- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
442 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
BOX 21.3 WORLD BANK’S SIX DIMENSION OF GOVERNANCE
Voice and accountability measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
Political stability and absence of violence measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.
Government e ectiveness measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
Regulatory quality measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Rule of law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of corruption measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, July 2007:3–4
21.5 Key Development Challenges
The country governance assessment of the Philippines10 identifies the following issues and challenges confronting the civil service system: (1) planning mechanism; (2) performance measures;
(3)government reorganization; (4) bureaucratic behavior; (5) political influence; (6) competencies, compensation, and morale; and (7) personnel distribution and representativeness (ADB 2005a). Table 21.10 summarizes these challenges and the manifestations.
Former DBM secretary Emilia Boncodin (2004) noted that, from the operational and bureaucratic level, the key issues that undermine government efficiency and effectiveness are: (1) operational leakages, referring to perceived graft and corruption in the bureaucracy; (2) weak corporate and regulatory environment; (3) weak public institutions, particularly in the enforcement of laws;
(4)poor incentive structure within the bureaucracy as well as in the private sector; and (5) the complaints against government’s slow response capability to changing situations and needs of the public. These gaps have weighed down the government’s ability to provide adequate and efficient basic services. In addition, these issues have contributed to the country’s poor fiscal position and its slow and unstable growth, which eventually led to a poverty level that remains high among middle-income developing countries (Boncodin 2004).
ADB (2007) noted that the “weak institutional capacity” of the Philippine public sector— which is beset with inadequate incentives, absence of performance culture, lack of professionalism,
10The main author of this chapter prepared the assessment on general public administration and the civil service system.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
LLC Group, Francis and Taylor by 2011 ©
Table 21.9 Performance of Selected Countries on World Bank’s Six Dimensions of Governance, 1996–2006 (percentiles)
|
Voice and Accountability |
|
|
Political Stability |
|
|
Government Effectiveness |
||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Country |
1996 |
|
2002 |
2004 |
2006 |
1996 |
2002 |
2004 |
2006 |
1996 |
|
2002 |
2004 |
|
2006 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bangladesh |
43.3 |
|
35.6 |
28.4 |
30.8 |
26.9 |
20.7 |
14.4 |
8.7 |
27.0 |
|
27.5 |
20.9 |
|
23.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
China |
10.1 |
|
9.1 |
10.6 |
4.8 |
41.8 |
38.5 |
39.9 |
33.2 |
66.8 |
|
60.2 |
57.3 |
|
55.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Indonesia |
16.3 |
|
36.1 |
37.0 |
41.3 |
9.1 |
8.2 |
7.2 |
14.9 |
64.0 |
|
32.7 |
38.9 |
|
40.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
South Korea |
66.8 |
|
71.2 |
74.0 |
70.7 |
47.6 |
55.8 |
62.5 |
60.1 |
80.6 |
|
81.0 |
78.7 |
|
82.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Malaysia |
43.8 |
|
38.0 |
45.7 |
38.0 |
48.1 |
59.1 |
56.7 |
58.7 |
79.6 |
|
75.8 |
79.1 |
|
80.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Philippines |
60.6 |
|
51.0 |
49.0 |
44.2 |
39.4 |
24.5 |
11.1 |
11.1 |
59.7 |
|
54.5 |
49.8 |
|
55.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Singapore |
57.2 |
|
54.8 |
57.2 |
46.6 |
82.7 |
97.1 |
87.5 |
94.7 |
99.5 |
|
97.6 |
98.6 |
|
99.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Thailand |
60.1 |
|
60.6 |
55.8 |
32.2 |
59.1 |
57.7 |
29.8 |
16.3 |
72.5 |
|
64.5 |
66.4 |
|
64.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Vietnam |
9.6 |
|
9.6 |
11.5 |
8.2 |
58.7 |
54.8 |
54.3 |
59.6 |
53.1 |
|
40.3 |
40.3 |
|
41.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Country |
|
Regulatory Quality |
|
|
Rule of Law |
|
|
|
Control of Corruption |
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Bangladesh |
36.1 |
|
17.6 |
15.1 |
20.0 |
24.3 |
25.7 |
18.6 |
22.9 |
35.0 |
|
13.1 |
4.9 |
|
4.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
China |
54.1 |
|
31.7 |
42.0 |
46.3 |
48.1 |
43.8 |
42.4 |
45.2 |
56.3 |
|
42.7 |
35.4 |
|
37.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Indonesia |
63.9 |
|
25.4 |
34.1 |
43.4 |
39.5 |
17.6 |
21.9 |
23.3 |
31.1 |
|
6.8 |
17.0 |
|
23.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
South Korea |
65.9 |
|
74.6 |
74.6 |
70.7 |
71.4 |
75.2 |
70.5 |
72.9 |
73.8 |
|
66.5 |
61.7 |
|
64.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(continued)
Philippines the in System Service Civil
443
Table 21.9 (continued) Performance of Selected Countries on World Bank’s Six Dimensions of Governance, 1996–2006 (percentiles)
Country |
|
Regulatory Quality |
|
|
Rule of Law |
|
|
Control of Corruption |
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Malaysia |
80.0 |
|
65.4 |
69.3 |
69.8 |
71.0 |
63.8 |
65.7 |
65.7 |
73.3 |
66.0 |
65.5 |
|
68.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Philippines |
72.2 |
|
50.7 |
43.4 |
52.2 |
54.3 |
34.3 |
31.4 |
41.9 |
35.4 |
36.9 |
35.9 |
|
27.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Singapore |
99.5 |
|
98.5 |
99.5 |
99.5 |
94.3 |
91.9 |
95.7 |
95.2 |
97.6 |
99.5 |
99.5 |
|
98.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Thailand |
69.8 |
|
59.5 |
59.0 |
62.4 |
68.1 |
59.0 |
55.2 |
55.2 |
38.3 |
45.6 |
50.0 |
|
50.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Vietnam |
35.1 |
|
24.4 |
32.2 |
31.2 |
30.0 |
32.4 |
38.6 |
44.8 |
27.7 |
32.5 |
24.8 |
|
29.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Adapted from Kaufmann, D. et al., Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996–2008, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2009.
Legend:
|
90th–100 |
|
75th–90th |
|
50th–75th |
|
25th–50th |
|
10th–25th |
|
Percentile |
|
Percentile |
|
Percentile |
|
Percentile |
|
Percentile |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Asia Southeast in Administration Public 444
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Table 21.10 Major Issues and Challenges of the Philippine Bureaucracy
Issues and challenges |
Manifestation |
|
|
|
|
Planning mechanism |
• Ineffective mechanism for planning, agenda setting, and policymaking |
|
|
• Haphazardly prepared policies and poor use of relevant and accurate information |
|
|
• Insufficient, inconsistent, and unreliable sources of data/information |
|
|
|
|
Performance measures |
• Inadequate or unavailable performance management and measurement system |
|
|
|
|
Government |
• Unclear delineation of functions, responsibilities and system of accountability of government agencies and |
|
reorganization |
instrumentalities |
|
|
• Overlapping and duplication of programs, uncoordinated policy implementation |
|
|
• Wasteful utilization of resources |
|
|
|
|
Bureaucratic behavior |
• Tendency to be very hierarchical and rule bound rather than performance oriented |
|
|
• Predisposes red tape and opportunities for graft and corruption |
|
|
|
|
Political influence |
• Patronage politics and vulnerability to political influence in the appointments and promotion in the civil |
|
|
service—lowest to top level officials |
|
|
|
|
Competencies, |
• Mismatch of managerial and technical competencies due to political patronage and accommodation |
|
compensation, and |
• Uncompetitive compensation level makes public office unattractive compared to higher and more secure |
|
morale |
||
paying jobs in the private sector |
||
|
||
|
• Poor performance standards and appraisal system leading to poor rewards systems |
|
|
• Low incentive to work and perform better |
|
|
|
|
Personnel distribution |
• Bureaucracy is top-heavy or concentrated at the central government level |
|
and representativeness |
|
|
|
|
Source: Adapted from Asian Development Bank (ADB), Country Governance Assessment: Philippines, Asian Development, Manila, 2005.
445 Philippines the in System Service Civil
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC