- •Brief Contents
- •Contents
- •Preface
- •Who Should Use this Book
- •Philosophy
- •A Short Word on Experiments
- •Acknowledgments
- •Rational Choice Theory and Rational Modeling
- •Rationality and Demand Curves
- •Bounded Rationality and Model Types
- •References
- •Rational Choice with Fixed and Marginal Costs
- •Fixed versus Sunk Costs
- •The Sunk Cost Fallacy
- •Theory and Reactions to Sunk Cost
- •History and Notes
- •Rational Explanations for the Sunk Cost Fallacy
- •Transaction Utility and Flat-Rate Bias
- •Procedural Explanations for Flat-Rate Bias
- •Rational Explanations for Flat-Rate Bias
- •History and Notes
- •Theory and Reference-Dependent Preferences
- •Rational Choice with Income from Varying Sources
- •The Theory of Mental Accounting
- •Budgeting and Consumption Bundles
- •Accounts, Integrating, or Segregating
- •Payment Decoupling, Prepurchase, and Credit Card Purchases
- •Investments and Opening and Closing Accounts
- •Reference Points and Indifference Curves
- •Rational Choice, Temptation and Gifts versus Cash
- •Budgets, Accounts, Temptation, and Gifts
- •Rational Choice over Time
- •References
- •Rational Choice and Default Options
- •Rational Explanations of the Status Quo Bias
- •History and Notes
- •Reference Points, Indifference Curves, and the Consumer Problem
- •An Evolutionary Explanation for Loss Aversion
- •Rational Choice and Getting and Giving Up Goods
- •Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect
- •Rational Explanations for the Endowment Effect
- •History and Notes
- •Thought Questions
- •Rational Bidding in Auctions
- •Procedural Explanations for Overbidding
- •Levels of Rationality
- •Bidding Heuristics and Transparency
- •Rational Bidding under Dutch and First-Price Auctions
- •History and Notes
- •Rational Prices in English, Dutch, and First-Price Auctions
- •Auction with Uncertainty
- •Rational Bidding under Uncertainty
- •History and Notes
- •References
- •Multiple Rational Choice with Certainty and Uncertainty
- •The Portfolio Problem
- •Narrow versus Broad Bracketing
- •Bracketing the Portfolio Problem
- •More than the Sum of Its Parts
- •The Utility Function and Risk Aversion
- •Bracketing and Variety
- •Rational Bracketing for Variety
- •Changing Preferences, Adding Up, and Choice Bracketing
- •Addiction and Melioration
- •Narrow Bracketing and Motivation
- •Behavioral Bracketing
- •History and Notes
- •Rational Explanations for Bracketing Behavior
- •Statistical Inference and Information
- •Calibration Exercises
- •Representativeness
- •Conjunction Bias
- •The Law of Small Numbers
- •Conservatism versus Representativeness
- •Availability Heuristic
- •Bias, Bigotry, and Availability
- •History and Notes
- •References
- •Rational Information Search
- •Risk Aversion and Production
- •Self-Serving Bias
- •Is Bad Information Bad?
- •History and Notes
- •Thought Questions
- •Rational Decision under Risk
- •Independence and Rational Decision under Risk
- •Allowing Violations of Independence
- •The Shape of Indifference Curves
- •Evidence on the Shape of Probability Weights
- •Probability Weights without Preferences for the Inferior
- •History and Notes
- •Thought Questions
- •Risk Aversion, Risk Loving, and Loss Aversion
- •Prospect Theory
- •Prospect Theory and Indifference Curves
- •Does Prospect Theory Solve the Whole Problem?
- •Prospect Theory and Risk Aversion in Small Gambles
- •History and Notes
- •References
- •The Standard Models of Intertemporal Choice
- •Making Decisions for Our Future Self
- •Projection Bias and Addiction
- •The Role of Emotions and Visceral Factors in Choice
- •Modeling the Hot–Cold Empathy Gap
- •Hindsight Bias and the Curse of Knowledge
- •History and Notes
- •Thought Questions
- •The Fully Additive Model
- •Discounting in Continuous Time
- •Why Would Discounting Be Stable?
- •Naïve Hyperbolic Discounting
- •Naïve Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
- •The Common Difference Effect
- •The Absolute Magnitude Effect
- •History and Notes
- •References
- •Rationality and the Possibility of Committing
- •Commitment under Time Inconsistency
- •Choosing When to Do It
- •Of Sophisticates and Naïfs
- •Uncommitting
- •History and Notes
- •Thought Questions
- •Rationality and Altruism
- •Public Goods Provision and Altruistic Behavior
- •History and Notes
- •Thought Questions
- •Inequity Aversion
- •Holding Firms Accountable in a Competitive Marketplace
- •Fairness
- •Kindness Functions
- •Psychological Games
- •History and Notes
- •References
- •Of Trust and Trustworthiness
- •Trust in the Marketplace
- •Trust and Distrust
- •Reciprocity
- •History and Notes
- •References
- •Glossary
- •Index
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Self-Serving Bias |
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Table 8.3 Average Accuracy and Confidence by Stage |
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Stage 1 |
Stage 2 |
Stage 3 |
Stage 4 |
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Percent Accurate |
26.0 |
23.0 |
28.4 |
27.8 |
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Confidence |
33.2 |
39.2 |
46.0 |
52.8 |
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this pattern of behavior was observed among all participants, it was most pronounced among the less-experienced undergraduate students. The experienced and inexperienced participants all displayed similar levels of accuracy in prediction, but the lessexperienced were substantially more confident in their answers, particularly in stage 4. Thus, the value of consulting experts might not be the diagnosis they provide. Rather, the true value of experts might just be their ability to recognize the inherent level of uncertainty displayed in the diagnosis they provide.
EXAMPLE 8.9 Better than Average
Many of us fancy ourselves to be rather good drivers. Just how good? Ola Svenson asked 161 participants in the United States and Sweden to rate their overall driving skill. Of the Swedes, roughly 69 percent believed they drove better than 50 percent of all drivers, and 93 percent of U.S. drivers believed they drove better than 50 percent of all drivers. Clearly people overestimate their own ability to drive. Similar results have been shown for a variety of other skills (for example, achievement on standardized tests or grade point averages). In a similar vein, Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly interviewed dozens of married couples, asking each spouse individually to assess their percentage contribution to various household chores. Of 20 different activities, there were 16 in which the husband’s and wife’s contributions added to more than 100 percent. Thus, at least one member of the household was overestimating his or her contribution to the household as a whole. Similar results have been found in basketball teams or on class projects. People seem to take too much credit for their work and believe they perform it at a level that not many others can achieve.
Self-Serving Bias
In close connection with optimistic overconfidence, people tend to bias information in self-serving ways. Thus, one overestimates one’s ability to perform a specific task. One overestimates the importance of one’s contribution to specific tasks. Finally, one interprets ambiguous information in a way that exaggerates one’s value or worth. Such mistakes in judgment are collectively called self-serving bias. Such an effect appears to be pervasive in many various contexts. Psychologists have argued that a self-serving bias can be useful in helping someone to be self-assured and confident. However, such biases do not come without consequences. For example, those who wrongly believe that they are gifted in their ability to pick winners and losers on the stock market can end up paying the price for their bias. As well, people who inflate their previous
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accomplishments on a résumé or job application can be ousted from any position obtained on the false pretext. More interestingly, self-serving bias can negatively affect people and any organization that engages in a contract with them. For example, a contractor could overestimate her ability to perform on a construction job. This leads her to place bids for the job that claim a cost savings or a time savings over other contractors. Once on the job, the contractor’s optimistic bias is exposed by reality. As costs or time mount beyond the bid, her employer will begin to feel the pinch.
EXAMPLE 8.10 Paying an Honest Tithe
Many churches ask for parishioners to donate to support church charity or other services, though some provide stricter guidelines than others. Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) believe in scripture that commands them to donate 10 percent of their income. However, the church avoids providing unambiguous direction about what should be considered income. For example, one LDS member receiving an inheritance from a relative who had regularly paid tithing on her income when alive might not consider it necessary to pay tithing on the inheritance.
Gordon Dahl and Michael Ransom administered a survey of members of the LDS church, asking their opinions on what sorts of income parishioners should pay tithing on. Further, they asked the same respondents about their own previous income history. They found mild evidence of the self-serving bias in terms of financial gain. For example, parishioners who own a home were much less likely to believe that income earned by selling a home for more than it was originally purchased was subject to tithing (43 percent versus 34 percent). Alternatively, there was relative agreement on the need to pay tithing on inheritances, income earned from stock investments, or income from public benefits. In contrast, those who attend church less frequently were much more willing to say that it was not necessary to pay tithing on nearly any income source. For example, about nine in 10 of those who attend church weekly say it is necessary to pay tithing on inherited income. For those attending once or twice a month it was only about 65 percent. Similar differences were seen for stock value gains, housing gains, or public benefits. In this case, people with less of an attachment to the LDS church appear to be willing to alter the interpretation of a commandment of God in a self-serving way. Moreover, they find that the majority of respondents do not seek advice on what income is subject to tithing. By seeking such advice, they might find that they need to pay more tithing in order to meet their ideal of morality. Thus, self-serving bias can affect information search much like confirmation bias, leading one to avoid information that is potentially damaging to one’s well-being.
Is Bad Information Bad?
It is worth noting that information only derives its value from how it might change the actions of a person. Consider again the farming example. In this case, the farmer was interested to learn whether the weather conditions would be good or bad. But this
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Is Bad Information Bad? |
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209 |
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information is only valuable if the farmer can do something to respond to these whether conditions. Thus, learning that there would be little rain could be of use if it leads the farmer to invest in water conservation or reduce the investment in seed or fertilizer. Taking these actions allows the farmer to make a greater profit (or a smaller loss) given the conditions. Once all production input decisions are made and are irreversible, information is no longer valuable. Profits may be different if weather is good rather than bad, but if the farmer would not do anything to change her strategy in either state, the information does not increase expected profit. In this vein it is important to realize that misleading information does not always reduce the utility or profit of the information user. Watching and believing the reports from a news channel that skews all the news toward conservative views—even to the point of dishonesty—might not be damaging to the person’s utility if the person would have responded with the same actions (e.g., voting, political donations, or activism) anyway. It is only damaging if it persuades the person to action that would not be taken if more-accurate information had been absorbed.
Obviously this argument would also apply to erroneous beliefs such as overconfi- dence. Thus overconfidence does no damage to people if it does not change their actions. However, in the case of overconfidence a stronger statement can be made. In fact, many psychologists have found that there are substantial benefits to overconfidence in some circumstances. This can occur, for example, if being overconfident about one’s ability leads to a better or more-relaxed performance. For example, someone who is giving a presentation and who feels she is a poor speaker when underprepared and nervous might speak more haltingly or speak with less volume or emphasis. The person who feels she is a great public speaker may be able to perform better with the same level of preparation simply for lack of nerves. Oliver Compte and Andrew Postlewaite show that when performance depends on the level of confidence, overconfidence could actually improve utility or well-being. In this case, bad beliefs or information can improve well-being even if acted upon.
EXAMPLE 8.11 Self-Serving Bias and Negotiation Impasse
When modeling the negotiating process, economists typically assume that both parties face a significant cost if there is an impasse. For example, if labor negotiations fail, labor union members face significant loss of income in the course of a strike, and employers face significant losses in profits for either shutting down or using less-skilled replacements. Similarly, when a plaintiff sues a defendant, both face steep costs in court costs, and attorneys’ fees. Thus, it is usually in their best interest to seek an out-of-court settlement. If this is the case, why do any cases go to court? Why are labor strikes as common as they are?
Linda Babcock and George Loewenstein suggest that self-serving bias may be the answer to both of these questions. They conducted two studies to see if self-serving bias played a role in the breakdown of negotiations. In the first study, an experiment, participants were asked to read the evidence and proceedings of an actual court case resulting from a traffic accident in Texas. Participants were asked to estimate the award given by the judge in the case. After being assigned as either defendant or plaintiff, they
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were then paired with another participant and asked to negotiate a settlement with a scaled-down pot of money, with the threat that the court-imposed settlement would prevail if they failed to reach an agreement and both sides would face additional costs. In a first condition, participants learned their role in the negotiations before they read the court proceedings. In this case, plaintiffs believed the settlement would be about $18,555 larger than those who were assigned as defendants, and close to 30 percent failed to negotiate a settlement. Alternatively, those who learned about their role only after reading the proceedings differed by only $6,936, and only 6 percent failed to reach a settlement.
The second study was a field study. All school district presidents and teachers’ union presidents in the state of Pennsylvania were surveyed. Both were asked to list school districts they considered comparable to their own for the purposes of salary negotiation. The responses displayed the hypothesized self-serving bias. The average salary for school districts listed by union presidents was $27,633. Alternatively, the average salary of school districts listed by the presidents of the school boards was $26,922. This is about a 2.4 percent difference between the two. The responses were then compared to the number and incidence of previous labor disputes. They found that a discrepancy of comparable income of $1,000 or more increases the probability of a strike by about 49 percent. Thus, teachers, students, and boards all feel the pinch of self-serving bias.
History and Notes
Sir Francis Bacon, in his 1620 treatise Novum Organum, laments that “The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion . . . draws all things else to support and agree with it.” Thus he was the first to articulate confirmation bias four centuries ago. Further, his reasoning on logic illustrates a relatively sophisticated notion of confirmation bias and the need to avoid it in engaging in scientific inquiry. His work was subsequently built upon in the 1740s by the philosopher David Hume, who questioned entirely our ability to use inductive reasoning to generalize the results of a hypothesis test from one context to another. This debate has led to the somewhat rigid rules of scientific argument and testing now employed. Wason was the first to test for the psychological bias directly, finding substantial support for Bacon’s ancient assertion.
The modern notion of overconfidence was originally discovered by Stuart Oskamp when examining the accuracy of experienced and inexperienced psychologists in diagnosing or predicting behavior. His general result, that amateurs are about as accurate though more confident in their answers, has been generalized to many and various contexts, including economic forecasting.