- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
502 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Law of the HCACAI was passed by the legislative assembly.1 Notwithstanding, the HCACAI had its own innate defect, that its functions laid down by the Organization Law stipulated that it could not carry out criminal investigations on corruption matters but only on matters of an administrative nature because the legislature refused to vest any further power in it; the government failed to reform its maladministration legacy; the civil service did not cooperate with them; and its functions were curbed by the court’s interpretation [2]. At that time, the HCACAI was set up to combat illegal behavior, including corruption and administrative wrongdoings in connection with civil servants.2 However, its performance was described as merely bluff. When Macao became a Special Administration Region of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after the retrocession from Portuguese administration on December 20, 1999, the HCACAI was transited into the Macao Commission Against Corruption (CAC) in accordance with Articles 50 and 59 of the Basic Law of MSAR. In almost one decade of practice, the CAC had carried out many operations with successful trial result. Notwithstanding, the performance still could not satisfy the public’s anticipation. The shocking scandal of the ex-secretary for Public Works and Transportation, Ao Man Long, showed the serious problems within the civil services, and that the monitoring mechanism on the civil servants seemed to lag behind.
This chapter intends to examine the functions of the anti-corruption body, and the internal and external limitations that may hinder it in combating corruption.
24.2Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
24.2.1 Functions
The MSAR, established on December 20, 1999, provided an opportunity for structural reform to this former “Portuguese Colony.” Eight months after the handover, the MSAR government rapidly announced an Organizational Law outlining the functions and powers of the CAC. The CAC adopts the dual functions of anti-corruption and ombudsman with an independent status and its commissioner is directly accountable to the chief executive. Edmond Ho, the first chief executive of MSAR, pointed out that the fundamental and crucial function of the CAC is to fight against the illegal behaviors within the civil service and investigation power should be vested on it [3]. According to Article 3 of the Organizational Law of Law number 10/2000,3 the functions of the CAC are to:
(1)Carry out preventive actions against acts of corruption or fraud
(2)Investigate any crimes of corruption and fraud committed by civil servants in accordance with Criminal Justice Law
(3)Investigate allegations of corruption and fraud in voter registration and related elections in the institutions in the MSAR in accordance with Criminal Justice Law
1 Ibid., pp. 81–116 and 171–96. See also the History of the Commission, CAC of Macao website: http://www.ccac. org.mo/en/subpage.php?cat=intro&page=history.
2 MSAR Commission Against Corruption website: http://www.ccac.org.mo.
3 See MSAR government website: http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2000/33/lei10_cn.asp.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Public Ethics and Corruption in Macao 503
(4)Promote the protection of human rights, freedom, security, and legitimate interests of individuals, and to ensure the fairness, lawfulness, and efficiency of the public administration through the clauses laid down in Article 4 of this law and other informal channels4
Notwithstanding, the term “civil servant” here refers to those working in the public departments or bodies in which half or more of the operation funding is sponsored by the government,5 it is astonishing that the power of the anti-corruption body is limited to crimes related to civil servants as mentioned in section 2 of the Organizational Law. However, illegal behaviors or briberies, such as accepting bribes in personnel promotion or merchandizing, occurring in the private sector are excluded from the CAC’s investigation. Hence, employees in the private sectors can be immune from prosecution provided that those graft behaviors do not involve a public officer.
24.2.2Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
The Macao administration enacted rules regulating the behaviors of public servants to maintain a high standard of ethics and clean government when it was still under the Portuguese rule. According to Article 279 of the General Regulations Governing the Staff of the Public Administration of Macao enacted in 1989,6 public servants have a series of obligations, including:
(1)Impartiality
(2)Zeal
(3)Obedience
(4)Loyalty
(5)Confidentiality
(6)Courtesy
(7)Assiduity
(8)Punctuality
(9)Not engaging in incompatible activities
Explanations of these obligations can be found in Clauses 3 to 11 in Article 279 of the same legislation (see Table 24.1). In addition to these regulations made decades ago, the CAC produced the Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants after the handover. These guidelines decode the definition of conflict of interest and other major ethical problems commonly found in Macao’s public service, including the handling of advantages received; outside employment; the recusal system; duty of confidentiality; use of department or institution property; legal liability; and duty to report and relevant channels.7 (See Appendix A for abstracts of
4Translations of sections 1–3 can be found on the Macao Commission Against Corruption official website: http://www.ccac.org.mo; section 4 is translated by the author directly from the Chinese version of this legisla-
tion. For details of this legislation, see http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2000/33/lei10_cn.asp.
5 See Panel Code, Article 364, MSAR Printing Bureau webpage: http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/95/46/codpencn/ default.asp.
6For details of this regulation, see: http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/89/51/estatuto_cn.asp (only Chinese and Portuguese versions are provided).
7A full version of the guidelines can be located on the CAC webpage: http://www.ccac.org.mo. For abstracts of these guidelines, see Appendix A.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
504 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Table 24.1 Obligations of Public Servants in MSAR
Obligations |
Features |
|
|
Impartial |
Not to accept money or other benefits that are not allowed |
|
by the laws directly or indirectly while carrying out duties, |
|
and to behave in a fair, impartial, and independent manner |
|
in handling any kind of private interest and pressure, so as |
|
to respect equality between people |
|
|
Zealous |
Carrying out duties in an effective way and wholehearted |
|
manner, especially in understanding the rules laid down by |
|
the laws and regulations, superiors’ instructions, and |
|
possessing and enhancing technical knowledge, mastering, |
|
and improving the ways of carrying out the duties |
|
|
Obedience |
Respecting and abiding orders issued by the due superior |
|
under legalized ways and task oriented |
|
|
Loyalty |
Carrying out duties in accordance with a superior’s |
|
instruction and doing so with the objective of the task itself |
|
in order to further public interests |
|
|
Confidentiality |
Keeping occupational secrets of ‘non-open’ facts acquired |
|
during the course of carrying out duties |
|
|
Courtesy |
Treating service users, colleagues, superiors, and |
|
subordinates in the public institutions with respect and in a |
|
well-bred manner |
|
|
Assiduity |
Working normally and continually in the department |
|
|
Punctuality |
Going to the department to work on time |
|
|
Not engaging in incompatible |
Ceasing from engaging or not taking on activities that are |
activities |
incompatible with current duties |
|
|
Source: Article 279 (3)–(11), General Regulations Governing the Staff of the Public Administration of Macao, http:// bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/89/51/estatuto_cn.asp
the guidelines.) It is remarkable to note that few codes in the guidelines involve the inter-personal relationship between superiors-subordinates, such as the recusal system, duty of confidentiality, and duty to report, signaling that patron-client relations under the Portuguese legacy is still happening in this post-colonial regime. Nevertheless, the CAC has made a lot of successful arrests in combating corruption cases since its setting up, whereas criticisms on its performance against heavy weight criminals can be heard from time to time (see Table 24.2).
24.2.3 Performance
Table 24.2 shows the total number of cases reported to the CAC from 2000 to 2007. It is worth noting that the number of cases reported dropped in 2006 and 2007. However, the cases commenced in these 2 years do not record a clear improvement compared with 2003–2005, when more than 1000 or so reported cases were recorded. This can be explained that when the former secretary for public work and transportation, Ao Man Long, was arrested in December 2006
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
|
|
|
Public Ethics and Corruption in Macao |
505 |
||
Table 24.2 Comparison of Cases Recorded by Categories since the Handover |
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Case Commenced |
|
Referred to |
Handled |
|
|
|
|
|
Cases with |
Another |
through |
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Criminal |
Ombudsman |
Insufficient |
Department to |
Informal |
|
Year |
Cases |
Cases |
Evidence |
Follow |
Channels |
Total |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000 |
83 |
52 |
783 |
60 |
– |
978 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2001 |
112 |
22 |
1062 |
64 |
5 |
1265 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002 |
115 |
16 |
917 |
59 |
9 |
1116 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2003 |
85 |
5 |
333 |
28 |
626 |
1077 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2004 |
75a |
1 |
708 |
81 |
362 |
1227 |
2005 |
69a |
1 |
714 |
39 |
286 |
1109 |
2006 |
54 |
3 |
460 |
31 |
292 |
840 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2007 |
66 |
9 |
367 |
43 |
251 |
736 |
|
|
|
|
|
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Source: Synthesizing various Annual Report of CAC from 2000 to 2007, website: http://www.ccac. org.mo/en/subpage.php?cat=intro&page=report.
aThe CAC Annual Report did not categorize criminal case and ombudsman case under case commenced item. The Annual Report in 2004 and 2005 only mentioned the number of criminal cases commenced in the chapter entitled Anti-Corruption instead of the chapter entitled General Description with Statistics used to report figures. Figures for these 2 years are calculated along this logic.
after almost a year-long investigation, people are so interested to see whether the authority would carry out a just investigation and prosecution in this case, as an ordinary citizen would be treated. Further, it is interesting to see that the total number of cases reported in 2007 was relatively low. One may expect that complaints should be increased after the arrest of Ao as there would have no other reason left to question the decisiveness of the CAC in combating bribery. The most possible factor driving such a phenomenon is that Ao’s case scares away those public servants who prefer to commit ethical crimes. Indeed, Ao’s case did encourage people to take notice of the performance of the civil service as the number of cases commenced in the ombudsman category drastically increased in 2007 compared with the previous 4 years.
Apart from the case reports made to the CAC to indicate their performance, the CAC is concerned about their performance evaluation by international organizations. Transparency International (TI) is a worldwide anti-corruption survey organization, and the CAC would pay relatively high attention to the surveys made by TI. In fact, the TI did not include Macao in its survey targets before 2006. According to an email enquiry to Liao Ran, TI’s senior program coordinator of South East Asia, made in early October 2006, “the countries which are listed on the CPI, they must be measured by three different surveys. Macao was not surveyed by three difference surveys, so it is not included.”8 Surprisingly, Macao was listed in the survey report by TI issued in November 2006 as there was a “small change to the methodology used
8Personal email enquiry made on October 5, 2006. I asked the TI why they did not include Macao in their survey because Macao was a place well known for gambling and corruption. Liao replied efficiently the next day.
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