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The new chief executive and his colleagues are now challenged to identify priorities and carry out core reform measures, such as developing a centralized recruitment system, revising laws for legislative elections, and the land auction policy. If some of the programs are carried out successfully, Macao citizens’ level of satisfaction will probably increase and a good foundation will be laid for further reforms in other areas. To improve the policy-making capabilities of high-level civil servants, the Macao government recently opened a training class with the support of the National Institute of Public Administration in Beijing, where officials studied one week in Beijing and returned to Macao for a 9-week project-based training program when they resumed their work in Macao. However, since the handover, many officials have been dispatched to Beijing, Singapore, and Guangzhou for training, but with little or limited effect. Will this training class be different? Urged by local scholars, the Macao SAR government opened a master program in cooperation with the National Institute of Public Administration in Beijing with the purpose of training local high-level civil servants in 2009. This is in the right direction, but the results have yet to be proved. As human resources compose the foundation of efficient public administration, this is just one example of how the Macao government will probably need to select core reform areas carefully with the purpose of realizing an all-round roadmap to effectively reform Macao’s public administration in the future.

References

1.Chan, C.U., “A Systematic Top-down Policy Formulation Process Model in Macao,” Journal Macau Studies, No. 36, October 2006, pp. 55–63.

2.Cheoy, S.P.A., “Empirical Study on TQM Implementation Public Sector Services of Macau SAR,” Macau Studies, No. 34, June 2006, pp. 21–26.

3.China Daily (Hong Kong edition), February 18, 2006 and other issues.

4.Citizen Daily, June 22, 2007 and other issues.

5.Ho, S.H., Political Development in Macau, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995.

6.Huang, Z. “The Choices in Development for Macau Administrative Culture,” Macau Studies, August 2008.

7.Information Journal, January 20, 2007 and other issues.

8.Internal Report on Macau Special Administrative Region: 2007–2009 Roadmap for Public Administration Reforms, Macau: Bureau of Public Administration and Civil Service, Macau Government, July 2007.

9.Justice Journal (Macau), February 6, 2003 and other issues.

10.Lin, W. “Policies and Regulations: A Cooperation Study in Controlling the Gaming Industries and Gambling Behaviors,” Macau Studies, No. 33, April 2006.

11.Lo, S., “Civic Groups and Macau Political Development,” Macau Public Administration, Vol. 18. No. 69, 2005 (in Chinese), pp. 10–15.

12.Macau Daily, December 20, 2006 and other issues.

13.New Chinese Macau Journal, July 16, 2007 and other issues.

14.Overseas Chinese Daily, June 26, 2007 and other issues.

15.Population Journal, July 14, 2007 and other issues.

16.South China Morning Post, May 2007 and other issues.

17.Xing, L. “Group Culture and Public Policy in Macau,” Macau Public Administration, Vol. 18, No. 71, 2005, pp. 37–41.

18.Zheng, J. “The History and Development of Macau Training Policy for Civil Servants,” Macau Studies, No. 45, April 2008, pp. 26–32.

19.Zhuang, J. “Views on Macau SAR Government Governance Capacities,” Macau Studies, No. 50, February 2009, pp. 27–31.

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of the Asian financial crisis, on improving the effectiveness of the civil service, and on strengthening the social welfare system. This chapter is an attempt to scrutinize this claim of smooth relations through a revisiting of the meanings of decentralization, and then the examination of recent events through these lenses. The picture presented here is far more complicated and cannot be captured in words like “harmony” and “smooth.”

23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy

Post-transition Macao is a case of decentralization in the sense that Beijing transferred many powers and responsibilities to the local government. The Macao government was given high autonomy in managing its local affairs. This arrangement is popularized in the slogan “one country two systems” (hereinafter OCTS) and “Macao people rule Macao.” Decentralization and autonomy are given an institutional manifestation in which Macao was granted both the Macao Basic Law that lay out in detail the areas of local jurisdiction, and a status of “Special Administrative Region” in China’s territorial system. In this way, Macao appears to join the global trend to become an autonomous city that has benefited under a policy of decentralization.

However, devolution of power cannot automatically be equated with autonomy because it matters greatly the manner in which power is locally exercised. The discussion on the high autonomy attained by Macao, unfortunately, falls into this. Decentralization is largely restricted to an institutional demonstration of power and freedom offered to Macao under the Macao Basic Law. There is very little discussion linking decentralization with increased autonomy and democracy in Macao. More often the so-called “Macao people rule Macao” is merely referring to a government led by a chief executive who was born in or came from Macao. The institutional arrangement ensuring that the chief executive exercises power for local interests has been sidelined in these discussions. A more nuanced understanding of autonomy is required to scrutinize the practice of autonomy in Macao. Following Pratchett (2004), this chapter uses the concept of autonomy with the following three meanings.1

In the first meaning, local autonomy is conceptualized as the degree of power and discretion local authorities may reserve for themselves from higher authority. In Brown’s (1993: 258) words it means, “what the locality stands autonomous from.” This is the conventional definition of local autonomy, and it usually comes with two associated views. Firstly, it is a top-down perspective because its intention is to understand why and how the central government is prepared to devolve power and authority to the local governments. Secondly, it holds a concept of power as a corporeal, tangible asset that can be exchanged and passed down from one level of government to another (Brown 1993: 262; Lake 1994: 425). The study of local autonomy becomes the study of an institutional demarcation of the scope of power in fiscal, political, and legal fields between different levels of government.2 Autonomy thus entails the concept of devolution.

The second meaning of local autonomy is the “freedom to” approach (Pratchett 2004: 366; Lake 1994: 426; DeFilippis 1999: 979). Unlike the previous approach, it does not fixate its attention

1 See Brown (1993), DeFilippis (1999), and Lake (1994).

2A classic example of this approach is Clark’s (1984) conceptualization of local autonomy into two dimensions, namely, the power of initiation and the power of immunity. The former refers to the the local authorities to pursue autonomous action on its own behalf and for its own interests. The latter refers to the power to pursue actions free from the oversight and proscription from higher levels of government. Local autonomy is higher if the locality operates with more powers of initiation and immunity.

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on the center-local power arrangement. Rather, local autonomy is interpreted as the ability of the local government to have independent impacts on improving people’s well-being, given the constraint of power and resources allowed by the central government. In other words, it does not dispute the concept of power or how much power is granted to the local. It problematizes how this power is autonomously exercised by the local government to maximize the benefits to the local residents (Wolman and Goldsmith 1990: 24). Local well-being is measured in terms of job creation, economic development, environmental protection, and the provisioning of a whole range of public services. This conception of local autonomy fits into a long tradition of analysis assigning the local government with the primary role of providing municipal services. Delivering those services in an efficient and equitable manner becomes its prime responsibility (Goldsmith 1992: 395; Magnusson 1986: 4; Scott 1996: 8).3

The third meaning connects local autonomy with the ascendancy of social forces articulating the local identity. It is a bottom-up process of identity construction. Local autonomy emerges from social actors who attempt to constitute the locality as a legitimate autonomous political entity. Power in this approach is not treated as a tangible entity passed down from the top or exchanged between discreet entities, but rather is constructed through social interactions that define the local in relation to broader social and political forces (Lake 1994: 426; Brown 1993: 257). This, in turn, may result in resistance from hierarchical and other power holders who seek to deny their autonomous existence. Through these processes of domination and resistance, local autonomy is confirmed, undermined, or negated. A vibrant and autonomous civil society in the locality appears to be an indispensable element for local autonomy, which sometimes engenders a transformation of relations among local actors, such as the emergence of participatory and democratic practice. This, in turn, can also provide a mechanism for the political elite to reflect local aspirations in its relations with the central government (Heller 2001: 140) or through interweaving local networks with interests at the supra-local level (Greer 2007: 3).

Regional autonomy is a complex process. Its full meaning has to be explored from the aforementioned perspectives (“freedom from,” “freedom to,” and collective identity). This chapter is an attempted to use these meanings to examine the center-local relations in Macao. It will be argued that proponents of the so-called Macao success in the implementation of the one-country-two- systems formula are too narrowly focused on the first form of autonomy, assuming that the lack of crisis and incident in center-local relations implies a workable and appropriate autonomous arrangement. The aim here is to cast doubt on this simplistic formulation. This chapter will attempt to show that the lack of incidents in center-local relations, paradoxically, is an indication of the unfulfilled realization of the autonomous potentials promised in OCTS. The future of OCTS in Macao lies on the emergence in the locality of groups committed to defend local autonomy and to tackle the central government on unrealized autonomous promises. The chapter ends on a positive note by showing glances of these fledging groups taking roots in the society.

