- •Brief Contents
- •Contents
- •Preface
- •Who Should Use this Book
- •Philosophy
- •A Short Word on Experiments
- •Acknowledgments
- •Rational Choice Theory and Rational Modeling
- •Rationality and Demand Curves
- •Bounded Rationality and Model Types
- •References
- •Rational Choice with Fixed and Marginal Costs
- •Fixed versus Sunk Costs
- •The Sunk Cost Fallacy
- •Theory and Reactions to Sunk Cost
- •History and Notes
- •Rational Explanations for the Sunk Cost Fallacy
- •Transaction Utility and Flat-Rate Bias
- •Procedural Explanations for Flat-Rate Bias
- •Rational Explanations for Flat-Rate Bias
- •History and Notes
- •Theory and Reference-Dependent Preferences
- •Rational Choice with Income from Varying Sources
- •The Theory of Mental Accounting
- •Budgeting and Consumption Bundles
- •Accounts, Integrating, or Segregating
- •Payment Decoupling, Prepurchase, and Credit Card Purchases
- •Investments and Opening and Closing Accounts
- •Reference Points and Indifference Curves
- •Rational Choice, Temptation and Gifts versus Cash
- •Budgets, Accounts, Temptation, and Gifts
- •Rational Choice over Time
- •References
- •Rational Choice and Default Options
- •Rational Explanations of the Status Quo Bias
- •History and Notes
- •Reference Points, Indifference Curves, and the Consumer Problem
- •An Evolutionary Explanation for Loss Aversion
- •Rational Choice and Getting and Giving Up Goods
- •Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect
- •Rational Explanations for the Endowment Effect
- •History and Notes
- •Thought Questions
- •Rational Bidding in Auctions
- •Procedural Explanations for Overbidding
- •Levels of Rationality
- •Bidding Heuristics and Transparency
- •Rational Bidding under Dutch and First-Price Auctions
- •History and Notes
- •Rational Prices in English, Dutch, and First-Price Auctions
- •Auction with Uncertainty
- •Rational Bidding under Uncertainty
- •History and Notes
- •References
- •Multiple Rational Choice with Certainty and Uncertainty
- •The Portfolio Problem
- •Narrow versus Broad Bracketing
- •Bracketing the Portfolio Problem
- •More than the Sum of Its Parts
- •The Utility Function and Risk Aversion
- •Bracketing and Variety
- •Rational Bracketing for Variety
- •Changing Preferences, Adding Up, and Choice Bracketing
- •Addiction and Melioration
- •Narrow Bracketing and Motivation
- •Behavioral Bracketing
- •History and Notes
- •Rational Explanations for Bracketing Behavior
- •Statistical Inference and Information
- •Calibration Exercises
- •Representativeness
- •Conjunction Bias
- •The Law of Small Numbers
- •Conservatism versus Representativeness
- •Availability Heuristic
- •Bias, Bigotry, and Availability
- •History and Notes
- •References
- •Rational Information Search
- •Risk Aversion and Production
- •Self-Serving Bias
- •Is Bad Information Bad?
- •History and Notes
- •Thought Questions
- •Rational Decision under Risk
- •Independence and Rational Decision under Risk
- •Allowing Violations of Independence
- •The Shape of Indifference Curves
- •Evidence on the Shape of Probability Weights
- •Probability Weights without Preferences for the Inferior
- •History and Notes
- •Thought Questions
- •Risk Aversion, Risk Loving, and Loss Aversion
- •Prospect Theory
- •Prospect Theory and Indifference Curves
- •Does Prospect Theory Solve the Whole Problem?
- •Prospect Theory and Risk Aversion in Small Gambles
- •History and Notes
- •References
- •The Standard Models of Intertemporal Choice
- •Making Decisions for Our Future Self
- •Projection Bias and Addiction
- •The Role of Emotions and Visceral Factors in Choice
- •Modeling the Hot–Cold Empathy Gap
- •Hindsight Bias and the Curse of Knowledge
- •History and Notes
- •Thought Questions
- •The Fully Additive Model
- •Discounting in Continuous Time
- •Why Would Discounting Be Stable?
- •Naïve Hyperbolic Discounting
- •Naïve Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
- •The Common Difference Effect
- •The Absolute Magnitude Effect
- •History and Notes
- •References
- •Rationality and the Possibility of Committing
- •Commitment under Time Inconsistency
- •Choosing When to Do It
- •Of Sophisticates and Naïfs
- •Uncommitting
- •History and Notes
- •Thought Questions
- •Rationality and Altruism
- •Public Goods Provision and Altruistic Behavior
- •History and Notes
- •Thought Questions
- •Inequity Aversion
- •Holding Firms Accountable in a Competitive Marketplace
- •Fairness
- •Kindness Functions
- •Psychological Games
- •History and Notes
- •References
- •Of Trust and Trustworthiness
- •Trust in the Marketplace
- •Trust and Distrust
- •Reciprocity
- •History and Notes
- •References
- •Glossary
- •Index
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Thought Questions |
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Biographical Note
Colin F. Camerer (1959–)
B.A., Johns Hopkins University, 1977; M.B.A., University of Chicago, 1979; Ph.
D., University of Chicago, 1981; held faculty positions at Northwestern University,
University of Pennsylvania, University of Chicago, and California Institute of
Technology
By the age of 22, Colin Camerer had already obtained an M.B.A. specializing in finance and his Ph.D. in behavioral decision theory from the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business and began his faculty appointment at Northwestern University. He is an accomplished and renowned scholar both in behavioral theory and in experimental economic methods. He is best known for his work on decision under risk and uncertainty and behavioral game theory. Camerer is the author of the premier book on behavioral game theory, as well as scores of articles and book chapters developing the theory of behavior in games. He has also contributed to the growing field of neuroeconomics, serving as the president for the Society of Neuroeconomics from 2005 to 2006. Camerer is a Fellow of the Econometric Society and a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In addition to his academic work, Camerer has taken an interest in punk music, founding and running his own punk recording label since 1983. His label, Fever Records, produced recordings for such underground Chicago bands as Bonemen of Baruma and Big Black.
T H O U G H T Q U E S T I O N S
1.Confirmation bias leads people to interpret the same information in very different ways. Given such a bias is pervasive, one must be careful in forming initial opinions. If confirmation bias is pervasive, what might this say about the quality of information sources that are available for controversial topics in which people often hold sharply diverging views? When people claim strong evidence for their opinion, should we believe them? Is there a way to obtain unbiased assessments?
2.Suppose you hold a stock and are considering whether to sell it or keep it. You initially believe that the probability the stock will rise in value in the long run is 0.7. You decide you will sell the stock when the probability of a long run drop in value reaches 0.5. Then, over the course of time you watch the changes in the value of the stock day to day, each day’s outcome
serving as a forecast of future value. Further, suppose that PRISErise = 0.6 where RISE indicates a longrun future rise in value and rise indicates an observed daily rise in value. Correspondingly, PFALLfall = 0.6, where FALL indicates a long-run decline in future values of the stock and fall indicates a daily observed decline in value. Suppose the probability that you misperceive a signal given it contradicts your current belief is q = 0.4. How many daily declines would you need to observe before you would sell the stock according to Rabin and Schrag’s model of confirmation bias? What would a Bayesian’s beliefs be regarding the probability of a decline at that point? How many daily declines would you need to observe in order to sell if you had perfect perception q = 0?
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CONFIRMATION AND OVERCONFIDENCE |
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3. In this chapter, we motivated the rational model of |
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impossible comes to pass. What would happen in these |
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information search by showing that rational people |
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cases if people were not required to insure? What |
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should prefer information that is accurate no matter |
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problems might arise if governments also prepared for |
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how it relates to their current hypothesis. People should |
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emergencies in a way that displayed overconfidence? |
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continue to seek new information until they are certain |
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What mechanisms could prevent overconfidence in |
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enough of the answer that the cost of new information |
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government action? |
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is not justified by the degree of uncertainty. Confir- |
5. |
Suppose |
we consider |
producers |
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competitive |
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mation bias can lead to overconfidence, where people |
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market. Hence all producers are price takers and earn |
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fail to |
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level of uncertainty they face. |
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profit |
π = pq − c q , |
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What implications are there for information search by |
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Thus, |
the |
mean |
of |
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those |
displaying confirmation bias? When will they |
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variance of profit is VAR π |
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cease to search for information? What might this imply |
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p |
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regarding |
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cease their |
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that each producer has an expected utility of wealth |
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function |
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education |
efforts at various phases? What education |
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E u π |
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VAR π |
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that |
each |
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policy might be implied by this result? |
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behaves so as to maximize expected utility of wealth. |
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4. Governments often require people to obtain insurance; |
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Consider that some producers are overconfident and |
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for example, all drivers are required to carry auto |
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others are not. Which will produce more (larger q)? |
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insurance to cover damages to others in the event of a |
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Which will obtain a higher profit on average? Suppose |
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crash. Homeowners are often required by banks to |
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that the mean price declines over time. What is the |
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carry insurance on their home. Why do these require- |
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condition for shut down? Will rational or overconfi- |
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ments exist? Would they be necessary if people truly |
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dent producers shut down first? What does this say |
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recognized the risk they faced? One characteristic of an |
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about the rationality of firms in a competitive |
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overconfident person is that she is continually sur- |
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environment? |
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prised |
when what |
she thought was |
unlikely or |
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R E F E R E N C E S
Alpert, M., and H. Raiffa, “A Progress Report on the Training of Probability Assessors.” In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (eds.). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 294–305.
Babcock, L., and G. Loewenstein. “Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(1997): 109–126.
Barber, B.M., and T. Odean. “Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence and Common Stock Investment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(2001): 261–292.
Bogan, V., and D.R. Just. “What Drives Merger Decision Making Behavior? Don’t Seek, Don’t Find, and Don’t Change Your Mind.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 72 (2009): 930–943.
Brockhaus, R.H. “Risk Taking Propensity of Entrepreneurs.” Academy of Management Journal 23(1980): 509–520.
Busenitz, L.W., and J.B. Barney, “Differences Between Entrepreneurs and Managers in Large Organizations: Biases and Heuristics in Strategic Decision-Making.” Journal of Business Venturing 12(1997): 9–30.
Compte, O., and A. Postlewaite, “Confidence-Enhanced Performance.” American Economic Review 94(2004): 1536–1557.
Dahl, G.B., and M.R. Ransom. “Does Where You Stand Depend on Where You Sit? Tithing Donations and Self-Serving Beliefs.”
American Economic Review 89(1999): 703–727.
Darley, J.M., and P.H. Gross. “A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
44(1983): 20–33.
Malmendier, U., and G. Tate. “Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction.” Journal of Financial Economics 89(2007): 20–43.
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References |
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213 |
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Mynatt, C.R., M.E. Doherty, R.D. Tweney. “Confirmation Bias in a |
Ross, M., and F. Sicoly. “Egocentric Biases in Availability and |
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Simulated Research Environment: An Experimental Study of |
Attribution.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 |
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Scientific Inference.” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psy- |
(1979): 322–336. |
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chology 29(1977): 85–95. |
Svenson, O. “Are We all Less Risky and More Skillful than our |
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Oskamp, S. “Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments.” Journal of |
Fellow Drivers?” Acta Psychologica 47(1981): 143–148. |
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Consulting Psychology 29(1965): 261–265. |
Wason, P.C. “Reasoning About a Rule.” Quarterly Journal of |
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Rabin, M., and J.L. Schrag. “First Impressions Matter: A Model of |
Experimental Psychology 20(1968): 273–281. |
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Confirmatory Bias.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(1999): |
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37–82. |
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Decision under Risk |
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9 |
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and Uncertainty |
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In many fields of occupation, there are regular and agreed-upon cycles to the job market. For example, because college students generally graduate in June, many employers focus their efforts for hiring entry-level positions to begin work soon thereafter. Some employers are very highly sought after for their level of pay and the future career opportunities of their employees. Consider a less-sought-after employer who has difficulty offering salaries that are similar to those commonly offered in the market. Very often, in such markets, less-sought- after employers start their process of seeking recruits earlier than their peers and make offers that expire before their competitors will make their initial offers. Such exploding offers are designed to put the recruit in a quandary. Consider a very qualified recruit with an exploding offer. He can take the offer and obtain the lower pay and a secure job with certainty. Alternatively, if he rejects the offer, he takes his chances and potentially fails to find a moredesirable job. If the salary offer is low enough, he might have a very high probability of obtaining a more-lucrative offer when the real cycle of offers begins. Nonetheless, it can be very difficult to turn down a job without another offer in hand.
People often face problems of decision under risk. In general, models of decision under risk consist of two-component models: a model of preferences over outcomes and a model of risk perception. Rational models of decision under risk depend heavily on the assumption that people understand the potential outcomes of any risky choice and the probability of each of those outcomes. In the previous chapters, we discussed several anomalies related to how people deal with probabilistic information. Behavioral models of risky choice generally base the component model of beliefs on behavior observed in experimental settings. For example, people seem to treat certainty in a very different way than probabilistic outcomes, an effect that might make exploding job offers more profitable for inferior firms. Or people may be reluctant to invest in the stock market despite higher average returns, opting for low-returning savings accounts. Interestingly, experimental observations of choice under risk sometimes contradict the common behaviors discussed in the previous chapters.
Examining the economics of decision under risk is a bit of a challenge. In a standard consumption context, we may observe whether someone chooses to purchase an apple or not. We know with relative certainty that the person understood the characteristics of either choice and we can also know with relative certainty what those characteristics are. In the context of risk, we may observe whether someone chooses to purchase a share of a particular stock, and we can observe subsequent changes in the value of that stock. However, we will never easily be
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