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86 Public Administration in Southeast Asia

4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability

Political instability seems to be inherent in the Thai parliamentary system. Since 1932, coalition government has been in evidence more so than the domination of one strong party, like in the years 2001–2006. Beyond this, military coups are quite common.

Consequently, political actors tend to place priorities on political stability, on how best to serve out their term or on how to prepare for the next election. Rarely does true moral and ethical leadership emerge from political actors. Perhaps this fluid and unstable political arena also undermines the status of politicians. In pursuit of power, politicians usually exhibit weaknesses and lack of ethics and morals.14

Ironically, regime changes, whether by “democratic” means or by military coup in Thailand invariably cite corruption as the rationale or justification for making political changes. Charges of corruption are commonly made by politicians and political parties at one another. Political leaders in general are not looked on for moral or ethical leadership, and there is understandably little “political will” or action to fight and deter or suppress corruption among most politicians.

4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption

After the 1997 Constitution came into effect, a number of independent organizations were created with specific mandates to carry out their tasks independently from the control of the executive branch or the ruling government. It was believed that Thai society needed a national countercorruption agency with independence, integrity, and autonomy so that it could carry out its task exclusively in tackling corruption among administrative and political officials. Moreover, the design of an “independent” status for these few agencies was aimed at allowing these agencies to act independently, not to be controlled, influenced, intimidated, or co-opted by the powerful government.

Independent organizations that came into existence from the 1997 Constitution include the National Counter-Corruption Commission (which has since changed its English name to the National Anti-Corruption Commission or NACC), the Election Commission, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Human Rights Commission. The NACC was expected to be the key player in fi ghting corruption and abuse of power by public officials (both elected and administrative officials). Other ‘independent’ agencies, like the Election Commission, were designed to deal with frauds, corruption, collusion, conspiracy, and all forms of wrong practices, including vote buying by political actors and political parties, especially in political elections, from local level to national level.

The ombudsman’s office, an “independent” agency, was set up as an oversight organization where citizens’ grievances and complaints against public officials and public agencies can be addressed and heard. In Thailand, prior to the 1997 Constitution, it was virtually impossible for the average citizen to lodge a complaint against state agencies. The all-powerful state was seen as immured to public scrutiny, much less to public challenge. Citizens’ feeling of inefficacy vis-à-vis wrongdoing against them by the state was to be corrected by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman. Although not legally empowered to prosecute or to make judgment on cases, the ombudsman’s

14It is commonly discussed and agreed in Thai society that politicians and political leaders provide no moral leadership for Thai society. The public often expresses distaste and disgust for the poor behaviors of some politicians.

©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

Public Ethics and Corruption in Thailand 87

expected role was deemed essential. To receive and investigate complaints, to make recommendations, and to forward types of systemic problems and failures in the administrative apparatus for proper corrections are much needed in Thai society. Under the 2007 Constitution, the current one, the ombudsman was also tasked with initiating core values for public ethics. Currently, all state agencies are required to formulate their code of ethics/conducts based in part on the core ethical values or principles put forth by the ombudsman.

The nine core values are to: uphold integrity and ethics; be conscientious about honesty and responsibility; uphold national interest above personal interest and be mindful of conflict of interest; persist in doing what is right, just, and lawful; provide services to the people promptly with civility and without discrimination; provide full and complete information to the people without distorting facts; aim for work results while mindful of standards, quality, transparency, and accountability; uphold democracy in which the king reigns; and uphold the ethics of each profession and the organization it subsumes under.15

Not unlike the NACC, the ombudsman inherited a staff from a pre-existing institution. In this case, it was the Secretariat Office of Parliament, which had helped form the ombudsman’s office. The ombudsman’s office has three commissioners who serve as its board members in the capacity of policy making, oversight of the secretary-general and its staff members, and in guiding and directing the overall policies of the office.

The Office of the Ombudsman has kept a low profile, almost as if it were invisible from public view. It has recently played a more visible role by creating nine core values as a basis for the formulation of code of conducts for all public agencies. Hopefully, the ombudsman’s office will make itself, its role and mission, as well as its accomplishments more visible and understandable to Thai society in general. The current board aims to work in a more proactive manner.16

The NACC was designed to be the leading agency in handling corruption and malfeasance by public officials (both elected and permanent officials). It inherited many of its staff members from a previous office for tackling corruption in the public sector, which was situated in the Prime Minister’s Office. The NACC has a secretary-general and deputies as well as staff members, many of whom are legal professionals. The secretary-general is tasked with duties in supervising the office and its staff, like a chief administrative officer. Above the secretary-general are the policy bosses who are the nine commissioners. In reality, the commissioners serve as policy makers, decision makers, as well as chairpersons of various sub-committees that are tasked with investigative functions. The NACC staff members help work on cases, often supported by external experts or specialists invited to join in the investigating of cases. However, the chairperson responsible for each case is invariably a commissioner. Given that upward of 5000 cases are either under investigation or are pending or waiting to be examined at any one time, the work load for each commissioner is overwhelming. This brings about an unavoidable lengthy period of time before a case can be concluded. This problem needs to be resolved by law changes because this issue, as well as many other areas with inadequate flexibility for the NACC, awaits amendments of the NACC law.

Corruption cases that the NACC must deal with before 2008 vary from minor malfeasance to grand corruption. Cases also involve low-ranking government officials to ministers and even the prime minister. Therefore, there is a need to prioritize cases like determining what are the important

15Translation of the nine core values of the ombudsman as presented here was done by Juree Vichit-Vadakan in a paper written for the World Bank Institute entitled Thailand. Country Governance in August, 2008.

16Drawn from personal discussion with various persons including a commissioner and the secretary-general of the Ombudsman.

©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

88 Public Administration in Southeast Asia

or fast track cases.17 The current commissioners of the NACC have made changes to many of the previous practices and have improved and speeded up the scrutiny process, which helps to make the NACC more hands-on and up-to-date with “hot issues” or allegations of wrongdoing either in corruption or malfeasance by public officials that the public is interested in.

However, given that Thailand has more than 63 million people, not counting at least a couple of million non-Thai aliens living and working in Thailand, the NACC is not adequately staffed or resourced to handle corruption in the public sector from local to national level. At present, the NACC permanent staff is around 600 with around 150 as contracted employees and around 40 temporary employees. Its annual operating budget is between 600 and 700 million baht, not counting money for capital investment.

Based on Saran Thitilak’s report,18 the NACC had completed 131 cases of wrongdoings by public officials from October 2006 to October 2008. Some were corruption cases that were to be criminally prosecuted. Others were to be given disciplinary sanctions, and some cases fell under the “unusually wealthy” category. Under the NACC law, when a public official is accused of becoming unusually wealthy, he/she is responsible for producing evidence to substantiate the sources of such wealth. In one notorious corruption scandal some years back, the Ministry of Public Health, some of its top-level officials, its minister, and his advisor were accused of corruption in medical supplies procurement. After lengthy investigations (albeit with some resistance from the state) with pressure from civil society organizations and with assistance from the media as well as some sectors within the ministry like the Rural Doctors Association that initially blew the whistle, the Pharmacists Association, and the Nurses Association, the advisor to the minister was convicted.19 The minister himself was eventually convicted, not on direct involvement in the corruption case itself as evidence could not link him directly to “kick-back” or “bribery.” The NACC, however, traced his money trail and found extra cash in his account. The NACC used the “unusually wealthy” law to charge him. The court did not believe his explanation of “winnings from casinos in Australia.” Hence, he could not explain the source of his unusual wealth and was convicted. Subsequently, this minister was sentenced to prison, which was actually the second case to date where a minister was sent to prison on corruption-related charges.

To the credit of the NACC, of the 131 cases, nine were important or major cases involving highlevel public officials. A former big political boss who had held ministerial positions many times in the past was charged with corruption in land procurement for water treatment—a protracted case that took years to investigate and conclude. The culprit in this case has fled the country and has not served his sentence. The other cases involved directors general of departments, or secretary-general, or permanent secretary of ministry either for wrongdoing in corruption or malfeasance.

These high profile cases would obviously make a stronger impact on societal perception of the NACC’s efficacy as a corruption fighter. All told, the NACC is the main agency with its own law to investigate and make conclusions regarding public officials in corruption. Although the NACC is not mandated to arrest or make final judgment, their findings are usually accepted by

17There were many complaints about the slowness of the NACC’s investigative process. The current commissioners have told me that they have changed their work process in an attempt to speed up investigations and also to prioritize important cases instead of the former “first come first serve” system.

18See Saran Thitilak, www.thaigoodgovernance.org.

19Civil society leader Rosana Torsitakul, who is now a senator, rose to fame and national prominence in leading a coalition of 30 NGOs in monitoring and pressuring for sanction against the Ministry of Public Health’s corruption scandal in the medical procurement case. The protracted fight led to success in bringing the culprit to justice.

©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

Public Ethics and Corruption in Thailand 89

the prosecutor-general’s office, which will then forward the case to the judicial court. Sentencing is under the jurisdiction of the judiciary.

To alleviate the NACC of its heavy case load, the Ministry of Justice in 2007 initiated the creation of another anti-corruption unit under its wing with the specific mandate to investigate corruption and malfeasance among middle to lower level public officials. The law was passed in early 2008 and in theory this new unit should be up and running. In essence, the structure and system of the Office of Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission are much akin to the NACC’s. Hence, it is expected to operate similarly with the NACC. In fact, the secretary-general of the NACC is also an ex o cio commissioner of the Office of Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission.

However, the selection of the Office of Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission’s commissioners and particularly the endorsement by Parliament have been delayed. As a result, the Office of Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission does not function fully at this time because it is yet to have its commissioners.

