- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
Market Structure and Competition • 173
TABLE 5.2
Four Classes of Market Structure and the Intensity of Price Competition
Nature of Competition |
Range of Herfindahls |
Intensity of Price Competition |
Perfect competition |
Usually below .2 |
Fierce |
Monopolistic competition |
Usually below .2 |
May be fierce or light, depending |
|
|
on product differentiation |
Oligopoly |
.2 to .6 |
May be fierce or light, depending |
|
|
on interfirm rivalry |
Monopoly |
.6 and above |
Usually light, unless threatened |
|
|
by entry |
|
|
|
In the remainder of this section, we describe each of the four market structures. We begin with brief discussions of perfect competition and monopoly. (More detailed discussions may be found in the Economics Primer and in microeconomics textbooks.) We then provide lengthier discussions of monopolistic competition and oligopoly.
Perfect Competition
Recall from the Economics Primer that a firm maximizes profit by producing a volume of output at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Recall, too, that the percentage contribution margin (PCM) equals (P 2 MC)/P, where P 5 price and MC 5 marginal cost. The condition for profit maximization can then be written PCM 5 1/ .4 In a perfectly competitive market, firms behave as if 5 `, so the optimal PCM is 0. In other words, firms expand output until marginal cost of the last unit produced equals the market price.
Market conditions will tend to drive down prices toward marginal costs when at least two of the following conditions are met:
1.There are many sellers.
2.Consumers perceive the product to be homogeneous.
3.There is excess capacity.
We now discuss how each of these features may increase competitive pricing pressures.
Many Sellers
Antitrust agencies vigorously enforce laws designed to promote competition. These agencies are seldom concerned about markets with more than a few sellers. Experience, coupled with economic theory, has taught them that prices tend to fall as the number of sellers increases. This is true for a number of reasons.
First, when there are many sellers, a diversity of pricing preferences is likely. Even if the industry is profitable, a particular seller may prefer a lower price. This is likely to be true for sellers such as Aldi and Wal-Mart that have costs below the industry average. It may also be true for sellers, including many Internet startups, that are attempting to boost market share without regard for short-term profitability.
Second, when sellers maintain high prices, consumers make fewer purchases. Some sellers will have to cut production, or prices will fall. When there are many
174 • Chapter 5 • Competitors and Competition
sellers, it can be hard to convince all of them to cut production, even when they are part of an explicit cartel. This point is illustrated by the contrast between the historical success of cartels in the potash and nitrogen industries.5 The potash cartel that existed before World War II was highly concentrated and generally succeeded in restricting production and keeping prices high. By contrast, the world nitrogen cartel consisted of many firms in the United States, Europe, and South America and was far less successful in its attempts to raise prices above competitive levels.6
The third reason is closely related to the second. When sellers do manage to restrict production and increase prices, some may be tempted to “cheat” by lowering price and increasing production. There are many small firms when a market is relatively unconcentrated, and small firms are often the most willing to cheat. A small firm may view the high prices charged by bigger rivals as an opportunity to increase market share and secure learning benefits and economies of scale that will enhance its long-run competitive position. A small firm may also gamble that its larger rivals will not detect or react to its price reductions.
Homogeneous Products
When a firm lowers its price, it expects to increase its sales. The sales increase may come from three different sources:
1.Increased sales to the firm’s existing customers
2.Sales to customers of a competing firm who switch to take advantage of the lower price
3.Sales to individuals who were not planning to purchase from any firm at the prevailing price
Customer switching often represents the largest source of sales gain. Korean electronics manufacturers Samsung and LG broke into Western markets by undercutting rivals’ prices on comparable-quality televisions and appliances. Customers are more willing to switch from one seller to another when the product is homogeneous, that is, if the characteristics of the product do not vary across sellers. When products are homogeneous, customers tend to be less loyal because any seller’s product will meet their needs. This intensifies price competition because firms that lower prices can expect large increases in sales. Samsung and LG benefited when high-definition televisions were sold using standard technologies (e.g., plasma and LCD) at standard screen sizes (e.g., 50-inch diagonal screens with a 16 3 9 screen aspect). Samsung and LG’s small price advantages were enough to offset the lack of brand-name recognition. Other products, such as medical services, are highly differentiated, and most consumers are unwilling to switch just to obtain a lower price.
Excess Capacity
To understand the role of capacity in pricing, recall the distinction between average costs and marginal costs that we made in the Economics Primer. For production processes that entail high fixed costs, marginal cost can be well below average cost over a wide range of output. Only when production nears capacity—the point at which average cost begins to rise sharply—does marginal cost begin to exceed average cost.
The numerical example in Table 5.3 illustrates the implications of excess capacity for a firm’s pricing incentives. The table depicts the situation facing a diesel engine manufacturer, such as Deere & Company, whose plant has capacity of 50,000 engines
Market Structure and Competition • 175
TABLE 5.3
Capacity Utilization and Costs
Annual |
Total Variable Cost |
Total Fixed Cost |
Total Cost |
Average Cost |
Output |
($millions/year) |
($millions/year) |
($millions/year) |
per Engine |
10,000 |
$1 |
$12 |
$13 |
$1,300 |
20,000 |
2 |
12 |
14 |
700 |
30,000 |
3 |
12 |
15 |
500 |
40,000 |
4 |
12 |
16 |
400 |
50,000 |
8 |
12 |
20 |
400 |
|
|
|
|
|
EXAMPLE 5.3 THE BOTTOM DROPS OUT ON CUBS TICKETS
For the past 25 years, the Chicago Cubs had been the envy of every professional sports team owner. Rarely a contender and often a doormat, the Cubs still managed to consistently fill venerable Wrigley Field to capacity, selling the vast majority of tickets before the season even began. Tourists from Iowa and beyond visited Wrigley the way that tourists in Paris visit the Eiffel Tower, while locals viewed Wrigley as a gigantic communal beer garden. Demand for seats was so strong that owners of apartment buildings across the street from Wrigley put makeshift stands on their roofs and charged up to $200 per ticket (including food and drinks). Cubs ownership even got a piece of the action.
