
- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References

4 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
the above patron-client and family-kinship relations did not develop in Hong Kong.2 Whatever personal network relations existed among the later rapidly increasing migrant Chinese population, this culture did not affect or threaten rule by the Hong Kong civil service over the colony until the early 1970s, when, as described below, it successfully adopted a range of to ensure the dominance of its “Weberian” principles. Hong Kong is very much an exception to the general pattern in this part of the world.
While network ties are an important feature, other norms are present, too, which often further support client-patron relations. In the Philippines, Reyes notes that such cultural values as “amor propio” (self-respect), “delicadeza” (propriety), “hiya (shame), “utang na loob” (debt of gratitude), and “pakikisama” (friendship or familial ties) affect bureaucratic behavior and the exercise of official functions. Superimposed on these values are such accepted norms of behavior as social acceptance, respect for authority/elders, and the influence of religion. These can result in the avoidance of disagreement and confrontation, thereby upholding close relations. As in Chinese culture, harmony and conflict avoidance reign high as accepted personal and interpersonal norms that also sustain close relations. “In spite of a hundred and fi fty years of British rule, to a large extent Hong Kong Chinese subscribe to a Confucian world view,”3 which promote these. The norms that support network and close personal relations are many and deep. The colonial legacy, discussed below, is an overlay on these traditional values, rather than vice versa.
Common bonds that promote trust and further cooperation and alliances exist in all cultures, whether they are based on client-patron or kinship relations, or as in the West, support among those with common educational experience (e.g., Ivy League schools) or business connections. Familiarity breeds trust, which is the basis of all relations. The challenge in all cultures is to ensure that such “special relationships” serve rightful and proper public purposes, and do not become foremost a means of exclusion and self-enrichment. In the West, for example, cozy lobbying relations have many negative features, while at the same time strong efforts are underway to use closer relations in the service of “collaborative governance.” The matter is one of balance, recognizing and restraining the darker side of human motives, while bringing forth the positive. The ties in Southeast Asia also provide for experiences of essential humanity and connectedness that few people would be willing to give up entirely and that are often seen as lacking in the West. In all countries, the task is to contain these darker manifestations of cultural patterns, and to shape fundamental human motives in the service of public purpose.
1.3 Colonial Legacies
Latin legacies are found in Macao (Portuguese) and the Philippines (Spanish), while Anglo legacies are found in Malaysia, Hong Kong (both British), and the Philippines (American). Authors note numerous consequences of their colonial legacies that continue to affect public administration today. In general, authors describe colonial administrations as seeking to extract value from their territories, while having little commitment to their development beyond what is needed
2Additionally, Burns notes that, “the readiness of civil servants to accept orders from their superiors is ‘largely attributable to conventional Chinese attitudes of respect for authority and avoidance of conflict.’” This may be a secondary factor that facilitates acceptance of these cultural norms.
3In Public Administration in East Asia, the impact of Confucian values is more deeply examined. A certain overlap exists, such as attending to the needs of one’s superior as an important, if not penultimate priority. However, few authors mention this in Southeast Asia, and in East Asia there is also the strong, expected reciprocation by superiors to show great consideration and understanding for a subordinate’s effort and circumstances.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

Public Administration in Southeast Asia: An Overview 5
to profit from them. Additionally, the Spanish conquest of the Philippines had the motive to propagate Christianity, and its American occupation in the early twentieth century also had the self-proclaimed objective to prepare it for independence. Regardless of these purposes, the colonial legacy often endures in the administrative cultures and practices that were established.
1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
The British colonial legacy in Malaysia and Hong Kong continues to be evident in three ways:
(i) the molding of civil service culture that is based on merit; (ii) a reluctant but nonetheless certain provision of infrastructure (transportation, schools, sanitation); and (iii) population policies for economic advantage that have racial elements and which, in the case of Malaysia, lead to enduring racial tension and confl ict.
As regards the first aspect, the British legacy in civil culture is undoubtedly strong. In both Hong Kong and Malaysia, the white, British senior managers upheld high values of ethics and professionalism. Chin states: “many of the white officers who served in Malaya were highly experienced, some having served in British colonies in Africa and the Indian subcontinent. Some were recruited directly from British Universities. The Malay Administrative Service (MAS) were generally corrupt-free and there was a strong respect for administrative law.” The legacy or professionalism and merit continues at lower levels of the service where Manaf notes that “for some posts, applicants are required to sit for tests relevant to the skills and capacity required to perform the job effectively. Thus, the emphasis... is based on merit, rather than political considerations or nepotism.” However, as described further, political neutrality is no longer a feature at the higher echelons.
The culture of professionalism in Hong Kong’s administrative culture continues today. Burns states that today’s administrative values in Hong Kong include “hierarchical loyalty, efficiency, meritocracy, and political neutrality,” although the latter has recently begun to change at the higher levels. He notes that, “compliance is reinforced by strict adherence to bureaucratic rules and regulations and an incentive system that highly values promotion.” Efficiency, meritocracy, and timeliness continue to be strong features in these cultures. The strength of commitment to these values set them apart from the bureaucracies of other cultures in Asia.4 Such values may also be found in other former British colonies like Singapore and even the United States.5
Second, infrastructure investments were made. Chin states: “The MAS believed in developing the Malayan economy, thus schools (mostly manned by missionaries), hospitals, roads, airports and other infrastructure, were built. The belief was that a strong Malayan economy will contribute to the home country and the British Empire.” Likewise, Lee notes that for Hong Kong, “while the indigenous population numbered only in the thousands in 1841 before the British takeover, by 1911, the population had grown to over 450,000. Such a rapid increase in population naturally brought about demand for public services... and problems such as public sanitation required the
4Anecdotally, the Hong Kong and Malaysian authors in this volume were the fi rst to complete their chapters, by far!
5Professionalism and meritocracy, however, should not be confused with the absence of corruption. As Burns notes: “In Hong Kong until 1997 the civil service managed itself almost entirely on its own: it determined its own selection procedures, disciplinary codes, performance standards and pay levels and benefits – a civil servants’ dream one might suppose. For decades these arrangements were rubber-stamped by an appointed colonial legislature. The result was, at least initially, systemic corruption on a grand scale that existed until the public would tolerate it no longer and then compensation packages that have become among the highest in the world.”
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
6 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
colonial state to step in, for example, free vaccination was provided to the population to prevent the spread of epidemics. Thriving commercial activities also required substantial development in infrastructure.” However, social services were left to the local population, and various Chinese communal associations formed a robust community of self-help.
Third, all cultures have their dark sides. Manaf describes how the British brought large numbers of Chinese to work in tin mines, Indians to work on rubber estates and as white collar workers, and sent Malays to work in rural areas as farmers and fishermen. The result was segregation along economic lines, and Malays becoming economically marginalized in their own country. The British response was to open up the civil service to the Malays through recruitment quotas for the administrative elite, which were introduced in 1952, and the practice continued unaltered after independence (in 1957). “This historically sets the basis for the country’s civil service to be gradually dominated by the Malays, and continues until today.” Chin continues:
Because the British brought in the Chinese and Indians for economic reasons, there was no real attempt to integrate them into the local environment – the thinking then was that these were temporary workers and they would go back to China and India once they have saved up enough money for retirement. In reality with such large numbers, this was not possible. Many did not earn enough to go back to the Chinese mainland or India. The large numbers also allowed the Chinese and Indian communities to build their own insular communities – they establish their own schools, temples and townships. The British were also keen to keep the communities apart as it was easier to rule over them.
Then,
On 13th May 1969, serious racial riots broke out in the capital Kuala Lumpur and several other urban areas The causes of riots are complex but in the main, it was political competition between the Chinese and the Malays. The Malays claimed that as the indigenous people of Malaya, this was their land and the concept of ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy) cannot be challenged by the non-Malays. In 1971 ...the government also launched the New Economic Policy (NEP), supposedly to correct the imbalance in the economy as identified by the May 13th report. Unfortunately, the NEP never lived up to its own stated goals. Rather the NEP was used as a policy to reinforced the “special rights” of the Malay and bumiputera community (indigenous groups) in all social, economic and political spheres. These “special rights” were defined broadly as meaning that the Malay community were entitled to preferential treatment by the government in all its activities. A quota was established for bumiputera entry to universities, bank loans, scholarships, business licences, etc. A special bumiputeraonly tertiary institution, Institut Teknologi MARA (now called Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM)) was establish to provide Malays with opportunities to get a tertiary education. The non-Malays who were excluded saw this policy as nothing more than state sanctioned racism and discrimination.
In this book, many chapters on Malaysia mention the racial divide. Hong Kong does not show such divide, undoubtedly because of the migrant nature of the Chinese population, the small size of the city, and the predominance of commerce and trading as the main economic activities. Still, with reference to Malaysia, one is reminded of similar racial divides in other former British
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

Public Administration in Southeast Asia: An Overview 7
colonies such as South Africa, India, and the Unites States, all of which continue to struggle with the politics of racial integration and healing today. The United States is no exception, where consequential forms of racial discrimination and profiling continue to affect social attitudes and economic practices. Singapore, another former British colony and not discussed here, also experienced racial riots and strong tensions in its early birth; racial tensions are minor today, but not negligible and some separation still exists. Indeed, race relations are also tense in Britain itself. How well countries address the racial challenge of the British legacy varies. Racial divides seem to be a British legacy in many of its former colonies.
1.3.2 Latin Legacy
Authors are clearly negative about the impact of Spanish and Portuguese legacies on administrative culture in, respectively, the Philippines and Macao. Reyes notes that the Philippines was a colony of Spain for over 300 years until a successful revolution in 1896, when it declared independence on June 12, 1898. During this time, the administrative system was built on the framework of serving private interests with the “practical objective of increasing the royal estate through tributes, monopolies, fees and fines.” Appointments were also made on the basis of sale of public offices. A functionary would thus consider his purchase of office as an investment that needed to be recouped as quickly as possible and at a profit; public office was seen as a business venture. These positions were reserved for Spanish nationals while the natives—the indios, as they were called— occupied the lowest rung in the administrative hierarchy, as headmen of the villages.
The administrative system that these practices spawned brought about two attitudes among the bureaucrats—outright indifference and lack of commitment to public office. They are succinctly expressed in the Spanish phrases, “no se haga novedad,” or do not commit or introduce any innovations on royal prescriptions, and “obedezco pero no cumplo,” or I obey but do not enforce or comply. The Spanish colonial period ended in 1898, but there is ample evidence that these attitudes of rent seeking and inefficiency became very deeply ingrained, and in the poverty of the post-war period, civil servants engaged in such widespread rent-seeking behavior, using public office to support their families and private interests in ways that involved corruption and incompetence.6 Even today, “such negative traits as refusal to initiate innovations (no se haga novedad) or weak or indecisive compliance of rules (obedezco pero no cumplo) continue to impair Philippine bureaucracy, though not as rampant as during the colonial era.” Of course, the culture of the modern Philippine civil service includes other elements, too, such as commitment to merit and fitness described below, but the Latin legacy endures.
Macao was governed by Portugal for over 400 years.7 Bolong writes, “In Macao Government, the public administration has been heavily influenced by its Portuguese administrative culture, which has its own merits of easiness and relaxation, but lacks discipline and formalization as
6As Reyes states, at the beginning of the Philippine Independence in 1946, “The system ill-equipped… and also inept, incompetent and corrupt, with the war time habits of complacency and indifference overpowering the
spirit of patriotic zeal.”
7The Portuguese tried to return sovereignty to the PRC. However, the Chinese government was apprehensive that the status of Hong Kong might be affected if she reincorporated Macao without resolving the Hong Kong problem with the British. Therefore, the PRC decided to resume sovereignty of Macao after resolution of the Hong Kong problem and allowed the Portuguese to continue to “administrate” Macao until 1999. It seems that the Spanish were not very concerned about losing the Philippines to the United States either in 1899. In both instances, the colonial, Latin masters had ceased considering their colonies as being a worthwhile investment or endeavor.
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