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446 Public Administration in Southeast Asia

low levels of competencies, poor management of hiring and promotion—represents a critical development constraint to competitiveness, economic development, and sustainable growth of the country.

21.5.1 Corruption

This issue of corruption cuts across the problematic areas of the Philippine bureaucracy. It impedes government effectiveness in service delivery and undermines the country’s ability to pursue development objectives. Efforts to combat corruption in government have been pursued, including a good number of anti-corruption legislations and given existing agencies with the authority to fight corruption like the CSC, Office of the Ombudsman, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), COA, Sandiganbayan, the Judiciary, DBM, COMELEC, Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), the creation of about 17 special bodies. However, these efforts have “remained futile in grappling the plague of corruption in the administrative system” (ADB 2005a).

There are numerous laws in the Philippines, dating back to 1955, which address the subject of graft and corruption. Currently, the main reference is the Revised Penal Code of 1960, referred to as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the 1987 Constitution (Article XI). Some of the notable anti-corruption initiatives are the public procurement reforms spearheaded by the DBM. These include the issuance of EOs to facilitate increased competition and reduce delays in bidding, the implementation of the electronic procurement system, and the creation of Procurement Watch, Inc. (PWI), a civil society-based monitoring body on procurement. In October 2001, EO No. 40 was issued to standardize government procurement procedures, shorten the time frame for bidding, provide the Bids and Awards Committee (BAAC) with a permanent secretariat, and institutionalize the representation of CSOs in the BAAC.11 EO No. 40 also facilitated the functioning of Procurement Watch, Inc. (PWI). The passage of the Government Procurement Reform Act in 2002 has further strengthened the policy framework to reduce the opportunities for corruption as well as to increase the risks of getting caught (ADB 2005a).

Under the leadership of the COA, key financial management reforms were undertaken, including the simplification and computerization of the government accounting system, the shift from residency auditing to audit team approach, and the introduction of participatory audit with civil society organizations (CSOs). The fight against corruption is drawing increasing involvement from civil society, the private sector, and media. They have become noticeably more active in demanding public accountability and transparency from government. Critical alliances have been formed via projects that support anti-corruption programs, e.g., the Transparent and Accountable Governance (TAG) Project—between the private sector and civil society, the Government and Budget Watch Projects—between government and civil society, and the Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN)—among civil society, the private sector, and the academe (ADB 2005a).

The CSC plays a preventive role in the fight against corruption by setting standards for government appointments and a punitive role by meting out penalties for violations of civil service rules. Government efforts to promote corporate governance and prevent private sector corruption are further strengthened by the joint initiatives of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,12 and the Anti-Money Laundering Council (ADB 2005a).

11The Implementing Rules and Regulations of EO No. 40 was signed in February 2002.

12Central Bank of the Philippines.

©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

Civil Service System in the Philippines 447

Every political administration in the Philippines after the Second World War has attempted to carry out public sector reform. The results and outcomes have been uneven and, to a certain extent, many initiatives have fallen short of expectations. The Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP) of 1972 under President Marcos promised the most extensive and wrenching effort at administrative reform in the history of the Philippine republic. It provided for decentralization, downsizing of the bureaucracy, and standardization of departmental organization. It also sought to introduce structural changes and reforms to strengthen the merit system as well as the professionalization of the civil service system. In retrospect, one could not really expect the landmark innovations of the IRP to take root since they unfolded in an environment of authoritarianism and oppression, where the interests of the rich and powerful few reigned over the welfare of the people (Brillantes and Mangahas 2006; ADB 2005a).

The bureaucracy under Marcos became more subservient than at any other time in its history (Endriga 2001). Under the guise of pursuing the objectives of nation-building and institutional strengthening, Marcos purged thousands of government employees and restructured the government as he deemed fit. The government was shielded from public scrutiny and criticism. To make matters worse, most of these irresponsible acts, if not all, were perpetuated, tolerated, and left unpunished (Brillantes and Mangahas 2006; ADB 2005a).

The Aquino Government (1987–1992) introduced another wave of administrative reforms. Aside from restoring democratic institutions and ratifying a new constitution, guidelines for promoting public participation and private initiative in the affairs of the state were established. Decentralization, accountability, efficiency of frontline services, and fi scal discipline were likewise pursued. Accountability institutions such as the Tanodbayan, the COA and the CSC established during the Marcos era were given expanded powers under the new constitution. Aquino also created the Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability and the Presidential Commission on Good Government to restore government integrity and public confidence. CSOs became more visible in government decision making and program implementation (Brillantes and Mangahas 2006; ADB 2005). These agencies were envisioned to strengthen government integrity and public confidence and to retrieve the so-called ill-gotten wealth of former dictator Marcos and his cronies.

The record of performance of all these initiatives did not meet expectations. Aiming to streamline the bureaucracy, thousands of civil servants were purged during the Aquino administration. Most of the vacancies were filled by new appointees—many of them from the private sector—who entered through the traditional career system. This even led to the tradition of creating new positions to accommodate political appointees. In the end, the Aquino government had more government employees than her predecessor (Brillantes and Mangahas 2006; ADB 2005a).

Reorganization under Aquino took place with minimal participation of those affected. Paradoxically, while lay-offs were justified in the name of downsizing a government, the number of civil servants as well as political appointees increased considerably. The proliferation of political appointees did not only blur the merit and career system in the civil service, but it also hindered, in many instances, the continuity and stability of policies and programs. The number of public agencies and offices likewise grew, resulting in an extended and fragmented government structure (Brillantes and Mangahas 2006; ADB 2005a).

President Fidel V. Ramos (1992–1998) pursued the new public management (NPM) paradigm by creating a blueprint for re-engineering the bureaucracy (DBM, 1995a). His administration set out a plan to re-engineer the bureaucracy, and laid down the guiding principles for reorganizing and improving government operations. He attuned civil service reform with the global trend of reinventing and re-engineering the bureaucracy popularized by Osborne and Gaebler in the

© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

448 Public Administration in Southeast Asia

early 1990s. Among the themes then were de-bureaucratization, decentralization, devolution, and deregulation for development. Ramos extended local governance and decentralization, promoted the privatization program by divesting GOCCs, and continued to implement the attrition law for rightsizing the civil service (Brillantes and Mangahas 2006; ADB 2005a).

President Joseph Estrada (1998–2001) issued EO No. 165 directing the formulation of an institutional strengthening and streamlining program for the executive branch and introduced a program on Re-engineering the Bureaucracy for Better Governance Program. He formed the Presidential Committee on Executive Governance (PCEG) through EO No. 165 dated October 19, 1999, to formulate an institutional strengthening and streamlining program for the executive branch, including GOCCs and SUCs. The PCEG crafted the Integrated Administrative Reform Plan (IARP) to identify specific administrative reforms affecting the missions, functions, structures, systems and operations, staffing, training and development, and compensation and benefits packages for personnel of government agencies (Brillantes and Mangahas 2006; ADB 2005b).

PCEG is an inter-agency body mandated to oversee and coordinate the overall implementation of public sector reform programs. It is co-chaired by the executive secretary and the DBM secretary with the NEDA director-general, the chairperson of the CSC, and the head of the Presidential Management Staff (PMS) as members. T he turbulent conditions led to the suspension of the PCEG’s operations. The Estrada administration was cut short through massive protests, with the president implicated in grave abuse of authority and graft and corruption, which led to his prosecution for plunder.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–2004; 2004–present) envisioned improving the civil service system by streamlining the bureaucracy. On President Arroyo’s assumption into office, she reactivated the PCEG. She issued Memorandum Order (MO) No. 93 directing the creation of six sub-committees to assist the PCEG in (1) service delivery, (2) organizational structuring and staffing, (3) financial management, (4) personnel management, (5) change management, and

(6) information technology. As the technical working groups of the PCEG, these sub-committees review government policies, structures, operations, and programs, and recommend solutions to identified gaps and weaknesses in government systems and practices.

The PCEG took the lead role in the implementation of EO No. 72 in February 2002, which sought to rationalize the organization and supervision of agencies under and/or attached to the Office of the President (OP). The PCEG oversaw the reorganization of the OP, which involved the transfer of 13 agencies from the OP to other government offices, the abolition of 61 agencies, and the possible abolition of 16 other agencies. On September 8, 2004, the PCEG was likewise abolished and its functions were transferred to the DBM. In September 2004, a total of 14 agencies were abolished through EO No. 357; four either merged with or their functions were transferred to other departments/agencies. It also commissioned the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) to review systems and procedures undertaken by key agencies in the issuance of business permits, passports, retirement benefits, veterans’ claims, land registration certificates, and professional licenses.

The PCEG also approved the Public Sector Institutional Strengthening and Streamlining Agenda. It likewise advocated the passage of the Reengineering the Bureaucracy Bill, which authorizes the president to implement the re-engineering plan and to create the Commission on Government Re-engineering. This bill is now with the Committee on Appropriations for review. The PCEG also led a review of the Code of Conduct for Civil Servants (RA No. 6713). It drafted EO No. 20, which directed heads of GOCCs, GFIs, and subsidiaries exempted from or not following the SSL to implement pay rationalization in all senior positions, suspend the grant of any salary increase and new benefits not covered by the SSL, and reduce the actual compensation package of senior officials and members of the Board of Directors/Trustees of GOCCs and GFIs.

© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

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