- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. CANADA
4.3. Budget execution
4.3.1. Apportionment of expenditure authority
At the beginning of each fiscal year, following a directive issued by the Treasury Board, the deputy head of each department prepares a division of the appropriation into allotments and submits the division to the Treasury Board (FAA, Art. 31). Where a division is approved by the Treasury Board, the allotments shall not be varied or amended without the approval of the Board.
4.3.2. Cancellation of budget authority and other in-year expenditure controls
There is no statutory provision to grant power to the executive, notably the Treasury Board, to cancel appropriations approved by Parliament. However, the FAA provides the Treasury Board with the authority to freeze appropriations approved by Parliament. When the government considers it prudent to reduce or cancel part of any appropriation, supplementary Appropriation Acts also may be used.
4.3.3. Emergency spending, excess spending and contingency funds
The law does not regulate the use of the contingency reserve fund established by the government in each year’s budget as a result of prudent economic assumptions. According to a Cabinet decision, the fund can only be used to compensate for forecasting errors and unpredictable events. It may not be used for new policy initiatives. If recourse is not made to the contingency reserve funds, they are automatically applied to deficit reduction in their entirety.
When a payment is urgently required while Parliament is not in session and there is no available appropriation for payment, the Governor General in Council, on the report of the President of the Treasury Board, may, by Order, direct the preparation of a special warrant authorising payment to be made out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund (FAA, Art. 30). A special warrant is deemed to be an appropriation for the fiscal year in which the warrant is issued. Every such warrant shall be published in the Canada Gazette within 30 days, and a statement showing all warrants issued and the amounts of those warrants shall be laid by the President of the Treasury Board before the House of Commons within 15 days after the commencement of the next session of Parliament (Art. 30). Where a special warrant has been issued, the amounts appropriated shall be deemed to be included in the Appropriation Acts (Art. 30).
4.3.4. Transfer and virement of appropriations within the year
Where a division of appropriation into allotments is approved by the Treasury Board, the allotment is not permitted to be varied or amended
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without the approval of the Treasury Board (FAA, Art. 31). In practice, the operation of transfers between appropriation lines depends on the nature of appropriations. Transfers between operating expenditures are permitted provided Parliament is notified, whereas transfers between operating expenditures, investment and programme funds are possible only with parliamentary approval. Appropriations can be reallocated from one programme to another with the approval of the Treasury Board.
4.3.5. Cash planning and management of government assets and debt
The FAA requires the Department of Finance to publish annually a debt management report and a debt management strategy. The debt management report provides a comprehensive record of the federal government’s debt operations in the previous fiscal year. It must be tabled in Parliament within 45 sitting days of the tabling of the public accounts (Art. 49). The debt management strategy provides information on the federal government’s planned management of debt for the coming fiscal year. It must be tabled before the end of the current fiscal year (Art. 49). Departments are required to keep accounts to show clearly the status of their assets as well as direct and contingent liabilities of the government (Art. 63). Data on financial assets, including international reserves, are included in the public accounts and the debt management reports.
4.3.6. Internal audit
Following directives issued by the Treasury Board, the deputy head is required to ensure, by an adequate system of internal control and audit, that the allotments provided are not exceeded (FAA, Art. 31). The deputy head shall establish and maintain records respecting the control of financial commitments chargeable to each appropriation (FAA, Art. 32). Ministries and agencies are required to audit and evaluate their programmes and operations so as to assess whether the management framework is well designed and working as intended. Internal audit policy and standards provide departments with a basis for carrying out cost self-assessment and improving quality.
4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
4.4.1. The accounting framework
The FAA and regulations of the Treasury Board govern the accounting framework. The FAA states that, subject to regulations of the Treasury Board, departments are required to keep accounts so as to show expenditures made under each appropriation, revenues, and other financial transactions into and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund (Art. 63). Without changing legislation,
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the government has presented its financial statements on a full accrual accounting basis since 2003.
4.4.2. Government banking arrangements
The law requires that all public money be deposited to the credit of the Receiver General, the chief financial officer of the federal government, who receives all revenues from the government and deposits them in the CRF (FAA, Art. 17). The FAA empowers the Receiver General to establish accounts for the deposit of public money and the Treasury Board to make regulations prescribing the manner in which public money shall be paid to the credit of the Receiver General.
4.4.3. In-year reporting
There are no legal provisions requiring the government to publish in-year reports on budget execution. However, throughout the year, monthly financial statements are published in the Fiscal Monitor. Results for each month and the year to date are compared with the same amounts during the same time period of the previous fiscal year.
4.4.4. Annual accounts and reports
Annual public accounts are required to be prepared by the Receiver General for each fiscal year and to be laid before the House of Commons by the President of the Treasury Board on or before 31 December following the end of that fiscal year (FAA, Art. 64). The public accounts need to be in such form as the President of the Treasury Board and the Minister of Finance direct. By law, the accounts are required to include:
●A statement of the financial transactions of the fiscal year, the expenditures and revenues for the fiscal year, and such assets and liabilities that, in the opinion of the President of the Treasury Board and the Minister of Finance, are required to show the financial position of the government at the end of the fiscal year.
●Other documents and information relating to the fiscal year as are deemed necessary by the President of the Treasury Board and the Minister of Finance to present fairly the financial transactions and the financial position of the government or as required by the FAA or any other Act (FAA, Art. 64.2).
●Contingent liabilities of the government.
●The opinion of the Auditor General on the accounts (AGA, s. 6).
In practice, the public accounts are in two volumes and provide a comprehensive report of budget execution. The accounts show the sources and uses of funds for each appropriation. The sources are broken down by
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several groupings – the main estimates, the supplementary estimates, adjustment and transfers, and transactions of previous years. The uses of funds are split between those used in the current year, lapsed or overexpended, available for use in subsequent years and used in the previous year. Volume I contains the summary report and financial statements. It provides a comparison of revenues and expenses in the budget. Volume II contains details of revenue and expenditure. It reports on the use of spending authorities (estimates) and reconciles expenditures (spending) to expenses (accrual).
The Minister of Finance voluntarily (i.e. there is no legal requirement) provides an Annual Financial Report to Parliament, which provides an ex post report on budget implementation. This is a short statement and is supplemented by condensed financial statements of government transactions. These financial statements are also audited.
4.4.5. Reporting of fiscal intentions
There are no statutory provisions requiring the government to report longand medium-term fiscal strategies and objectives to Parliament and the public. Unlike other Westminster countries, Canada has not adopted a legal approach to comprehensive disclosures (compare the Fiscal Responsibility Act of New Zealand). However, the budget and the Economic and Fiscal Update provide Parliament with the shortor long-term fiscal intentions of the government.
4.5. External audit
4.5.1. Managerial, financial and operational independence
The Auditor General Act 1977 (AGA) governs the general principles and procedures for external audits by the Office of the Auditor General. The AGA does not specify any parliamentary involvement in the appointment of the Auditor General. This position is appointed by the Governor General in Council (i.e. the head of the executive) for a non-renewable ten-year period and the holder may be removed by the Governor General in Council on address of the Senate and House of Commons (AGA, Art. 3). Each year, the Auditor General prepares an estimate of the sums that will be required to fulfil the responsibilities of the office. The provisions of the FAA with respect to the division of appropriations into allotments do not apply in respect of appropriations for the office of the Auditor General (FAA, Art. 20). The office has the freedom to recruit its own staff and set the terms and conditions of employment for staff in accordance with Article 15 of the Public Service Employment Act.
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4.5.2. Institutional coverage of audits
The Auditor General is required to examine several financial statements, as specified in the FAA (Art. 64) and any other statements that the Treasury Board or the Minister of Finance may present for audit (Art. 6). These include a statement of the financial transactions of the fiscal year, expenditures and revenues for the fiscal year, and the assets and the contingent liabilities of the government (FAA, Art. 64).
The Office of the Auditor General audits most areas of government activities, including:
●Federal government departments and agencies ranging from small boards to large, complex organisations whose activities extend across Canada and overseas.
●Crown corporations (for example, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the Royal Canadian Mint). Under the FAA, most Crown corporations must undergo a value-for-money audit every five years (in addition to an annual audit of their financial statements).
●Departmental corporations.
●Areas of responsibility shared by more than one department, such as immigration.
●Issues that affect the entire government, for example, personnel matters or the use of computers.
4.5.3. Types of audit
Pursuant to the AGA (Arts. 17 and 7.2.f) and the FAA (Part X), the Auditor General conducts several types of legislatively-authorised audits:
●Performance audits of departments and agencies. These examine whether programmes are run economically, efficiently and with due regard for their environmental effects, and also whether the government has the means to measure their effectiveness.
●Attestation audits of the summary financial statements, to verify that they represent fairly the government’s overall financial situation. Only the Government of Canada financial statements contained in section 2 of volume 1 of the annual accounts is audited. The other financial information is not explicitly audited although the Office of the Auditor General may look at aspects of it during the course of its work.
●Financial audits of Crown corporations, territorial governments and other organisations to determine whether their financial information is presented fairly and whether they comply with legislative authorities.
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●Special examinations of Crown corporations to determine whether their systems and practices provide reasonable assurance that assets are safeguarded, resources are managed economically and efficiently, and operations are carried out effectively.
In addition, the Auditor General reports annually on the extent to which departments are meeting the objectives and implementing the plans set out in their sustainable development strategies, which they have been required to prepare under amendments to the AGA in 1995.
4.5.4. Powers of investigation
The AGA contains provisions and powers for investigation (Art. 13). The Auditor General is entitled to free access, at all convenient times, to information that relates to the fulfilment of his/her responsibilities, and to require and receive such information, reports and explanations as he/she deems necessary. He/she may station persons employed in the Office of the Auditor General in any department, and that department shall provide the necessary office accommodation. Furthermore, the Auditor General may examine any person on oath for matters pertaining to any account. For the purpose of any such examination the Auditor General may exercise the powers of a commissioner specified under Part I of the Inquiries Act.
4.5.5. Reporting obligations and publication
Since 1879, the principal instrument for reporting has been the Auditor General’s Annual Report to the House of Commons (AGA, Art. 7). The observations of the Auditor General on the government’s financial statements are also included in the public accounts and complement the Auditor General’s annual audit report. The Auditor General may also make special reports, including:
●where the Auditor General considers that the matter is so important and urgent that he/she should not delay in reporting it until the presentation of the next annual report (Art. 8);
●where he/she considers that amounts provided for the office in the estimates submitted to Parliament are inadequate to enable him/her to fulfil the responsibilities (Art. 19).
Since the amendment of the AGA in 1994, the Auditor General may produce up to three reports per year in addition to the annual and special reports (Art. 7). In any given year, these reports contain the results of:
●Comprehensive audits of federal departments and agencies, and of issues that cross department lines.
●Government-wide audits.
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