With such high demand and a fixed supply of seats (even including the rooftops), the Cubs’s owners could have set the highest ticket prices in the sport, but chose instead to hold the line on ticket prices. After all, it might be unseemly to charge more for Cubs tickets than for Yankee tickets when the Yankees have won 27 World Series and the Cubs have not won a World Series for over 100 years. Ticket brokers, who buy tickets in bulk at the start of the season and resell them for whatever the market will bear, were major beneficiaries of the Cubs’ popularity. Every year, brokers purchased hundreds or even thousands of tickets to every home game and sold them for multiples of their face value. With the growing popularity of the StubHub Internet ticket reselling platform, season ticket holders got into the act, unloading unwanted tickets at prices high enough to more than pay for their entire season ticket packages. Even the Cubs got into the act, holding back some tickets at the
start of the year and selling them at their own web site, again at a multiple of face value.
And then 2011 happened. The Cubs had actually played well in the preceding decade, posting a winning record six times and making the playoffs three times. But the team’s “success” (they failed to reach the World Series) seemed to change fans’ attitudes. For the first time in decades, fans expected to see a winning team. But the team stopped winning. When the team faltered in 2010, a few empty seats could be seen at Wrigley. The Cubs opened the 2011 season alternating wins and losses, but in May the team went into a tailspin and never recovered. Seemingly overnight, everyone noticed that the team was no good and that once quaint Wrigley Field was antiquated, uncomfortable, and occasionally unpleasant. So the fans stopped coming, not in droves, but enough to alter the balance from excess demand to excess supply.
The fundamental economic problem with baseball tickets is that once a game is over, they have zero value. Ticket brokers understand this better than anyone. As much as they would have liked to sell $40 face-value tickets for $200, they found themselves accepting prices well below face value. Prices at StubHub crashed as well. From the Cubs’s perspective, the unsold tickets actually had “negative” value, because fans who entered Wrigley could be relied upon to buy food and beer at inflated prices. So Cubs management supposedly gave out free tickets before each game. But even at bargain basement prices, the Cubs are playing to far less than capacity crowds. The other 29 MLB team owners no longer look on in envy.
176 • Chapter 5 • Competitors and Competition
per year. Because of a recession, suppose that Deere has confirmed orders for only 10,000 engines during the upcoming year. Deere is confident, however, that it can increase sales by another 10,000 engines by stealing a major customer from one of its competitors, Navistar. To do so, Deere has to offer this customer a price of $300 per engine, well below the average cost of $700.7
It may seem surprising, but Deere is better off offering this price and stealing the business from Navistar. To see this, note that the increase in Deere’s revenue is $3 million, whereas the increase in its total cost is only $1 million. By selling the extra engines at $300, Deere makes a contribution toward fixed costs, and some contribution is better than no contribution. Of course, Navistar may not let Deere steal its business, so the result may be a battle that drives the price for this order below $300. But as long as the order carries a price greater than the average variable cost of $100, Deere would be better off filling the order than not filling it.
In the long run, competition like this can drive price below average cost. If such competition persists, firms may choose to exit rather than sustain long-run economic losses. But if firm capacity is industry specific—that is, it can only be used to produce in this industry—firms will have no choice but to remain in the industry until the plant reaches the end of its useful life or until demand recovers. If demand does not recover, the industry may suffer a protracted period of excess capacity, with prices below average costs.
Monopoly
The noted antitrust economist Frank Fisher describes monopoly power as “the ability to act in an unconstrained way,” such as increasing price or reducing quality.8 Constraints come from competing firms. If a firm lacks monopoly power, then when it raises price or reduces quality its customers take their business to competitors. It follows that a firm is a monopolist if it faces little or no competition in its output market. Competition, if it exists at all, comes mainly from fringe firms—small firms that collectively account for no more than about 30 to 40 percent market share and, more importantly, cannot threaten to erode the monopolist’s market share by significantly ramping up production and boosting demand for their own products.
A firm is a monopsonist if it faces little or no competition in one of its input markets. The analyses of monopoly and monopsony are closely related. Whereas an analysis of monopoly focuses on the ability of the firm to raise output prices, an analysis of monopsony focuses on its ability to reduce input prices. In this chapter we discuss issues concerning monopolists, but all of these issues are equally important to monopsonists.
A monopolist faces downward-sloping demand, implying that as it raises price, it sells fewer units. This is not the same as having a stranglehold on demand. Even monopolists lose customers when they increase price. (If a monopolist raises price without losing customers, then profit maximization behooves it to raise price even further. Eventually, the price will increase to the point where it drives away some customers.) What distinguishes a monopolist is not the fact that it faces downwardsloping demand, but rather that it can set price with little regard to how other firms will respond. This stands in contrast with oligopolists, described below, who also face downward-sloping demand, but must be very mindful of how competitors react to their strategic decisions.
A monopolist selects price so that the marginal revenue from the last unit sold equals the marginal cost of producing it. For example, we shall calculate the