- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. NEW ZEALAND
4.2.10. Budgetary implications of other bills
There is no legal provision which requires any bills having budgetary implications to be reviewed by the FEC or any other committee.
4.3. Budget execution
4.3.1. Apportionment of expenditure authority
Once an appropriation act or an imprest supply act has been passed, the departments will agree with Treasury on the timing of the passing of the required funding to Crown and departmental bank accounts that are operated by individual departments. Thereafter, the management of public expenditure is a two-stage process consisting of the incurrence of an appropriation by Parliament and the issue of money from the Crown or departmental bank to settle amounts owing. While these transactions can occur simultaneously, they may be years apart (as is the case for employee superannuation).
Departments incur expenses against appropriation, and must provide the Treasury with information each month on the status of each appropriation. This information is forwarded to the Auditor General within ten working days of the end of each month. The Auditor General may direct a responsible Minister to report on any breaches of appropriation if it is considered that any expenses or capital expenditure has been incurred in excess of or outside the scope of an appropriation.
In addition, if the Auditor General has reason to believe that any money to be paid out of a Crown or department bank account may be applied for a purpose that is not lawful or is outside the scope, financial limit or period of any appropriation or other authority from Parliament, he or she may direct the ministry or the Treasury to stop payments out of the relevant Crown or departmental bank account.
4.3.2. Cancellation of budget authority and other in-year expenditure controls
Appropriations are a permissive authority – there is no requirement imposed on the government to utilise the appropriations approved by Parliament. This means that the government does not require parliamentary authority to cancel appropriations. When it is considered prudent to reduce or cancel part of the appropriations, supplementary appropriation acts or imprest supply acts may be used.
4.3.3. Emergency spending, excess spending and contingency funds
Although spending above appropriations is stated to be illegal, the PFA also authorises the Minister of Finance to approve spending above
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appropriation. In particular, the Minister of Finance may approve the incurring of expenses or capital expenditures in the last three months of any financial year which are in excess, but within the scope, of an existing appropriation approved by Parliament. The limit on such excess expenditure is the greater of NZD 10 000 or 2% of the specific appropriation. Any such authorisation must be included in a new appropriation bill. A similar parliamentary approval is needed to validate any unlawful expenditure which the Minister of Finance does not approve. For any such expenses, explanatory statements are required in annual accounts of the government and those of the relevant department.
When there is a national disaster, a civil emergency or a public health or security situation requiring the government to declare an emergency, the PFA allows the government to incur emergency expenses or capital expenditures. No limit applies, but the amounts must be included in the annual financial statements of the Crown and be approved by Parliament in an appropriation bill. Typically, the costs of disasters are first accommodated through the use of an imprest supply act.
4.3.4. Transfer and virement of appropriations within the year
Appropriation is made for specific purposes such as purchasing or providing specific classes of outputs, making specific benefit payments or investing in specific entities or assets. Even if the authorised appropriation limit is not reached, the remaining amount of an appropriation cannot be used for another purpose. However, the PFA permits the Governor General, by Order in Council, to direct that an output expense appropriation in a vote be transferred to output expense in that vote if:
●The amount transferred does not increase an appropriation for a financial year by more than 5%.
●No other transfer to that appropriation has occurred during that financial year.
●The total amount appropriated for that financial year for all output expense appropriations in that vote is unaltered.
Such transfers authorised by the executive have to be approved by an appropriation act.
4.3.5. Cash planning and management of government assets and debt
All public money must be held in either a Crown or a departmental bank account (see below). This permits centralised Treasury management of the Crown’s cash position. The Treasury, under the authority given by the PFA, may invest any money held in a Crown bank account or any departmental bank account for such periods on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. In order to maximise the long-term economic return on the Crown’s financial
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assets and debt portfolio, and to manage the risks to the taxpayer involved in the government debt, the New Zealand Debt Management Office (NZDMO) was established in 1988 by the PFA.3
4.3.6. Internal audit
Chief executives of departments are responsible to the responsible minister for the financial management of the department. Amongst their principal responsibilities, the SSA states that a chief executive of a department shall be responsible to the appropriate minister for the efficient, effective, and economical management of the activities of the department (s. 36). In fulfilling these duties, it is expected that a chief executive will put in place appropriate internal audit arrangements. Large government departments usually have internal audit groups reporting to the chief executive.
The Secretary to the Treasury is required to sign a statement of responsibility with each set of Crown financial statements that the system of internal control (that provides reasonable assurance that the transactions recorded are within statutory authority and properly record the use of all public financial resources of the Crown) has operated adequately throughout the reporting period. To provide assurance of this, the Treasury requires the audit service providers of government departments to undertake and report on the results of an annual departmental internal control evaluation.
4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
4.4.1. The accounting framework
Both the PFA (s. 8) and the FRA (s. 5) require the government to produce actual and forecast financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which describes the rules applied when preparing and presenting financial statements. GAAP requires the presentation of financial statements to be on an accrual basis, but also prescribes a cash flow statement. The government began the process of producing its financial statements in compliance with GAAP in 1989. Government departments were the first to move to accrual appropriations and accounting under GAAP. The first set of financial statements reporting on the Crown as a whole was prepared in 1991. The introduction of the FRA in 1994 changed the basis of the fiscal forecasts to accruals.
4.4.2. Government banking arrangements
The PFA specifies that all taxes and government receipts must be paid into a Crown bank account or departmental bank account. The Treasury may open, maintain, and operate the Crown bank account at a bank or banks that
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the Minister of Finance may direct. Accordingly, the Treasury has contracted a private bank to act as banker for most departmental and Crown activities. The amount held in the government bank accounts are “swept” into the Crown bank account with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand each night.
The PFA allows a departmental bank account or accounts to be opened, maintained, and operated by a department at such bank or banks as the Minister of Finance may direct. The Minister of Finance may give directions as to any terms and conditions under which any departmental bank account may operate and at any time close and suspend the operation of a Crown or departmental bank account. The following money is required to be paid into a departmental bank account:
●Such money as may be disbursed to the department by the Treasury.
●All receipts relating to departmental revenue.
●All receipts resulting from the sale or disposal of capital assets of the department.
4.4.3. In-year reporting to Parliament
The PFA requires the Treasury to prepare, as soon as practicable after the end of each month (except the first two and the last months) in each financial year, consolidated financial statements for the Crown for the period of the financial year to the end of the month concerned (s. 31A). These must be prepared according to GAAP. The PFA elaborates on content – financial statements required by GAAP, a statement of borrowings, and additional information and explanations. The law also establishes a six week publication lag (with a few exceptions).
Departments are required by Treasury instructions to provide monthly reports to their ministers and Treasury. These consist of actual against projected comparisons for: appropriations by type; an operating statement, cash flows and balance sheet; and net fiscal impact. Every quarter, departments are required to report the actual outputs produced, and the quality, quantity and cost of each, against projected output for that quarter.
4.4.4. Annual accounts and reports
The PFA requires the Treasury to prepare consolidated annual financial statements for the Crown for that financial year, in accordance with GAAP, as soon as practicable after the end of each financial year (s. 27). The major contents include: a statement of the financial position of the Crown (balance sheet); an operating statement; a statement of cash flows; a statement of borrowings, including a comparison between budgeted and actual borrowings; a statement of unappropriated expenses and capital expenditure; a statement of emergency expenses; a statement of trust money held by departments and
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