- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
46 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
principles supported by pro-governance educated citizens with the old public administration traditions is a new emerging legacy. In principle, the system of public administration purported by pro-governance citizens is threatening to the bureaucratic elites, politicians, and big businessmen.
2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
The author has described the five public administration systems of Thailand that left unique historical and emerging political and administrative legacies in the Thai polity. He will now provide examples that illustrate the complexity and dynamics of the Thai bureaucracy.
Why is it that the existence of five masters with different principles of government has not led to “a do or die” confrontation among them? The military coup makers of 1932 did not abolish monarchy. The strong position of the military in government and politics was not weakened after the 1973 Student Revolution. The power of big businessmen has not been shaken after the military coup against Thaksin in 2006. So far, the five masters have coexisted.
From the perspective of the five masters, the present struggle for power among Thaksin and his supporters (“red-shirts”) and anti-Thaksin supporters (“yellow shirts”) have shown that the former support the big businessmen model of government, while the latter claims to adhere to models of the citizens as master and the kings as master. After the military coup against Thaksin in 2006, former Prime Minister Thaksin was able to install his trusted nominees as prime ministers (Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat who is married to one of Thaksin’s sisters). This has fueled protests and demonstrations from the yellow shirts. Thaksin’s nominee governments were short-lived because of the constitutional court’s rulings that invalidated their premierships. On December 17, 2008, the leader of the Democrat Party became prime minister. Since then, there has been violent protest against the Abhisit government (December 17, 2008–present) by the red shirts. For the bureaucrats, the uncertainty of the political situation has meant that their political bosses may suddenly change. Many bureaucrats who were transferred to inactive posts by the Abhisit government were accused of being pro-Thaksin. Many who were not favorites of Thaksin were promoted instead by the Abhisit government.
Despite the fact that the clash between “big businessmen as master” with other public administration models seems to be intensifying, the author believes the situation will not get out of hand. First, we have the tradition of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. Second, there are factors that “cool down” the potentiality of conflict escalation. Thais are linked not just by profession, but also by family networks, school ties, and patron-client networks. A big businessman may have a brother who is an army general. The son of a big businessman marries the daughter of royalty. An elected politician may have gone to the same school as the big businessman and the army general. A patron may have clients who are army generals, big businessmen, educated citizens, and royalty. Moreover, a person may also be both royal kin, army general, and elected politician at the same time. These intermarriages and linkages undermine the extent of political conflict in Thailand.
What has this multi-master situation meant for the Thai bureaucrat? In terms of career advancement, it has meant a lot. To survive in a context of unpredictable changes of political bosses, the bureaucrat will need to expand his network connections. In fact, it would be wise to be under the patronage of royalty, army generals, elected politicians, and big businessmen. It would be unwise to rely on a single patron. If the bureaucrat has enough powerful backups, his immediate formal boss in the department may be reluctant to punish him or treat him unfairly.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
History and Political Context of Public Administration in Thailand 47
The fact is that in the Thai bureaucracy, your career advancement depends less on your immediate superior and more on your connections outside the department. Some successful bureaucrats were fortunate to be born into a powerful family with networks extending to the palace, military, political parties, and the business world. Those that are less fortunate will have to build their own political network connections. Therefore, it is a wise practice to join government-training programs that allows a bureaucrat to make friends from other agencies and professions, and extend his connections further. I shall give an example of two influential families: the Sarasins and the Shinawatras.
The founder of the Sarasin clan was a Chinese named Tien who graduated in medicine from the United States and became a doctor in the court of King Rama VI. He was given an aristocratic title of Phraya Sarasin Sawamipak. His fi rst son, Pote, became the ninth prime minister of Thailand through the support of coup-maker General Sarit. Pote’s oldest son, Pong, is a big businessman (Pong Sarasin owns Thai Coca Cola Company and Isuzu Motor Companies) and former leader of the now defunct Kiksangkom Political Party. His second son, Pao, became police chief. His third son, Bandit, became director-general of the Customs Department. His fourth son, Asa, became permanent secretary and minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is now His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary. Asa’s wife is from the Kittiyakorn family, the same family as Her Majesty. His youngest son, Supat, was a lieutenant-general in the army. His only daughter married a former secretary-general of the Civil Service Commission.
