Source: Public Opinion Program, University of Hong Kong, March 5, 2004 in Burns, J. P., Government Capacity and the Hong Kong Civil Service, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 2004.

Note: Question “Rank order the following occupations by level of prestige going from most prestigious to least prestigious.” The survey was carried out from March 1 to 3, 2004 by telephone using the standard Public Opinion Program telephone sampling method (telephone numbers were selected randomly from telephone directories and mixed with additional numbers generated by computer). There were 1031 successful cases; the response rate was 63.7% and standard error <1.6%.

16.3 Administrative Values

Despite 150 years of British rule, to a large extent Hong Kong Chinese subscribe to a Confucian world view (Lau and Kuan, 1988, 83). Confucianism holds that society is bureaucratic and hierarchical with the state being stronger than civil society (Dao, 1996, 48). “The Confucian model of government is bureaucratic and unitary. In this model, political order is remarkably monolithic, with all political power and actions centered in a single bureaucracy headed by the Emperor” (Dao, 1996, 51). In Confucian states, the division between civil servants and politicians is blurred and the bureaucracy tends to be more powerful and autonomous than in Western states (Dao, 1996, 58). Entry into the bureaucracy is based on merit for a career in an organization that is highly prestigious. In the Confucian states, graduates of elite universities staff the bureaucracy. The Confucian concept of governance requires that the bureaucracy be staffed by superior men of talent. Although the consent of the governed is important for the legitimacy of government (and is obtained by a government that cares for the people and develops the country), Confucian government is not democratic. In this view, the people give their consent but do not participate in government. This world view resonates well with the experience of governance in Hong Kong.

Administrative values in Hong Kong include hierarchical loyalty, efficiency, meritocracy, and political neutrality4 (Lui, 1988, 137–40; Scott, 2005, 64–87). In 1988, Terry Lui wrote that, “the

4Scott (2005, 65–80) identifies Hong Kong civil service values as small government, fiscal frugality (both arguably related to efficiency), centralization, rule by an administrative elite, merit, hierarchy, tenure, rule of law, corruption prevention, and political neutrality.

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Hong Kong civil service demonstrates remarkable compliance with hierarchical authority. Line implementation is highly effective. Insubordination is uncommon, and ‘whistle blowing’ among serving officials is almost unheard of…” (Lui, 1988, 139). The importance of hierarchical loyalty has changed little since then. As Lui (1988, 139) points out, the readiness of civil servants to accept orders from their superiors is “largely attributable to conventional Chinese attitudes of respect for authority and avoidance of conflict.” Compliance is reinforced by strict adherence to bureaucratic rules and regulations and an incentive system that highly values promotion. Again from the vantage point of the 1980s, “efficiency is of overriding importance to government officials in Hong Kong,” evidenced by the extraordinary attention paid to the input phase of the administrative process and the detailed scrutiny paid to government expenditure within government (Lui, 1988, 137). The Audit Commission’s value-for-money audits reinforce the government’s preoccupation with efficiency. Official emphasis on small government and fiscal frugality continue to the present day.

Entry into Hong Kong’s civil service is highly competitive and for the most prestigious posts (e.g., in the Administrative Service), those holding the appropriate educational qualifications are required to pass a battery of examinations, tests, and interviews with a success rate of no more than 0.2%. Despite the low success rate, from 10,000 to 12,000 apply each year for 25 to 30 AO posts, indicating the continuing attractiveness of the positions even in the face of civil service reforms that abolished pensions and reduced benefits and other changes that since 2002 have put the top policy-making positions in the hands of political appointees, not civil servants. Merit within the civil service is largely defined in terms of seniority, however, where position-based rewards are the norm.

Although Hong Kong’s political system does not include well-developed political parties, official policy highly values political neutrality. Senior civil servants are prohibited from campaigning for candidates in Hong Kong’s elections or standing for election to the Legislative Council or District Councils without first resigning from the civil service.5 Moreover, no civil servant of whatever rank may engage in any activity that would jeopardize the impartiality of government or that might lead to a conflict of interest (Lui, 1988, 138; Burns, 2004, 62–63; Scott, 2005, 77).6 These regulations, however, have not prevented a pro-big business orientation within the government that has kept direct taxes and welfare payments low, delayed the introduction of a competition law, and occasionally led to charges of business-government collusion (e.g., over the construction of the Cyberport, a large property and business development project handed to tycoon Li Ka-shing’s son without competitive bidding).

