firms will earn below-average profits and indeed may appear to be making negative economic profits.16 These arguments can be illustrated with a simple numerical example. Consider an industry in which firms produce undifferentiated products but have different production costs. Average variable cost (AVC) and marginal cost (MC) are constant up to a capacity of 1 million units per year. We assume that this level of capacity is small relative to the overall size of the market, so the industry can accommodate many firms producing at capacity. The most efficient firms in this industry can achieve an AVC of $1 per unit. There are many potential entrants into this market, but because imitation is imperfect, not all of them can emulate those that achieve the low-cost position in the market. (See Figure 11.5.)
The problem that each entrant faces is that, before entry, it does not know what its costs will be. Accordingly, before entering the market, a prospective competitor believes that there is a 20 percent probability that its AVC will take on each of five values: $1, $3, $5, $7, or $9. Suppose, finally, that a firm must incur the cost of
FIGURE 11.5
Average Variable and Marginal Cost Functions with Imperfect Imitability
The figure shows the different average variable cost functions (AVC) that a firm might have if it enters this market. Since AVC is constant up to the capacity of 1 million units per year, the AVC function coincides with the marginal cost (MC) function. The firm’s AVC can take on one of five values— $1, $3, $5, $7, or $9—each with equal
(i.e., 20 percent) probability. The equilibrium price in this market is $6 per unit. At this price, each firm’s expected economic profit is zero.
Average variable cost, marginal cost
$ per unit
$9/unit |
|
AVC = MC |
||
|
||||
$7/unit |
|
AVC = MC |
||
|
||||
$6/unit |
|
Equilibrium price |
||
$5/unit |
|
AVC = MC |
||
|
||||
$3/unit |
|
AVC = MC |
||
|
||||
$1/unit |
|
AVC = MC |
||
|
||||
|
|
|
|
Quantity |
|
1,000,000 |
|
||
|
(units per year) |
384 • Chapter 11 • Sustaining Competitive Advantage
building a factory if it comes into the industry. This factory costs $36 million to build and (for simplicity) never depreciates and cannot be converted to another use. Investors expect a return of 5 percent on their capital, so the annualized cost of the factory is 0.05 3 $36,000,000 5 $1,800,000, or $1.8 per unit of capacity.
What will the equilibrium price be? In equilibrium, firms in the market will have positive operating profits while a potential entrant’s expected operating profit will be equal to or below the cost of entry. In this example, the price that makes a prospective entrant just indifferent between entering and not entering is $6.17 At that price, firms that enter and learn that their AVC is $7 or $9 will immediately exit. Firms with an AVC of $1, $3, or $5 will produce up to capacity and earn a per-unit operating profit of $5, $3, and $1, respectively.
A potential entrant’s expected operating profit per unit of capacity, when the price is $6, is thus:
(0.2 3 5) 1 (0.2 3 3) 1 (0.2 3 1) 1 (0.2 3 0) 5 $1.8
This expected operating profit equals the entry costs of $1.8 per unit, so a price of $6 leaves potential entrants just indifferent between entering or not. Put another way, at a price of $6, each firm’s expected rate of return on its invested capital (ROIC) is equal to its cost of capital of 5 percent. This is illustrated in Table 11.1.
The example illustrates the distinction between ex ante and ex post economic profitability. Before entering (i.e., ex ante), each firm’s expected economic profit is zero; that is, each firm expects to earn its 5 percent cost of capital (see Table 11.1). After entering (i.e., ex post), a firm’s economic profit may be positive or negative; that is, a firm may earn more or less than the competitive return of 5 percent. This yields a fundamental insight: to assess the profit opportunities available in a particular business, managers should not just focus on the performance of the most successful firms (i.e., those firms that are still in the business). In the preceding example, the average ROIC of active producers is (13.89 1 8.33 1 2.78)/3 5 8.33 percent, yet ex ante profitability is just 5 percent. The reason for this is that a simple average of the profitability of active firms ignores unsuccessful firms that have lost money and exited the industry.
This example offers another fundamental insight about profitability. If one takes an “ex ante” perspective and entry is free, then it is impossible to have positive expected profits without unique resources and capabilities. Before entering the market, firms in this example all have the same expected profits. The same can be said more generally about entrepreneurs before they sink investments into their new business ideas. Unless they
TABLE 11.1
Summary Statistics for Imperfect Imitability Example
|
|
|
|
|
ROIC |
|
|
Annual |
|
|
(annual |
|
Annual |
Total |
Annual |
Annual |
operating |
|
Revenue @ |
Variable |
Operating |
Operating |
profit/$36 |
AVC |
$6/unit |
Costs |
Profit |
Profit |
million) |
$1/unit |
0.2 |
$6,000,000 |
$1,000,000 |
$5,000,000 |
13.89% |
$3/unit |
0.2 |
6,000,000 |
3,000,000 |
3,000,000 |
8.3 |
$5/unit |
0.2 |
6,000,000 |
5,000,000 |
1,000,000 |
2.78 |
$7/unit |
0.2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
$9/unit |
0.2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|