The Office of the Auditor-General is tasked with auditing all public institutions, quasi-public institutions, “independent agencies,” and other state affiliated institutions that receive budget from the state. The auditor-general supervises the day-to-day work of its office, including assigning special tasks and attention to vulnerable or high-risk agencies or projects. There is a board of commissioners that serves as advisors and gives support and policy guidance to the auditor-general and its office. Before the creation of the NACC, this office was the main agency for detecting and dealing with fraud and corruption in the public sector. The office conducts an annual audit of public agencies, although not necessarily of every unit within an agency. Its auditing duty generally focuses on how rules and regulations have been adhered to in financial matters and in procurement. Generally, auditors from this office can detect misuse of funds, irregularities regarding financial matters, and deviation from rules, regulations, and standard procedures. Its findings and recommendations are made known to the head of the agency. Response and remedial effort are required of the head of an agency. In cases of suspected fraud and corruption, the head of an agency is duty-bound to proceed with investigation and disciplinary action, including filing criminal charges when necessary.

The Office of the Auditor-General and its board of commissioners are now in the independent organization category and no longer under the executive branch of government. This is necessary to ensure its neutrality, flexibility, and independence from political pressure. Currently, it does not have power to arrest or prosecute. If the proposed amendment of its law passes Parliament and is promulgated, this office will be given more power to carry out its task in a more comprehensive manner. There are pros and cons to this proposed law change. It remains to be seen if it will come into effect.

In essence, the auditor-general’s office serves as a regular check-up mechanism on the public administrative system to keep public sector agencies on their toes. Whereas the NACC serves as a body to investigate cases of alleged corruption and malfeasance, especially when a complaint is filed, unlike the Ofi ce of the Auditor-General, the NACC does not perform a routine or regular audit of public agencies.

Public agencies, except for very small agencies, also have an internal auditing unit that performs auditing and reports its findings directly to the head of the agency or to its board, if there is one. Increasing importance is given to the internal audit unit as it could help the executives with risk management, as well as with compliance, fraud, and corruption issues. In addition, public sector departments as well as all ministries have persons in the positions of departmental inspector or ministerial inspector. These inspectors are high-ranking officials usually at an equivalent level to a deputy director general of the department or a deputy-permanent secretary at the ministry level.

© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

90 Public Administration in Southeast Asia

Since many central agencies also have offices outside Bangkok, inspectors tend to travel around the country to oversee if the agencies’ representatives in the provinces are performing in a transparent manner. In reality, inspectors respond to complaints and reports of alleged corruption and malfeasance. At times, inspectors lack resources, and support from the very top of the agency.20

4.4.1Other State Agencies related to Corruption and Ethics in Public Office

The OCSC is the central agency on issues relating to public officials’ human resource (HR) management and development. It continues to conduct an entrance examination for the public sector, although this is no longer the big annual event it used to be because the Thai public sector is supposed to downsize and become lean, trim, and highly efficient. The OCSC sets standards for HR practices. It is also tasked with setting measures for disciplinary standards, rules, regulations, and proper procedures in all areas regarding HR management, like recruitment, retention, promotion, demotion, transfers, rotations, and disciplinary process and procedures. Another key role of the OCSC is training and development activities. In particular, the OCSC is tasked with the promotion of ethics and integrity in public officials. When the 2007 Constitution stipulated that ethics and codes of ethics/conduct were to be formulated in every public agency, while the ombudsman drew up the core values as a framework or guideline for public agencies to follow, the actual implementer of this task fell eventually on the OCSC. Within the OCSC, there is a Sub-committee on Ethics Promotion and an Ethics Center. These two entities are responsible for promotional activities on ethics with a view to transforming itself into an ethics office somewhat akin to the Ethics Office of the US federal government. Some of the past activities of the Ethics Center and the Sub-committee on Ethics Promotion include the creation of a hybrid public cum civil society organization with management and secretarial support for this organization coming from the OCSC. Although registered as a foundation like many other civil society organizations, Crystal Clear Thailand continues to be managed and run by the OCSC staff. Its activities waxed and waned although it has around 80,000 members countrywide. Some enthusiastic members have donated cash and land to the organization in the hope that the Thai public sector can become transparent and corruption free.

Ethics promotion of the OCSC has the blessing of the cabinet, which also entrusted the OCSE to carry out monitoring duties of public agencies to make them comply with writing their own codes of conduct. In addition, the OCSC is expected to provide training and other measures to promote public ethics. Other agencies that play a role in combating corruption, albeit not as a primary function, also need to be mentioned here.

The first is the Department of Special Investigation (DSI). This is under the Ministry of Justice with a special mandate somewhat like the FBI of the United States to investigate special crimes of a magnitude that will negatively impact the well-being of Thai society. It was conceived as a highpowered, highly specialized, neutral, non-partisan investigative body that will take on cases where high-powered and highly influential persons are involved as culprits, collaborators, or protectors of the alleged crimes. Where a regular police investigative team may fail to solve these cases, the DSI team is supposed to be able to deal with them.

20From years of observations and discussions with public administrators, especially with inspectors themselves, I have come to this analysis and conclusion. Generally, to be appointed an inspector is not perceived as a good appointment but a disfavor from the boss.

©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

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