- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. JAPAN
to audit by the BOA, or may ask questions or demand appearance before it of a person concerned (Art. 26).
4.5.5. Enforcement of findings
In cases where the BOA deems, as a result of an audit, that an official in charge of government financial transactions has caused a grave loss to the government intentionally or through gross negligence, it may make a demand for disciplinary action against the official, to the head of the line ministry concerned or to other persons responsible for supervising him/her (Art. 31). In cases where the BOA adjudicates that a cash-handling official or a goodshandling official is liable to pay an indemnity, the head of the line ministry concerned is required to order him/her to pay the indemnity in accordance with the adjudication made (Art. 32). Furthermore, in cases where the BOA deems that an official in charge of government financial transactions has committed a crime while discharging his/her duties, the BOA is required to notify the Public Prosecutors Office of the matter (Art. 33).
Notes
1.The new Cabinet Office is part of three interrelated organisations: the new Prime Minister’s Office (secretary and advisors), the Cabinet Secretariat (a small number of officers, about 50 to 100, dealing with strategic issues of the government), and the Cabinet Office (dealing with a wide range of issues; like a ministry in size).
2.The major members of the Cabinet, currently 17, include the Prime Minister, the Minister for Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Minister of the Economy, Trade and Industry, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and the Minister of the Environment. See the Internet site for more details: www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government/the_cabinet_law.html.
3.For more details, see the Internet site www.kantei.go.jp.
4.The CEFP is a representative council within the Cabinet Office set up at the time of the Administration Reform 2001. The purpose of the CEFP is to allow the Prime Minster to show full leadership on economic and fiscal policies, fully reflecting the opinions of knowledgeable persons. Members consist of the Prime Minister (Chairman), the Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of Economic and Fiscal Management, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of the Economy, the Minister of Public Management and Home Affairs, the Governor of the Bank of Japan, and four people from outside the government.
5.The Law of Decentralisation 2000 amended this. As from fiscal year 2006, prefectures and municipalities must consult with the Ministry and prefectures respectively. If the Ministry and prefectures do not agree on the bond issuance,
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
279 |
|
IV. JAPAN
prefectures and municipalities may still issue public bonds, provided they report in advance to the parliaments of the prefectures and the municipalities.
6.These budgets are submitted to and approved by the Diet at the same time although they are compiled separately. The general account budget, commonly referred to as “the budget”, consists of the government’s major programmes, such as public works, social security, education, science, national defence, and economic co-operation. All national taxes, even if shared with local governments, are treated as revenue of the general account except for several earmarked taxes, including road taxes.
7.Examples include the National Life Finance Corporation, the Government Housing Loan Corporation, the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation, the Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterprises, the Japan Bank for International Co-operation, and the Development Bank of Japan.
8.The guidelines set out the ceilings of expenditure requests for the whole budget, including public works and social security, for the next fiscal year. These ceilings are usually expressed in terms of absolute or percentage increase (decrease) compared to the previous fiscal year’s amount. Also, the guidelines specify the government’s fiscal target, the policies proposed, and the procedures for the preparation of the sectoral budget.
9.The assumptions underlying the Ministry of Finance’s plan are available on the Ministry’s Internet site, notably www.mof.go.jp/english/budget/brief/2004/2004f_04.htm.
10.Ministries within the executive branch submit budget estimates to the Ministry of Finance (i.e. from one ministry to another ministry), while the Diet, the Court and the BOA submit them to the Cabinet (i.e. from one constitutional organisation to another constitutional organisation).
11.This article is ambiguous, as the term “budget” includes both revenues and expenditures. Interpreted literally, it means that proposals to either increase spending or revenues need Cabinet consideration. On the other hand, since the law does not discuss possible decreases of the “budget”, the question arises as to whether the Diet is empowered to reduce taxes without Cabinet consideration.
12.There have been only four times since the end of World War II that amendments have been made (Tanaka, 2003).
13.Article 3 of the PFA has been suspended by special legislation (the Act Concerning the Exception to Article 3 of the Public Finance Act 1948). It says that “the Government can decide or revise the prices stipulated by the Art. 3 of the PFA without legislation or Diet approval as long as the current situation of economic emergency remains.”
Bibliography
Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (2002), Local Government in Japan, Council of Local Authorities for International Relations, Tokyo.
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2001a), Japan: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes – Fiscal Transparency Module, IMF, Washington DC.
IMF (2001b), Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001, Statistics Department, IMF, Washington DC.
280 |
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
|
IV. JAPAN
Ministry of Finance (2004), Understanding the Japanese Budget 2004, Ministry of Finance, Tokyo, www.mof.go.jp/english/budget/brief/2004/2004.htm (in English).
OECD (2000), Economic Surveys of Japan, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2003), Economic Outlook 74, OECD, Paris.
Tanaka, Hideaki (2003), “Fiscal Consolidation and Medium-term Fiscal Planning in Japan”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 3, No. 2, OECD, Paris, pp. 105-137.
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
281 |
|
ISSN 1608-7143
OECD Journal on Budgeting – Volume 4 – No. 3 © OECD 2004
Korea*
|
Structure of the Case Study |
|
1. |
Overview...................................................................................... |
284 |
2. |
Principles underlying budget system laws .................................. |
287 |
3. |
Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors |
|
|
in the budget system.................................................................... |
289 |
4. |
Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle ..................... |
292 |
*This study has benefited from comments from: Hong Sang Jung, Director in the Ministry of Planning and Budget; several officials from the Ministry of Finance and the Economy and from the Board of Audit and Inspection; and OECD colleagues including Sang-In Kim (from the Ministry of Government Affairs and Home Administration).
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
283 |
|