- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
50 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Graham, W.A. (1912). Siam: A Handbook of Practical Commercial and Political Information. London: De La More Press.
McCargo, D. and Ukrist, P. (2004). The Thaksinization of Thailand. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press.
Neher, C.D. (1976). Modern Thai Politics: From Village to Nation. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman.
Neher, C.D. and Bidhya Bowornwathana (1988). “Thai and Western Studies of Politics in Thailand,” Asian Thought and Society, 11, 16–27.
Noranittipadungkarn, C. (1984). Somdej Phraboromwongthur kromphraya Damrong Rajanubhab kap Krasuang Manatthai [HRH Prince Damrong Rajanubhab and the Minister of Interior]. Bangkok: Odeonstore.
Pasuk, P. and Chris Baker (2004). Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand. Bangkok: Silkworm Books. Phumisak, C. (1957). Chom Na Sakdina [The face of feudalism]. Nitisaek Journal, Thammasat University. Punyaratabandhu, S. and Daniel H. Unger (2009). “Managing Performance in a Context of Political
Clientelism: The Case of Thailand,” in Clay Wescott, Bidhya Bowornwathana, and Lawrence R. Jones (eds), The Many Faces of Public Management: Moving Ahead Amidst Challenges and Opportunities in Emerging Markets and in Di cult Times. Bingley, UK:: JAI Press, Emerald Group, 279–306.
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Riggs, F. (1966). Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center Press. Scott, J.C. (1972). Comparative Political Corruption. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
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Wales, H.G. Quaritch (1934). Ancient Siamese Government and Administration. London: Bernard Quaritch. Wilson, D.A. (1962). Politics in Thailand. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Wyatt, D.K. (1976). “Family Politics in Nineteenth Century Thailand,” in Clark D. Neher, (ed.), Modern Thai Politics: From Village to Nation. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company, 54–72.
Appendix A
Chronological development of public administration systems in Thailand
1238–1438 |
Sukhothai period. Beginning of absolute monarchy—kings as master |
1351–1767 |
Ayudhya period |
1767–1782 |
Thonburi period |
1782 |
Beginning of Bangkok (Ratanakosin) period under the Chakri dynasty |
1821–1868 |
Growing challenge from the West |
1855 |
The Bowring Treaty with Britain |
1869–1910 |
Abolish slavery, improve public welfare, railway, post and telegraph services |
1892 |
Major bureaucratic reform by King Chulalongkorn Rama V (1869–1910): |
|
authoritarian rule, centralization, and big government |
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
|
History and Political Context of Public Administration in Thailand 51 |
1910–1925 |
King Vajiravudh, Rama VI: education reforms: Thailand’s first university, |
|
Chulalongkorn University, founded in 1917; compulsory primary education |
|
in 1921 |
1928 |
First Civil Service Act |
1925–1935 |
King Prajadhipok Rama VII (1925–1935): political reform |
1932 |
June 24, constitutional monarchy replaced absolute monarchy |
|
The birth of the “military” or “bureaucratic polity”—Bureaucratic elites as |
|
master |
1933 |
First national elections of members of Parliament |
1938 |
Beginning of the tradition for military elites becoming prime ministers and |
|
cabinet ministers |
1946 |
June 9, King Bhumibol Adulyadej Rama IX ascended the throne |
1950s |
US assistance helps strengthen the bureaucracy, especially Ministries of |
|
Interior (police department) and Defense |
1957–1958 |
Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat became prime minister after a military coup: |
|
first national economic development plan in 1957 |
1965 |
Number of bureaucrats increased from 75,000 (in 1944) to 250,000 (in 1965) |
1973 |
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and Field Marshal Prapass Charusathien |
|
were ousted by student-led mass demonstrations |
|
Politicians began to challenge the traditional power of the bureaucratic elites |
1974 |
Beginning of regime transition to a democratic polity—politicians as master |
A democratic constitution promulgated |
|
1975 |
Political parties started to grow |
Civil Service Act of 1975 |
|
1976 |
October 6, a military coup took place. Return of military rule |
1977–1980 |
General Kriengsak Chamanand government |
1980–1988 |
Bureaucratic elites maintained power |
March 1980, General Prem Tinsulanonda government |
|
|
Compromise between bureaucratic elites and politicians on the allocation of |
|
cabinet posts. General elections of 1979, 1983, and 1986. Multi-party systems |
1988–1991 |
and the institutionalization of coalition politics and government |
Chatichai coalition government |
|
1991 |
Most ministerial positions filled by politicians |
Military coup in February overthrew the Chatichai government |
|
1992 |
In May, urban middle-class demonstrations overthrew General Suchinda |
|
government |
|
Anand second interim government |
|
Civil Service Act of 1992 |
|
General elections |
|
Chuan government. Democrat Party became the core of the coalition |
|
government |
1994 |
Politicians became ministers |
Civil servants Code of Ethics |
|
1995 |
Banharn government. Chart Thai Party becomes the coalition party leader |
|
Elected politicians assume ministerial portfolios |
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
52 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
1996 |
November elections |
|
General Chavalit government. His New Aspiration Party became the core |
|
party in the coalition |
|
Politicians became ministers |
1997 |
Political reform movement |
New constitution (based on governance principles, and supported by pro- |
|
2001–2006 |
governance citizens) |
Thaksin government—big businessmen as master |
|
2006 |
Ministries increased from 13 to 20 |
Yellow shirts mass protest |
|
|
Military coup led by General Sonthi Bunya-anan overthrew the Thaksin |
|
government |
2007 |
New 2007 Constitution (revised 1997 Constitution) |
2008 |
Short-lived Samak and Somchai governments |
|
Yellow shirts mass protest |
|
The military reluctant to stage a coup |
2008–present |
Abhisit coalition government |
|
Red shirts mass protest |
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Chapter 3
Decentralization and Local
Governance in Thailand
Achakorn Wongpreedee and Chandra Mahakanjana
Contents
3.1 |
Thailand Administrative Structure................................................................................... |
54 |
|
3.2 |
History of Decentralization in Thailand .......................................................................... |
56 |
|
|
3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State............................................................................. |
56 |
|
|
3.2.2 |
Towards Decentralization ..................................................................................... |
58 |
3.3 |
The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand ..................................................................... |
59 |
|
|
3.3.1 Political Parties and the Growing Importance of “Representativeness” .................. |
59 |
|
|
3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy .................................. |
60 |
|
|
3.3.3 Increased Policy-based Electoral Campaigning..................................................... |
60 |
|
3.4 |
Drafting the TAO Law 1994............................................................................................. |
61 |
|
|
3.4.1 Competition for Political Benefits (or, on Stage at the Parliament) ....................... |
63 |
|
|
3.4.2 |
Reflections ............................................................................................................. |
65 |
3.5 |
Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in |
|
|
|
Thailand: Ongoing Challenges.......................................................................................... |
65 |
|
|
3.5.1 |
Strong Executive System ....................................................................................... |
66 |
|
3.5.2 Thai Local Political System................................................................................... |
68 |
|
|
3.5.3 |
Fiscal Decentralization ......................................................................................... |
69 |
|
3.5.4 |
Transferred Responsibilities .................................................................................. |
72 |
|
3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel ............................................................................ |
73 |
|
|
3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System............................................................ |
73 |
|
3.6 |
Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community.................................................. |
74 |
|
3.7 |
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... |
75 |
|
References |
................................................................................................................................. |
75 |
53
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