- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
38 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
2.2.3 Politicians as Master (1973–1997)
After the overthrow of absolute monarchy in 1932, the first national elections for members of Parliament took place on November 15, 1933. From then on until the present (June 2009), there have been 23 national elections (Traimat 2007, 138). Elected politicians have assumed the premiership and cabinet portfolios. The conduct of, and decisions regarding, reform of the public administration are in the hands of elected politicians: not the king or the military elites. Although there have been many elected governments, all of them have been short-lived, ending in being ousted by military coups. Between 1932 and 1973, Thailand was under the rule of military and civilian bureaucrats. Politicians were weak, and most of the time, military leaders assumed cabinet seats concurrently. Democracy in Thailand was fragile, and continues to be so, to a great extent, to the present day.
In 1973, the Thai bureaucratic polity was, for the first time, severely shaken by a mass uprising led by students, which eventually overthrew the Thanom-Prapass military government. The 1973 revolution symbolized the beginning of the end for the legitimacy of military rule through coup d’état, and marked a major step toward democratic rule. From that time, the transformation process from a bureaucratic polity to democratic polity started to gain momentum. Executive control of the bureaucracy began to change hands from the bureaucratic elites to elected politicians, who assumed ministerial portfolios under a multi-party parliamentary democracy. Increasingly, democracy and national elections have become the norms of modern Thai politics, at least in theory. Influential military generals form their own political parties or join existing political parties in order to run for national elections.
The political arena is shifting from “military bureaucracy” to “general elections.” To become prime minister, or a cabinet member, or a member of Parliament, one has to be an elected politician, not a military bureaucrat. To be able to run for elections, one needs strong fi nancial backing and support from a rich political party. During the recent governments of Chatichai, Chuan, Banharn, and Chavalit, the majority of cabinet positions have been occupied by politicians from political parties, not by bureaucratic elites. The struggle for political power is becoming a struggle among political parties for parliamentary seats and cabinet posts. Within a political party, the struggle among politicians is for senior posts in the party, so that they can qualify as the party’s nominees for ministerial portfolios.
The process of democratization in Thailand is slowly eroding the traditional power of the bureaucratic elites. Since Thailand is still at an early stage of transition, however, the power of the bureaucratic elites in the bureaucracy remains strong. Nevertheless, in the new politics, politicians are gradually replacing bureaucratic elites as the new political heads or superiors of bureaucrats in ministries. Increasingly, bureaucrats see the importance of politicians as the new “patrons” who can support their career advancement and provide them with protection from enemies in the bureaucracy. Governments are coalitions of political parties because no single party has been able to win a majority. In coalition governments, power is diffused and executive authority is shared among members of the coalition. For the Thai bureaucracy, coalition governments have emerged as the key factor in determining which politicians will become their political superiors in the ministries (Bowornwathana, 2001b).
2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
During 1973–1992, the Thai polity was transformed from a bureaucratic polity to a fragile democracy. After the student uprising in 1973, military rule was shaken. Former prime ministers during
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
History and Political Context of Public Administration in Thailand 39
this period, such as Seni Pramoj, Kukrit Pramoj, General Kriengsak Chamanan, General Prem Tinnasulanond, and General Chatichai Choonhavan, ruled with the support of a coalition government. Since 1932, there have been 27 prime ministers and 59 cabinets (Office of the Secretariat of the Cabinet, http:#www.cabinet.thaigov.go.th/bb2_main21.htm). Government reform was marked by a struggle for power between the bureaucratic elite and the elected politicians. Reform was geared toward strengthening the power of politicians and political institutions. Politicianbureaucrat relationships became an important aspect of the Thai bureaucracy. The elected politicians gradually took over cabinet positions from military and civilian bureaucrats. New values and standard operating procedures in government as professed by politicians began to gain ground.
To advance in the bureaucracy, a young aspiring bureaucrat needs to have a powerful politician as patron. The longer a politician can retain his ministerial post, the more power he is likely to have over the career bureaucrats. To ascend to high important positions in the ministry, such as permanent secretary or director-general, the bureaucrat must be a “favorite” of the elected politician boss. The situation can become quite awkward for an honest candidate who wants to move up and is confronted with a corrupt political boss.
2.2.3.2Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
For bureaucrats in subordinate positions, frequent cabinet changes and unstable coalition governments created a new phenomenon in the Thai government. Under absolute monarchy, the bosses of bureaucrats were stable and predictable. During 1932–1997, military dictators were usually able to stay in power for long periods, so political bosses did not change that often.
Though military rule was no longer accepted during 1973–1997, coalition governments were fragile. There were frequent changes in government and unpredictable changes in ministerial posts. The bureaucrats in a ministry do not know when their political boss will be removed and replaced by another boss. A bureaucrat may move up the career ladder quickly under his patron, but find his progress halted when a new political boss takes the ministerial post. In Thai ministries these days, one can reasonably predict the destiny of high bureaucrats in a ministry when a newly elected politician becomes the new boss. If a particular bureaucrat has good connections with the political party of his new minister, he will have a good opportunity for career advancement.
2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
With the introduction of parliamentary democracy in 1932, the rules of the game for becoming political bosses or ministers changed. To become a minister in charge of a ministry, one needs to win a seat in Parliament in the national elections, join the coalition government, and carry enough clout to be selected as a cabinet member. The bargaining power of a candidate for a ministerial post rests heavily on the number of members of Parliament in his faction. The larger the number of members of Parliament one controls, the better. Since most of the members of Parliament are from the provinces, most cabinet posts are assigned to provincial members of Parliament. This is quite a departure from the old tradition when all heads of ministries came from the capital Bangkok. Gradually, provincial leaders have become more influential in national politics and administration. For instance, Chuan Leekpai, a popular member of Parliament from Trang province and leader of the Democrat Party, became minister of several ministries and ultimately prime minister. Another popular member of Parliament from Suphanburi Province, Banharn Silapa-acha, was also
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
40 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
prime minister and minister of several ministries. Newin Chedchob MP, from Buriram Province was deputy minister of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Vithaya Kaewparadei MP, of the Democrat Party from Nakorn Srithammarat province is the minister of public health. Julin Laksanavisit MP, of the Democrat Party from Panga Province is the minister of education. Many of these members of Parliament from the provinces are usually re-elected. For some, family members also run in national and local elections as well. In some provinces, members of prominent political families have tended to monopolize national and local politics. Together they constitute the new political bosses of the bureaucrats.
2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
Since 1933, Thailand’s experience with elected politicians and governments has not been a smooth one. National elections have been characterized by vote buying and money politics. Corruption charges against government are rampant. Politicians try at all cost to be in government and consider being in the Opposition as a loss. Politicians take turns becoming cabinet members. They move from one political party to another. New political parties are formed and joined by old faces. The new politician boss fosters an atmosphere of corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency in the ministry. Politicians in Thailand have acquired a bad reputation, and the search for clean politics and politicians goes on. A major topic of discussion is the ethics and morality of Thai politicians. An honest, uncorrupted, and good politician is a rare commodity these days.
Bad politicians affect the career advancement of bureaucrats in the ministry. First, a corrupt boss will easily corrupt subordinate bureaucrats. Second, honest bureaucrats will have a difficult time surviving and advancing their career under a bad politician. The bad politician may want to transfer honest bureaucrats, who do not follow his orders, to inactive posts by justifying his transfers on grounds that the honest bureaucrats violated certain bureaucratic rules. He can set up a committee to investigate and implicate the honest bureaucrats of wrongdoings.
