Intergovernmental Relations Between Mainland China and the Macao SAR 493

23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics

With rising social discontent against the government since 2006, these social groups play a central role in deflecting attack and absorbing challenges. For instance, the role of these social groups was put under intense public scrutiny after the 2006 May Day demonstrations. Mainstream opinions put the blame on these social groups, accusing them of failing to do their work in bringing the concerns of the people inside the government. These pro-China social groups have been criticized as being hierarchical, resistant to change, rampant nepotism, and even under feudalistic family control.53 An opinion survey conducted by scholars from Hong Kong and Macao in 2006 revealed that public participation in the activities of these social groups was rather low and many considered these social groups dominated by a small circle of people.54 The survey fueled more demands for reform and rejuvenation of the social groups. Privately, these social group leaders vented their anger on the government leaders accusing them of not accepting their opinions and suggestions. And when the government faced public challenges on poor policy formation, it conveniently found scapegoats in them. The important point is that amid these debates and accusations on the need for reform and rejuvenation of the social groups, the state itself largely escapes scrutiny. Indeed, the more attention and controversies that these social groups stir up, the better they are serving their role as a defender of the political regime.

Another dimension of the social group dynamics involved intra-elite contests. During the 1970s and 1980s, a group of entrepreneurs from Hong Kong and China started up business in the enclave. Herbert Yee (2001: 122, 158) called these new arrivals the nouveau riche, and gradually, they have become as rich, if not richer, than the old rich.55 Some of its more prominent members are Chow Kam Fai, Fung Chi Keong, and Chan Meng Kam. Many of them got very rich by operating casino VIP rooms (Yu 2007: 428–30). They have joined the Macao Chamber of Commerce, but have found it difficult to be admitted into the inner core. Many of them have to fend for themselves in order to secure a place in the Macao political structure. They solicit the support of existing social groups often by making huge donations, if not bribery (Chou 2005: 201). Others embark on a spree of group creation, aiming to attain the numerical advantage to win in the indirect elections.56 Only when these ways do not work out for them do they participate in direct election. These nouveau riche have been accused of extensive vote buying in the Legislative Assembly election (Yu 2007). The limited democratic space in the Legislative Assembly is thus further narrowed by the scrambling of political influence from the nouveau riche.

53Aomen fāzhăn cèlüè yán jiū zhōng xīn (2000: 13). For instance, Ho Yin was the head of the Macao Chamber of Commerce for more than 30 years until his death in 1983. Since then, his deputy, Ma Man Kei succeeded him, and Ma is still its chairperson (see information on its website http://www.acm.org.mo/main1.htm, accessed May 12, 2008). See also Chou (2005: 203) and Ng (1990: 197).

54According to the survey, 76.6% of the respondents do not or rarely participate in social groups’ activities; 40.3% of the respondents agree or very agree to the statement that social groups are control by a small circle of people, which is more than the 36.5% disagree or very disagree to the statement. See Jornal Va Kio, January 4, 2007.

55See also Ng (1990: 137).

56A social group can be formed with as few as three members. To qualify for elector status in the indirect elections, a group has to make the proper application proving that it has registered with the government for at least 3 years (see Yu 2007: 422). In the 2001 Legislative Assembly election, there were a total of 625 such groups. In May 2008, the number has increased to 923 (see http://app.safp.gov.mo/re/zh/estat/RE_Estat080531_00c. pdf, accessed September 5, 2008). The increases caused directly elected legislator, Jose Coutinho, to cry foul of a defective election mechanism allowing the wealthy elite to finance the setting up of new groups in order to control the indirect election. See his questioning to the government in the Legislative Assembly (http://www. al.gov.mo/interpelacao/2006/06-161c.pdf, accessed September 5, 2008).

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494 Public Administration in Southeast Asia

This social group politics has tremendous implications for the central-local relations between China and Macao. They are a staunch voice to articulate the nationalist identity and an ardent defender of China’s presence in Macao. It is through these social groups that China maintains its unchallenged control on Macao politics. For the pro-China elite, the stake is now even higher in the present rapid economic growth and gambling liberalization because China has become the preponderant source of Macao’s present economic take off. The influxes of huge transnational gambling corporations and other regional economic interests into Macao have intensified the competition for businesses and demonstrated to the local economic elite that political connection remains vital to avoid being marginalized. Apparently, the basic requirement to get inside the circle is being accepted to be “nationalistic.” Thus, the local elite, no matter old or new rich, sing in unison of the caring and kindness of the motherland. There has been very little political will to dispute with the central government on any issue remotely related to its intervention in the local affairs of the SAR. The central government has also realized that once its will is made known, usually indirectly but authoritatively, to the Macao society, the local pro-China forces can mobilize public opinion to foster an atmosphere that can make this will prevail and accepted as a genuine desire of the Macao society. The predominance of these social groups is thus the cornerstone of successful decentralization in Macao.

For instance, the Macao government has been obliged by the Macao Basic Law to review the election mechanism of the chief executive and the Legislative Assembly for the 2009 elections.57 Shortly before the public consultation was launched, a well-known Tsinghua University law professor with close connections to the Beijing leadership, Wang Zhenmin, was invited to Macao to give a seminar. In his speech, he pointed out that the current priority of Macao’s electoral reform should be on making the existing election system work better, rather than on making any significant changes to it, such as increasing its democratic elements (Macao Daily, December 15, 2007). This message was immediately picked up by the pro-China mass media and promoted as the direction for reform. The Macao government then produced a consultation paper aimed at closing the loopholes on vote buying by making minor procedural changes in conducting the election. Pro-China social groups endorsed this proposal in unison. Only Ng Kuok Cheong and Au Kam Sun persisted with their call for democratization, but their voices were safely ignored.58 The political elite also managed, in the name of improving the administration of the election, to make it more difficult for newly formed social groups to obtain the voting franchise.59 In all, the changes will likely tighten the old elite’s grip on Macao politics.

This instance demonstrates that there is a lack of powerful locally oriented social forces to urge the central government to fulfill the promises made under the Macao Basic Law. The central-local relations between Macao and Beijing were very smooth, especially when compared with that of Hong Kong, only because there was a lack of political determination within the elite to stand up to China. China managed to put an elite in power whose interests and loyalty have long been

57See Annex I and II of the Macao Basic Law.

58As early as July 2007, the two legislators proposed a plan to increase the democratic elements of the elections of the chief executive and the Legislative Assembly, mainly by expanding popular participation in the electoral college and increasing the number of directly elected seats (see Jornal do Cididao, July 2, 2007).

59Presently, any social groups can register to participate in the election after 3 years in existence. The proposed change requires a social group to wait a further 4 years after the 3-year qualification period before it can actually vote in the election. Moreover, after qualifying, each social group is required to submit annual activity reports and face regular evaluation to see if it meets the standard to vote. See the consultation document (http://www.safp.gov.mo/apps/files/ reform/Consulta_LeisEleitorais_cn.pdf, accessed August 20, 2008). These revisions are still under debate in the Legislative Assembly at the time of writing.

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