
- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References

80 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
However, public attitudes toward grand corruption are much stronger than towards petty corruption. Especially among the educated public, information on grand corruption evokes strong reactions a seething anger and frustration over individual inefficacy to make changes. Like an outrage that could translate into action, if and when conditions permit. Indeed, the root causes of the current political instability, conflict, and turmoil (2005–2009) stemmed mainly from grand-scale corruption or corruption charges against the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. On the charge of using his political office and influence to pave the way for his wife’s successful bidding for a very valuable piece of state-owned land, he was convicted by the Supreme Court for the Holders of Political Office and sentenced to 2 years in prison. He was convicted in absentia because he had jumped bail and left the country before sentence was passed.1
Corruption charges and allegations have been a common reason or justification for regime changes in Thailand.2 This chapter discusses public ethics in Thailand, the reasons behind many current concerns, and various efforts to address public ethics.
4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
Thailand has been included in the ranking system of Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception Index3 (CPI). Since the CPI’s inception, Thailand’s score has not changed dramatically. Its score never reached 4 points out of a 10-point scale (Table 4.1).
As a perception index, it does not profess to measure the actual incidence of corruption, nor the degree or level of corruption in a country. Perhaps because this instrument has been around for over a decade, its continuity and virtual monopoly in ranking the transparency of countries at the international level has made the CPI a potent instrument that many countries look on seriously. Thailand is one such country. Government agencies and especially independent anticorruption agencies like the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) hope to upgrade Thailand’s score in the CPI from 3 plus to 5 points in a few years. In fact, the NACC drafted a
1It is important to note that according to the design of this special Supreme Court to deal with offenders who are politicians, no appeal was allowed. The rationale for this rested on past experiences when political office holders utilized the regular lengthy three court-system with appeals court and Supreme Court to evade punishment and to continue carrying on their tasks and duties despite a first and second conviction. Because of the lengthy process from charges and investigation, to formal charges by the prosecutor’s office, court hearings, and final court judgment, which may still involve another two tiers of appeal, some accused persons may have died before the final judgments. Worse still, criminal offences as with other offences have term limits or expiration that in the past had served to absolve many alleged wrongdoers before the conclusion of a case in the judiciary system. The Constitution of 1997 enabled this special one-tier court to come into existence. The current Constitution of 2007 did not make changes to this special “Supreme Court.” However, under the current political conflict; many politicians are calling for a revision of the constitution, which may include changes to this special court system for politicians.
2Pressures against an elected government often include corruption charges, which when the urban public begins to be convinced of the charges, could eventually lead to the waning of the government’s position, which may ultimately result in the dissolution of Parliament and the call for a new election. Likewise, charges of corruption are inevitable as justification for military take-over in coup d’états that Thailand has had a fair share of since 1932, when absolute monarchy was replaced with constitutional monarchy and the institution of parliamentary democracy.
3From Transparency International (http://www.transparency.org/). CPI’s scoring systems runs from 0 to 10. The higher the score, the less corrupt a country is perceived to be.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

Public Ethics and Corruption in Thailand 81
Table 4.1 Thailand in the Corruption Perception Index
Year |
Score |
Ranking |
No. of counter ranked |
|
|
|
|
1995 |
2.79 |
34 |
41 |
|
|
|
|
1996 |
3.33 |
37 |
54 |
|
|
|
|
1997 |
3.06 |
39 |
52 |
|
|
|
|
1998 |
3.00 |
61 |
85 |
|
|
|
|
1999 |
3.20 |
68 |
98 |
|
|
|
|
2000 |
3.20 |
60 |
90 |
|
|
|
|
2001 |
3.20 |
61 |
91 |
|
|
|
|
2002 |
3.20 |
64 |
102 |
|
|
|
|
2003 |
3.30 |
70 |
133 |
|
|
|
|
2004 |
3.60 |
64 |
146 |
|
|
|
|
2005 |
3.80 |
59 |
159 |
|
|
|
|
2006 |
3.60 |
63 |
163 |
|
|
|
|
2007 |
3.30 |
84 |
179 |
|
|
|
|
2008 |
3.50 |
80 |
180 |
|
|
|
|
Source: From Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/.
Note: The score of transparency is from 0 to 10. The higher the score, the less corrupt a country is perceived.
National Anti-Corruption Strategy to fight corruption. If the strategy works, the NACC expects to see Thailand’s ranking in the CPI improve significantly.4
4.2.2 Types of Corruption
Cases of public corruption often involve private sector persons or organizations. Particularly in grand-scale corruption, a sophisticated network or system of relationships may affect the supply or demand side of corruption. Examples of types of corruption involving public officials are numerous. Many of them are akin to corruption cases elsewhere around the world, such as “kick-backs” or illegal “commission” from procurement, influence peddling, conflict of interest cases like selling land at a higher than market value while holding a public office position; or dictating policies or ministerial directives that will favor certain parties. Rezoning to increase land value is also one form of corruption. However, we also find that some public officials in Thailand may also engage in dishonest behavior regarding promotion and appointment. Large sums of money may change hands
4The National Anti-Corruption Commission has designed a National Anti-Corruption Strategy that has four components. The first one focuses on awareness raising, instilling of moral values and ethics in all sectors of society to prevent corruption. The second strategy is to mobilize all sectors of society through participation and networking in a broad coalition against corruption. The third strategy is to strengthen all anti-corruption institutions. The fourth strategy is capacity building for strong professionalism for persons working in this sector.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

