- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
Performance Management Reforms in Malaysia 195
time the Bumiputera (literally translated as “princes of the earth”) community, made up of Malays, the ethnic majority group in Malaysia and the Orang Asli, the Aborigine community of Peninsular Malaysia. In reality, the policy would later take on a role of targeting mainly the Malay ethnic group in terms of corporate equity and wealth ownership of the nation. The NEP implied that the public sector would be given a significant role in being directly involved in the national commercial and economic sectors through productive activities such as banking and finance, manufacturing, and so on. The role of the state was given significant prominence, evidenced by the setting up of several state organizations designated to improving productive capacity, such as the Bumiputera Commercial and Industry Corporation (BCIC), and other public enterprises.
In the 1980s, however, there was a major policy shift, as Malaysia became a highly industrialized country, with increasing reliance on exports. Under the guidance of then Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Mohamad, the pace of industrialization was accelerated through his “Look East Policy,” emulating South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan; Malaysia introduced its first national made-in-Malay- sia car, Proton, and in the early 1980s UNIDO sponsored studies that went into the formulation of the country’s first Industrial Master Plan (IMP), announced in early 1986. The manufacturing sector was emphasized, which eventually broadened to form a sizeable percentage of the Malaysian economy. Manufacturing industries grew at an average of 13% in the early 1990s, later slowing to 9% (late 1990s) and 4.1% (between 2000 and 2005).1 As global approaches to development leaned toward privatization as opposed to state-run mechanisms, Malaysia responded likewise. This was also a response to high operational budgets and huge deficits faced by the government. The responsibility for economic development was shifted to the private sector, stemming largely from then Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Mohamad, who introduced the Malaysia Incorporated and Privatisation Policy in 1983 and envisaged that the government would become the service arm of the enterprise. The Malaysian Privatisation Master Plan (MPMP) was later published in 1991 followed by Guidelines on Privatisation.
The civil service would now facilitate productive activities that could be more efficiently carried out by the private sector, still maintaining the objective of alleviating poverty and uplifting the status of the Bumiputera community, but through alternative means. The state would continue to play an important role in economic development and its performance through facilitation of legal structures, but the financial burden of the government would be reduced through transfer of actual activity to the private enterprise. Programs and projects were reviewed, with deliberate attempts to downsize the state to reduce excessive public expenditure, as indicated by Sarji. Under the Excellent Work Culture that was launched in 1989, another policy introduced was the Look East Policy, also aimed at reforming models of governing. This policy was specifically deployed to increase productivity, as inspired by Japanese and South Korean work ethics and methodologies. In the later plans of the NDP and NVP, although public-private co-operation was promoted for investment and growth, the public service was still expected to play a crucial role in achieving national developmental goals.
10.1.2 Organizational Structures
As early as 1965, a study was conducted on “Development Administration in Malaysia,” resulting in the Esman-Montgomery report. This was one of the milestones of impetus for change, recommending major changes in the public administration, education, and training systems. This led
17th, 8th, and 9th Malaysia Plans, Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department, Government of Malaysia.
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196 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
to the formation of the Development Administration Unit (DAU) in 1966. Given the responsibility of spearheading reforms in the government administration, the DAU was later expanded and renamed the Implementation Co-ordination Development Administration Unit (ICDAU), to co-ordinate development projects as well as planning and developing human resources. After several restructuring exercises, this unit was eventually split in two, one of which was named the Malaysian Administration Modernisation and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU). Tasked with the functions of administrative modernization and human resources planning, MAMPU was given the mandate to introduce strategies to improve public administration.
The National Training Institute, formed in 1972, was tasked to train a large number of public sector employees. In 1970, the Federal Establishment Office was also reorganized to form the Public Service Department (PSD) as a separate institution, entrusted with the responsibility for carrying out personnel management policies to ensure greater efficiency of the public service.
10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
From the late 1970s, Islamic codes of conduct were considered the benchmark by which work ethic was measured. Indeed, in 1982, MAMPU launched a campaign based on Islamic values, which included calls for a clean, efficient, and trustworthy public administration, the first time in which religious values were used as bases for codes of bureaucratic self-conduct. In 1985, these three values were expanded to eleven: “trustworthiness, responsibility, sincerity, dedication, moderation, diligence, cleanliness, discipline, cooperation, and gratitude”. The code of conduct under the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993, outline conduct guidelines for civil servants, including loyalty, priority of public interest, non-active participation in politics, strict rules against accepting gifts and presents for favors, and seeking outside employment that would jeopardize work performance. The “Leadership by Example” policy, introduced in 1983, encouraged public servant leaders to lead by example.
In the same light, later, in 1992, the National Institute of Public Administration, INTAN highlighted twelve values that should direct public servants’ conduct: valuing time, perseverance, pleasure of working, dignity of simplicity, character, kindness, influence of examples, obligation of duty, wisdom of economy, patience, improvement of talent, and joy or originating. These were then incorporated into human resource development courses for all civil servants, examined on values and ethics when being considered for job promotions. Islamic values, coupled with sociological postulations of Malaysian values, have therefore dominated the discourse and consequent implementation of imposed conduct and ethics within the civil service.
10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
Under the Excellent Work Culture, the civil service was to be transformed into a more customerfocused, result and performance-oriented, responsive, accountable, and innovative public service. Prior to this, public criticism of the civil service included that of poor quality and service. A total of 22 Development Administrative Circulars were issued, including the Modified Budget System, Total Quality Management (TQM) of the Micro Accounting System, the NPA System, the Client’s Charter, and ISO9000, all of which were to improve the responsiveness and quality of the civil service. Other specific initiatives were one-stop counters to answer questions, additional counters, better layout, and basic facilities for the public.
One of the more significant Development Administrative Circulars was the introduction of Quality Control Circles (QCCs), which was defined as self-governing workgroups that would
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Performance Management Reforms in Malaysia 197
meet regularly to identify and analyze work-related problems. The QCCs would then upgrade their quality of work through discussion, solving problems together, and generating interest in work. Triantafillou reported that productivity and quality of work would be enhanced by encouraging QCC members to negotiate a “performance norm for the production output and product quality of the group.”
Another administrative device was the TQM, providing guidelines to civil servants to commitment toward product quality and customer responsiveness. Quality would be achieved in all operational aspects, including products, services, management, and employee competency and commitment.
In 1993, the Client’s Charter was introduced; a written commitment made by respective government departments on standards it would keep to regarding its public service delivery. The Client’s Charter would be made public, therefore departments would be held accountable for their actions. Departments that formulated their Client’s Charter reported a significant drop in complaints.
Other specific techniques of performance were introduced from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, from which only several will be mentioned here. These measures included the Civil Service Ethic, leadership by example, a clock-in system, and a name tag system, among others. Performance measurement was used at both individual and organizational levels, with the objectives of ensuring that programs and activities would be implemented efficiently and effectively. At the individual level, the New Remuneration System in 1992 was introduced to improve the public sector’s personnel administration and management system by “linking individual performance measurement to salary increment” [11], and the New Performance Appraisal (NPA) System was launched in support of this, where there would be direct links between individual performance and rewards in terms of a salary increase and promotion. On an organizational level, a manual was distributed in 1993 entitled “Guidelines for establishing performance indicators in government agencies,” which would assist government agencies in implementing performance measurements, indicators of which would be incorporated into budget estimates and annual reports.
10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
In order to best manage performance in the public sector, performance reporting was considered essential, as this would improve individual and public accountability and responsibility. Hence, in 1979, the auditor general’s powers were expanded to include management audits. The Audit Act of 1982 was amended to enhance his powers and duties to undertake extensive investigative auditing of the activities of an agency [12]. This “performance audit” monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agencies’ delivery systems. The Audit Act requires the auditor general’s findings to be submitted to Parliament for examination by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC).
The Public Complaints Bureau (PCB) was also set up within the Prime Minister’s Department to allow members of the public to report on any abuse of powers within government agencies, address these complaints, and improve any systemic flaws. The Parliament Committee on Public Complaints was set up to monitor these services. In 1982, the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) was also established under the Anti-Corruption Act. The ACA has received and investigated numerous cases involving high-level government officials and other business tycoons with political links. The ACA has now been transformed into the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) after the MACC Bill was passed in Parliament in December 2008. The MACC, however, has recently come under fire for selective investigations (to be elaborated on below). At the time, these mechanisms were introduced to address any misuse of power and funds. Other tools initiated to improve performance reporting in the public sector included the Program Performance Budgeting
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