- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
Civil Service System in Thailand 131
6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
On the one hand, the performance of the civil service regarding discipline looks satisfactory. The number of officials who breached discipline (gross and non-gross breach) in 2007 is 472 officials, which is only 0.1% of the civil service officials. In fact, the number of disciplined officials is improving over the years. That is, there were 937, 829, 563, and 502 disciplined officials in the year 2003– 2006, respectively, compared to the mentioned 472 disciplined officials in 2007 (OCSC 2009b). However, the survey on upholding the civil service’s values may tell another story. That is, it was found that civil servants perceive the civil service’s value on “courage to stand for the right thing” is the value that is most breached (i.e., cannot be practiced), while the major obstacles against following the values include lack of a good role model (i.e., supervisors), distrust in the merit system, and a lack of incentive mechanisms (Sarapimpa 2009). Therefore, one might assume that the low rate of disciplinary actions might be because a lot of malpractice cases are not reported. Another challenge of the civil service discipline system is how to maintain a balance between discipline and performance. While the newly created MSPC and the credible Administrative Court will help the civil service to be more transparent and accountable, it is possible that as these check and balance mechanisms provide easy access for complaints, they can make officials too cautious in doing their jobs and in proposing innovations. Another challenge lies in the public sector’s internal labor market. Legal officers in the civil service have been attracted by higher pay and a better career in other public sector organizations, such as the Administrative Court, Court of Justice and Public Prosecutor Office. The OCSC has responded to this problem with top-up pay for its legal officers. However, given the better image, status, and career in such organizations, brain-drain of legal officers from the civil service can still be predicted.
As for the MSPC, one challenge is how to manage its overflow of work. The MSPC has anticipated this problem by recruiting 14 prescribing commissioners to help its 7 core commissioners. It is expected that such prescribing commissioners will start work by the end of 2009. However, it is interesting to see the qualifications of these new prescribing commissioners. As the work of the MSPC is more than discipline and appeals (i.e., it also reviews the merit of departments’ rules and regulations), the MSPC needs prescribing commissioners whose skills and experiences cover both disciplinary actions and organizational management. Next, the term of service of the MSPC commissioners is also worth mentioning. The system was designed such that the term of service of all seven commissioners will end at the same time. It means that a lot of organizational knowledge will be gone with the retired commissioners. The MSPC as an organization, therefore, needs to develop an effective knowledge management system to support the new set of commissioners to do their jobs effectively, in a timely fashion.
6.7 Conclusion
The Thai civil service has continually evolved through its 80-year journey from the first Civil Service Act in 1928 to the newly enacted Civil Service Act of 2008. This current act is the first major amendment in almost 20 years that aims to enhance the overall efficiency of the civil service HR management system, ranging from the restructuring of the CSC (which includes devolution of authority of CSC in various functions), establishing the MSPC, to renewing the position classification system and salary schedule (OCSC 2009e).
Driving this new management platform, however, requires secondary laws and regulations to turn concepts and principles into operations. It is this stage that will create the next momentum for the
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132 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
civil service management. The new act will need 53 secondary laws (e.g., Royal Decree, civil service regulations, circulations, and standards), but as of September 2009 which is more than 1 year after the enactment of the act, only 27 of such laws have been adopted. One example of the important regulation that is still in the process of consideration by the CSC is the regulation on promotion and transfer of officials. This regulation is expected to integrate the promotion and transfer processes and procedures of all position groups into one regulation instead of having separate regulations for each position group as in the previous act. This integration requires consensus among working groups that draft laws and the CSC sub-commission on legal matters in many aspects including the clarity of concept of each position group, the appropriate legal language and terminology, and even the common pattern in writing the regulation. Without an effective coordination mechanism, such a consensus will be difficult to implement and as a result will affect the timely execution and credibility of the act. Therefore, in order to effectively drive the implementation of the new Civil Service Act, it is necessary for the OCSC to speed up the law-making process of these secondary laws.
In addition, the OCSC has to make sure that the outcome of dealing with all functional challenges discussed earlier will help the civil service to become the employer of choice in Thailand’s labor market. The huge number of 500,000 applicants for the civil service in 2009 can only create the “reversed” employer of choice. Among these candidates, only about 30% came from leading universities (Wanichtanom 2009). Among this 30%, it is not known how many are in the top tier in their universities. The OCSC must work with departments to redesign recruiting strategy to show the public how the civil service is a place for energetic and talented people. Together with such a rebranding strategy, the OCSC should operationalize section 53 of the act, which allows the CSC to devolve the implementation function of recruitment and selection to ministries and departments, which in turn will catalyze these line agencies to innovate their recruitment and selection practices. Increased flexibility for departments, however, requires an effective facilitating and monitoring role by the OCSC.
Becoming the employer of choice also means the ability to retain and motivate qualified officials. The OCSC has to increase the confidence of officials on the merit system as stated under section 42 of the act. This is because such confidence can affect the work motivation of officials, and it turns out that confidence in the merit system is not satisfactorily high. According to the Report on the Civil Service Human Resource Management Status 2008, whose survey was the response from about 70% of all departments, more than 75% of officials are satisfied with their work. However, the officials’ perception regarding the merit and fairness of the HR management system is in the opposite direction. For example, less than half of officials in the survey regard performance appraisal as merit-based and only 30% support the process and outcomes of promotion decisions of their departments. In addition, almost half of officials do not feel involved by their executives in the policy-making process. Punitamai (2009), moreover, found that although executives and HR officials in the public sector are in need of talent, almost 60% of talented officials in the survey admitted they used to think about leaving the organization. Trust building, therefore, is another key success factor for the civil service.
