- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
374 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
There are three major areas that need to be strengthened in order to make fiscal decentralization work better. First, the fiscal structure of the national government should pursue fiscal discipline or spending within our means, optimal and appropriate revenue assignments and expenditure responsibilities between central and sub-national government levels, and a good intergovernmental fiscal transfers system. Second, political institutions and the larger political system of the country where decentralization operates should be considered in establishing systems of accountability. The behavior of national and sub-national officials affects the utilization of fiscal resources for developmental functions—which jeopardizes the desired development goals and policy objectives. Third, fiscal decentralization policy should be able to promote market-preserving local institutions and the development of an optimal economic system both at the national and sub-national levels. There has to be mutual reinforcements between the markets and the fiscal decentralization policy, thereby enhancing the performance of the private and public sectors (Tiu Sonco 2008).
It is within this context that the following may be considered for further research: (1) establish measures on the impact of decentralization vis-à-vis various performance indicators including economic development, fiscal effects, distribution and poverty reduction, service delivery and revenue generation, and governance; (2) given the existing revenue assignments, LGUs should be able to approximate or estimate their revenue earning capacity; (3) mapping and policy options on the appropriate intergovernmental fiscal transfers in the Philippines; and (4) attaining a market preserving fiscal decentralization policy and operationalizing inclusive growth at the local government level.
18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
Indeed, decentralization is like a double-edged sword: when correctly implemented and given the proper policy and capacity mix at the national and sub-national levels, it has the potential to be a very powerful tool to effect good governance and a potent poverty reduction strategy; however, if not used properly, it can exacerbate inequalities across local governments and regions, and even lead to fragmentation of the state (Brillantes 2004).13
On the one hand, there are perceived policy design flaws of the LGC. On the other hand, its implementation has shown progress and desirable results. Policy change and continuing capacity building are necessary to strengthen and deepen decentralization.
Partisan politics has affected the implementation process of the decentralization policy in the Philippines. For instance, the strong familial ties and strong political clans of the Filipinos threaten the degree of democratization, electoral participation, and political accountability at the local government level.
Strengthening the local bureaucracy would go beyond the competences of LCEs. It is one area that has been left on the back burner; but, if appropriately addressed, it would create significant and long-term gains in making local governments become responsive and accountable institutions. Professionalizing the local bureaucracy requires establishing the competency needs of civil servants at the local level, their career path and development in the local bureaucracy.
13Brillantes’, Innovations and Excellence in Local Governance and other papers articulate the gains of the Code. The Center for Local and Regional Governance (CLRG) and Center for Policy and Executive Development (CPED) of UP-NCPAG likewise continue to build the capacities of local governments to attain better governance, development results, and local fiscal sustainability in the Philippines, among other things; it has likewise been documenting some best and leading practices on local governance for replication by others—inside and outside the Philippines.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Decentralization and Local Governance in the Philippines 375
In developing countries, central governments still hold a greater capacity to raise revenue and equitably redistribute the countries fiscal resource. In the Philippines, efforts to improve the capacities of local government to attain fiscal sustainability—updating of real property values and revenue codes, computerization, and other innovations—should be coupled with a new policy design of the intergovernmental fiscal transfers system that promotes distribution equity and offers incentives for revenue collection efficiency, and avoid dependency of LGUs on the IRA.
The many issues and challenges noted above certainly require attention by decentralization advocates and stakeholders in the Philippines. A comprehensive capacity building program would respond to capacity problems of the central and local governments in decentralization. Key institutions should be able to prioritize policy decisions and the issuance of the appropriate policy instruments. Should policy change be warranted, i.e., amendment to the LGC of 1991, oversight agencies may have to step up their involvement and pursue a common policy agenda. A policy design team from within the executive department with support from serious policy studies and the academe would be able to pursue and shepherd the political process of policy change. Perhaps it can reconcile and balance the competing interests of the various stakeholders, including the leagues of local governments, interest groups from the civil society, central and local government officials, and the legislators.
The process of decentralization in the Philippines has been a long and arduous task. There have been many victories and there have been many challenges as well. One thing is sure, decentralization is an irreversible process and it is here to stay.
References
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Balisacan, A. and Hill, H. (eds). Dynamics of Regional Development: The Philippines in East Asia. Great Britain: Edward Elgar, 2007.
Brillantes, A. “Decentralized Democratic Governance Under the Local Government Code: A Governmental Perspective.” Philippine Journal of Public Administration (Vol. No. 42, I and II), 1998: 38–57.
———.Innovations and Excellence in Local Governance: Undestanding Local Governments in the Philippines.