82 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
between the promoter/appointer and the promoted/appointee. This problem spreads like wild fire and happens in local as well as national governments.5
When one has to pay for a promotion or a specific position, it is most likely that he/she expects to extract monetary returns from the position, at least to recoup the investment. Hence, corruption increases and spreads. Corruption pertaining to payment for a position has reached an absurd level when it is reported that at the local government level, when applicants undergo a competitive examination, there will be a published list of candidates ranked by their test score. Top on the list will be recruited first and the list will be used for sometime as positions are made available and gradually filled. This provides an opportunity for the lower-ranking candidates to bribe those higher on the list to give up his/her position, thereby allowing the person below to move up the list. For a position to become available may also entail payment. Hence, to get a public sector job in local government, a person may have to pay more than one person and for different acts before he/she gets the job.6
Corruption in the public sector often involves elected officials or politicians, not just permanent civil servants. Elected and permanent officials could be in collusion, or the elected officials may solicit assistance from the civil servants, through either interest enticement or coercion. As mentioned, political conflicts often stem from alleged corruption or even dissatisfaction with how benefits from corruption are not perceived to be fairly distributed among partners in corruption.7
Although the protracted political conflict since 2005 has taken on more issues as it progresses, accusations and allegations as well as charges against former Prime Minister Thaksin, which ultimately resulted in his conviction by the Supreme Court for Persons Holding Political Positions, was none other than corruption and conflict of interest. In simple terms, the prime minister helped his wife to win the bidding. The act violated the conflict of interest provision in the law that is under the jurisdiction of the National Counter-Corruption Commission.
To give a picture of the pervasiveness of corruption in Thai society, one recognizes that it occurs in both public and private sectors. At times, some allegations have also been made against some nonprofit organizations for lack of transparency and improper use of funds, including some Buddhist temples where public donations are handled by the abbot (head of the temple) either singly or in conjunction with the temple advisory board. Buddhist temples are tax-exempted and donations to the temple can also be tax-exempted for their donors. This is a privilege not automatically granted
5See for instance studies done by Pasuk Pongpaichit et al. on corruption since 1994. In particular, a research report on Corruption in the Thai Public Sector in 1998.
6Data on “buying position” in the public sector tend to be communicated through the grapevine. It is a common practice that is widely known but not formally recorded. My data are drawn from statements made by public sector officials who are graduate students in my classes over the years. I have promised that there will be complete confidentiality. Their names will not be revealed, but they would need to write down actual transactions that took place.
7According to an article written by Prasong Lertratanavisuth, Thailand’s foremost investigative reporter in Matichon, December 27, 2008, p. 2, 20,000 Thai corruption cases have been lodged with the NACC over its 10-year existence. In 2007, there were 11,578 cases left from 2006 in addition to 2,826 new cases in 2007. The NACC was without commissioners for some time, hence cases accumulated. According to Prasong, only 68 cases were concluded in 2007. The NACC could dismiss cases, not accept cases, transfer them to other agencies for initial investigation, or it can proceed with its own investigation. The NACC law requires amendment to enable them to function more efficiently and effectively. The NACC law was amended by the National Legislative Assembly in 2007, but failed to be promulgated because of a small “technical error.” Currently, the NACC has resubmitted this law for amendment. There’s no predicting when it will be amended as parliamentary process is lengthy and political uncertainties may lead to dissolution of Parliament any time.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC