- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. JAPAN
The final budget is often different from the initial budget, which may be formulated in a contractionary stance compared with the previous year. Frequent use of supplementary budgets has a risk of undermining confidence in the value of the initial budget.
4.2.10. Budgetary implications of other bills
In cases where a motion of amendment on bills brings about an increase of the budget or requires budgetary action, the Diet Act requires a House or Budget Committee to afford the Cabinet an opportunity to give its opinion on an amendment to increase the total amount of the budget (Art. 57ter).
4.3. Budget execution
4.3.1. Apportionment of expenditure authority
The PFA governs budget implementation. The PFA requires the Cabinet to allocate appropriations to line ministries by article and by item (Art. 31). The Ministry of Finance is required to report this to the Board of Audit (Art. 31). Overall responsibility for executing the budget is given to the head of each ministry and agency, following detailed allocation (Art. 32). To spend, the PFA requires line ministries to prepare a draft disbursement plan and submit it to the Ministry of Finance for approval (Art. 34). The Ministry of Finance also is required to prepare implementation guidelines to be decided by the Cabinet, taking into account the state of National Treasury funds, revenues, finances and expenditures. When the Minister of Finance approves the draft disbursement plan, he/she is required to report it to the line ministries and the Bank of Japan.
4.3.2. Cancellation of budget authority and other in-year expenditure controls
There is no legal provision which allows the cancellation of a spending authority by the executive. In practice, when the executive needs to cancel appropriations, a supplementary budget is proposed.
4.3.3. Emergency spending, excess spending and contingency funds
The Constitution requires a contingency fund to be authorised by the Diet and to be expended for unforeseen deficiencies in the initial budget upon the responsibility of the Cabinet (Art. 87). On this basis, the Cabinet prepares a certain amount of unallocated expenditure in the annual budget not specifying any particular purpose, and the Diet reviews whether the proposed amount is appropriate. Once the draft budget is approved by the Diet, the Cabinet may spend the money as it deems appropriate for unexpected circumstances such as natural disasters or a weaker-than-projected economy. The PFA provides procedures on how to use the contingency fund. The
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Ministry of Finance is granted the power to manage and use it (Art. 35). For the use of the contingency fund, the PFA requires line ministries to prepare documents specifying the reasons for its use, the amount of the expenditure to be used and the grounds of the calculation of the expenditure to be used, and submit it to the Ministry of Finance (Art. 35). Then, the Ministry of Finance reviews and adjusts the request and seeks the Cabinet decision. When Cabinet approves the proposal of the Ministry of Finance, spending may take place. After using the contingency fund, line ministries are required to prepare and submit the report on how it used the money. The Ministry of Finance then prepares a comprehensive report for the Diet’s approval, after the opening of the subsequent ordinary session of the Diet.
4.3.4. Transfer and virement of appropriations within the year
The PFA strictly limits the use of budget spending authority by line ministries. The PFA prohibits line ministries from using expenditures for any purpose other than those appropriated in the approved budget (Art. 32). The PFA also prohibits line ministries from transferring budget authority for paragraphs (kwan) among ministries and divisions (Art. 33). Only in cases where such a transfer was approved in advance by the Diet, taking into account the necessity of implementing the budget, can the appropriated budget be transferred upon obtaining the approval of the Ministry of Finance. Spending ministries that wish to transfer budget spending authority at the item level (i.e. within articles, kou) can only do so upon obtaining the approval of the Ministry of Finance (Art. 33.2). If the ministry would like to transfer money between articles (kou), approval of the Diet is required.
4.3.5. Cash planning and management of government assets and debts
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for cash planning and management of government assets and debt. Based on the implementation plan approved by the Ministry of Finance, money is allocated to line ministries from the National Treasury funds established in the Bank of Japan (Art. 2 of the Public Accounts Act 1947, as amended). The Bank of Japan, in cases where a cheque issued by line ministries is presented, is required to pay the amount of money required (Art. 28). The Public Accounts Act also requires the separation of the duty of disbursement and account keeping in order to prevent any possible corruption (Art. 26). The PFA provides the legal basis for the management of national public property. National property, unless otherwise authorised by law, is not to be exchanged as a payment or transferred without the receipt of a proper price. It needs to be managed in the most efficient manner (Art. 9).
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4.3.6. Internal audit
Line ministries’ financial activities are under the control of the Ministry of Finance. The PFA requires line ministries to implement their budgets in accordance with guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance, which need to be approved by the Cabinet. In addition, under the Public Accounts Act 1947, as amended, line ministries are required by the Ministry of Finance to report revenues and expenditures, to conduct field examinations of the state of budget implementation and, subject to Cabinet decision, to give the necessary instructions for implementation of budget (Art. 46). Even though the Ministry of Finance has authority to require field examinations of budget implementation, in practice this authority has not been exercised for a long time. Instead, the Ministry of Finance has carried out a budget execution survey on selected projects since fiscal year 2002 to review whether the budget execution of each line ministry is efficient and effective. Internal audit procedures are set out in the administrative guidelines of line ministries, and internal audits are subject to review by the Board of Audit.
4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
4.4.1. The accounting framework
The PFA states that the government accounts consist of the general account and special accounts (Art. 13). Expenditure authority is cash based, as the PFA states that “expenditure shall mean disbursed funds” (Art. 2). The term “income” as used in the law, shall mean received funds that serve as the source of payment to meet demands, while “expenditure” shall mean disbursed funds to meet various demands (Art. 2). Non-cash transactions are excluded.
4.4.2. Government banking arrangements
The National Treasury funds account is at the Bank of Japan, into which revenues from the general account and the special accounts are paid and out of which the expenditures from both accounts are met (the Public Accounts Act 1947, as amended). All national funds are accounted for as government deposits at the Bank of Japan. They are classified into a checking account, a separate account, or a designated account, and receipts into and payments from the accounts are made only from the Bank of Japan (Ministry of Finance, 2004, p. 16).
4.4.3. In-year reporting
The Constitution provides that at regular intervals and at least annually, the Cabinet is required to report to the Diet and the public on the state of the national finances (Art. 91). Accordingly, there is quarterly reporting to the Diet and the public on the execution of the budget, with a one quarter lag. There is
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also monthly reporting of the receipts and outlays of national treasury accounts, with a two month lag (IMF, 2001a).
4.4.4. Annual accounts and reports
The Constitution requires the BOA to audit the government’s annual accounts and for the Cabinet to submit the accounts to the Diet, together with the audit report of the BOA (Art. 90 of the Constitution and Art. 40 of the PFA). For the Ministry of Finance to prepare the annual accounts, after the close of the fiscal year, the PFA requires line ministries to submit their accounts to the Ministry of Finance. Based on these, the Ministry prepares consolidated accounts for total revenues and expenditures, as well as a statement of liabilities (Art. 37). After approval by the Cabinet, the annual accounts are required to be sent to the BOA by 30 November (Art. 39), i.e. within eight months after the end of the fiscal year.
There is no legal provision requiring the government to make special reports such as long-term projections, statements of fiscal policy intentions or of the major fiscal risks in budget projections.
4.5. External audit
4.5.1. Managerial, financial and operational independence
The Board of Audit (BOA) is established in the Constitution, which requires an annual audit and statement of audit by the BOA (Art. 90). The Constitution leaves the details of the organisation and competency of the BOA to be set out in legislation. In view of this, the Board of Audit Act (BOAA) was adopted in 1947. Unlike many countries, the BOA is not directly under the Diet, but under the Cabinet. The BOAA, however, states that the BOA is independent from the Cabinet in terms of operation, appointment and finance (Art. 1).
The BOA is composed of Audit Commission consisting of three commissioners and a General Executive Bureau in order to secure the independence of the BOA in terms of its management and decision making (Art. 2). Commissioners are appointed by Cabinet with the consent of both Houses of the Diet (Art. 4). The president of the BOA is appointed by the Cabinet in accordance with the decision of the commissioners (Art. 3). Their term of office is seven years and they may be reappointed only for one additional term (Art. 5). A commissioner can only be removed from office on the decision of both Houses where he/she is unable to perform their duties due to mental or physical impediment or he/she is in violation of their duties in office (Art. 6). A commissioner is also not required to resign unless he/she is condemned to a serious penalty by a criminal court (Art. 7). The PFA provides a special budget process for the BOA in order to strengthen its financial
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independence, giving the BOA the authority to prepare its budget estimates and submit them to Cabinet.
4.5.2. Institutional coverage of audits
The BOAA requires the BOA to audit all financial and non-financial matters/activities of the central government, as well as of public corporations (Arts. 22 and 23). Public corporations include entities partially owned or invested in by the government. Audits cover:
●Revenues and expenditures of the government.
●Acceptance and distribution of cash and goods owned by the government.
●The accounts of legal entities if more than half of the capital is invested by the government.
●Securities which are owned or taken custody of by the government, and cash and goods taken custody of by the government.
●Acceptance and distribution of cash, goods and securities by entities other than on behalf of the government.
●The accounts of bodies that receive subsidies, incentive grants, or other financial assistance such as loans or indemnity of losses, directly or indirectly by the government.
4.5.3. Types of audit
The BOAA requires the BOA to audit annual accounts to secure their adequacy and rectify their mistakes from the viewpoints of accuracy, regularity, economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Art. 20): 1) whether expenditures (settlement of accounts) fairly reflect implementation of the budget and its financial position (accuracy); 2) whether accounting is in conformity with the budget requirements, laws and regulations (regularity); 3) whether projects are implemented in economical and efficient ways (economy and efficiency); and 4) whether project goals are achieved (effectiveness). Traditionally, the first two objectives used to be dominant, but since the late 1990s, economy, efficiency and effectiveness audits have become increasingly important (OECD, 2000).
4.5.4. Powers of investigation
Those bodies subject to audit by the BOA are required to submit to the BOA statements together with supporting documents in accordance with the regulations (Art. 24). The BOA may dispatch its staff to conduct field audits on a regular or irregular basis (Art. 25). The BOA, if necessary for its audit, may demand submission of books, documents or reports from those bodies subject
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