Quezon City: UP National College of Public Administration and Governance, 2003.
———.Decentralization Imperatives: Lessons from Some Asian Countries. GSICS Working Paper Series, Kobe: Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University, 2004.
Brillantes, A, and Moscare, D. “Decentralization and Federalism in the Philippines: Lessons from Global Community.” Discussion Paper presented at the International Conference of the East Weste Center, Kuala Lumpur, 2002.
Brillantes, A, Llanto, G., Alm, J. and Sosmena, G. An In-Depth and Comprehensive Study on Decentralization.
Commissioned Study by the Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Asian Development Bank, Quezon City: Forthcoming, 2009.
Brillantes, A., Remigio, O. and Tumanut, M. Devolved Agricultural Extension Services in the Philippines: Trials and Triumphs. Quezon City: Center for Local and Regional Governance, 2007.
Capuno, J., Garcia, M. Sardalla, J. and Villamil, L. “The Development Payoff of Good Governance: Emerging Results of a Social Experiment in Two Philippine Provinces.” International Society for Third-Sector Research. http://www.istr.org/conferences/capetown/volume/capuno.pdf (accessed February 20, 2009).
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de Dios, E. “Local Politics and Local Economy.” In The Dynamics of Regional Development: The Philippines in East Asia, by Balisacan, A. and Hill, H. (eds), 157–203. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007.
Diokno, B. “Decentralization in the Philippines After Ten Years: What Have We Learned? What have I learned?” U.P. School of Economics Discussion Paper No. 2003–08, University of the Philippines, Quezon, 2003.
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Annexes
Annex 18.1 Devolved Services by LGU Level
|
Province |
City |
Municipality |
Barangay |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Agriculture |
• Agricultural extension and |
• All services and facilities |
• On-site research and |
• Agricultural support |
|
|
on-site research (prevention |
of the province and |
agricultural extension |
services (distribution |
|
|
of animal pests and diseases, |
municipality plus, |
services (livestock dispersal |
system and farm |
Decentralization |
|
artificial insemination |
support for education, |
and seedling materials for |
operation) |
|
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|
centers, assistance to |
police, fire services and |
aquaculture, cooperative |
|
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|
organizational assistance to |
facilities |
development, inter-barangay |
|
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cooperatives) |
|
irrigation system) |
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Environment |
• Law enforcement: |
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• Implementation of |
• Sanitation services |
|
|
community-based forestry, |
|
community-based forestry |
and solid waste |
|
|
pollution control, small-scale |
|
projects |
collection |
and |
|
mining |
|
• Management of communal |
|
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Local |
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forests (less than 50 km2) |
|
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• Solid waste disposal system |
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Governance |
|
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Health |
• Management of hospitals |
|
child care, disease control, |
centers |
|
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• Field health services and |
• Maintenance of |
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|
and tertiary health services |
|
hospital services (primary |
barangay health |
|
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health care, maternal and |
centers and day care |
|
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purchase of medicines) |
|
in |
|
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the |
Social Welfare |
• Programs for rebel returnees |
|
• Programs and projects for |
|
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• Low-cost housing and mass |
|
vagrants, beggars, drug |
|
Philippines |
|
and evacuees |
|
youth, women, elderly, |
|
|
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• Population development |
|
disabled |
|
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services |
|
• Rehabilitation programs for |
|
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dwellings |
|
abuse victims, etc. |
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• Investment support services |
|
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377 |
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(access to credit financing) |
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(continued) |
|
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Annex 18.1 (continued) Devolved Services by LGU Level
|
Province |
City |
Municipality |
Barangay |
|
|
|
|
|
Education |
|
|
• Building of schools (public |
• Putting up |
|
|
|
elementary and secondary |
information and |
|
|
|
facilities) |
reading center |
|
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• Maintenance of public |
|
|
|
|
library |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Public Works |
• Locally funded projects |
|
• Locally funded public works |
• Facilities like |
|
(provincial roads, inter- |
|
and infrastructure projects |
multi-purpose halls, |
|
municipal waterworks, |
|
(local roads, clinics, |
plaza, and sports |
|
reclamation projects, |
|
communal irrigation, small |
center |
|
irrigation systems, drainage |
|
water pounds and water |
• Maintenance of |
|
and sewerage, etc.) |
|
supply systems, fish ports, |
|
|
|
barangay roads, |
||
|
|
|
drainage and sewerage, |
|
|
|
|
bridges, and water |
|
|
|
|
traffic signals, etc.) |
|
|
|
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supply systems |
|
|
|
|
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• Satellite or public |
|
|
|
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market, if viable |
|
|
|
|
|
Tourism |
• Promotion programs |
|
• Provision of facilities and |
|
Promotion |
|
|
equipment acquisition |
|
|
|
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|
Administration |
|
|
|
• Maintenance of |
of Justice |
|
|
|
Katarungang |
|
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|
Pambarangay |
|
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|
Source: Adapted from Ilago, S., Decentralization in East and Southeast Asia, Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance, Tokyo, 2007.
Asia Southeast in Administration Public 378
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Annex 18.2 An Assessment of the Progress of Decentralization
Area |
Description |
Positive |
Negative |
|
|
|
|
Devolved |
Mixed results, modest |
On health: |
|
services |
gains in devolved |
• Improved efficiency in the procurement of |
• Mismatch between revenue and health |
|
services |
||
|
medicines and supplies |
expenditure requirements |
|
|
|
||
|
|
• A more flexible orientation on basic health |
• Difficulty to maintain quality of service in |
|
|
programs |
poorer areas |
|
|
• Innovative mechanisms for revenue |
|
|
|
generation |
|
|
|
• Integrated and area focused planning |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
On agriculture: |
|
|
|
• Increased cooperation between LGUs, the |
• Weak linkage between the Department of |
|
|
private sector and non-governmental |
Agriculture and the local governments |
|
|
organizations in extension, i.e., farm systems |
• Unclear personnel requirements |
|
|
|
|
|
|
• Adopted partnership models involving |
• Lack of financing prioritization by LGUs |
|
|
municipalities, NGAs, academic institutions, |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
and private organization, i.e., for improved |
|
|
|
coordination, information sharing, |
|
|
|
consolidation of produce, etc. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
On social welfare services: |
|
|
|
• Most successful among devolved services due |
• Limited funding at the municipal level |
|
|
to careful devolution of personnel, funding, |
• Low priority of social services in some |
|
|
opportunities for access to external funds, |
|
|
|
local governments |
|
|
|
preparedness of personnel, and demands for |
|
|
|
• Lack of technical support in the delivery of |
|
|
|
social services at the local level |
|
|
|
social services from other government |
|
|
|
• More efficient and effective delivery by |
|
|
|
agencies |
|
|
|
reducing bureaucratic procedures |
|
|
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|
|
|
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|
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|
(continued) |
379 Philippines the in Governance Local and Decentralization
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Annex 18.2 (continued) An Assessment of the Progress of Decentralization
Area |
Description |
Positive |
Negative |
|
|
|
|
People |
Improved context and |
• Increased participation in the formal |
• Inability to meet the 25% requirement for |
participation |
initiative for |
processes of local government through the |
NGO participation by the LGC |
|
participation in local |
special bodies in local development council: |
• Marginal inputs of local civil society |
|
governance, but token |
55% of provinces; 67% of municipalities; and |
|
|
organizations |
||
|
participation in some |
63% of cities |
|
|
|
||
|
areas of local |
• Greater and “embedding” citizen participation |
|
|
governance |
|
|
|
in better led LGUs, e.g., Naga City |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Development |
Sectoral planning has |
• A comprehensive land use plan and a |
• Disconnect of sectoral plans between |
planning |
not been fused with |
comprehensive development as requirements |
national and LGUs |
|
local planning |
for effective resource management and |
• Need assessment for effectiveness of local |
|
|
programming |
|
|
|
planning |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Local finance |
Improving conditions |
• Automatic release of IRA transfers |
• Broad-based taxes remain collected by the |
|
for local finance, but |
• Increased innovations in resource |
central government |
|
policy design flaws |
|
|
|
mobilization and generation |
• Policy restrictions in setting local tax rates |
|
|
need correction |
||
|
|
• Inability to increase tax rates due to |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
political risks |
|
|
|
• Mismatch between taxing and expenditure |
|
|
|
responsibilities, e.g., provinces have low |
|
|
|
taxing powers and IRA transfers relative to |
|
|
|
their expenditure responsibilities |
|
|
|
|
Political |
Policy implementation |
• Received firm support from the president, |
• Tendency of the president to misuse |
process |
did not escape the |
especially during the time of Presidents |
authority over local governments and the |
|
political process, but |
Aquino (preventing authoritarianism) and |
purse to ensure “political survival” and |
|
firm policy support |
Fidel Ramos (vetoed attempts to recentralize |
maintain legitimacy in offices |
|
shores up |
health services) |
|
|
decentralization |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Summary based on Ilago (2007) with additional inputs.
Asia Southeast in Administration Public 380
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC