- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
Performance Management Reforms in the Philippines 403
Reinventing government and its principles of reform prescribing a shift toward market approaches for the public sector anchored on entrepreneurial philosophies became evident not only in the United States, but in other countries as well. Given different labels, such as “new public management” (NPM), managerialism, market-based public administration, and post-bureaucratic paradigm, the new philosophy advocated economic approaches and private sector techniques in the management and operations of public agencies.
Public administration in the Philippines adapted to these new directions in public sector reform as embodied in such themes as NPM (Ocampo, 2003), reinventing or entrepreneurial government (Reyes, 1996, 1994), reengineering (Reyes, 2003; Sta. Ana, 1996; Presidential Committee on Streamlining the Bureaucracy, 1995), privatization (Mendoza, 2003), and decentralization (Brillantes, 2003), among others.
20.4The Philippine Experience in Promoting Results-based Management
Heppell (2008) identifies four major functions of government: making policies, raising revenue, providing goods and services, and regulation. Every president or political administration in the Philippines since the 1900s has been under pressure to continuously and effectively institute reforms in the bureaucracy to improve the performance of these functions. These reforms have taken various forms, as pointed out earlier, such as reorganization, streamlining, reengineering, reinventing, performance management, and quality management, among others.
Developing sometime in the 1980s, NPM advocates minimal government, a focus on policy making rather than on service delivery, on “steering rather than rowing.” Its initiatives include deregulating the economy, reducing the size and role of the bureaucracy, decentralizing government, empowering the citizens, involving other sectors in governance, and developing performance measures that focus on outcomes rather than rules and regulations. In sum, NPM promotes the adoption of private sector methods in the public sector.
To be able to access credit from multilateral institutions, countries had to accept structural adjustment packages (SAP) and conditionalities that include embarking on reforms that were pro-market and pro-private sector. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) viewed the role of government in many crises states as “far too extensive, intrusive, expensive, and inefficient” (Larbi, 1999: 7–8). The language of NPM such as “value for money,” “doing more with less,” “consumer as customer,” “results over process,” “downsizing and rightsizing,” “lean and mean,” “contracting out,” “outsourcing,” and “empowering rather than serving” have influenced public sector management reforms (Larbi, 1999: 11; Tillah, 2005: 12).
This section focuses on performance management initiatives implemented in the Philippines over the past decade that take the nature of NPM. The rise of NPM coincides with the transition of the Philippines from an authoritarian regime to a democratic government, thus a brief background on the post-martial law reform measures puts in context the strategies adopted more recently.
20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
As a reflection of the power and centralized decision making that the martial law dictator exercised from 1972 to 1986, the Offi ce of the President of the Philippines had grown in size with about 3000 agencies and institutions attached to it, while the number of government-owned or controlled
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
404 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
corporations (GOCCs) had ballooned from 75 in 1970 to around 303 in 1985 (Carlos, 2004: 43–47; Tillah, 2005: 24).
After the peaceful people-power EDSA Revolution in 1986 that ousted the dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos and restored democracy, expectations ran high that the bureaucracy would be rid of its inefficiencies and focus on serving the people well. Administrative reform measures that followed addressed the issues of curbing graft and corruption, defining ethical standards of bureaucratic behavior and promoting accountability, managing the size of the bureaucracy and enhancing the efficiency of government service delivery systems, structures, and processes, and decentralizing operations.
20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
President Corazon Aquino inherited a politicized military, a bureaucracy that was primed to respond to authoritarian ways, public institutions and processes that were savaged, and an economy that was in ruins. The housewife-turned-President faced a man’s job of repairing the damage to institutions, energizing a unmotivated bureaucracy, rehabilitating the military, and turning the economy around.
One of the first things that President Aquino did was to “rationalize” the bureaucracy. Soon after the EDSA Revolution, reforms started as a drive to “de-Marcosify” the bureaucracy, i.e., to purge it from appointees and loyalists of the dictator, using the policy of reorganization. Because there were virtually no ground rules to govern the wholesale replacement of elective and nonelective officials and the reorganization that took place from 1986 to 1987, and because the “deMarcosification” was selective and arbitrary, the results were unsettling and a sense of insecurity and instability in the bureaucracy was discernible.
By 1988, the CSC moved in to stabilize the bureaucracy by upholding “the basic democratic doctrine of due process and the right of government employees to security of tenure even during reorganization and radical political change” (Sto. Tomas, 1992: 7, 14). The passage of the Security of Tenure Act (Republic Act 6656) made government reorganization more methodical and orderly. At the same time, it made it extremely difficult to remove inefficient and ineffective employees since these were not sufficient grounds for dismissal, unless really pronounced and provided employees were criminally negligent.
President Aquino issued directives ordering the revamp of government along five principles: promotion of private initiative, decentralization, cost effectiveness, efficiency of frontline services, and accountability (Sto. Tomas, 1992: 6).
The workforce kept growing bigger, however. While the size of the bureaucracy was only 898,000 in 1982, it grew to 942,000 in 1986, reached 1.61 million by 1989, and stood at 1.3 million in 1991. The term “bloated bureaucracy” gained greater currency during the Aquino administration (Sto. Tomas, 1992: 14). By 1999, the civil service had 1.4 million employees representing 1.93% of the population. At that time, the civil servant to population ratio in other developing countries in Asia was over 2%. The Philippines has a ratio of 19 civil servants for every 1000 of the population and thus compares favorably to Singapore’s 23:1000, Europe’s 70:1000, or Brunei’s 73:1000. Despite this, the public perception of a bloated bureaucracy remained. The issue was more of efficiency, distribution, and cost (NEDA, 2001: 257–58). The wage bill was eating up more than 30% of the national budget so reducing the size of the bureaucracy was a major concern.
The ratification of a new constitution in 1987 was not sufficient to reverse the damage to the bureaucracy wrought by more than a decade of martial law. It restored the balance of power
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Performance Management Reforms in the Philippines 405
among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, reaffirmed the merit system as the foundation of the civil service, established the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to deal with issues of graft and corruption, and recognized the role of civil society in governance. But more needed to be done to satisfy the longings of a people for an efficient and effective government. A weak economy, political instability, weak political institutions, corruption, and a politicized bureaucracy, however, proved to be formidable obstacles in performance management.
The smooth transition of leaders after the 1992 elections indicated that democracy was thriving once more. President Fidel V. Ramos, however, faced the phenomenon of a “bloated bureaucracy” that needed to be trimmed down. Emboldened by a Supreme Court decision that upheld the power of the president to reorganize the Executive Branch, he marshaled the powers of the Office of the President to streamline the bureaucracy (Carlos, 2004: 55). He reconstituted the Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating Committee (GCMCC) to monitor and evaluate the performance of government corporations and initiated a management audit to determine the disposition of GOCCs that were not privatized.
From 1992 to 1995, 130 agencies, or 45% of national government agencies, streamlined their public delivery systems and 48 agencies downscaled operations by eliminating redundant or outdated activities. These dramatic reductions were due to various measures, particularly the implementation of Republic Act No. 7430 or the Attrition Law that was passed on April 15, 1992. Within 5 years from the approval of the law, no positions vacated as a result of resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, or transfer to another of f cei could be filled, with few exceptions (RP, 1992). The law arrested the growth of government and generated savings of over Php6 billion in the 5-year period. As the Ramos administration approached the end of its term, the size of the bureaucracy had been cut by 2.5%, or by over 60,000 positions (Carlos, 2004: 55–56).
Within a year after assuming office, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 165 on October 19, 1999, reiterating that “reengineering the bureaucracy for better governance” was a priority program of his administration “to develop an efficient, results-oriented and innovative bureaucracy that will support effective governance and sustainable socio-economic growth.” A Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) was created to oversee and coordinate institutional reforms in the bureaucracy. The PCEG was tasked to study and investigate the organization and operations of all agencies of the Executive Branch, including GOCCs and state universities and colleges (SUCs), and to prepare a “Public Sector Institutional Strengthening and Streamlining Agenda that will establish the framework, governing principles, and guidelines and pacing” for the process (RP, 1999: 2).
A provision of the 1999 General Appropriations Act had earlier directed heads of agencies to identify activities that were no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out or abolished, eliminate programs, projects and activities and that are redundant, irrelevant, and outdated and strengthen key functions and priority programs (RP, 1999: 1). The PCEG formulated a comprehensive plan to streamline the bureaucracy but this was not realized due to the sudden change in political leadership in 2001.
The setting up of the Housing Assistance One-Stop Center (to assist developers and beneficiaries of socialized and low-cost housing projects) and the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop-Shop for Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center (to expedite the processing of tax credit certificates and tax debit memos) were among the efforts to simplify government operations during the administration of President Estrada (Carlos, 2004: 61).
President Arroyo continued the efforts to streamline the bureaucracy. The Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) 2001–2004 adopted the Reengineering the Bureaucracy for Better Governance Program of the previous administration. This resulted in the abolition in
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406 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
2002 of 77 agencies and task forces attached to the Office of the President, generating a savings of Php56 million.
20.4.1.2 Privatization
Inefficient public enterprises are a fiscal burden to the state, thus NPM prescribes privatization. Reforma (2003, cited in Tillah, 2005: 24) identifies four goals of privatization: (1) a mechanism to get government out of the business of private sector; (2) a means of disposing non-performing assets to fund the agrarian reform program; (3) a way of reducing outlays for GOCCs and easing the financial burden of government; and (4) satisfying the SAP and conditionalities of multilateral lending institutions. These goals are reflective of the characteristics of NPM.
Privatization took the form of sale of government assets such as real estate, infrastructures, and facilities; abolition; mergers; build-operate-transfer (BOT); joint ventures; commercialization; and relinquishing government responsibilities and functions as opportunities for private sector businesses.
During her term, President Corazon C. Aquino immediately started privatization efforts as part of the SAP with the World Bank and the IMF, which specified austerity measures in government spending. She embarked on a privatization program that targeted government corporations and their subsidiaries and issued Proclamation No. 50 on December 15, 1986, creating the Asset Privatization Trust to expeditiously dispose of government assets under the supervision of the Committee on Privatization (RP, 1986). Intense bickering among high officials and politicians whose interests were affected delayed the privatization efforts. By 1992, some 122 of these corporations were privatized (OECD, 1998: 4).
Proceeding on the intertwined battle cry of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, the Ramos administration pursued privatization more vigorously and urged Congress to pass laws to implement these. Midway through his term, only 79 GOCCs remained, from the previous high of 300 GOCCs.
After many years of dialogue and debate, in June 2001, Republic Act 9136 or the Electric and Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) was passed, privatizing the National Power Corporation, which was bleeding the resources of government as it was mired in debt. The EPIRA provides the framework for structural reform toward an open and competitive power sector to attract substantial private investment. The law authorizes the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) to adopt alternative forms of internationally accepted methods of setting rates that would ensure reasonable prices for electricity and enhance efficiency in transmission (GOP, WB, ADB, 2003: xi–xii).
20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
Every administration has its own inventive way of dealing with the issue of corruption. As an indication of the seriousness of their intentions, new offices or agencies are created with new mandates. This has resulted in redundancies and waste of government resources and has not assuaged the public that is still waiting to see the “big fish” convicted for corruption.
On February 20, 1989, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 6713 establishing a Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and upheld the timehonored principle of public office being a public trust. The code spells out the norms of conduct and expected duties of public officials and employees, refers to incentives and rewards for exemplary service, and enumerates prohibited acts and transactions and the penalties for violations (RP,
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1989). While the code may not deter those determined to pursue personal gain over public good, it sets the standards of acceptable behavior for civil servants.
President Aquino had her President’s Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability (PCPEA) while President Ramos created the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) on January 11, 1994, by virtue of Executive Order 151 to demonstrate the will of the administration to curb graft and corruption. It was mandated to investigate cases or complaints involving graft and corruption filed against all presidential appointees in government and any of its agencies, including members of the governing board of any instrumentality, regulatory agency, chartered institutions and directors or officers appointed or nominated by the president to GOCCs. Its jurisdiction went as far as non-presidential appointees who may have acted in conspiracy or may be involved with a presidential appointee.
For his part, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 79 in August 1999 establishing the Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council (IAGCC), composed of representatives from the CSC, PCAGC, Commission on Audit (COA), OMB, and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The IAGCC’s task was to promote greater coordination among the agencies involved in addressing the issues of graft and corruption. He eventually abolished the PCAGC on July 18, 2000, by virtue of Executive Order 268 and created the National Anti-Corruption Commission “to implement and coordinate policy at the national level for the prevention, control of and ultimately elimination of graft and corrupt practices at all levels of government by public officers and private persons alike” (RP, 2000). The Commission, however, was never activated.
On April 16, 2001, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). The PAGC was tasked to investigate and conduct hearings on cases and complaints against all presidential appointees in the Executive Department and to assist the president in the drive against graft and corruption. A unique feature of the PAGC, which is also considered the Arroyo administration’s unique contribution in the fight against graft and corruption, is its authority to proactively conduct “lifestyle checks” on government officials with the rank of director and higher, including the First Gentleman. The PAGC has partnered with other government agencies and civil society organizations to craft a National Anti-Corruption Plan.
While the legal framework and institutional requirements to address corruption are in place, efforts and political will to successfully implement laws are sorely insufficient. Corrupt officers and employees have managed to go scot-free through inventive ways of going around laws and rules.
20.4.1.4 Decentralizing Operations
Previous attempts to decentralize operations were generally limited to giving field officers and local authorities the responsibility to implement programs or perform certain functions. The passage of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC) in October 1991 effectively devolved powers from national government agencies to local government units (LGUs) and institutionalized greater involvement of the people in the process of governance (RP, 1991).
Among the functions devolved to LGUs were provincial health offices, social services, agriculture and fishery extension services, forest management, local budget officers, public works funded by local funds, programs for rebel returnees, and development of tourism, involving over 70,000 positions.
Devolution of powers promotes administrative effi ciency as local chief executives can make faster decisions on local issues. The LGC has expanded citizen participation in governance and institutionalized the representation of civil society representatives in local councils such as the Local Development Council, and the local school and health boards. It has enabled
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