Finally, one of the main objectives under the current Civil Service Act is the devolution of authority from the CSC to departments and ministries, which includes position, recruitment, and selection management. Effective devolution of HR management requires the ability of line agencies to analyze their manpower situation. However, the status report mentioned above says that only 40% of departments keep updating their manpower database. A number of departments also do not use their manpower database for decision making on HR policy. The OCSC therefore needs to help departments’ capability in managing their manpower database system and utilize the database in HR policy management.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Civil Service System in Thailand 133
Appendix 1: Civil Service Commission’s Power
and Duties (Section 8)
(1)To make proposals and advise the Council of Ministers on public human resource management policies and strategies with respect to standard for remuneration, management and development of human resource, as well as the manpower planning and other matters, which are to be adopted as operational guidelines for government agencies;
(2)To report to the Council of Ministers with respect to considerations for the appropriate revision of salaries, positional allowances, subsistence supplements, welfare or other fringe benefits for government officials;
(3)To prescribe rules, procedures and standards for the management and development of human resources of civil officials to be adopted as operational guidelines for government agencies;
(4)To approve the manpower framework of government agencies;
(5)To issue CSC Regulations and rules governing human resource management in pursuance of this Act, including to give advice or guidelines for the performance of functions under this Act; a CSC Regulation shall come into force upon approval by the Council of Ministers and publication in the Government Gazette;
(6)To give interpretations and rulings on problems arising from the application of this Act, including to lay down practice guidelines for problem cases; a resolution of the CSC under this subsection shall be enforceable under the law upon approval by the Council of Ministers;
(7)To supervise, oversee, monitor, inspect and evaluate the human resource management of civil officials in ministries and departments in order to maintain fairness and human resource management standards, including to inspect and monitor the performance of functions under this Act; in this regard, the CSC shall have the power to summon documents and evidence from government agencies, or to summon representatives of government agencies, officials or other persons to give statements of facts, and the power to issue rules requiring ministries and departments to file reports on human resource management of civil officials within their scope of authority with the CSC;
(8)To formulate policies and issue rules concerning King’s scholarships and government scholarships so as to correspond with human resource management policies with respect to government officials, as well as to assign scholarship recipients to government services in ministries and departments or State agencies upon completion of studies;
(9)To issue directives or rules pertaining to the provision of education, supervision and assistance to public personnel, King’s scholars, government scholars and private students under care of the CSC, including to collect service fees for the supervision and administration of education; in this regard, services fees for the supervision and administration of education shall be deemed as revenues of a government agency providing publicly beneficial services under the law on budgetary procedures;
(10)To prescribe rules and procedures for accrediting the credentials of holders of degrees, vocational certificates or other credentials for the purpose of instatement and appointment as civil officials, and to determine the salary rates or remuneration as well as the position levels and categories for such credentials;
(11)To determine rates of fees for the performance of functions pertaining to human resource management under this Act;
(12)To consider the installment of a personnel record system and the alteration of personnel records with respect to the date of birth, and the control of retirement by age of civil officials;
(13)To carry out other duties as provided in this Act and other laws.
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134 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
In issuing a CSC Regulation under (5), in the case where it is deemed appropriate, the Office of the Civil Service Commission shall also consult the relevant ministries in conjunction with the considerations of the CSC.
Section 13. There shall be an Office of the Civil Service Commission, abbreviated “OCSC” with the Secretary-General of the CSC as the superior official in charge of the officials and administration of the OCSC, directly accountable to the Prime Minister.
The OCSC shall have the following powers and duties:
(1)To act for the CSC and MSPC in the performance of their official functions and to perform other duties as assigned by the CSC or MSPC;
(2)To make proposals and give advice to ministries and departments in relation to the rules, procedures and guidelines for public human resource management;
(3)To develop, promote, analyze and conduct researches in relation to policies, strategies, systems, rules, procedures and standards on the human resource management of civil officials;
(4)To monitor and evaluate the human resource management of civil officials;
(5)To carry out acts in relation to manpower planning of civil officials;
(6)To be the center of database on public human resources;
(7)To prepare strategies, to coordinate and to carry out acts in relation to the human resources development of government officials;
(8)To promote, coordinate, disseminate, provide consultation and advice and carry out acts in relation to the provision of welfare and the enhancement of quality of life for public human resources;
(9)To carry out acts in relation to King’s scholarships and government scholarships in accordance with policies or rules of the CSC under section 8(8);
(10)To carry out acts in relation to the care of public personnel and scholars in accordance with directives or rules of the CSC under section 8(9);
(11)To carry out acts in relation to the accreditation of degrees, vocational certificates or other credentials of persons for the purpose of instatement and appointment of civil officials and to determine the salary rates or remuneration as well as the position levels and position categories for such credentials;
(12)To carry out acts in relation to the maintenance of personnel records and to oversee the retirement by age of civil officials;
(13)To prepare an annual report on human resource management in the civil service for submission to the CSC and the Council of Ministers;
(14)To perform other duties as provided in this Act, other laws or as assigned by the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister or CSC.
Appendix 2: DO’s and DON’T’s for Thai civil servants
Section 82. A civil servant must act in accordance with the following directives:
(1)To perform official duties faithfully, honestly and fairly;
(2)To perform official duties in accordance with laws, regulations, rules of official authorities, Council of Ministers resolutions, government policies and act in accordance with the regulatory framework of official authorities;
(3)To perform official duties with a view to obtaining desirable results and in advancement of the government service with determination, diligence, attention and an awareness to preserve the interests of official authorities;
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