2.2.4 Big Businessmen as Master (2001–2006)
This fourth master, big businessmen, comes into power through national elections. In fact, “big businessmen as master” is a version of “politicians as master.” Of course, businessmen have been in politics since the first elections in 1933. Since then, the direct role of businessmen in politics has been increasing in Thai politics. In the old days of absolute monarchy, businessmen were mostly of Chinese origin. They carried out their trade with the approval of the king. Under the bureaucratic polity (1932–1973), Chinese businessmen began to expand their trade rapidly in accordance with the expanding world market and capitalism. They became owners of big companies such as banks (Akira, 1996). Military elites were appointed as board members and advisors to these banks. Rumors about businessmen providing large sums of money, assets, and real estate to generals in power were common. In return, the military elites in power would provide them with protection and support for their businesses. Gradually, during 1973–1997, these Chinese businessmen began to fund political parties indirectly, and some of them would send their sons to join political parties.
2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
What makes the 2001 elections unique is that a group of big businessmen with huge funding had formed their own political party (the Thai Rak Thai party) and won the national elections. The big businessmen consisted of: the Shinawatra family who owned the Shin Corporation
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
History and Political Context of Public Administration in Thailand 41
(telecommunication and satellite industry); the Jungrungreangkit family who owned Thai Summit and Summit Group (auto parts industry); the Maleenont family who owned BEC world and television Channel 3; the Bodharamik family who owned Jasmine International Company (telephone and satellite communications); the Mahakijsiri family (Nestle (Thai) Public Company); and the Chearavanont family who owned Chaoreon Pokkapan or CP Company (agro-industry and food, and telecommunications industry). Under the leadership of Thaksin Shinawatra, the Thai Rak Thai Party was able to attract many big businessmen, local businessmen, and politicians. Huge sums of money to fund election campaigns became a key factor in winning elections.
Big businessmen became cabinet members and members of Parliament. For example, the first Thaksin government (17 February 2001 to 11 March 2005) consisted of twelve big businessmen, nine former bureaucrats, eight politicians, and two others. The number of big businessmen increased in the next Thaksin cabinet. The second Thaksin government (11 March to 19 September 2006) consisted of fifteen big businessmen, five former bureaucrats, four politicians, and four former university professors.
By occupying positions of political power themselves, big businessmen no longer need the support of the king or the military elites; nor do they need politicians to protect their businesses as they did before. As long as national elections involve the expenditure of large sums of money, it is likely that big businessmen running for office will have an advantage over the other candidates. Thai politics has turned into “money politics.”
2.2.4.2Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
Under big businessmen’s rule, the system of public administration began to change. In the author’s opinion, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra ran the country as though it was his company. Thaksin’s model of government consisted of the following assumptions: the prime minister is the Super CEO of the country; government growth is a sign of the company’s prosperity; a CEO management style works well in government; employment by contract in government increases efficiency; destroy business competitors, silence government opposition; voters are like customers, they must be kept happy; marketing techniques must be employed in government; government must serve business interests of government politicians; and government fairness is def ined in capitalist terms (Bowornwathana, 2004a).
Elsewhere, I have argued that Thaksin’s style of government had resulted in the return of the traditions of authoritarian rule, centralization, and big government that had originated during the periods of kings as master and military elites as master (Bowornwathana, 2006b). Prime Minister Thaksin became a Super CEO at the apex of the government hierarchy. Administrative reform was conducted to consolidate power from other ministers and high bureaucrats into the hands of the Super CEO Thaksin. Under the first Thaksin government, a major structural reform took place that increased the number of ministries from 13 to 20. Under the new government structure, the 20 ministries are: Education, Culture, Tourism and Sports, Public Health, Justice, Interior, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Science and Technology, Natural Resources and Environment, Energy, Agriculture and Cooperatives, Industry and Entrepreneurs, Information Technology and Communications, Social Development and Human Security, Labor and Professional Development, Commerce, Transport, Defense, and the Office of the Prime Minister (Bowornwathana, 2002). The increase of ministries accommodated the desire of Thai politicians to be ministers who believed that ministerial positions are symbols of social status and achievement, power, and prestige.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC