- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
42 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
2.2.4.3Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
Subordinate bureaucrats tried to adjust to their new political boss, former Prime Minister Thaksin. Those who served the new political boss well were promptly rewarded with promotions to higher and more powerful positions in the bureaucracy. Those who failed to please big businessmen-turned political boss, were abruptly transferred to inactive posts. Government bureaucrats were treated as “company employees” of big businessmen in power. The problem with big businessmen-led governments such as the T haksin government is that if one assumes that a government must serve the business interests of politicians in government, then the Thai polity will be overwhelmed with double standard practices, grand corruption, and conflicts of interest. Indeed, that was the story of Thaksin’s administration during 2001–2006 (Bowornwathana, 2009, 2009a; Pasuk and Baker, 2004; McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005).
2.2.5 Citizens as Master (1997–present)
“Citizens” here refers to educated persons who are supporters of the democratic reforms of public administration, which is much influenced by liberal ideas from western countries. Globalization plays a critical role in assimilation of the new foreign ideas of government reform, such as governance, into the educated Thai community. Educated Thais here may be intellectuals, educated middle and upper classes, or the educated poor.
Once in a while, this educated and active group is able to produce a major change or “big bang” in line with the principles and processes of democracy. The group does not occupy government positions. Its power for change is based on its ability to organize large groups of people in mass demonstrations to topple government and install western democratic institutions. Once the government falls, there is a power vacuum that provides pro-democracy citizens with the opportunity to introduce major changes in the government system by rewriting the constitution and pertinent laws. Examples of such political incidents include: the overthrow of absolute monarchy in 1932; the 1973 Student Revolution and the 1992 May Bloodshed that overthrew the military dictatorship and led to the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution; and the overthrow of the Thaksin government in 2006, leading to the 2007 Constitution that incorporates principles of democratic governance.
2.2.5.1Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
Governance or democratic governance has become the global trend for the ideal system of government in modern democracies. The basic assumption of governance is that the country belongs to the citizens and not to kings, military generals, politicians, or big businessmen. Citizens own government, and they are the true masters of all those who hold government positions. The prime minister, cabinet ministers, under-secretaries, directors-general, senators, members of Parliament, and other government officials are merely “representatives” of the citizens, working in the interests of the citizens. To make sure that these government officials operate accordingly, governance principles support the creation of independent accountability institutions that will monitor and guide the work of government and government officials to be in line with the principles of governance. Examples of these independent institutions are the Office of the Ombudsman, the constitutional court, the administrative court, the National Anti-Corruption Commission, the State Audit Commission,
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
History and Political Context of Public Administration in Thailand 43
the Senate, and the Election Commission. The major principles of governance are accountability, transparency, fairness, honesty, integrity, equity, small central government, privatization, strong civil society, and local governments (Bowornwathana, 1997).
The problem is that these governance values do not fit well with the realities of Thai polity and society, thus resulting in reform hybrids and unintended consequences (Bowornwathana, 2001, 2004b, 2006c, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming c). First, the creation of strong independent accountability institutions such as the constitutional court has raised several new questions: Are judges of the constitutional court indeed independent? Can they be influenced by other masters? Are the new accountability institutions in fact highly politicized? In this regard, several observations can be made. In the first place, those who have encountered adverse rulings meted out by accountability institutions often accuse the judges and commissioners of being biased and politicized. They accuse the judges of having been appointed by their political enemies. Second, positions in these new accountability institutions provide lucrative job opportunities for retired government officials (who retire at 60) to be retired at age 70 (which is the retirement age of members of the accountability institutions) and to benefit from the power, privileges, and rewards derived from their positions. Third, a new question also arises regarding the enormous power of accountability institutions that can put an end to or seriously obstruct the work of an elected government on legal grounds. The issue of “Who Guards the Guardians” is still wide open in Thailand. Table 2.1 summarizes the origins of major public administration legacies from five different masters.
Table 2.1 Origins of Public Administration Legacies from Different Masters
The Five Masters |
|
Legacies |
|
|
|
Kings (1238–1932) |
1. The king as leader |
|
|
2. |
Authoritarian rule, centralization, and big government |
|
3. |
Hierarchy and clientelism |
|
4. |
Reconciliation |
|
|
|
Military elites (1932–1973) |
1. Bureaucratic elites as a privileged group |
|
|
2. |
Authoritarian rule, centralization, and big government |
|
3. |
Staging military coups |
|
4. |
Loyalty to the king |
|
|
|
Politicians (1973–1997) |
1. Politicians as new political bosses |
|
|
2. |
Frequent and unpredictable changes of political bosses |
|
3. |
Politicians from the provinces becoming political bosses |
|
4. |
Low credibility of politicians |
|
|
|
Big businessmen (BB) |
1. BB in power |
|
(2001–2006) |
2. |
Super CEO authoritarian rule, centralization, and big |
|
||
|
|
government |
|
3. Government must serve business interests of BB |
|
|
|
|
Citizens (1997–present) |
1. Clash between western governance values and realities of |
|
|
|
the Thai polity |
|
|
|
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
44 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
Table 2.2 summarizes the important traits of governmental culture that has accumulated over eight centuries. First, there is the culture of perceiving the King as the Leader of the country despite the fact that constitutional monarchy was established in 1932. During the present King Rama IX reign, prime ministers and cabinets may come and go, but the king remains the pillar of national unity. Second, the tradition of authoritarian rule, centralization, and big government acquired from the past has been with us to the present. This tradition of a centralized big government with a single authoritative figure has been a strong trait of Thai traditional governmental culture. The underlying assumption is that the entire government bureaucracy, central and local governments, should be under a single person such as the prime minister. Third, the traditions of the hierarchy and clientelism have been core features of the Thai bureaucracy and society from the past to the present.
Fourth, the reconciliation tradition has been much alive throughout modern Thai political history (1932 to present). Fifth, under absolute monarchy and military rule, bureaucratic elites were accepted as a powerful privileged group. Under elected politicians and big businessmen, bureaucratic elites still wield considerable clout in government, but their leading dominant role has been curtailed. Sixth, the practice of staging military coups was acceptable during absolute monarchy and military rule. Such practice became more and more unacceptable under elected politicians and big businessmen. Seventh, the tradition of the military’s strong loyalty to the king has been kept alive to the present day.
Table 2.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
|
|
|
|
Authoritarian |
|
|
Absolute |
Bureaucratic |
Democratic |
capitalism |
Pro- |
Traits of |
monarchy |
polity under |
polity under |
under big |
governance |
governmental |
under kings |
military elites |
politicians |
businessmen |
citizens |
culture |
(1238–1932) |
(1932–1973) |
(1973–1997) |
(2001–2006) |
(1997–present) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
The king as the |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
leader |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Authoritarian |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
rule, |
|
|
|
|
|
centralization, |
|
|
|
|
|
and big |
|
|
|
|
|
government |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hierarchy and |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
clientelism |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Reconciliation |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
tradition |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bureaucratic |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
elites as a |
|
|
|
|
|
privileged group |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Staging military |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
coups |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
History and Political Context of Public Administration in Thailand 45
Table 2.2 (continued) Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
|
|
|
|
Authoritarian |
|
|
Absolute |
Bureaucratic |
Democratic |
capitalism |
|
Traits of |
monarchy |
polity under |
polity under |
under big |
Pro-governance |
governmental |
under kings |
military elites |
politicians |
businessmen |
citizens |
culture |
(1238–1932) |
(1932–1973) |
(1973–1997) |
(2001–2006) |
(1997–present) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
The military’s |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
loyalty to the |
|
|
|
|
|
king |
|
|
|
|
|
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Politicians as new |
– |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
political bosses |
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Frequent and |
No |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
unpredictable |
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change of |
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political bosses |
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Politicians from |
– |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
the provinces |
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becoming |
|
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|
|
political bosses |
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Low credibility of |
– |
– |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
politicians |
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Big businessmen |
– |
– |
– |
Yes |
No |
in power* |
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Government |
– |
– |
– |
Yes |
No |
must serve |
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business interests |
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of big |
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businessmen* |
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Clash between |
– |
– |
– |
– |
Yes |
western |
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governance |
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values and |
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realities of the |
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Thai polity* |
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Note: Yes = supportive, No = not supportive. *Emerging legacies.
Eighth, the phenomenon of having elected politicians, especially from the provinces, as new bosses of bureaucrats is a recent one. Ninth, the tradition for the elected politicians to be seen by others as corrupted and bad is also another characteristic of the Thai governmental culture. Tenth, the use of government power to facilitate the businesses of big businessmen in power is unacceptable for the pro-democracy citizens. Lastly, the clash between governance
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC