- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
Performance Management Reform in Macao 525
In general, contracted employees did not enjoy the same benefits, did not have the same promotion opportunities, and did not have the same job security as those hired as staff. The inequality created low morale and made it difficult to motivate the contracted employees. It was also difficult to motivate the staff employees to perform better, since they enjoyed a high level of job security and better benefits and promotion opportunities regardless of their performance.
In addition, the 2006 consultation report (SAFP et al., 2006: 6) indicates that civil servants could generally reach the topmost rank and level of their career tracks in about 15–21 years, whereas a civil servant’s career lifespan is usually 30–36 years. It is obviously difficult to motivate civil servants to seek continuous improvement when there is no further reward in sight.
This complex and unfair system had undermined effective performance management before and after the Handover. The government recognized the problems of this system and organized two rounds of consultation with civil servants (SAFP et al., 2006: 9). In July 2009, the government revamped the civil service system to simplify the career track and employment arrangements as well as to improve equity among civil servants of all types. The new system also expanded the number of intermediate ranks and levels to provide more steps for promotion throughout the civil service career span.24 The new system put contracted employees and staff employees, more or less, on equal footing. A government news release emphasized that the objectives of introducing the new system were to motivate civil servants, improve morale, and unify the rights and duties of contracted and staff employees.25
Retirement pensions had also been a topic of inequity in the civil service. In the old system, staff employees were entitled to join a civil service pension scheme, which was enormously better than the public social security scheme available to those on contracts. This problem, to a large extent, was addressed by the introduction of the Provident Fund Scheme for Workers in the Public Services under Law no. 8/2006,26 which provides a financially viable and equitable pension scheme for all civil service employees. Those under the old lucrative system were allowed to stay in the old system under a so-called one-cut grandfather clause.
The new civil service system and the civil service provident fund were aimed at correcting the systemic problems in the civil service that had been hampering morale and undermining reform efforts. Obviously, it is too early to know whether these efforts can contribute significantly to changing the minds of the civil servants and the civil service culture.
25.6 Performance Management Reform
After the Handover, the government introduced a number of reform initiatives to improve the civil service. The early efforts were in streamlining the structure of the government in order to reduce redundancy and to improve efficiency. Under Law no. 17/2001, the government structure was reduced from two levels to one by combining two municipal councils into a municipal affairs bureau (Instituto para os Assuntos Cívicos e Municipais). T he Macao Foundation was established in 2001 under Law no. 7/2001 to promote cultural, social, economic, educational, scientific, academic, and philanthropic activities. Under Article 60 of the Basic Law of the Special Administrative Region of Macao, the Commission of Audit was formed on the Handover. It
24See Macao Daily News, July 23, 2009, p. A3.
25See http://www.gov.mo/egi/Portal/rkw/public/view/showcomp/jsp?id=InfoShowTemp&docid=c373e921a5c5549.
26For details, see http://www2.fp.gov.mo/RP/PDF/RP-Regime_English_Final.pdf.
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526 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
was restructured in 2007 under Administrative Regulation no. 12/2007. In recent years, the commission has been active in criticizing unnecessary wastage of public resources.27 The High Commissioner Against Corruption and Administrative Illegality was reorganized in 2000 under Law no. 10/2000 to become the Commission Against Corruption. The police and custom agencies were also reformed, among other reorganization initiatives (Lam, 2009). Some new departments were formed owing to increasing needs. For example, under Administrative Regulation no. 2/2008, a traffic affairs bureau (Direcção dos Serviços para os Assuntos de Tráfego) was formed to deal with increasing traffic problems.
Privatization, decentralization, and budget reform were not major emphases in Macao’s civil service reform. Traditionally, the Macao government provides certain services through public bodies (officially autonomous organizations), such as advanced education and sports events. The operation and budget execution of these public bodies are less transparent than that of government departments and have been severely criticized.28 Many legislators had urged the government to reform the budgetary system and process. The reform emphasis was not on linking performance to budgeting, but on modernizing the system, increasing transparency, and meeting future challenges.29 In August 2009, the Executive Council indicated that the public financial management system was to be reformed and ten reform recommendations were proposed to increase transparency, strengthen monitoring, and improve the budget approval process. 30
Until 2009, privatization of public services was not high on the government’s reform agenda. Nevertheless, public utilities, such as electricity and water supply, have been provided by private companies with some level of government ownership. For example, the government currently owns 8% of the electricity company (Companhia de Electricidade de Macau).31 Some services are contracted out, such as waste treatment.32 In delivering the policy address for 2009, the chief executive emphasized developing community enterprises to complement the government in providing public services (Lam, 2009). This might be a signal that certain public services might be privatized to community organizations. The united neighborhood association of Macao (União Geral das Associações dos Mordores de Macau), the Macao Federation of Trade Unions, and the Cáritas de Macau, which have already been providing various types of community and social services, are most likely to develop into service providers for the government. In early September 2009, a group of 30 business persons formed a non-profit community enterprise for the construction industry, proposing to offer training courses for upgrading construction personnel.33 Whether public funds should be used for industrial training is obviously a debatable issue.
Regarding performance management, two schemes were introduced as the corner stone for reform: performance pledges and a new employee performance assessment scheme. Against a conservative culture, these two new schemes alone could only serve as a starting point and would be inadequate to overcome the aforementioned problems.
27See Macao Daily News, September 8, 2009, p. A3, and September 25, 2009, p. A6, for recent examples.
28See Macao Daily News, February 22, 2008, p. B3, and March 15, 2009, p. A1 for examples.
29See Journal Va Kio, December 4, 2006, p. 13, December 19, 2007, p. 14, and December 19, 2008, p. 14, as well as Macao Daily News, March 20, 2009, p. A3 for the various concerns.
30See Macao Daily News, August 6, 2009, p. B7, and August 7, 2009, p. B5.
31See http://www.cem-macau.com/-rubrique217-.
32See http://www.suez-environment.cn/en/suez-environment-in-china/waste/ssws/csr/csr/.
33See Macao Daily News, September 7, 2009, p. A1.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Performance Management Reform in Macao 527
25.6.1 Performance Pledges
In the policy address for 2001, the chief executive introduced a performance pledge plan to increase the accountability and efficiency of government departments. In the policy address for 2002, the chief executive announced that the implementation of the performance pledge should be comprehensive and include all government departments.34
The aims of the performance pledge, as stated by the government, are “putting people first” and “sustainable improvement.” In “putting people first,” government departments are required to be more transparent, including providing a simple and unambiguous explanation of the performance pledges, and to set up performance monitoring systems.35 The chief executive, in his policy address for 2005, indicated that the government would promote using public satisfaction surveys to help assess public service performances. In the 1996 policy address, the chief executive encouraged clients of public services to use public service counters and government e-mail addresses to give their feedback on service performance.36
The government stated two sets of objectives for using public satisfaction surveys.37 First, the government, through the surveys, would like to improve (1) civic quality, (2) communication between government and the people, (3) quality of public services, and (4) the legitimacy of the government and people’s sense of belonging to Macao. Second, the government aims at obtaining public feedback in the following areas in order to set improvement priorities: (1) the future direction for resources allocation, (2) the service quality required, (3) the awareness training needed for civil servants, (4) the improvement needed for existing operations, and (5) the potential changes in public demands.
Prior to the Handover, the government had already put in place a system for handling public complaints. In accordance with Article 21 of Decree 5/98/M (Decreto-Lei no. 5/98/M), all complaints or disputes made by identifiable individuals must be replied to within 45 days, and cross-departmental committees should be formed to deal with complaints involving two or more departments. However, there is no mandatory requirement to respond to suggestions made by the public.38 Due to the political apathy of the people, this system might not have been used adequately. The performance pledge plan, therefore, contains not only performance targets, but also a monitoring system.
As mentioned earlier, government departments were advised by the chief executive to become more transparent. The performance pledge plan was followed up by requiring government departments to effectively convey the following to the public: (1) services provided and the accessing venues, (2) service evaluation criteria, (3) venues for public feedback, and (4) current status in fulfi lling performance pledges. Mandatory explanation and operation review are required for unmet pledges.39
Internal communication is also emphasized. An internal service review must be conducted before finalizing performance pledges. Operation handbooks and guidelines on performance pledges must be provided to new and existing staff, and form the basis for staff performance assessment,40 with the aim of unifying program targets and individual performance goals.
34See http://app.safp.gov.mo/qs/pledge_intro.
35See http://app.safp.gov.mo/cms/view?aid=89&mid=741.
36See http://app.safp.gov.mo/qs/satisfaction_intro.
37See http://app.safp.gov.mo/cms/view?aid=99&mid=747.
38See http://app.safp.gov.mo/cma/view?aid=107&mid=758.
39See http://app.safp.gov.mo/cms/view&aid=89&mid=742.
40See http://app.safp.gov.mo/cms/view?aid=89&mid=743.
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528 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Furthermore, SAFP published a document in 2003, clearly stating the following (2003a): (1) performance targets must be clearly set and all civil servants must participate in achieving them; (2) performance indicators must be clearly specified; (3) transparency must be ensured;
(4) cooperation with business partners is encouraged, if applicable, to achieve targets; (5) error prevention and correction systems must be set up; and (6) increasing public satisfaction must be achieved.
SAFP also provided a guidebook that stipulates a long list of responsibilities for department heads (2003b): (1) clarifying the vision, mission, and beliefs of their departments; (2) setting longterm and short-term performance targets; (3) assessing and approving performance pledge implementation plans; (4) conducting regular progress reviews; (5) maintaining good communication with subordinates; (6) assessing and approving performance pledge handbooks/guidebooks for their units; (7) assessing and approving services requiring business partners; (8) assessing and approving publication materials for performance pledges; (9) actualizing the staff training required for service improvement; (10) monitoring the management of public feedback; (11) ensuring the public release of public satisfaction survey reports and other related reports; (12) examining review reports to raise the level of or expand the scope of performance targets; (13) monitoring staff attitudes; (14) continuous improvement to raise public satisfaction; and (15) cooperating with SAFP in implementing performance pledge plans.
The whole performance pledge system, therefore, is quite comprehensive, involving a total system covering from leadership responsibilities to individual duties, from internal communication to external relations, from clarifying visions to obtaining feedback, from stand-alone services to cooperation with business partners, from monitoring individuals to monitoring organizations. This approach bears many features of TQM. TQ, as defined by J. Rampey and H. Roberts, “is a total system approach… across functions and departments, involving all employees, top to bottom, and extends backwards and forwards to include the supply chain and the customer chain…” (Bounds et al., 1994: 4).
In order to ensure the quality of performance management, all government departments with external services are required to have their performance pledge systems certified by a designated commission by the end of 2008. The government also encouraged its departments and public bodies to seek ISO9001:2000 certification of quality management system.41 In 2007, the public service performance assessment commission (Comissão De Avaliaçao Dos Serviços Públicos) was set up in accordance with Despacho da Secretária para a Administração eJustiça no. 22/2007. The commission, chaired by the director of SAFP, consists of four external professionals.42 The commission completed on schedule the assessment of all government departments and public bodies with external services, except newly formed agencies and the University of Macau, which had successfully been granted exemption due to its ISO9000 certification. In a press briefing on September 9, 2009, the commission indicated that it had provided 196 items of advice to various government departments for system improvement and these advices were expected to be followed. Although all departments and agencies had eventually passed the assessment and obtained the performance pledge certification, four of them failed initially and required additional work to pass the assessment. The commission stressed that recertification was required once every 2 years and higher requirements would be imposed to ensure continuous improvement.43
41See http://app.safp.gov.mo/qs/iso_intro.
42The author of this article is one of four professionals.
43See Macau Daily News, September 10, 2009, p. B6.
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