- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
432 |
Public Administration in Southeast Asia |
|
Table 21.2 Levels of Career Appointments |
||
|
|
|
Level |
|
Coverage |
|
|
|
First |
|
Clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions, which involve |
|
|
non-professional or sub-professional work in a non-supervisory or |
|
|
supervisory capacity requiring less than 4 years of collegiate studies |
|
|
|
Second |
|
professional, technical and scientific positions involving professional, |
|
|
technical or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory |
|
|
capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division |
|
|
Chief level |
|
|
|
Third |
|
positions in the Career Executive Service |
|
|
|
Source: CSS (2008); de Leon (2000).
69% of all career employees are working in NGAs, while 24% and 7% are in LGUs and GOCCs, respectively. Of the non-career positions, 68% are in LGUs, 21% in NGAs, and 11% in GOCCs.
Despite the implementation of the decentralization program since 1991 and the succeeding rationalization efforts, the civil service system remains top heavy, particularly in terms of distribution of government personnel. Between 1984 and 2004, the NGA comprised 67% to 68% of the total workforce. In 2008, NGA personnel declined to 63% in 2008, while LGU employees increased to 29% and GOCCs increased to 8%.
21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
The Philippine civil service has well-established rules and procedures on recruitment and selection, which include announcement of job opportunities, competitive application, and qualification standards, among others. Each government agency has a designated human resource development office/unit responsible for performing this function.
The civil service, however, is generally not a very attractive career in the Philippines. Aside from the low compensation packages, there are concerns about the recruitment process and procedures, stigma of an inefficient bureaucracy, and rent seeking. On some occasions, political patronage and interference impede career advancement and undermine established procedures that uphold the merit system.
Table 21.3 Career Service Employees by Position Level, 2008
|
NGAs |
|
GOCCs |
LGUs |
|
Total |
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Position Level |
No. |
|
% |
No. |
% |
No. |
|
% |
No. |
|
% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
First level |
148,528 |
|
18.6 |
33,275 |
40.4 |
169,021 |
|
62.0 |
350,824 |
|
30.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Second level |
628,146 |
|
78.7 |
46,173 |
56.0 |
101,863 |
|
37.4 |
776,182 |
|
67.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Third level |
10,305 |
|
1.3 |
2,080 |
2.5 |
931 |
|
0.3 |
13,316 |
|
1.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Non-executive |
11,605 |
|
1.5 |
929 |
1.1 |
795 |
|
0.3 |
13,329 |
|
1.2 |
career |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
798,584 |
|
69 |
82,457 |
7 |
272,610 |
|
24 |
1,153,651 |
|
100 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Adapted from CSC, 2008 Inventory of Government Personnel, 2008; authors’ computations.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Civil Service System in the Philippines 433
Non-Executive
Third Level, Career, 1.2%
1.2%
First Level,
30.4%
Second Level,
67.3%
Figure 21.6 Distribution of career service employees, 2008. Source: by the authors.
During the incumbency of CSC chairperson Corazon de Leon, she introduced the Brightest for the Bureaucracy Program (BBP) to attract honor graduates and the best talent to the Philippine public service system. Government agencies are directed to allocate a certain number of vacant positions for BBP eligibles, but there is lack of empirical data on the progress of BBP.
21.3.4 Examination-based Entry and Appointment System
Regular appointment in the Philippine civil service requires civil service eligibility (CSE)—both at professional and sub-professional levels.4 Eligibility is generally earned by passing the civil service examination. University graduates with academic honors (e.g., cum laude, magna cum laude, summa cum laude) are conferred with eligibility under a special law. Individuals who have passed the professional certifications (board examinations) by the Professional Regulatory Commission
Table 21.4 Non-Career Service Employees by Type of Appointment, 2008
Type of |
NGAs |
|
GOCCs |
LGUs |
|
Total |
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
appointment |
No. |
|
% |
No. |
% |
No. |
|
% |
No. |
|
% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Co-terminus |
6,075 |
|
17.8 |
2,843 |
16.8 |
10,422 |
|
9.6 |
19,340 |
|
12.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Casual |
18,718 |
|
54.9 |
10,052 |
59.5 |
68,554 |
|
63.0 |
97,324 |
|
60.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Contractual |
8,036 |
|
23.6 |
3,849 |
22.8 |
8,997 |
|
8.3 |
20,882 |
|
13.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Elective |
322 |
|
0.9 |
0 |
0.0 |
20,425 |
|
18.8 |
20,747 |
|
13.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Non-career |
941 |
|
2.8 |
159 |
1 |
494 |
|
0.5 |
1,594 |
|
1 |
executive |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
34,092 |
|
21 |
16,903 |
11 |
108,892 |
|
68 |
159,887 |
|
100.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Adapted from CSC, 2008 Inventory of Government Personnel, 2008; authors’ computations.
4Professional level requires university degree holders while sub-professional are undergraduates and at least high school graduates.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
434 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Non-carrer executive
1% |
Coterminus |
Elective |
12% |
13%
Contractual 13%
Casual
61%
Figure 21.7 Distribution of non-career service employees, 2008. Source: by the authors.
(these are engineers, doctors, nurses, among others) are CSE. Lawyers who passed the bar examinations also have CSE.5 Foreign service officers who passed the foreign service examination (FSE) likewise earn CSE.
In 2008, 132,602 took the civil service examination (professional level, i.e., university degree holders), of which 12,279 or 9.1% passed. At the sub-professional level, 4,707 or 13.6% passed out of 34,521 takers. A total of 10,331 (professional and sub-professional levels) joined the government service in 2008. CSC statistics, however, cannot show whether those who took the examination in 2008 were the same individuals who joined the government service. CSC examination passers do not necessarily enter the civil service. Table 21.5 shows the number of civil service examinees for the professional and sub-professional levels.
The CSC introduced the Walk-In and Dispersed Career Service Examination to provide greater access for potential entrants. The system was designed to improve the examination process for individuals seeking CSE. The passing mark was also increased from 70% to 80% to give greater premium to the most basic requirement in entering the government service, which is the CSE. This marks the intention of the CSC to increase the competency and requirements for
Table 21.5 Examinees and Passers in CSC Eligibility Screening, 2005–2009
|
|
Professional |
|
Sub-professional |
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Year |
Examinees |
|
Passed |
% |
Examinees |
Passed |
% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005 |
125,120 |
|
4,542 |
3.6 |
23,377 |
3,222 |
13.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2006 |
129,534 |
|
9,915 |
7.7 |
25,506 |
2,581 |
10.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2007 |
147,064 |
|
15,870 |
10.8 |
33,924 |
5,630 |
16.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008 |
135,602 |
|
12,279 |
9.1 |
34,521 |
4,707 |
13.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009 |
95,208 |
|
8,669 |
9.1 |
23,786 |
2,941 |
12.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: CSC (2009), percentages by the authors.
Note: Partial results for 2009.
5See http://www.csc.gov.ph/cscweb/elig_special.html for the “Eligibilities Granted under Special Laws and CSC Issuances.”
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Civil Service System in the Philippines 435
civil servants. This effort needs to be complemented with strategies and programs to attract more highly skilled and intelligent graduates, board passers, and CSEs.
The Computer-Assisted Test (CAT) CAT-VIP and the Job Opportunity Data Bank System are two innovations by the CSC. CAT is a CSC-developed software program instituted to revolutionize the pencil and paper types of civil service examinations. CAT facilitates the systematic storage, updating, retrieval, checking, and scoring of examinee data through the computer software. It allows examinees to find out whether or not they have passed the examination in about an hour. Individuals with special needs like the visually impaired were initially precluded from taking the civil service examinations; however, the CAT-VIP introduced a voice-sensitive computer aid and specially designed instruments or keyboards for those with disabilities.
21.3.5 Position Classification, Compensation, and Salary Structure
During the presidency of Corazon Aquino and the CSC chairmanship of Patricia Sto. Tomas, the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) was implemented through the enactment of RA No. 6758 entitled, “An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and for Other Purposes” or “Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,” on August 21, 1989, which covers all positions in the government, including GOCCs and GFIs.6
The Department of Budget Management (DBM) through its Compensation and Position Classification Bureau (CPCB), now named Organization, Position Classification and Compensation Bureau (OPCCB) determines the position and its equivalent rank in the salary grading system. A manual on position classification and compensation provides details on the operationalization of the SSL.
The staffing positions of the NG are further classified into constitutional positions, key executive positions, and other permanent positions. Constitutional positions (with 315 filled positions in 2005) cover the highest level—elective and appointive—positions in government service, including the president, vice president, senate president, Speaker of the Lower House, chief justice of the Supreme Court, senators, members of the House of Representatives, associate justices of the Supreme Court, and chairpersons and commissioners of the constitutional commissions, and the Ombudsman. Key executive positions refer to executive, managerial, and chief division or equivalent positions (e.g., executive secretary, department secretaries) numbering 21,280 positions in 2005. Other permanent positions include technical, support to technical and administrative positions, part-time, positions exempt from the SSL,7 and the uniformed personnel had a total of 1,129,086 filled positions in 2005 (DBM 2005).
These positions have salary grades (SG) and ranks, which follow 33 SG levels, each grade level with eight steps and equivalent monthly rate fees. The president has SG 33 with a monthly pay of PhP57,750 or roughly US$1,200 (computed at 47 peso to a dollar).
Table 21.6 shows the equivalent SGs for constitutional positions, which range between 33 and 30 SGs. To illustrate the monthly compensation of civil servants in the Philippines, Table 21.7 indicates the pesos equivalent of the top and bottom five SGs. Annex 2 provides the complete SG list and the estimated number of positions on each level.
6The SSL schedule was adjusted in 1994. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has signed Joint Resolution No. 4 Series of 2009 or the Salary Standardization Law III, which intends to raise salaries by 50%. It will be imple-
mented in tranches between 2009 and 2012.
7 Mostly, GFIs and confidential staff of Congress are not covered by the SSL.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC