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powerful family members remain a common practice despite laws to the contrary. Political dynasties in various provinces and cities are often built on the strength of these relationships.

Likewise, the spirit of the dato leadership lives in Philippine barangays today, especially in remote villages or peripheral communities where the barangay captains serve as the galvanizing spirit of community activities, and are often at the forefront of settling conflicts, negotiations and arbitration, peace and order, and other duties that are not performed by the nearby local government.

17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime

The Spanish conquest of the Philippines began in 1521 with the coming of Ferdinand Magellan, the Portuguese explorer in the employ of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish conquest “was swift and relatively bloodless, but the Muslims in Mindanao resisted colonization” (Abueva, 1988: 25). Arriving to find fragmented and ethnically diverse and isolated communities, the Spanish conquistadores did not find it difficult to contain resistance in the islands, except in parts of Mindanao where consolidated sultanates were claimed to have existed and vigorously resisted subjugation by the Western invaders.

The Spanish conquest of the Philippines was founded for two basic interrelated reasons. Spanish colonization was first, a religious crusade to propagate Christianity in what were believed to be heathen and pagan lands, and second, as an opportunity to seek wealth that would support the Spanish Crown. The centuries-long struggles of Spain against the Moors had been draining the royal coffers, not to mention the need to finance the Crown’s excessive and extravagant lifestyles along with its nobility. It was also incumbent for the monarch to provide rewards and incentives to loyal subjects who had served the king well in his wars to insure their continuing loyalty and also to assure others that they stood to be rewarded (Corpuz, 1957: 10–11).

It was thus logical that the political, economic, and administrative institutions that Spain established in the Philippines would be anchored or founded on these predicates. Spain established a centralized authority and absorbed the barangays, except those in the predominantly Muslim areas in the South. The datos or the village chieftains were subsequently appointed as heads of towns or pueblos, and called the gobernadorcillos, the highest position given to the natives in the early stages of Spain’s colonial rule (Abueva, 1988: 27). Spain also instituted what Abueva validly calls a “theocratic” rule, where the union of church and state was fostered, with the friars exercising far-reaching powers in the affairs of the state (Corpuz, 1989, 1957; Abueva, 1988).5 The friars assumed powerful influences and roles in the administration of the islands to the effect that they enjoyed vast powers that exceeded even those of officially appointed functionaries in the localities.

The extensive powers enjoyed by the friars were so strong that disputes between church and state almost always ended in their favor. In one incident, a governor-general in the Philippines, Fernando de Bustamante, who served between 1717 and 1719, ordered the arrest of some civilian officials involved in irregularities. These officials sought and were given sanctuary in the archbishop’s cathedral. The friars then incited a riot against Bustamante, who was killed trying to defend himself against the rioters. As a result, four of the succeeding nine governor-generals in the Philippines were either bishops or archbishops, none of whom earned distinction for competence. (Corpuz, 1957: 56).

The powerful church also acquired properties in the form of vast land holdings in many parts of the islands, particularly in the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, Cavite, and what is now Rizal

5Corpuz’ (1989) two-volume work, The Roots of the Filipino Nation, provides a more detailed and incisive account of these, along with penetrating analysis of not only Spanish colonization but of Philippine history.

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province (Abueva, 1988: 27). The administrative system that the Spanish colonial rule installed was largely subservient to the church which actively meddled in the making of policies and their implementation or execution.

At the same time, the administrative system was also built on the framework of serving private interests with the “practical objective of increasing the royal estate through tributes, monopolies, fees and fines” (Endriga, 2003: 394). Spain also adopted a policy of appointments to public offices in the country based on grants or favor, called merced, from the king. The colonies were considered the Spanish monarch’s personal kingdom and thus, could dispose of any property therein as he pleased. Thus, Endriga points out,

Claimants for such favor were plentiful and they included those who participated in the conquest and pacification of the colonies, including their descendants who expected, and asked for, such grants. (Endriga, 2003: 394)

Appointments made from grants were usually for the highest colonial positions such as those of viceroy, governor-general, members of the Audiencia (or supreme court), and provincial executives.

Enhancing this was the policy of dividing the native populations into communities, called encomiendas, under the control of a recipient, called encomendero, who was vested with the right to collect tributes from the people belonging to these communities. The encominedas or haciendas were distributed or granted to those in recognition of their dutiful service to the Spanish Crown, “to discoverers and their descendants, to royal favorites or meritorious officials, or to settlers in the New World, as rewards, favors, or inducements” (Corpuz, 1957: 16).

Another mode of appointment was made on the basis of the sale of public offices, a practice that was apparently common even in Europe at that time, particularly in France and Prussia (Raadshelders and Rutgers, 1996: 77). The sale of offices to the highest bidder was also a regular feature of all colonial regimes in the Indias (Endriga, 1979: 248; Corpuz, 1957: 27), and practically resulted in a corrupt bureaucracy based on patronage instead of merit.

A variety of positions in Spain’s colonial administration in the Philippines were offered for sale, such as clerkships, notarial offices, the offices of constables, sheriffs and wardens, treasurers, assayers, and inspectors, among others (Corpuz, 1957: 28; Veneracion, 1988: 37–44).6 These saleable offices were not minor or inconsequential positions inasmuch as “many of them involved the assessment, collection and custody of public funds, as well as the collection of fees ordinarily charged for the performance of official acts” (Corpuz, 1957: 29).

To institutionalize these arrangements, a variety of laws were established to govern and legitimize the sale. Corpuz provides an almost graphic description:

The bureaucrat who had acquired his office via purchase held a title or deed which stated in detail: the royal cedula authorizing the sale; the name of the judge who presided over the auction; the public notices announcing the sale; the value of the office the last time it was sold; the previous holder of the office, and how the post was vacated (- by death, promotion, or renunciation); the bids and bidders for the office; qualifications and special conditions attached to the sale, in addition to a host of other details. (Corpuz, 1957: 28)

6Veneracion (1988: 39–43), citing Cushner (1971), provides a tabulation of offices in the bureaucracy that were sold from 1589 to 1834, identifying therein the buyer and the price, as well as date of confirmation.

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A functionary would thus consider his purchase of office as an investment that needed to be recouped as quickly as possible and at a profit. It was therefore understandable that the bureaucrat treated his office as a personal business venture. The factors of distance between the Philippines and Spain, and the long months of travel, made it exceedingly difficult for Spanish authorities to check on excessive bureaucratic rapacity. It should be noted that these positions were reserved only for Spanish nationals while the natives—the indios as they were called—occupied the lowest rung in the administrative hierarchy, as headmen of the villages, known as pueblos or barrios.

Institutionalized corruption often went unchecked despite the feeble efforts of the Spanish colonial administration using mechanisms such as investigative authorities—the visitador- generales—and the residencia, a practice whereby bureaucrats were required at the end of their terms to give a report of their actions and conduct while in office.

Institutionalized corruption flourished and created not only instability, but also growing resentment among the populace, the natives or the indios, who were at the receiving end of bureaucratic misfeasance. Thus, Veneracion explains:

Nothing contributed more to structural instability than the various cases of defalcations and embezzlements in the period between the middle of the 18th and the late 19th centuries. Extant documents at the Philippine National Archives are packed into 106 big bundles of 6 to 8 cases, investigated and litigated by various offices throughout the Philippines. At the root of these cases of embezzlements and defalcations were the institutional arrangements. (Veneracion, 1988: 56)

The administrative system that these practices spawned brought about two remarkable attitudes among the bureaucrats. These involved outright indifference and a lack of commitment to public office, while keeping the appearance of obedience to established and formal political and administrative policies and rules.

Two outstanding philosophies or principles guided bureaucratic conduct during that period and are succinctly expressed in the Spanish phrases, no se haga novedad or “do not commit or introduce any innovations on royal prescriptions,” and obedezco pero no cumplo or “I obey but do not enforce or comply” (Veneracion, 1988: 29; Endriga, 2003: 394).

For the pragmatic bureaucrat, then and now, the best response is not to innovate or depart from accepted practices and rituals even if this means compromising the goals or objectives of the agency. Accompanying this comfort zone of “trained incapacity”7 is the bureaucrat’s propensity to openly, but half-heartedly accept instructions, and even express an enthusiastic response. But that would end in rhetoric, not actual compliance would not be made. The practice continues today with both politicians and bureaucrats proclaiming support or advocacy for one thing, only to do another.

It was thus understandable that these, aside from other abusive and exploitative practices committed by Spanish civilian and military officials, and abetted or aggravated by the friars, would result in instability and alienation among the native populace, which brought about countless numbers of Filipino revolts during more than three centuries of Spanish misrule.

These excesses evoked Filipino nationalism and resistance to Spanish rule, which were decisively subdued and quelled. A propaganda movement in Spain was launched by newly educated Filipinos, called the illustrados, to call attention to Spanish abuses in the Philippines.

7Th e term “trained incapacity” refers to the state of affairs in which one’s abilities function as inadequacies or blind spots, as defined by Merton (1961) in his analysis of negative bureaucratic behavior.

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With Jose Rizal, the Philippines’ national hero, and other patriotic young members of the intelligentsia, the campaign managed to reach receptive ears, but did not succeed in bringing about much needed reforms especially in uplifting the fortunes of the lower-class of Filipinos.

In 1896, following a long and protracted struggle, a successful revolution was staged under the leadership of the plebeian Filipino revolutionary, Andres Bonifacio. While experiencing setbacks at the hands of the Spanish defenders, Bonifacio was soon joined by other Filipinos coming from different classes.

17.5Short-Lived Philippine Republic: Beginnings of a Professional Civil Service

The Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines formally ended in 1898 when the new leader of the revolution, General Emilio Aguinaldo, who wrested power from Bonifacio, proclaimed Philippine independence on June 12, 1898, at Kawit, in the province of Cavite. At this time, war broke out between Spain and the United States as an offshoot of the Cuban revolution against Spain. Admiral George Dewey of the United States and his fleet appeared in Manila Bay to destroy the Spanish armada. Spain surrendered Manila to the Americans, and in December of the same year, the Philippines was ceded by Spain to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris in December 1898.

The Filipinos, believing that they had become independent, assumed for the Philippines the status of a sovereign state. They soon inaugurated the fi rst Philippine Republic at Malolos, Bulacan. Accordingly, a republican constitution was promulgated and ratified. The new charter, known as the Malolos Constitution, was adopted in January 1899 by delegates from Philippine provinces and was patterned after the constitutions of France, Belgium, and South American republics (Abueva, 1988: 32). The Malolos Constitution was excessively long consisting of 101 articles and provided guarantees for civil liberties and rights, with three branches of government, a strong legislature, and executive and judicial departments.

The striking feature of this document, for public administration and for executive institutions, is that it incorporated full blown provisions on the “Administration of the State,” under Title 12, which defined procedures on the budget, payment from the appropriation laws, disposal of property, and securing of loans; Title 11 also provided for the organization and powers of provincial and municipal assemblies, which in effect embodied a system of local governments in the country.8 It should be noted that even the American Constitution of 1787 did not provide for provisions to govern administrative practice. Stillman (2000: 19) states that the American Constitution “says nothing about the civil service, budgets, executive departments, planning and, yes, public administration, all essential to promoting effective government performance.”

The experience of bureaucratic rapacity and inefficiency committed by unqualified civil servants during the Spanish regime impelled the Filipinos to advocate for a civil service based on merit and fitness that not only ensured appointments determined by open competitive examinations, but also guaranteed security of tenure.

8Here, I am using the English translation by Jacinto Manahan (1935) from the original Spanish version, which was published as part of a large volume. This appeared as an index to a reprint of Majul’s Apolinario Mabini, Revolutionary in 1998 as part of the centennial Collection of Filipino Heroes series under the auspices of the National Centennial Commission headed by Dr. Salvador Laurel (see Majul, 1998). This material also included a reprint of the Malolos Constitution.

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