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Intergovernmental Relations Between Mainland China and the Macao SAR 487

bureaucratic red tape. It has made no clear timetable on the program to increase the accountability of senior government officials, and the government has made no commitments on dealing with abuse of power of officials exposed in the trials of the Ao Man Long case.39 The reform does lead to the setting up of a one-stop service center for government services, thus improving service delivery. But, it is later pointed out that the services available in these centers are restricted to the jurisdiction under Chan’s purview. Issues such as pipe backup, which involves jurisdictions with other secretaries, could not be resolved there. Moreover, the integration of services is so minimal that the onestop service center really means the placing of various services counters from different departments under one roof. It involves no re-engineering and re-integration of back-office functions (Macao Daily, May 11, 2008; Jornal Da Cidadao, May 7, 2008).

The experience of Macao’s decentralization and autonomy could not be claimed to be a successful one. The responsiveness and efficiency that was supposed to spring from autonomy ended up in corruption, power abuse, and cronyism. The mismanagement of the economy caused inflation, speculation, traffic congestion, and intensified social agitation against migrant workers. One of the structural causes of these problems has to be found in the design of the Macao Basic Law, which allows very little democratic accountability. The incumbent elite feel so firmly ensconced in place and so insulated from public pressure that many criticisms remained unanswered and needed policies are simply not made. If the local government fails to take policy initiatives to address people’s concerns, people may find it expedient to look for redress at higher level of government. If higher level of government perceives an impending crisis that the local government is too feeble to address, it may be tempted to use a direct way of ordering the local government to make policy adjustments. As these cases multiply, there will be less and less concern on local autonomy from all sides as long as the problems at issue are fi xed. Local autonomy becomes less and less relevant to all concerned. Unfortunately, the Macao government’s situation appears to have reached this stage.

23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity

This dimension perceives autonomy as a bottom-up process in which local forces play an important role in securing and defending an autonomous space. In this regard, autonomy can no longer be conceived as a tangible, transferable entity. Instead, autonomy can only be meaningfully discussed in relational terms within the context of power and social dynamics. This section argues that the poor performance of the local government is not only related to the unaccountable institutional arrangement prescribed by the Macao Basic Law, it also relates to the lack of powerful social forces in Macao consistently probing the government for more accountability, and demanding it to guard and to defend local interests. Obviously, one of the critical elements in the emergence of locally oriented social forces is the arrival of a self-conscious local identity. This is based on the awareness of the self-defined difference, and the desire to maintain it through engaging in collective efforts to manifest and assert it in meaningful ways. The post-Second World War history of Macao, however, is a history largely of the obliteration of the local in preference of the national. This job is carried out by the ubiquitous pro-China social groups enthusiastically propounding the nationalistic sentiment. By the time the Macao SAR was set up, the pro-China nationalist social

39See the comments by former senior government official, Jorge Rangel, Jornal Da Cidadao (June 16, 2008), Jornal Informacao (March 28, 2008), and Jornal San Wa Ou (July 23, 2007).

©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

488 Public Administration in Southeast Asia

force prevailed over the local society unopposed. Their mission is to provide stability to the Macao SAR and to make sure the OCTS works according to China’s desire.

23.4.1 Rise of the Pro-China Social Forces

The ascendancy of the pro-China nationalist force has to be traced to the “123 incident”40 that took place in 1966. These social forces managed to lead a colony-wide mobilization and defeat the Portuguese colonial rule. What saved Portugal from being evicted from Macao was China’s interest in seeing it to her advantage of maintaining the status quo. The ending of Macao’s colonial status would jeopardize Britain’s control of Hong Kong, which supplied China with precious foreign exchange through purchasing the bulk of food and other daily necessities from China. From then onward, Macao was turned into, in Tam’s (1994: 252) words, a communist “semi-liberated zone.” Pro-Taiwan KMT forces were expelled from the enclave. The pro-Beijing social forces expanded unopposed in the society. 41 By the 1990s, these groups managed to build an elaborate network of schools, community centers, hospital and clinics, trade unions, business associations, mass media, clan associations, etc. (Lou 2004: 126; Dicks 1984: 125; Lo 1995: 59). The pro-China nationalist ideology was ardently articulated and intimately meshed with almost every aspect of Macao’s economic and social life. The colonial regime could not rule effectively without the cooperation and support of these groups (Yee 2001: 35; Ng 1990: 179).

There are various attempts to conceptualize this form of politics that emerged out of the unique historical incident since the 1960s. One scholar characterizes it as a form of “bi-polar politics,” highlighting the fact that the colonial state could no longer rule according to its own wishes. Effective rule was shared between the colonial authority and the local Chinese groups (Lengxia 1999). However, many others call it a societal corporatism by virtue of the political potency of social groups and their being incorporated into the ruling coalition. The corporatist proponent, Lou Sheng Hua (2004), has offered a very benign and unproblematic interpretation of this form of Macao politics. He saw corporatism as a natural outcome of a weak colonial state leaving a vacuum to be filled by social groups. This arrangement served the interests of all concerned parties: The colonial state could dispense with messy interference to the Chinese society; Chinese residents got their needed services provided by an intermediaries; The social groups found their niche in serving both the rule and ruled, and thus improved social harmony. In so doing, Lou, unfortunately, depoliticizes these social groups and camouflages their very important connection with the communist regime in China. On the one hand, he tries to manufacture an unrealistic image of the emergence of an autonomous civil society in Macao without tracing China’s instigation, concoction, and control on them. On the other hand, he has unproblematically conceived the nationalistic identity of these groups as the natural expression of their true Chineseness, neglecting its constructiveness and artificiality under the anti-colonial setting (see Lou 2004: 335). The contests

40The incident was triggered by pro-China groups in Taipa attempting to build a school without, allegedly, securing the necessary clearance from the colonial authority. The subsequent violent suppression sparked a city-wide anti-colonial mobilization with the tacit backing from Red Guards across the border in China. In the end, the colonial authority admitted a humiliating defeat by apologizing for using force. This victory earned the pro-China groups unchallengeable control of Macao society. For further discussions of the incident, see Dicks (1984), Share (2006: 52–54), and Fernandes (2007).

41Chinese agents penetrated and operated unhindered in Macao. According to a report, it even managed to infi ltrate the Mozambique soldiers stationed by Portugal in the Macao garrison. Fearing the possible spread of anti-Portugal anti-colonial feelings when these soldiers returned home, Portugal decided to withdraw the Mozambique detachment in the 1960s (see Fernandes 1999: 1180).

©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

Intergovernmental Relations Between Mainland China and the Macao SAR 489

and politics associated with the rise of this nationalism have been completely sanitized. The status quo is justified by a crude functionalism and a depoliticized national identification.

More critical scholars such as Herbert Yee (2001) and Chou (2004), are not as sanguine as Lou and his associates on the potentials of these social groups in the expansion of autonomous civil society. Chou (2005: 197) called this a patron-client network in which the local Chinese elite maintained their control on the population through the dispensing of favors and influence. Yee (2001: 17–18) recognizes that these pro-China Macao social groups are enmeshed in a hierarchical network. The top of this command structure was located at China’s unofficial representative office in Macao, the Xinhua News Agency (NCNA).42 This agency coordinated the vast pro-Beijing network in Macao, including its economic interests (the most important was undoubtedly the Nam Kwong Trading Company), the communist party cell, its media mouthpiece, the Macao Daily, which is the daily newspaper with the largest circulation in Macao, plus the network of pro-China social groups. NCNA’s mission was to provide unified leadership to this massive network so that China’s interests would be protected and pursued. Furthermore, Xinhua provided the authoritative channel to settle disputes that might arise out of conflicts of interests within this network, such as between the business associations and the trade unions, so that unity and stability could be maintained. This monolithic structure has almost attained domination in Macao society. Alternative voices were threatened with marginalization and exclusion. A unified ideology of nationalism and political unity has been aggressively promoted. In the words of Yee (2001: 165), “Beijing’s influence is pervasive and present in all levels of Macao society.”

More pertinent to our purpose here is that these social organizations helped to articulate a dogmatic version of nationalism that calls for an unconditional identification with Mainland China (Chou 2005: 196; Pereira 2001: 122). In their charters, almost all of these organizations distinguish themselves as aiguo aiao (literally, “love China love Macao”) organizations. Their immediate goal is to promote the political stability of Macao, which is also a manifested goal of China. Working for the interests of their members is usually listed as their last objective.43 Many of these groups are enmeshed in the corresponding networks in China, receiving training and ideological tutelage from the latter.44 For instance, the Macao Federation of Trade Unions has strong connections with the All-China Federation of Trade Union in China. Based on an analysis of some key social groups, Li (2008: 170–172) comes to the conclusion that promoting national identification is a key part of their activities. They have been successful in promoting identification not only with “cultural China,” but also with “political China,” meaning China’s ruling party and the political regime. This has distinguished Macao’s social groups with their counterparts in Hong Kong.

Among the local actors within this pro-China network, the Macao Chamber of Commerce has emerged as the most important group with many of its directors, most prominently being its long-time leader Ho Yin and his successor Ma Man Kei, being given key political posts in China’s

42China and Portugal did not normalize their relations until 1979. Prior to normalization, the Xinhua News Agency became the unofficial body representing Beijing’s presence in Macao. In this sense, the news agency was a cover for China’s operation in the colony.

43For instance, the objective of the Macao Chamber of Commerce is listed as follows: “To support the principle of ‘one-country, two systems,’ to be persistently devoted to the country and Macao, to united different entities and individuals in the industrial and commercial sectors in Macao, to server [sic] them and safeguard their legitimate rights and interests….” See their website (http://www.acm.org.mo/en/main1.htm, accessed September 4, 2008).

44See Tam (2008) for a discussion of how the leaders of the Macao Youth Federation are incorporated in the AllChina Youth Federation.

©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

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political hierarchy (Chou 2005: 197; Afonso and Pereira 1986: 52).45 Political commentators have pointed out that the Macao Chamber of Commerce has been dominated by a few major families since the 1950s. Some of them, like the Ho Yin, Ma Man Kei, and Chiu Tak Kei families, have taken a more politically visible approach (Lou 2004: 92; Yee 2001: 122–23). Others, such as Ng Fok, are not as visible, but politically and economically no less powerful. The political connection has served them well by bringing in many lucrative business opportunities with China and with the Macao government. 46 Such a connection could be critical for getting lucrative contracts from the colonial state, and for running business in an economy where bureaucratic red tape is rampant. More pertinent to our purpose here is that this economic significance is derived from the occupation of a political position in which loyalty and ideological belief plays a paramount role. The open manifestation of a true believer and an ardent defender of nationalism is thus closely linked to material interests.

The popular perception of a politically weak, incompetent, and economically backward colonial state among the Chinese population did not help to consolidate an alternative identity to challenge the dominant China-oriented nationalist discourse. The colonial regime never invested significant resources in the education system to promote the Portuguese language, thereby building up a direct channel of communication with colonial subjects (Fernandes 1997: 47). Instead, it relied on the Macanese, a creolized population of the Portuguese and Asian origin, as an intermediary because they speak both Portuguese and Cantonese, the lingua franca of the local population. They fi lled up the middle-stratum positions of the colonial bureaucracy. The abuse of power and condescending attitude of this middle stratum of the colonial state often alienated the Chinese population, and did not help to build an affection with the Portuguese regime (Yee 2001: 34).

The enforcement of this nationalist discourse serves a number of purposes. The most important, of course, is to prevent the emergence of a local identity that may counterbalance the nationalist ideology and thus complicate the national unification project. There has been a persistent effort to deny this local identity by exhorting the Macao people’s proud nationalist aspiration, which was not difficult to be understood as an indirect reference to Hong Kong people’s pro-British and procolonialism predilection. Occasionally, the elite also referred to Macao as the historical center of East and West exchange, and developed a unique cultural mix not found in other places (Cheng 2002). However, this uniqueness has never dared to be conceived and transformed into a political project by the local elite. It is merely celebrated in a historical and cultural direction with the overt motivation to advertise for tourist gratification. In a perceived zero sum situation, the promotion of a local-oriented political identity could be interpreted as an attempt to negate national identity. Even worse, it could be construed as an attempt to resist Beijing control or outright separatism. From this perspective, a local scholar, Gary Ngai (1999: 112), has aptly remarked that “discussing and defining Macau’s identity had for a long time remained taboo.”47 The nationalist identification has achieved an unchallengeable position, which was clearly reflected in a 1999 survey indicating that 74% of Macao people were proud to be Chinese while only 38.8% were proud to be Macao citizens (Yee 2001: 71).

45For instance, Ma Man Kei was appointed to the vice-chairmanship of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (see Chou 2005: 197).

46An example of the close relations between mainland and local Chinese capital was the injection of mainland China funds into the Ho Yin-owned Tai Fung Bank, when the bank faced a run in 1983. Kamm (1991: 233) has observed that the distributorship or agency of Chinese products and services tended to go to members of the Macao Chamber of Commerce.

47On this respect, Clayton (2001)’s thesis also offers very good insights.

©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

Intergovernmental Relations Between Mainland China and the Macao SAR 491

Offering some feeble, but not insignificant resistance to this hegemonic nationalist discourse was the small democratic camp. Since the 1980s, a democratic force has emerged in Macao’s political scene representing an alternative to the mainstream pro-China social forces. Its most important representatives are undoubtedly the democratic duo, Ng Kuo Cheong and Au Kam San. Both were active members of the Macao movement supporting the students in the Tiananmen massacre, and thus became a thorn in the side of the Chinese government. With regard to local Macao politics, they were critical of both the Portuguese regime and the pro-Chinese forces, accusing them of engaging in a “conspiracy politics” of maintaining authoritarian control and slowing down Macao’s democratization (Yee 2001: 33). If the pro-China social forces have been asserting a nationalist project, the democratic duo is arguably insisting that this nationalist project should have a large localist component. In other words, they maintain that this has to be a bottom-up process with a strong element of popular participation. Of course, this idea was found to be too radical and was unacceptable to the Macao political elite and the pro-China social groups. Using their preponderance power in Macao’s economy and society, the pro-China elite has managed to marginalize and intimidate members of the democratic camp. Ng and Au were fired from their jobs because of their political belief (Chou 2005: 201; Yee 2001: 166). They eventually turned themselves into full-time politicians, and have been continuously re-elected since the 1990s. Other members, many belonging to the fledgling Macao middle classes, found their career path blocked and chose to leave for fear of reprisal. The democratic force thus remained a tiny minority, and never became a significant force to be reckoned with, though from time to time, their critical voice has catalyzed public action, and played a role in changing policy direction.

23.4.2 Post-Transition Ruling Coalition

Since the 1999 transition, the political role of the pro-China social groups has undergone a critical transformation. Previously, they largely exercised an informal influence over an alien regime. However, after the transition, institutional arrangement has entrenched their formal control over the political process. A clear indication can be gauged from the composition of the government’s top advisory body, the Executive Council. It is an entirely appointed entity with 10 members: 5 are officials from the Macao Chamber of Commerce, 2 from the Macao Federation of Trade Unions, and 1 from the General Union of Neighbors Association of Macao (commonly known as the Kaifong Association).48 In other words, 8 out of 10 are from the proChina groups. In addition, it must be noted that their advisee, the chief executive, is a long-term member of the Macao Chamber of Commerce.

