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324

 

NAÏVE PROCRASTINATION

behave better in the future, but that future is never realized. In this case, food stamp recipients believe they will be able to restrain their appetites later in the month, but they never do. This eventually leads to severe shortages of food in the last week, as the data have documented. Often, hyperbolic discounting is misunderstood to simply embody heavy discounting of the future. Instead, it is a statement on how discounting of a pair of days in the future evolves as those days become closer to the present and how this causes recipients to change their consumption plans.

Naïve Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting

One of the primary advantages of the exponential discounting function is the simplicity with which the exponential discount could be used in solving maximization problems. By contrast, the hyperbolic discounting model can be difcult to deal with mathematically given the functional form for the discount factor. This has led David Laibson to propose an approximation to the hyperbolic discounting function called quasi-hyper- bolic discounting.

Quasi-hyperbolic discounting separates the hyperbolic prole of time discounting into two different discount factors. These two factors represent the discount applied to utility of consumption in the second period and the discount applied to the utility of consumption for each additional period, respectively. The discount factor applied to the second period is small relative to the other discount factor, representing the notion that people discount consumption tomorrow relative to today more heavily than the day after tomorrow relative to tomorrow. In other words, any consumption in the future receives some penalty in the mind of the consumer, but trading off consumption between two different periods in the future does not face such a steep penalty. Thus, instead of the model in equation 12.2, we write

Uc1, c2, =uc1+βuc2+βδuc3+βδ2uc4+ +βδi−2uci+

 

T

12 30

=βu c1 +

βδi−2u ci ,

 

i =2

 

where 0 < β < δ < 1, and where, if we want to consider the innite time horizon problem, T may be . Here β represents the discount applied to utility of consumption in the second period (which also multiplies utility in all future periods), and δ represents the discount applied to utility of consumption for each additional period as we move farther into the future. In general, if β < δ the function approximates hyberbolic discounting.

Figure 12.4 displays a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function (marked in triangles) that has been selected to approximate the corresponding hyperbolic discounting function. The advantage of this form is that it closely replicates the exponential mathematical form, thus restoring the simple mathematical formulas for time-discounting problems. The solution to the utility-maximization problem for equation 12.30 again requires that discounted marginal utility is equal. However, the differential discount implies

uc1 = βδi − 2uci

12 31

 

 

 

 

 

Naïve Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting

 

325

 

and for i, j > 1

 

 

 

 

uci = δj − iucj .

12 32

 

 

 

Both of these equations are reminiscent of equation 12.18. Thus, given a functional form for the instantaneous utility function, we can nd a relationship between planned consumption in one period and the next.

For example, suppose that people must maximize their utility of consumption over an innite time horizon, given an initial endowment of wealth w. Suppose further that uc = cα, so that the marginal utility (or slope of the utility function) of consumption is

given by uc = αcα − 1. Then equations 12.31 and 12.32 imply

 

 

 

αc1α − 1 = αβc2α − 1 = αβδc3α − 1 =

 

 

 

 

 

= αβδi − 2ciα − 1 =

 

12 33

 

or

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

αβδi − 2

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

α

α − 1

c1 =

αβ

 

α − 1

c2 =

=

 

α − 1ci =

.

12 34

 

This implies that c2 = c1β

1

 

, and that in general ci = c1β

1

δ

i − 2

when i = 2, 3,

.

α −

1

α − 1

α − 1

The budget constraint implies

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

c1 + c2 + c3 + = w,

 

 

 

 

 

12 35

 

or, substituting from above,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

c1

1 + β

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

δ

1

i

= w.

 

12 36

 

 

 

α − 1

i = 0

α − 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

By the properties of geometric series,2 this can be rewritten as

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

β

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

c1

1 +

 

 

α −

1

 

 

 

 

 

= w,

 

 

 

 

 

12 37

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

− δ

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

α − 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

leading to the closed-form solution

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

c1 =

 

 

 

 

 

w

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.

 

 

 

 

 

12 38

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

β

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 +

 

 

α − 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

− δ

α − 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

All other periodsconsumption could then be calculated from the above formula via equation 12.34.

2 Let Y = k + kr + kr2 + kr3 +

=

krt , where

0 < r < 1. Then, Y = k 1 − r . To see this, note that

 

 

 

 

 

 

t = 0

 

Y = k + kr + kr2 + kr3 + . Also, rY = kr + kr2 + kr3 +

. Thus, Y − rY = k, or Y 1 − r = k implying the result. In

this case, k = β

1

, and r = δ

1

 

.

 

 

α − 1

α −

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

326

 

NAÏVE PROCRASTINATION

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 12.2 Estimated Discount Factors for Different Amounts

 

 

 

 

and Lengths of Time

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Time Delay

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Amount

6 Months

1 Year

2 Years

4 Years

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

$40

0.626

0.769

0.792

0.834

 

 

 

$200

0.700

0.797

0.819

0.850

 

 

 

$1,000

0.710

0.817

0.875

0.842

 

 

 

$5,000

0.845

0.855

0.865

0.907

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Benzion, U., A. Rapoport, and J. Yagil. ”Discount Rates Inferred from Decisions: An Experimental Study.“

Management Science 35(1989): 270–284.

Alternatively, if we modeled the same decision using a hyperbolic discount function, equation 12.36 would be replaced by

 

β

 

c1 1 +

1 + iα α = w,

12 39

 

i = 1

 

which cannot yield a closed-form solution. Thus, in many situations, economists use the quasi-hyperbolic approximation rather than the hyperbolic form. In fact, the quasihyperbolic form is much more common in practice than the hyperbolic form that it approximates.

Uri Benzion, Amnon Rapoport, and Joseph Yagil nd evidence of changing discount rates over time. They asked 204 participants about their preferences between receiving bundles of money after various waiting periods. For example, one question asks participants to suppose they had just earned $200 for their labors, but after coming to pick up the money, they nd their employer is temporarily out of funds. Instead, they are offered payment in six months. Participants were asked how much would need to be paid at the later time to be indifferent between receiving $200 now or the higher amount later. The amounts of money and the length of time were varied. Table 12.2 displays the estimated discount factors for each of the various scenarios similar to the scenario just described, assuming a money metric utility function.3 For each, we see a relatively large discount factor for the rst six months of delay. Discounts for longer periods are much smaller, reecting the hyperbolic nature of discounting. If a person must delay a reward for some time, longer waits are no longer thought of as so costly. Similar experiments have been run with actual money payouts, nding additional evidence that discount factors climb over time, eventually becoming stable.

3 They actually calculate average discount rate. This is the rate R such that F = P(1+R)t, where P is the present amount, and F is the future amount. The discount factor that we have discussed in this chapter is equivalent to δ = 1/ (1+R). The table displays the discount factor implied by the discount rate they report. The money metric utility function simply assumes that utility is linear in dollars.

 

 

 

 

Naïve Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting

 

327

 

EXAMPLE 12.2 Reading Days Are for Procrastination

It seems to have happened to all of us at one time or another. In fact, many of us have experienced it repeatedly. The big test is coming in two weeks, and we should be studying. But there is so much time before that. “I could put off studying one more day without hurting my grade,” you may tell yourself. Each day you tell yourself this, until it is so late that you truly do not have as much time to study as you probably should have. Your grade is not what you wanted or what you could have achieved. Then the next semester, despite your previous experience, you procrastinate just as before.

Hyperbolic discounting might provide one explanation for why procrastination is so prevalent. Consider a student with the following (daily) instantaneous utility function

u s = − s2,

12 40

where s is the portion of the day spent studying. Thus, one receives negative instantaneous utility from studying, with decreasing marginal pain from additional studying given by us = − 2s. Moreover, suppose that the grade on a particular test is measured by an index g, as a function of time studying:

g s = s.

12 41

Of course it is more likely that grades show declining returns to studying, but this abstraction makes our example easier to calculate, and it ensures a solution will exist. Finally, suppose that the student’s utility of receiving a grade of g is equal to g2, discounted as if received on the day the results are announced. Finally, suppose that the student discounts future utility according to a quasi-hyperbolic discount function.

Suppose further that the exam will take place in four days, and the results will be announced seven days later. The student has set a goal of studying a total of 1.05 days. For simplicity, consider that the student is choosing between two different study plans. The first plan consists of s1 =0.21, 0.21, 0.21, 0.21, 0.21, indicating that the student will study 0.21 of a day each day until the test. The second plan considers shirking today,

but making up for it later, s= 0.17, 0.22, 0.22, 0.22, 0.22 . These plans are not

1

binding, meaning that the student could easily change her mind tomorrow. If s is chosen,

the student obtains a negative instantaneous utility of

0.21 2 = − 0.0441 today and

each of the next four days. Then, seven days later,

she will receive a grade of

0.21 × 5 = 1.05, yielding instantaneous utility 0.525. This can be written

 

 

5

 

 

U s1 = − 0.0441 −

i = 2 βδi − 2 × 0.0441

+ βδ10 × 0.525.

12 42

So, for example, if β = 0.75 and δ = 0.99, then Us1 0.182. Alternatively, if sis chosen, then instantaneous utility in the first day will be 0.172 = − 0.0289, and instantaneous utility on each succeeding day will be 0.222 = 0.0484. Moreover, the grade will be 0.17 + 4 × 0.22 = 1.05, yielding instantaneous utility 0.525:

= − 0.0289 −

5

 

i − 2

10

× 0.525.

12 43

U s1

i = 2

βδ

 

× 0.0484 + βδ

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

328

 

NAÏVE PROCRASTINATION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thus, if β = 0.75 and δ = 0.99, then U s1

0.184, and the student will plan on s,

 

 

shirking somewhat today and planning to make up the time with extra studying

 

 

tomorrow.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The next day, however, the student needs to choose again how much to study. In this

 

 

case, with only four days in which to study, suppose the choice is between sticking to the

 

 

plan s2= 0.22, 0.22, 0.22, 0.22

or shirking somewhat today and making it up with

 

 

more time studying later s2

= 0.19, 0.23, 0.23, 0.23 , where again both plans yield the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

target amount of studying, 1.05. In this case, sticking to the plan would yield

 

 

 

 

4

i − 2

× 0.0484 + βδ

9

× 0.525 0.145.

12 44

 

 

 

U s2 = − 0.0484 −

i = 2

βδ

 

Choosing to procrastinate yields instantaneous utility of 0.192 = 0.0361 in the first period and 0.232 = 0.0529 in the three following periods. The grade obtained will be 0.17 + 0.19 + 3 × 0.23 = 1.05, yielding instantaneous utility of 0.525 when the grades are received, or

= − 0.0361 −

4

i − 2

× 0.0529 + βδ

9

× 0.525 0.147.

12 45

U s2

i = 2

βδ

 

Thus, the student decides again to postpone the bulk of her studying.

Similar choices each day lead the student to postpone studying, planning to eventually make up the time and obtain the same grade. The next day, the student decides

whether to continue with her new plan s= 0.23, 0.23, 0.23 , yielding utility

3

= − 0.0529 −

3

i − 2

× 0.0529 +

 

8

× 0.525

0.107,

12 46

U s3

i = 2

βδ

 

βδ

 

or to procrastinate again by planning on s3 = 0.21, 0.24, 0.24

and yielding utility

 

 

 

 

 

′″

 

 

 

 

 

′″

= − 0.0441 −

3

 

i − 2

 

 

8

 

 

 

U s 3

i = 2

βδ

 

× 0.0576 + βδ

× 0.525

0.109,

12 47

where again the planned grade is 1.05. She again chooses to procrastinate and in the

fourth day faces the

choice of

continuing

with

s 4 = 0.24, 0.24 ,

with U s 4 =

 

 

7

 

 

 

′″

′″

− 0.0576 − β0.0576 + βδ

0.067

or

 

″″

= 0.23, 0.25 ,

× 0.525

procrastinating with s4

″″

 

 

7

× 0.525

0.068. In this fourth day she also

yielding U s4

= − 0.0529 − β0.0625 + βδ

chooses to procrastinate. In the final day, the student faces the choice to study according

to plan s5 = 0.25

, yielding U s5

0.026, or to just give up, s5

= 0.16 , yielding

U s5

″″

″″

′″″

0.031.

 

 

 

′″″

 

 

 

 

The student eventually has an actual study profile of 0.17, 0.19, 0.21, 0.25, 0.16, yielding a grade of 1, less than the grade planned upon in each of the prior periods. The student’s procrastination ends up costing her almost 20 percent of the anticipated grade on the test. This is the cost of not recognizing that as the test moves closer, she will change the way she discounts between the days of the study period. For the first four days of the study period, she believes she will trade off the disutility of studying between day 4 and day 5 by δ. By the time day 4 rolls around, she instead discounts day 5 disutility of studying by β. It is the constant shifting of the β discount through time that explains the procrastination behavior.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Naïve Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting

 

329

 

 

EXAMPLE 12.3

Going on a Diet

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Obesity has become a major issue around the world, and particularly in the United

 

 

States. Some economists have placed the annual economic cost of obesity and over-

 

 

weight at around $500 billion. Almost 60 percent of Americans want to lose weight, but

 

 

only about 15 percent are on a weight-loss diet at any time.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Put yourself in their shoes. Suppose you are overweight and want to go on a diet. Yet

 

 

every day you face the choice to eat food you like, xl, that will likely maintain your high

 

 

weight, or to eat food that is healthy, xh, which you do not like as much, and potentially

 

 

lose weight. Let us suppose that people derive their utility from eating food and from

 

 

their weight and that the instantaneous utility of each is additively separable. Thus,

 

 

utility at time t, can be represented as u xt , wt

= ux xt

+ uw

 

wt , where xt

is food

 

 

consumption at time t, ux x is utility of food consumption, wt is weight at time t, and

 

 

uw w

is utility of weight. Suppose that eating what you like provides an instantaneous

 

 

utility

of ux xl = ul,

which

 

is

larger

than the utility of eating

food that is

healthy,

 

 

ux xh

= uh. Weight takes a long time to change. Let us suppose that weight is the result

 

 

of a weighted sum of consumption over the last 180 days, wt =

 

t − 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

i = t 180 γixi , and that

 

 

people receive instantaneous utility of weight according to u w = −

 

− w 2, where

 

 

 

 

 

w

w

 

 

is the person’s ideal weight. Thus, any deviation from this ideal induces a lower utility. At

 

 

any point in time the potential dieter faces the decision (placing this in the framework of

 

 

an infinite planning horizon problem)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

max

xt t =

 

u x

1

,

w

+ β

δt − 2u x

, w .

 

 

 

12 48

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

t = 2

t

t

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Let’s begin by ignoring the current period and considering behavior in the next

 

 

period. In that period, people could choose either to eat what they like or to eat healthy

 

 

food. If they choose to eat healthy food in the next period, they will obtain

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

u x1, w1 + βuh

 

− w2

2 + β

t = 3 δt − 2u xt , wt x2 = xh .

12 49

 

 

 

 

 

 

w

 

 

 

If instead they choose not to eat healthy food in the next period, they will obtain

 

 

 

 

u x1, w1 + βul

 

 

 

− w2

2 + β

t = 3 δt − 2u xt , wt x2 = xl .

12 50

 

 

 

 

 

 

w

 

 

 

They will thus plan to eat healthy food in the next period if

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

uh

t = 3 δt − 2

 

 

 

 

t − 1

 

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

w

i = t − 180

γixi x2 = xh

> ul

12 51

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

t − 1

 

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

t = 3 δt − 2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

w

i = t − 180

γixi x2 = xl

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

or if the instantaneous difference in utility of consumption is smaller than the discounted

 

 

difference in utility of weight:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

t − 2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

t − 1

 

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

t = 3 δ

 

w −

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

i = t 180 γixi x2 = xl

> ul − uh.

12 52

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

t − 2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

t − 1

 

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

t = 3 δ

 

 

w

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

i = t − 180 γixi x2 = xh

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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