Hong Kong civil servants’ utility maximizing orientation operates within the value milieu outlined above and also within a bureaucratic culture that values harmony and good co-worker relations.

16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats

The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in policy making has gone from one of almost complete bureaucratic domination during the colonial period to one of shared roles since 2002.

5This prescription applies especially to all administrative officers, directorate officers, police officers, and information officers.

6Hong Kong’s political neutrality was referred to as “British practice” by officials in China in 2003. Political neutrality is not carried out on the mainland (see Burns, 2004, 63).

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The turning point came when the government introduced the Principal Official Accountability System (POAS) and replaced civil servants in the most senior policy-making roles with political appointees.

In the pre-2002 period, political power was concentrated in the hands of a single political appointee: the British governor until 1997 and the chief executive from 1997 until 2002. The evidence suggests that although they had the power to make policy and give directions to the civil service, they were highly dependent on the civil service for policy advice. Only occasionally did these single-appointee political executives dominate policy making. During the recent colonial period, among British governors, Murray MacLehose (1971–1982) was decisive in at least one area, the decision to establish the Independent Commission Against Corruption in 1973 (Scott, 1989, 146–52). MacLehose was also influential in other policy domains, such as various decisions to expand public services, including public housing, compulsory 3 years of secondary education, and social welfare. More recently, Chris Patten (1992–1997) put his personal stamp on reforms of Hong Kong’s political system in the run up to the transfer of sovereignty in 1997. Hong Kong’s first post-1997 chief executive, Tung Chee Hwa (1997–2005), attempted to make his mark on housing policy only to be undone by the Asian financial crisis in 1998. Tung’s supporters complained that the civil service failed to support the chief executive and obstructed his policies, leading the central government in Beijing to urge the civil service to better support Tung (Ming Pao 27.9.2000). Still, Tung was able to introduce the POAS in 2002, the prospect of which had prompted the head of the civil service, Chief Secretary Anson Chan Fang On-sang, to resign a year earlier.

Despite their constitutional position,7 governors/chief executives have been highly dependent on the civil service, which has, for the most part, dominated policy making. Governors were outsiders who brought with them only a very small staff. Until 2002, all the top positions, except for the position of governor/chief executive and one or two personal assistants, were held by civil servants. The chief secretary (a civil servant) chaired the Policy Committee (made up of policy secretaries, all of whom were civil servants until 2002) that made policy before it was endorsed by the Executive Council, an advisory body appointed by the governor/chief executive. Senior civil servants were drawn almost exclusively from the Administrative Service. Because of its disconnect from the people, the civil service-dominated government, in the words of one pre-2002 policy secretary, sometimes made policy that “did not meet the expectations of the people.”

In July 2002, to gain tighter control of the civil service, the government introduced reforms (the POAS) that added a political layer (policy secretary) on top of the most senior civil service positions (permanent secretary). As originally conceived, the chief executive would nominate the politically appointed policy secretaries from among outsiders who, because of their standing in the community or professional accomplishment, would introduce reforms that would improve the popularity of the government. From 2002 to 2005, when Tung resigned, half of the policy secretaries were appointed from among experts who came from outside government. They brought with them ideas about reform and attempted to implement their proposals with varying success. Relations between the outsiders and the civil service varied from conflict and hostility as some new appointees sought to gain control of their portfolios, to cooperation and partnership based on agreed divisions of labor, depending in large part on personal style. The outsiders for the most part apparently perceived some deficiencies in the generalist orientation of the senior civil servants they worked with and in many cases a kind of “Yes, Minister” relationship developed with permanent

7According to the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions for the pre-1997 period and the Public Service (Administration) Order for the post-1997 period the tenure of civil servants is insecure. In practice, however, civil service positions have been “iron rice bowls” and dismissals or terminations of employment rare.

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