Decentralization and Local Governance in Thailand 59

3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand

Many students of Thai politics were thus surprised at the enactment of the Tambon Council and Tambon Administrative Organization Act in 1994. The TAO law has since turned out to have been a very significant step in the current decentralization process. Between 1994 and 2004, decentralization became an important process in Thai politics.

The coup led by the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) in February 1991 was an attempt by the military elite to return to a centralized government controlled by themselves and the bureaucrats. The coup ultimately failed when the military turned its guns on protesters in May 1992, prompting a fierce popular reaction against the military’s ambitions, and in favor of greater democratization through, among other things, decentralization.13 There were, in particular, three factors that created the conditions that gave rise to decentralization: the growing importance of political parties and the concept of “representativeness”; the decline of military power and with it the erosion of the power of the bureaucracy; and increased policy-based competition during elections. The pro-decentralization drive initially challenged the power of the MOI by demanding that the post of provincial governor be made elective.

3.3.1Political Parties and the Growing Importance of “Representativeness”

The main reason why the political crisis erupted in May 1992 was the protestors’ opposition to the elevation of a prime minister who was not a member of Parliament. Earlier in November 1991, activists also objected to a senate in which all the members were appointed rather than elected, and two thirds of them were bureaucrats. This appointed Senate had considerable authority, including the power to initiate an administrative decree (phraratchakamnot) or to request a debate of non-confidence in the government. The power of non-elected senators was on a par with that of the members of Parliament elected to represent the people.

In June 1992, the constitution was amended to give higher importance to “representativeness.” In concrete terms, this meant that only a member of Parliament in future could become prime minister.14 The Speaker of the House of Representatives also became the ex o cio president of the parliament instead of the Senate Speaker.15 The president of the parliament played an important role in receiving the Royal Endorsement (phraboromma-ratcha-ongkarn) that legitimized the appointment of a prime minister. The reforms also reduced the power of the Senate, which retained the right to ask for a general session of Parliament, but lost the right to vote on non-confidence in the government. This right now belonged exclusively to the House of Representatives.16

As “representativeness” became increasingly important at the level of national politics, it inevitably had a reverberating effect at the local level as well. Many political parties raised the issue in relation to the provincial governor, arguing that election was a far better and more democratic

13Shortly after the February 1991 coup d’état, speakers at an academic seminar held at Thammasat University argued that real democracy could only be achieved when social groups had a greater say in policy making. The speakers also implied that, as long as MOI bureaucrats retained their stranglehold on the administration of the country, there would be no truly participatory democracy in Thailand. See “Academics suggest democratic solutions,” Bangkok Post, March 20, 1991, p. 6.

14The 1991 Constitutions of Thailand (fourth amendment) September 10, 1992.

15Section 86 of the First Amendment became effective on June 29, 1992.

16Khien Thirawit (1993: 118–25).

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60 Public Administration in Southeast Asia

option than the usual practice of appointment by the MOI. They argued that local representatives, who were able to understand the specific and complicated problems in their areas, were better qualified to hold this important post.

3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy

Before the political crisis of May 1992, the Thai military played a dominant role in balancing the political power of politicians and acting as a friendly and efficient adviser to civilian bureaucrats. But after the political crisis in May 1992, the military’s capacity to intervene in politics declined considerably.17 The army commander in chief, Gen. Wimon Wongwanich declared that the military would no longer be involved in politics—the first time that a top military leader had publicly expressed this view. One of the consequences of this announcement was that the military’s strategic partners—civilian bureaucrats—also came under pressure to reduce their involvement in politics.

This new situation was different from the past when, since the revolution in 1932, the military had always played a significant role in preserving the balance of power between politicians and civil servants. Politicians respected and honored high-ranking permanent officials because they believed in the knowledge, ability, and work experience that the latter had fostered through their expertise in each specific field. But once the military withdrew from active politics, this balance was lost and civilian officials were weakened. The idea that power should be transferred to “those who are elected from the people” gradually increased. Permanent officials began to accept professional politicians, and this in turn created the opportunity for decentralization, despite initial confrontation between politicians and civil servants. Furthermore, the new balance of power gave scope for the idea that extra-bureaucratic forces could take over some aspects of government, which had formerly been closely guarded by officialdom. This idea was realized in the 1997 Constitution when the conduct of elections was transferred from the MOI to a new extra-bureaucratic structure.18

3.3.3 Increased Policy-based Electoral Campaigning

In 1992, the demand for elective provincial governors was strongly supported by academics and scholars, and was subsequently adopted by political parties as part of their election platform. At elections in March 1992, several political parties, including the Democrat Party (DP), Palang Dharma Party (PDP), New Aspiration Party (NAP), Solidarity Party (SLP), and Seri Dharma Party (SDP), announced support for elective provincial governors. But machine politics and vote buying were more important than platform promises in determining the election result. The Samakkitham Party (STP), which opposed this reform, won the largest number of seats and headed the coalition government. The issue of reforming local government was again pushed aside. Yet, when elections were called again six months later, after the bloody suppression of demonstrations in May 1992, there were signs of change. At elections in September, the DP and PDP again campaigned by promoting the value of local self-government and promising to bring about

17Tamada, Yoshifumi (2002: 120–72).

18“Kasem named head of new-look Poll Watch” The Nation, July 9, 1992, p. A1. The idea was for a non-govern- mental organization to oversee the election. The Constitution of 1997 Chapter 6, Part 4 specified an “Election Commission” as a non-governmental organization with the authority to oversee the election and ensure that it is righteous and fair. This effectively removed the responsibility from the MOI’s hands, thereby reducing its power to some extent.

©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC