- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
Intergovernmental Relations Between Mainland China and the Hong Kong SAR 267
(Chen, 2003: 366). Since 1997, no national laws except those relating to exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, and immunity from compulsory measures concerning the property of foreign central banks have been added to the list of national laws that would be applied to Hong Kong.20 However, there are no clear rules or legal principles with which the NPCSC has followed in rendering the three interpretations. Yash Ghai has argued that the procedures for the interpretation of the Basic Law should be “judicialised” (Ghai, 2005: 42–43). For instance, if the NPCSC wants to “interpret” the mini-constitution, it should invite submissions and carry out public hearings and the Committee for the Basic Law should be able to make its own recommendations. Hence, the cultivation, formalization, and adoption of constitutional norms might be one alternative in building constitutional relations between the central authorities and the Hong Kong SAR in future.
13.4.2 Political Dimension
The political dynamics between Beijing and Hong Kong are multi-faceted.21 The central government adopted a relatively “hands-of f ” approach in managing Hong Kong af airsf in the early period after reunification. However, with the outburst of popular discontent against the Article 23 legislation in early summer 2003, the central leadership has become seriously concerned with Hong Kong’s political situation and has taken a very active role in shaping its economic and political development. The following section examines the precarious nature of Hong Kong’s political autonomy, the growing intervention by Beijing in Hong Kong’s governance since 2003, and the contention over political reform since 2004.
13.4.2.1 Hong Kong’s Precarious Political Autonomy
Most studies on the political relations between Beijing and the Hong Kong SAR highlight the precarious nature of Hong Kong’s autonomy. Some analysts emphasize the “Mainlandization” of Hong Kong, suggesting that Hong Kong’s political, economic, and legal systems have become much more influenced by Beijing and have been converging with the Mainland since 1997. According to Sonny Lo, Mainlandization refers to the Hong Kong SAR government’s policy of “making Hong Kong politically more dependent on or similar to Beijing, economically more reliant on the mainland’s support, socially more patriotic toward the motherland, and legally more reliant on the interpretation of the Basic Law” by the NPCSC (Lo, 2008: 42–43). Tung’s administration followed Mainland-style practices in reversing democratic politics such as the introduction of a proportional representation system in legislative elections in order to favor the pro-government and pro-Beijing political forces, the abolition of the two elected Municipal Councils and the reintroduction of appointed members into the District Councils, and the adoption of a pro-China and patriotic ideology (Lo, 2008: 55–57). However, Lo argues that such a policy backfired because the gap between the government and society exacerbated political alienation and the political exclusion of the pro-democracy camp only intensified the confrontation between the government and its critics (Lo, 2008: 44–49).
20For a list of the national laws that are applied to Hong Kong, see http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/.
21Given the focus on public administration in this volume and the limitation of space, this section cannot provide a comprehensive analysis of the political dynamics between Beijing and Hong Kong. Please refer to recent studies by Suzanne Pepper, Sonny Siu-hing Lo, and Kitty Poon for more systematic treatment of this important issue.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
268 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
In a similar vein, there are other scholars who also argue that Hong Kong’s political autonomy is precarious (Holliday et al., 2002). The political autonomy in Hong Kong has been “unusual” because it lacks the two common elements in other autonomous areas, namely, cultural and ethnic distinction and democratic procedures (Holliday et al., 2002: 462). Moreover, they believe that a “dependent mentality” in Hong Kong has emerged as a result of Hong Kong’s post-1997 economic crisis, and the pragmatism of certain segments of the elite and masses to look for short-term economic gains by seeking closer economic relations with the Mainland might accelerate the erosion of its autonomy (Holliday et al., 2002: 455–64). They believe that the protection of local autonomy in Hong Kong came from the actions of local civil society groups and support from foreign governments and the international media, such as the defense of press freedom by Hong Kong journalists and the champion of judicial autonomy by the legal profession, which “raised the stakes” for the Hong Kong SAR government in sacrificing local autonomy (Chan and Chan, 2007; Holliday et al., 2002).
On the other hand, some scholars hold a different view. Albert H. Y. Chen, a Hong Kong legal scholar who is a member of the Committee for the Basic Law, has offered a good summary of the perspectives of the central authorities. As he puts it,
China’s understanding of Hong Kong’s autonomy is that of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong,” provided that the majority of Hong Kong people exercising the power to rule Hong Kong are considered to be patriots—people whom the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party consider to be patriots and thus political allies. (Chen, 2007b: 34)
In other words, Beijing’s perspective is that the Hong Kong SAR “already enjoys full autonomy in the sense of ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’ and not Communist cadres ruling Hong Kong, and the central government not interfering with the administration, policy-making and law-making of Hong Kong” and it “already enjoyed a significant degree of democracy (including the Rule of Law, civil liberties, judicial independence, multi-party competition, direct elections, functional constituency elections, etc.)” (Chen, 2007b: 39).
The centerpiece of the Basic Law political system, from Beijing’s perspective, is the executivedominated government. The chief executive is the key interface through which the central government interacts with the Hong Kong SAR. Despite the strong constitutional power given to the executive, Mr. C. H. Tung, the first chief executive, experienced great difficulties in delivering effective governance. Theoretically speaking, the formal institutional arrangements of the Basic Law framework allow the Hong Kong SAR government to continue the previous colonial “executive-led” and “bureaucracy-based” governance, which was characterized, for instance, by co-optation of elites into the administrative machinery (often called “administrative absorption of politics”), the continuation of the government’s capacity to “make sound policy in exchange for political legitimacy,” the government’s ability to stay above private interests, and the existence of a weak legislature and a weak civil society (Cheung, 2005, 2007). But these conditions no longer existed in the post-1997 period. For instance, the public demanded greater accountability and better government performance. Tung had committed serious policy blunders and set out many ambitious policy goals, but lacked the capacity to deliver them, especially when the economy had suffered from a serious downturn after the Asian financial crisis. However, despite his unpopularity, Tung was still able to secure a second 5-year term without any challenger competing with him, which can largely be explained by the strong support rendered by the former Chinese leader, Jiang Zemin. From Beijing’s perspective, the critics of Tung and his administration were not just
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Intergovernmental Relations Between Mainland China and the Hong Kong SAR 269
criticizing his ineffective governance, but they were also seeking every opportunity to challenge the foundation of the political system designed in the Basic Law and hence indirectly the authority of the central government.
13.4.2.2Beijing’ Growing Intervention in Hong Kong’s Governance since 2003
Nothing is more critical than the political crisis in 2003 in defining the relations between the central authorities and the Hong Kong SAR. The deadly severe acute respiratory syndrome was transmitted to Hong Kong in February 2003 from neighboring Guangdong. Owing to the tight control over information by Mainland authorities, the Hong Kong SAR government was not informed of the dire situation and had encountered great difficulties in coping with this unknown disease, at least until Beijing decided to become more transparent due to international pressure and allowed better coordination between Hong Kong and Mainland health authorities. The epidemic had a chilling effect on Hong Kong’s economy and further aggravated Tung’s governance crisis, which was already marred by his poor handling of the car purchase scandal of his financial secretary and the aggressive championing of the national security legislation by his secretary for security. Even the conclusion of a free trade agreement with the Mainland and the relaxation of the inflow of Mainland visitors announced during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Hong Kong on the eve of the sixth anniversary of its reunification with China could not reverse the anti-Tung sentiments. Not only had the massive demonstrations against the Article 23 legislation and Tung’s administration, on July 1, 2003, shocked the Chinese leadership, but it had also produced an indelible impact on relations between the central government and the SAR.
The July 1 protest could perhaps be compared to Hong Kong’s massive demonstrations in 1989 supporting the pro-democracy movement in the Mainland, which similarly produced a reorientation in China’s policy on Hong Kong by expediting the opening up and development of Shanghai and other coastal cities because Hong Kong was regarded as politically unreliable. The thrust of central policy toward Hong Kong in the 2003–2004 period aimed at achieving political stability and shoring up the falling popularity of the Tung administration, which could no longer be entrusted with full responsibility to ensure political order in Hong Kong. In contrast to its previous non-interventionist posture, Beijing has changed to a far more activist strategy to shape Hong Kong politics. Among the many initiatives the central government has taken include, revamping its agencies and policy coordination group responsible for Hong Kong affairs, stepping up the monitoring of Hong Kong political developments, intensifying unified front work with political, business, and community leaders, and offering economic policy support measures to boost the Hong Kong economy, including most importantly supporting the conclusion of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) agreement between Hong Kong and the Mainland. In other words, Beijing’s growing interventions in Hong Kong affairs since mid 2003 can also be considered as a response to the governance crisis partly induced by the problematic political system designed in the Basic Law and partly aggravated by the ineffective governance delivered by its hand-picked appointee, C. H. Tung (Cheung, 2005, 2007; Lo, 2008: 48–59).
Aside from the constitutional powers to appoint the chief executive and his top officials and to interpret the Basic Law, there are various ways through which Beijing could directly influence Hong Kong’s governance. The following discussion only highlights some prominent examples in the past decade. First, the central government can render (or withdraw) support to the chief executive and his administration. Getting central support is a prerequisite for the chief executive to govern effectively, hence the incumbent must also take whatever directives (or even indirect
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
270 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
clues) from the central government seriously. For instance, with the strong backing of the central government and especially President Jiang Zemin, C. H. Tung was able to secure a second term as chief executive, despite his low popularity, in 2002. When Tung was considered more a liability than an asset in Beijing’s eyes in the aftermath of the political crisis in 2003, President Hu Jintao reprimanded C. H. Tung in a widely publicized meeting in Macao in December 2004, and by March 2005, Tung had tendered his resignation on the grounds of health (Poon, 2008: 88–89). The central government also indicated their positive assessment of Donald Tsang’s work before the chief executive election was held in March 2007, although the central leadership no longer offered an open endorsement this time (Lo, 2008).
Second, the central government could influence governance in Hong Kong through political patronage and co-optation in order to influence political parties, interest groups, or other elites to toe Beijing’s line. Sonny Lo uses the perspective of patron-client relations in a pluralistic context to characterize the relations between the central government and the chief executive and other political actors in Hong Kong (Lo, 2008: 29–37). Beijing, being the most powerful patron, can use its constitutional power of appointment of the chief executive and principal officials as well as other political and economic resources to solicit political allegiance from different political actors in Hong Kong. In exchange for political and economic policy support from Beijing, the chief executive would have to deliver his political loyalty to the central government. Similarly, the chief executive could serve as a political patron and obtain compliance and support from other political actors through appointing them as members in government advisory and policy-making committees or as politically appointed policy secretaries since 2002 (Cheung and Wong, 2004). In fact, a growing number of political elites, such as executive councilors, legislators, and politicians of the pro-government parties, and retired senior officials, have been appointed as delegates of China’s NPC and CPPCC in recent years. Such a network is even larger if memberships in similar provincial and municipal level organs or other advisory bodies in the Mainland are counted. The overlapping membership in political institutions in Hong Kong and the Mainland is indicative of the growing interlocking of the two different political systems (Pepper, 1999, 2008).
Third, the central government also uses its symbolic power to steer the political discourse and shape public opinion in Hong Kong. Although central officials usually do not comment on local governance in Hong Kong, there are several controversial cases. For instance, in 2000, a senior central official maintained that the Hong Kong media should not advocate the “two states” theory after Taiwan’s de facto representative in Hong Kong defended this controversial notion in a radio program of the publicly funded Radio Television Hong Kong. Similarly, a deputy director of the Liaison Office warned that the media should not report news on the advocacy of Taiwan independence after a Hong Kong television station broadcasted an interview with the newly elected Taiwanese vice-president (Wong, 2004: 22–24; Yeung, 2002: 251). Another important case concerns the discussion on Hong Kong’s path of political reform from late 2003 to early 2004. In order to assert central authority over the discourse on political reform, Mainland officials and legal experts reminded the Hong Kong community of the primacy of the central government and the importance of “One Country” in the process of democratic political reform in Hong Kong and the need to emphasize patriotism as a criterion in assessing who would be qualified to govern Hong Kong. The “invisible hand” of Beijing can also be found in the policy rhetoric adopted by the Hong Kong SAR government, such as its emphasis on building a harmonious society and pursuing people-based governance since 2005, which ran parallel to the policy orientation of the central leadership in Beijing (South China Morning Post, April 27, 2008, p. A12).
Fourth, the central government has offered economic policy support to Hong Kong and hence has particularly privileged the business community. But the growing economic influence of the
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