Their strong presence in the government is partly a reflection of the political structure that gives them the power to choose the chief executive and members of the Legislative Assembly.49 The chief executive is elected by a 300-member electoral college ostensibly represented by different functional constituencies from business, cultural, education, professional, sports, labor, social services, religious, and other sectors. The unique aspect of this system is that only registered organizations, rather than individuals, within each constituency are allowed to nominate and elect electoral college members, who in turn nominate and elect the chief executive. It is beyond doubt that the pro-China social groups dominate the electoral college. They monopolized the nomination process and produced uncontested elections by fielding the same number of electoral

48The composition of the current members of the Executive Assembly can be found in Jornal Cheang Pou December 16, 2004. See also Chou (2005: 197–99).

49See Yu (2007: 420–23) for more details on the regulations of the indirect election.

©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

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candidates as the number of seats available in each of the constituencies. Moreover, a cross-check- ing of the associational background of the 300-electoral members identified that at least 183 of them belong to the four key pro-China associations, namely, the Macao Chamber of Commerce (106), the Macao Federation of Trade Unions (39), the Kaifong Association (17), the Women’s General Association of Macao (10), and the Chinese Educators Association of Macao (11).50 If other lesser known personalities and more peripheral pro-China organizations are counted, the percentage could be much higher. The figures also clearly demonstrate the influence of the Macao Chamber of Commerce, which alone accounted for more than one-third of the votes in the electoral college. The same collection of social groups are responsible for the selection of the 12 indirectly elected members in the 29-member Legislative council. Similarly, they made the 2005 and 2009 elections uncontested.

The institutionalization of these social groups in the ruling structure has brought forth a number of very profound implications. Firstly, the traditional role of these social groups has been changed. The leaders of these social groups have been invited to sit on various high-power government committees and bodies.51 Huge amounts of government funding and resource have been extended to these social groups to expand their services and activities (Chou 2005: 200).52 In exchange for these power and resources, these social groups are used to legitimize government policies. From time to time, they have been asked to defend unpopular government positions. In a candid interview, an insider and senior member of the pro-China social sector, Professor Ieong Wan Chong, has made a very precise and succinct analysis of their present condition. According to him, in the past, these social groups played a check and balance role outside the colonial government to restrain its excessiveness and abuse of power. After the transition, they entered and sided with the government and tried to defend all its policies and actions from social criticisms (Jornal Va Kio, October 4, 2007). In short, the economic wing of the pro-China elite was given real power in controlling the government without much democratic accountability. The social and labor wing of the pro-China groups are incorporated into the ruling coalition as instruments of social control. Once in a while, the latter groups may push for better governance on matters of a non-structural nature. But in matters affecting fundamental interests, such as land allocation and the freedom to import migrant workers, their maneuvering room is limited by their role as loyal supporters of the government, and, by their aversion to action remotely causing social and political instability to the regime. Given that these social groups dominated the civil society in Macao, their cozy relations with the government thus deprived the latter with a major source of vibrancy and critique.

50The list of the Electoral College members of the 2004 chief executive election is available at http://www.ce- election.gov.mo (accessed May 4, 2008). Their associational background is identified by checking their names with the lists of officials put up by the key pro-China organizations in their websites. Their association identity is verified again through newspaper reports accessible in Wisenews.

51For instance, the Macao Federation of Trade Unions has one representative in the Executive Assembly, 4 Legislative Assembly members, and its members sit in 30 other consultative committees (see http://www.faom. org.mo/web/?action-viewnews-itemid-236, accessed May 12, 2008).

52For instance, the Macao Federation of Trade Unions has become a mammoth organization providing various social services, training and recreational activities. As listed in its website, the MFTU boasted of running a network of primary and secondary schools, a continual education centre, four clinics, three childcare facilities, four elderly centers, four recreational complexes, one fitness center, one rehabilitation centre, one sports stadium, one job training center, one job bank, and four branches and offices (see http://www.faom.org.mo/web/?action- category-catid-221, accessed May 12, 2008).

©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

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