- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
506 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Table 24.3 CPI Scores and Rankings of Macao from 2006 to 2008
|
|
World Rank |
|
Asia-Pacific Rank |
|
CPI Scorea |
|
||||||
Country/Region |
2008 |
|
2007 |
|
2006 |
2008 |
2007 |
2006 |
2008 |
|
2007 |
|
2006 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
New Zealand |
1 |
|
1 |
|
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
9.3 |
|
9.4 |
|
9.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Singapore |
4 |
|
4 |
|
5 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
9.2 |
|
9.3 |
|
9.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Australia |
9 |
|
11 |
|
9 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
8.7 |
|
8.6 |
|
8.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hong Kong |
12 |
|
14 |
|
15 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
8.1 |
|
8.3 |
|
8.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Japan |
18 |
|
17 |
|
17 |
5 |
5 |
5 |
7.3 |
|
7.5 |
|
7.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Taiwan |
39 |
|
34 |
|
34 |
6 |
6 |
7 |
5.7 |
|
5.7 |
|
5.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Macao |
43 |
|
34 |
|
26 |
7 |
6 |
6 |
5.4 |
|
5.7 |
|
6.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Synthesizing various Annual Global Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) surveys conducted by Transparency International from 2006 to 2008, website: http://www.transpar- ency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.
aCPI measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in a given country and it is a composite index that scores 180 countries (163 countries in 2006 surveys) on a scale from 0 to 10; 0=high levels of perceived corruption, 10=low levels of perceived corruption.
in 2006.”9 The CPI report for Macao was good in 2006, but deteriorated in 2007 and 2008. Macao’s global ranking dropped in these 2 years, and was even overtaken by Taiwan in 2008. Obviously, the arrest of Ao cannot redeem the notorious image of this ex-Portuguese enclave. Hence, more remedies are needed for the sake of retrieving people’s faithful heart (Table 24.3).
24.2.4 Structure
The Organizational Law has officially laid down the structure and establishment of the CAC’s daily operations. According to the Administrative Regulation number 31/2000, “Approval to the Departmental Structure and Operation System of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao,”10 it concretely outlines the division of different departments. It is noteworthy that the CAC has to play two major roles to maintain higher standards of ethics to the public officers, namely, the Anti-Corruption Bureau and Ombudsman Bureau (see Figure 24.1). Further attention should be drawn to the number of investigation departments in these two major bureaus. It seems to be short of manpower as there are only two teams performing anti-corruption functions and one team for ombudsman functions, whereas the Cabinet of the Commissioner appears to be swollen impressing that the focus of the CAC has shifted to public relations as well as administration (see Figure 24.1).
24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
According to Administrative Order number 28/2003, “Amendment of the Establishment Table of the Personnel of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao,” issued by the chief executive in
9Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2006, p. 11. For more detail, see the TI website: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006.
10For detail of this regulation, see website: http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2000/34/regadm31_cn.asp.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Commissioner
Deputy
Commissioners Cabinet of the
Commissioner
|
Anti-Corruption |
|
Ombudsman |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bureau* |
|
Bureau* |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Investigation |
Investigation |
Technical |
Investigation |
Inspection |
Community |
|
General A airs |
||
Support |
Relations |
|
|||||||
Department I |
Department II |
Department III |
Department |
|
Department |
||||
Department |
Department |
|
|||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|
Education & |
|
|
|
|
Administration & |
|
|
|
|
Dissemination |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Finance Division |
|
|
|
|
|
Division |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Public Relations |
Information |
Research & |
|||
|
|
|
|
Organization |
|||||
|
|
|
|
& Media Unit |
|
Centre |
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
Unit |
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Figure 24.1 Organizational chart of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao. *The deputy commissioner is inherently designated as the director of the bureau. (The CAC website: http://www.ccac.org.mo/en/intro/structure_details.htm#.)
507 Macao in Corruption and Ethics Public
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
508 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
July 2003, the total number of personnel, including their ranks and posts, are regulated in this Order.11 However, the CAC started to increase its personnel since 2004, thereby going beyond the 109 it is assigned (see Table 24.4). It is actually not an unusual arrangement for the CAC or any other government department to recruit extra staff over the assigned manpower indicated by the personnel establishment. But they cannot, of course, recruit as many staff as they require in as this would cause problems of over budgeting, bureaucratic accountability, public monitoring, bureaucratic imperialism, and playing down the sublime authority of the regulation itself. Many other countries would address this without too many difficulty, such as by amending the Administrative Order in good time to catch up with the rapid development in the community. It is unwise to leave such a personnel arrangement, which is clearly in contravention with the related administrative order, as it would enable the public to query the justice and neutrality status of this ethical watchdog.
Table 24.4 Personnel Establishment of the Macao Commission Against Corruption
|
|
|
Number of |
Personnel by Posts |
Grades |
Rank |
Positions |
|
|
|
|
Leadership and head |
– |
Chief of cabinet of the |
1 |
|
|
commissioner |
|
|
|
|
|
Leadership and head |
– |
Advisor or expert Department head |
6 |
|
– |
Chief investigation officer Division |
2 |
|
– |
head |
5 |
|
– |
|
2 |
|
|
|
|
Senior officer |
9 |
Senior officer |
6 |
|
|
|
|
Senior information |
9 |
Senior information technology |
2 |
technology officer |
|
officer |
|
|
|
|
|
Interpreter |
– |
Interpreter |
1 |
|
|
|
|
Personal secretary |
– |
Personal secretary |
2 |
|
|
|
|
Office assistant |
– |
Office assistant |
1 |
|
|
|
|
Office assistant |
8 |
Office assistant Information |
4 |
|
|
technology officer |
1 |
|
|
|
|
Investigator |
– |
Investigator |
52 |
|
|
|
|
Professional officer |
7 |
Assistant officer Public relations |
13 |
|
|
officer Information technology |
1 |
|
|
assistant |
1 |
|
|
|
|
Administrative official |
5 |
Auxiliary staff Administrative official |
6 |
|
|
|
3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
109 |
|
|
|
|
Source: Administrative Order 28/2003, MSAR Printing Bureau, website: http://www.imprensa. macau.gov.mo/bo/i/2003/30/ordem28_cn.asp.
11For more details of this regulation, see: http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2003/30/ordem28_cn.asp.
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