Another example is the Shinawatra clan. The founder of the Shinawatra clan is a Chinese by the name of Seng Sae Ku who lived in Chantaburi province and then moved to Chiengmai province. He served as a tax collector (nai a-korn boin biew) of the king. His son, Chiang Shinawatra, married a daughter of a rich merchant in Chiangmai. Chiang’s son, Lert or Bunlert, the father of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, married Chiangmai royalty bloodline (the Na Chiangmai family). He had a coffee business, and his wife traded clothes. Chiang had ten children. Some of them are: Yaowaluk, a former mayor of Chiangmai; Yaowalerk manages the Pue Thai Party in the South and is chair of the Women Council of Thailand; Yaowapa manages the Pue Thai Party in the North and is married to former prime minister Somchai Wongsawat. She also owns M-Link Corporation and other telecom companies. Her daughter owned a large amount of real estate. Yingkuck is the managing director of Advanced Info Services and SC Assets. She married the managing director of M-Link Company; and Payap Shinawatra takes care of the Pue Thai Party in the Northeast and manages Shinawatra Thai Silk Company. Former Prime Minister Thaksin graduated from the Police Academy. He married Pochaman Damapong, whose father was a former policeman. Pochaman’s brothers are policemen. One is Deputy Police Chief General Puewpan. Another is a police lieutenant-general. She also has a step-brother, Bannapot Damapong, who is a businessman. Thaksin has a cousin, General Chaiyasit Shinawatra, who was commander in chief of the Royal Thai Armed Forces and commander in chief of the Royal Thai Army, appointed at the time when Thaksin was prime minister.
Winning government concessions is another good example. If you are a businessman bidding for a government project or concession, it is necessary that you have connections with several masters of the senior bureaucrats in charge of bidding decisions. These powerful masters can put pressure on government officials to choose your company as the winner. It is not enough for you to have good relations with the government officials in charge, as the situation can get very competitive as your rival bidders may pull strings from outside.
It should now be obvious why it is almost impossible for a Thai bureaucrat to work “without hatred or passion” (or Max Weber’s “sine ira et studio”). One can understand why members of the
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
48 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
newly created accountability institutions such as the constitutional court and the National AntiCorruption Commission have difficulties performing their jobs. They have family networks and school ties. They also have “masters” who may indirectly influence their decisions. For example, their sons may be working under the senior bureaucrat whom they are investigating. The bureaucrat under investigation may be a friend, relative, or classmate of powerful big businessmen and military generals.
It might be appropriate to explain why recent efforts to introduce governance reform in Thailand have not been so successful. Governance reform policies, such as accountability, transparency, fairness, smaller central government, decentralization, and citizen power, are not compatible with the historical traditions of public administration in Thailand. When governance reform policies are implemented, they are likely to deviate from their original forms and goals to serve the special historical contexts of the Thai public administration. The results are reform hybrids that are unable to serve the goals of governance, and in turn, produce unintended consequences. “The citizens as master” model is not compatible with models of “the kings as master,” “the bureaucratic elites as master,” “the politicians as master,” and “the big businessmen as master.” Pro-democracy citizens are not in favor of authoritarian rule, centralization, and big government. They are against allowing the bureaucratic elites to remain a privileged group, and against military elites staging coups d’état. But since kings, bureaucratic elites, politicians, and big businessmen are still powerful, governance reform is likely to face strong resistance. In Thailand, governance reform ideas are adapted to fit the needs and interests of traditional powerful actors in the bureaucracy (Bowornwathana, 2008a, forthcoming a).
2.4 Conclusion
For 800 years, Thai bureaucracy has been shaped by five masters: kings, military elites, politicians, big businessmen, and citizens. These provide legacies that live on today, notably the traditions of authoritarian rule, centralization, and big governments. Thailand also has traditions of reconciliation of ousted leaders, as well as client-patron relations for bureaucratic advancement. To survive in a context of unpredictable changes of political bosses, today’s bureaucrats need to expand their network connections, such as among powerful family/business groups or political parties. Adaptations of government reform ideas from abroad are sometimes hindered by the detailed realities of Thai politics and administration that can compromise efforts to ensure that government is responsive to citizen masters and operates with increased accountability and transparency.
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©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
History and Political Context of Public Administration in Thailand 49
———.(2001b). “Thailand: Bureaucracy under Coalition Governments,” in John P. Burns and Bidhya Bowornwathana (eds), Asian Civil Service Systems. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 281–321.
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