- •BUSINESSES IN THE BOOK
- •Preface
- •Brief Contents
- •CONTENTS
- •Why Study Strategy?
- •Why Economics?
- •The Need for Principles
- •So What’s the Problem?
- •Firms or Markets?
- •A Framework for Strategy
- •Boundaries of the Firm
- •Market and Competitive Analysis
- •Positioning and Dynamics
- •Internal Organization
- •The Book
- •Endnotes
- •Costs
- •Cost Functions
- •Total Cost Functions
- •Fixed and Variable Costs
- •Average and Marginal Cost Functions
- •The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions
- •Sunk versus Avoidable Costs
- •Economic Costs and Profitability
- •Economic versus Accounting Costs
- •Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit
- •Demand and Revenues
- •Demand Curve
- •The Price Elasticity of Demand
- •Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities
- •Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions
- •Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions
- •Perfect Competition
- •Game Theory
- •Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium
- •Game Trees and Subgame Perfection
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Doing Business in 1840
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Doing Business in 1910
- •Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
- •Production Technology
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Government
- •Doing Business Today
- •Modern Infrastructure
- •Transportation
- •Communications
- •Finance
- •Production Technology
- •Government
- •Infrastructure in Emerging Markets
- •Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Definitions
- •Definition of Economies of Scale
- •Definition of Economies of Scope
- •Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs
- •Economies of Scale Due to Trade-offs among Alternative Technologies
- •“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”
- •Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Density
- •Purchasing
- •Advertising
- •Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer
- •Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding
- •Research and Development
- •Physical Properties of Production
- •Inventories
- •Complementarities and Strategic Fit
- •Sources of Diseconomies of Scale
- •Labor Costs and Firm Size
- •Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin
- •Bureaucracy
- •Economies of Scale: A Summary
- •The Learning Curve
- •The Concept of the Learning Curve
- •Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage
- •Learning and Organization
- •The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale
- •Diversification
- •Why Do Firms Diversify?
- •Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification
- •Scope Economies
- •Internal Capital Markets
- •Problematic Justifications for Diversification
- •Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios
- •Identifying Undervalued Firms
- •Reasons Not to Diversify
- •Managerial Reasons for Diversification
- •Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions
- •Problems of Corporate Governance
- •The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance
- •Performance of Diversified Firms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Make versus Buy
- •Upstream, Downstream
- •Defining Boundaries
- •Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies
- •Avoiding Peak Prices
- •Tying Up Channels: Vertical Foreclosure
- •Reasons to “Buy”
- •Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies
- •Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs
- •Agency Costs
- •Influence Costs
- •Organizational Design
- •Reasons to “Make”
- •The Economic Foundations of Contracts
- •Complete versus Incomplete Contracting
- •Bounded Rationality
- •Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance
- •Asymmetric Information
- •The Role of Contract Law
- •Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain
- •Leakage of Private Information
- •Transactions Costs
- •Relationship-Specific Assets
- •Forms of Asset Specificity
- •The Fundamental Transformation
- •Rents and Quasi-Rents
- •The Holdup Problem
- •Holdup and Ex Post Cooperation
- •The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs
- •Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation
- •Investments to Improve Ex Post Bargaining Positions
- •Distrust
- •Reduced Investment
- •Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •What Does It Mean to Be “Integrated?”
- •The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
- •Alternative Forms of Organizing Transactions
- •Governance
- •Delegation
- •Recapping PRT
- •Path Dependence
- •Making the Integration Decision
- •Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency
- •The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Trade-off
- •Real-World Evidence
- •Double Marginalization: A Final Integration Consideration
- •Alternatives to Vertical Integration
- •Tapered Integration: Make and Buy
- •Franchising
- •Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures
- •Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships
- •Business Groups
- •Keiretsu
- •Chaebol
- •Business Groups in Emerging Markets
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitor Identification and Market Definition
- •The Basics of Competitor Identification
- •Example 5.1 The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets
- •Putting Competitor Identification into Practice
- •Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification
- •Geographic Competitor Identification
- •Measuring Market Structure
- •Market Structure and Competition
- •Perfect Competition
- •Many Sellers
- •Homogeneous Products
- •Excess Capacity
- •Monopoly
- •Monopolistic Competition
- •Demand for Differentiated Goods
- •Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Oligopoly
- •Cournot Quantity Competition
- •The Revenue Destruction Effect
- •Cournot’s Model in Practice
- •Bertrand Price Competition
- •Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different?
- •Evidence on Market Structure and Performance
- •Price and Concentration
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •6: Entry and Exit
- •Some Facts about Entry and Exit
- •Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Bain’s Typology of Entry Conditions
- •Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement
- •Structural Entry Barriers
- •Control of Essential Resources
- •Economies of Scale and Scope
- •Marketing Advantages of Incumbency
- •Barriers to Exit
- •Entry-Deterring Strategies
- •Limit Pricing
- •Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational?
- •Predatory Pricing
- •The Chain-Store Paradox
- •Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation
- •Wars of Attrition
- •Predation and Capacity Expansion
- •Strategic Bundling
- •“Judo Economics”
- •Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior
- •Contestable Markets
- •An Entry Deterrence Checklist
- •Entering a New Market
- •Preemptive Entry and Rent Seeking Behavior
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Microdynamics
- •Strategic Commitment
- •Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements
- •The Strategic Effect of Commitments
- •Tough and Soft Commitments
- •A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies
- •The Informational Benefits of Flexibility
- •Real Options
- •Competitive Discipline
- •Dynamic Pricing Rivalry and Tit-for-Tat Pricing
- •Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?
- •Coordinating on the Right Price
- •Impediments to Coordination
- •The Misread Problem
- •Lumpiness of Orders
- •Information about the Sales Transaction
- •Volatility of Demand Conditions
- •Facilitating Practices
- •Price Leadership
- •Advance Announcement of Price Changes
- •Most Favored Customer Clauses
- •Uniform Delivered Prices
- •Where Does Market Structure Come From?
- •Sutton’s Endogenous Sunk Costs
- •Innovation and Market Evolution
- •Learning and Industry Dynamics
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •8: Industry Analysis
- •Performing a Five-Forces Analysis
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power and Buyer Power
- •Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces
- •Coopetition and the Value Net
- •Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses
- •Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Commercial Airframe Manufacturing
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Barriers to Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Professional Sports
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Professional Search Firms
- •Market Definition
- •Internal Rivalry
- •Entry
- •Substitutes and Complements
- •Supplier Power
- •Buyer Power
- •Conclusion
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Competitive Advantage Defined
- •Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus
- •From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus
- •Value-Created
- •Value Creation and “Win–Win” Business Opportunities
- •Value Creation and Competitive Advantage
- •Analyzing Value Creation
- •Value Creation and the Value Chain
- •Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities
- •Generic Strategies
- •The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership
- •The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership
- •Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage
- •Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages
- •“Stuck in the Middle”
- •Diagnosing Cost and Benefit Drivers
- •Cost Drivers
- •Cost Drivers Related to Firm Size, Scope, and Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Independent of Firm Size, Scope, or Cumulative Experience
- •Cost Drivers Related to Organization of the Transactions
- •Benefit Drivers
- •Methods for Estimating and Characterizing Costs and Perceived Benefits
- •Estimating Costs
- •Estimating Benefits
- •Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies
- •Segmenting an Industry
- •Broad Coverage Strategies
- •Focus Strategies
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The “Shopping Problem”
- •Unraveling
- •Alternatives to Disclosure
- •Nonprofit Firms
- •Report Cards
- •Multitasking: Teaching to the Test
- •What to Measure
- •Risk Adjustment
- •Presenting Report Card Results
- •Gaming Report Cards
- •The Certifier Market
- •Certification Bias
- •Matchmaking
- •When Sellers Search for Buyers
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Market Structure and Threats to Sustainability
- •Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets
- •Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures
- •Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability
- •The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Imperfect Mobility and Cospecialization
- •Isolating Mechanisms
- •Impediments to Imitation
- •Legal Restrictions
- •Superior Access to Inputs or Customers
- •The Winner’s Curse
- •Market Size and Scale Economies
- •Intangible Barriers to Imitation
- •Causal Ambiguity
- •Dependence on Historical Circumstances
- •Social Complexity
- •Early-Mover Advantages
- •Learning Curve
- •Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty
- •Buyer Switching Costs
- •Network Effects
- •Networks and Standards
- •Competing “For the Market” versus “In the Market”
- •Knocking off a Dominant Standard
- •Early-Mover Disadvantages
- •Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium
- •Creating Advantage and Creative Destruction
- •Disruptive Technologies
- •The Productivity Effect
- •The Sunk Cost Effect
- •The Replacement Effect
- •The Efficiency Effect
- •Disruption versus the Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
- •Innovation and the Market for Ideas
- •The Environment
- •Factor Conditions
- •Demand Conditions
- •Related Supplier or Support Industries
- •Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Principal–Agent Relationship
- •Combating Agency Problems
- •Performance-Based Incentives
- •Problems with Performance-Based Incentives
- •Preferences over Risky Outcomes
- •Risk Sharing
- •Risk and Incentives
- •Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Trade-offs between Costs
- •Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?
- •Implicit Incentive Contracts
- •Subjective Performance Evaluation
- •Promotion Tournaments
- •Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination
- •Incentives in Teams
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •13: Strategy and Structure
- •An Introduction to Structure
- •Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies
- •Complex Hierarchy
- •Departmentalization
- •Coordination and Control
- •Approaches to Coordination
- •Types of Organizational Structures
- •Functional Structure (U-form)
- •Multidivisional Structure (M-form)
- •Matrix Structure
- •Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure
- •Network Structure
- •Why Are There So Few Structural Types?
- •Structure—Environment Coherence
- •Technology and Task Interdependence
- •Efficient Information Processing
- •Structure Follows Strategy
- •Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •The Social Context of Firm Behavior
- •Internal Context
- •Power
- •The Sources of Power
- •Structural Views of Power
- •Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers?
- •The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals
- •Culture
- •Culture Complements Formal Controls
- •Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs
- •Culture, Inertia, and Performance
- •A Word of Caution about Culture
- •External Context, Institutions, and Strategies
- •Institutions and Regulation
- •Interfirm Resource Dependence Relationships
- •Industry Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms
- •Chapter Summary
- •Questions
- •Endnotes
- •Glossary
- •Name Index
- •Subject Index
Doing Business in 1910 • 49
size and complexity of multiproduct operations necessitated a further reorganization into semiautonomous divisions. For example, the divisions of General Motors made operating decisions for each car line, while corporate management controlled corporate finance, research and development, and new model development. This organizational form, known as the multidivisional or M-form, became characteristic of the largest industrial firms until the 1960s.
The expansion of mass production was also associated with the subsequent growth of mass distribution firms in such sectors as groceries, apparel, drugstores, and general variety merchandising. While chain stores dated to the mid-nineteenth century, they greatly expanded in number and market share after World War I. In the United States, the number of A&P food stores tripled, as did J.C. Penney stores, while the number of Walgreens drugstores increased twentyfold. By 1929, the national market share of the top three grocery chains (A&P, Kroger, and Safeway) approached 40 percent. (The growth of national chains came more slowly in Europe, which had been beaten down by the First World War.)
The growth of vertically and horizontally integrated firms often reduced the number of firms in an industry and increased the potential for collusion to restrict competition and increase profits. During the period around 1910, the U.S. government directed antitrust activities toward breaking up firms that appeared to be national monopolies. Among the major cases during this time were those involving Standard Oil (1911), American Tobacco (1911), DuPont (1912), International Harvester (1918), and Eastman Kodak (1920).
Integrated firms employed more individuals in more complex and interrelated tasks than had earlier firms. They responded by standardizing jobs and tasks, monitoring worker compliance with management directives, appraising worker performance, and testing and training employees. These approaches spread widely among large firms, under the influence of a new type of specialist, the management consultant. Perhaps the best known of these approaches was “Scientific Management,” developed by Frederick W. Taylor, which sought to identify the most efficient ways of performing tasks through “time-and-motion” studies and then motivate workers to adopt these ways of working through the use of incentives, rewards, and sanctions.9
As firms grew larger, the functional areas of business—purchasing, sales, distribution, and finance—grew more important. The owner-manager could no longer perform these tasks alone. Firms created dedicated central offices staffed by professional managers, who ensured that production went smoothly and finished goods made it to market. As Alfred Chandler describes, the resulting hierarchy substituted the visible hand of management for the invisible hand of the market.10
These changes in the nature of the firm and its managers caused problems and conflicts. The development of internal controls needed for coordination and efficiency could easily turn into excessive bureaucracy. Newly expanded workforces resisted the controls on their behavior and the standardization of their work habits that were needed to foster greater and more predictable throughput. This aided the growth of unions, and with them increased labor-related conflicts.
Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure
A substantially new infrastructure for business had emerged by 1910, notably in transportation and communications. These developments fostered the growth of national markets by enabling firms to count on the fast and reliable movements of goods, along with instantaneous and accurate communication over vast areas.
50 • Chapter 1 • The Power of Principles: An Historical Perspective
Production Technology
Most people did not begin to hear about mass production until after 1913, the year in which Henry Ford began producing the Model T. Mass-production processes permitted high-volume, low-cost manufacturing of many products, including steel, aluminum, chemicals, and automobiles, to name only a few. These products proved to be of more than sufficient quality to compete with the lower-volume custom products they replaced. The technology of producing “management services” also developed. Innovations in document production (typewriters), copying (carbon paper; photocopying), analysis (adding machines; punched-card tabulators), and organization (vertical file systems) enabled managers to coordinate the increased volume of transactions. Supplying these products spurred the growth of such firms as IBM, Burroughs, and Remington Rand.
Transportation
The continued consolidation and rationalization of the railroads after the initial period of growth assured the throughput necessary for economical mass production. By 1910, railroads dominated passenger and freight transportation. Travel by rail became faster, safer, and more reliable. Manufacturers could obtain raw materials from distant sources and swiftly ship their products to customers hundreds or even thousands of miles away. Smaller manufacturers sold to the new massdistribution firms, such as Sears, which could cheaply distribute via the rails vast arrays of goods to scattered customers. Motorcars were also developing as a fundamental means of transportation, but trucks would not displace the U.S. railroads until the development of an extensive system of interstate highways following World War II.
Communications
The main components of the communications infrastructure in 1840—the postal system and the telegraph—were still important in 1910 and were increasingly becoming part of the management and communications systems of large firms. During this time, however, the telephone grew more important. Phone calls to suppliers and distributors could instantly assure managers that large production runs were feasible and that there were markets for their output.
The growth of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) illustrates how the development of large firms depended on market and technological conditions. When the telephone was invented in 1876, its technological potential (and hence its profitability) was uncertain because some devices essential for telephone service as we know it, such as the switchboard, were unknown. The market conditions facing the telephone were also uncertain because of patent conflicts. This led to local competition to provide service. By the 1880s, patent conflicts had been resolved, and new technology made consolidation possible. In 1883, under the leadership of Theodore Vail, AT&T adopted a strategy of merging local telephone companies into a national system. The resulting network reduced the costs of interconnecting large numbers of users, and the telephone quickly replaced the telegraph as the communications technology of choice.11 The telephone also had implications for how the emerging firms of this era were organized. For example, it is hard to imagine the growth of the multistory headquarters office building without the telephone to connect all headquarters employees with each other and with field offices.12
Doing Business in 1910 • 51
EXAMPLE 1.3 EVOLUTION OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY
In the first half of the twentieth century, success in the steel industry required both horizontal and vertical integration. Traditionally, the leading firms, such as U.S. Steel, Bethlehem Steel, and Republic Steel, produced a wide array of high-volume steel products and controlled the production process, from the mining of ore through the production of the finished steel products to marketing and distribution. But in the early 1950s, changes in market demand and technology transformed the industry.
The most significant change in market demand was driven by shifts in the economy. In the 1950s, “lighter” products, such as strips and sheets used to produce appliances, automobiles, and computers, became relatively more important than “heavier” products, such as rails and plates used for railroad and ship building. But the large steel producers, particularly U.S. Steel, were committed to the “heavy” products. Much of the steelmakers’ capacity was also poorly located to meet the new demands for lighter products. These factors allowed foreign producers to penetrate American markets.
The most notable technological advances were the basic oxygen furnace, the continuous casting process, and scrap metal processing with the electric arc furnace. The basic oxygen furnace, which was commercialized in 1950 by an Austrian firm, Linz-Donawitz, replaced the open-hearth process as the fastest way to convert iron into raw steel. Continuous casting, a German invention that was perfected in the early 1960s by a small American company, Roanoke Electric, allowed steel producers to bypass the costly process of pouring molten steel into ingots and reheating them for milling and finishing. The electric arc furnace was available before World War II but was little used before 1960.
However, the increasing availability of scrap steel from discarded automobiles changed that, and by 1970, the electric arc furnace had become a viable way of producing nonalloy steel.
These technological advances had two profound effects. First, in postwar Japan and Germany, and later in Brazil and South Korea, start-up steel firms quickly adopted the basic oxygen furnace and continuous casting. By contrast, in the United States, the established integrated mills had made nonrecoverable investments in the older technologies, in terms of both physical capital and expertise. These firms were therefore reluctant to shift to the new technologies. As late as 1988, 93 percent of all Japanese firms and 88 percent of South Korean steel firms had adopted continuous casting, while only 60 percent of American firms had done so, and nearly half of these U.S. firms had made the changes only in the 1980s.13 This allowed foreign producers to become competitive threats to the large integrated American producers.
Second, the new technology spurred the development of minimills, small nonintegrated producers that convert scrap metal into finished steel products. The success of minimill producers, such as Nucor, Chapparal, and North Star, is emblematic of the significance of this new way of producing steel. Minimills have eliminated the advantages of high-volume manufacturing in product lines, such as steel bars, structural shapes, and wire rods, and with Nucor’s recent breakthrough in thin-slab casting, they may also take away the advantages of scale in the production of hotand cold-rolled sheet. Although the large integrated producers have not disappeared, their importance has clearly diminished.
Finance
Since the 1860s, large investment banking houses had been underwriting most stock transactions that were essential for the financing of large firms. In 1910, securities markets publicly traded the shares of the largest industrial firms. The development of a financial infrastructure was further aided by the systematization and circulation of
52 • Chapter 1 • The Power of Principles: An Historical Perspective
credit information (credit bureaus), the availability of installment financing, and the development of the communications infrastructure.
During this time, owners, managers, and investors realized that the growing scope of business required new ways of keeping track of a firm’s activity and reporting its results. For example, the railroads produced major innovations in cost accounting to manage their requirements of operating efficiencies, while mass-marketing firms such as Sears developed new accounting concepts, such as inventory turnover, to link profits to fluctuations in sales volume.
Accounting developments also focused on the idea of public accounting—the public disclosure of details of a firm’s operations to ensure that investors were not being cheated by managers and that capital was being maintained. Laws enacted in England between 1844 and 1900 required the presentation of a “full and fair” balance sheet at shareholders’ meetings, the payment of dividends out of profits, the maintenance of a firm’s capital stock, and the conduct of compulsory and uniform audits of all registered firms. Similar developments occurred in the United States. The first U.S. independent accounting firm was founded in New York in 1883, and the American Association of Public Accountants was formed in 1886.
Government
Government regulation of the conditions under which business was conducted, in such areas as corporate law and governance, antitrust, provisions for disability insurance and worker safety, and insurance for widows and children, increased during this period. (Securities markets and labor relations were not fully regulated until the 1930s.) This increased regulation affected not only how firms behaved toward competitors and employees, but also how they were managed, since government forced managers to collect detailed data on their operations that had not been gathered before and that were useful to professional managers. Nearly universal mandatory secondary school education also became the norm for industrialized nations in the first half of the twentieth century. This produced a workforce able to meet the specialized needs of large bureaucratic firms. Finally, through continued infrastructure investments, along with increasing military and shipbuilding expenditures, government became an important customer and partner of industry. These different roles embodied numerous potential conflicts and did not always fit together well in the new economic terrain.
Summary The business infrastructure in 1910 made it efficient for firms to expand their markets, product lines, and production quantities. New technologies permitted a higher volume of standardized production, while the growth of the rail system allowed the reliable distribution of manufactured goods to a national market. The telegraph enabled large firms to monitor and control geographically separate suppliers, factories, and distributors. The growth of futures markets, capital markets, insurance companies, investment banks, and other financial institutions enabled business to be transacted on a scale that would have been impossible in 1840. By one estimate, the “transaction-processing sector,” which included transportation, communication, and financial institutions, had become one-third of the U.S. economy by 1910.14 To achieve the cost savings afforded by mass production and distribution, many firms reorganized and became more vertically and horizontally integrated. Increasingly, a new class of professional managers developed during this period and made critical decisions for firms. These managers became expert in functions that had not previously