3Local governments encounter a number of constraints in performing the role of service provider. One of the factors is fiscal resources. The width of the tax base and the level of taxation power are crucial considerations in affecting the amount of financial resources available for it to use in providing services. In addition, local government requires the skills and capacity to formulate and implement policies to meet the expectations of the citizens. This, in turn, implies an efficient bureaucracy and the political elite accountable for overseeing the long-term interests of the people in planning and policy making. In all, the capability of the local government to operate in an effective and efficient manner within the autonomous space assigned to it is a significant confidence booster for the devolution policy (Smith 1998: 89; Campos and Hellman 2005: 241). A poorly performing local government conversely induces popular disillusionment on autonomy, and may strengthen the call for more central involvement on local issues. A capable and accountable local government is crucial in actualizing and reinforcing local autonomy.

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of the Macao government be elected by a 300-person electoral college that is dominated by local pro-Beijing elite (Lo 1995: 204). The elected candidate needs to obtain a final appointment from Beijing, and pro-Beijing legal experts have maintained that this is not a procedural, but a substantive, endorsement (Yang and Li 1995: 105; Xiao 2005: 35). Beijing reserved the power to remove the chief executive.9 There is no promise on the eventual popular election of the chief executive and the Legislative Assembly (Fifoot 1994: 40, 43; Ghai 2000b: 191).10 Furthermore, the Macao Basic Law invests the chief executive with an enormous amount of power11 with minimal counterbalance from a legislative assembly dominated by largely appointed and indirectly elected members (Cardinal 2002: 301; Ghai 1995a: 274).12 This arrangement is euphorically called an executive-led government. In reality, however, the power arrangement is designed to entrench an authoritarian local leader who is predisposed to the influence and control from the central government (Pereira 2001: 124–25; Ghai 1995b: 308).

Moreover, even though the Basic Law has given Macao a long list of powers, there are concerns that these powers are not entrenched in the constitution like those in a federal system (Grant 2002: 304). Subsequent statements made by Chinese legal experts add to the worry. For instance, Xiao Weiyun (2005: 1) maintained that, “Macau SAR is a form of local government… The central government’s relation with the local government is based on a rule and being ruled relationship. The local government is a subordinate unit of the central government, and is not hierarchically on an equal footing with the latter. So, the local government must obey the order from the central government. It cannot resist its wishes.”13 This view of autonomy is congruent with the view of “freedom from” type of autonomy. Power is seen as a tangible entity transferred from a higher to a lower level of government. In this sense, it is comprehensible and logical to conceive autonomy as solely originating from the central government, and is equally validly can be removed at will by the latter. It is also expected that the center can impose various restrictions on it, such as the interpretation of the Basic Law is solely the prerogative of the central government, and there is no provision in the Basic Law allowing for an independent arbitration

9 Article 15, MBL. See also Lo (1995: 203).

10The Macao Basic Law was modeled on the Hong Kong Basic Law (Wang 1999: 194; Luke 2000: 730). There are, however, important differences, some subtle, others more substantive. See Fifoot (1994) and Ghai (1995b) for careful studies of the differences. Much attention is on their democratic contents. Macao’s Basic Law is said to be less democratic than that in Hong Kong because it was created after the Tiananmen massacre. For instance, Hong Kong’s Basic Law has done away with appointed members in the Legislative Assembly, and it promises that both the elections of the chief executive and Legislative Assembly members will eventually be by direct popular vote. See also Yee (2001: 165).

11The chief executive holds a wide range of powers stipulated in Article 50 of the MBL. He appoints 7 members to the 29-person Legislative Assembly. Individual members of the Legislative Assembly are restricted in their power to introduce bills related to public expenditure, political structure, or the operation of the government. Written approval from the chief executive is required for the introduction of bills relating to government policies. The chief executive must sign all bills passed by the Legislative Assembly before they can take effect. If he refuses to sign the bill, he has to return the bill to the Legislative Assembly and give reasons. If the Legislative Assembly passes the bill again with a two-third majority, he must sign and promulgate the bill within 30 days, or dissolve the assembly. If the chief executive chooses to dissolve the assembly and the newly elected assembly passes the original bill again, then the chief executive has to sign the bill or he must resign. In all, the MBL has designed a political structure giving the executive significantly more power than the Legislative Assembly (Ghai 1995b: 298–99).

12Out of a total of 29 members in the Legislative Assembly, 7 are appointed members, 10 indirectly elected, and 12 popularly elected. See Annex II of the MBL.

13See also Pereira (2001: 113).

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