- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. GERMANY
4.2.10. Budgetary implications of other bills
The Constitution states that “bills which increase the budget expenditure proposed by the federal government or involve or will give rise to new expenditure shall require the consent of the federal government. This shall also apply to bills which involve or will give rise to cuts in revenue” (GG, Art. 113). Also, measures which may oblige the Federation or the Länder to spend in future financial years shall only be permissible if the budget provides authorisation for them to do so (HGrG, s. 19).
4.3. Budget execution
Budget execution is governed by the HGrG and budget codes. For the federal government, the law authorises the Federal Ministry of Finance to issue administrative regulations concerning financial and budgetary administration (BHO, s. 5). Detailed regulations have been issued, which have binding force over federal ministries and dependent entities. Similar regulations have been issued by the 16 Länder.
4.3.1. Apportionment of expenditure authority
Appropriated funds shall be administered in such a way that they suffice to cover all expenditure for the various purposes indicated (HGrG, s. 19). Disbursements (and collections) may be made only on the basis of written warrants by the Minister of Finance or by agencies so authorised (HGrG, s. 32). The law adds that the minister may approve exceptions.
4.3.2. Cancellation of budget authority and other in-year expenditure controls
The Minister of Finance can block expenditures: “if developments in the revenue or expenditure situation so require, the Minister of Finance may make commitments or expenditure subject to his approval” (HGrG, s. 25). The instrument of freezing expenditures has been used in recent years. When spending exceeded the cash limits established by the Ministry of Finance, spending ministers were required to seek the permission of the Minister of Finance prior to spending authorised amounts (Sturm and Müller, 1999, p. 198). For investment spending financed by loans, prior approval of the Minister of Finance is needed for both commitments and payments (HGrG, s. 21). The regulations to the budget codes contain details on how these provisions are implemented.
4.3.3. Emergency spending, excess spending and contingency funds
The Constitution authorises expenditure in excess of budgetary appropriations, with the consent of the Minister of Finance, but only in the
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case of an unforeseen and compelling necessity. Details may be provided by federal legislation (GG, Art. 112). For the federal budget, “the need shall not be deemed compelling if in the specific case a supplementary budget can be adopted in time or if expenditure can be postponed until the next budget law has been passed. A supplementary budget shall not be required if the excess expenditure does not in any one case exceed a specific amount to be stipulated in the budget law” (BHO, s. 37).
The law provides the authority for the federal government’s budget to contain an unspecified expenditure item for use when economic activity declines and a disturbance in general economic equilibrium needs to be averted. Approval by the Bundestag, with comments by the Bundesrat, is needed for expenditure under this item (StWG, s. 8).
Concerning wage expenditures at all levels of government, “the granting of salary payments in excess of the collectively agreed scale requires the consent of the relevant Minister of Finance if this results in additional expenditure in the current or following fiscal year” (HGrG, s. 24). Similarly, the minister’s consent is required should administrative fees be lowered, resulting in a loss of revenue (HGrG, s. 24). Statutory expenditures (for example, for regular payments to civil servants, pensions) have to be paid irrespective of the amount provided for in the budget.
4.3.4. Transfer and virement of appropriations within the year
Transfers of budget authority between ministries is generally possible. Virement – the swapping of budget authority within titles and chapters for a particular ministry – has traditionally been very restrictive. Prior to the 1998 budget, virement was allowed between expenditure titles “only if there was an administrative or substantive connection. Expenditure budgeted without any detailed indication of its purpose could not be declared eligible for virement” [HGrG, s. 15(2)]. Following the adoption of the Law Adapting Budget Legislation of the Federation and the Länder in late 1997, virement rules for administrative expenditures were eased. The new rules allow virement within section 4 (salaries, except title 411), within section 5 (non-personnel administration expenditures), within title 711 (construction projects) and section 8 (other capital expenditure). Additionally, 20% of the budgets for each of these sections may be swapped with other sections. The impact of this more flexible management has been rather limited since only about 6% of total federal expenditures has been affected (even though the rules relate to 104 chapters, comprising about 3 000 budget titles). The main reason for this is that major federal government expenditures, including those on social security, transportation, subsidies and interest payments, were unaffected by the new legislation.
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4.3.5. Cash planning and management of government assets and debt
Principles for efficient cash management are incorporated in law, notably that “revenues shall be collected punctually and in full” and that “money may only be spent as and when necessary” (HGrG, s. 19). Also, for the federal government, the Federal Budget Code specifies “that a liquid reserve should be accumulated with the Bundesbank… In order to ensure proper cash management without recourse to borrowing authorisations” (BHO, s. 62).
The BHO also contains provisions for asset acquisitions (“only if required for the performance of the federal government’s tasks in the future”) and for asset sales (“sold only if not required for the performance of the federal government” and “sold at full value, with exceptions permitted in the budget”) (BHO, s. 63). There is also an article relating to real estate property (BHO, s. 64).
The executive is authorised to exercise in-year control over government borrowing for macro-stability reasons. The StWG provides details on operating procedures. In particular, the law requires a special committee of the Financial Planning Council to prepare a quarterly schedule of the priority of proposed borrowings, the amounts involved, and borrowing terms and conditions. This schedule may be declared binding by the Federal Minister of Finance. In consultation with the Bundesbank, the minister may suspend the schedule should capital markets deteriorate (StWG, s. 22). Each Land is required to ensure by appropriate measures that borrowing by a Land, its municipalities and other subordinated entities do not exceed the level decided at federal level (StWG, s. 23). Land and special funds are required to report, if requested by the Federal Minister of Finance, on their borrowing requirements (StWG, s. 24).
4.3.6. Internal audit
Until 1997, the law required government authorities to carry out internal financial control in the form of ex ante control, including for receipts, payments, commitments to incur expenditure, assets, and liabilities (BHO, s. 100). The BHO required a finance officer to be established in every agency (BHO, s. 9). Each internal audit office (called a pre-audit office) was integrated with the authority in which it was established, being directly subordinate to the head of such authority. The Federal Court of Audit was required to give its agreement to the appointment and recall of heads of internal audit offices, and each internal audit office was required to submit its audit results to the Federal Court of Audit. Since 1997, this legal requirement was removed from the HGrG. The pre-audit offices were replaced by internal auditing within the departments, where specific transactions can be checked at any time. Internal auditing is carried out on a decentralised basis in all departments in the form of a self-check.
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4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
4.4.1. The accounting framework
The Constitution requires annual accounts to cover not only revenues and expenditures, but also assets (“property”) and debt liabilities (GG, Art. 114). When this clause was inserted in the Constitution in 1969, it was understood that the governments’ accounting systems would be on a modified cash basis. “All collections and disbursements shall be entered separately for each financial year, in the year in which they were made” (HGrG, s. 34). “Collections and disbursements shall be recorded in accounts chronologically and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the budget or otherwise provided. The Minister of Finance may order accounts to be kept on commitments entered into and monies accruing. All entries in accounts shall be supported by documents” (HGrG, s. 33). A few exceptions are specified in the law, including transactions made during the unspecified complementary accounting period when books are being closed.
4.4.2. Government banking arrangements
The concept of a consolidated revenue fund for all revenues is explicit in the law: “all revenue shall serve as cover for all expenditure. Exceptions must be stipulated by law” (HGrG, ss. 7-8). However, the law does not require a single treasury account, opened in the name of the Minister of Finance. Nor does the law specify government banking arrangements associated with federal cash offices. The Bundesbank Act, 1992, entitles the central bank to conduct any financial transaction (with the exception of granting loans) for the Federation, special funds, Länder, and other public bodies. However, the law does not oblige the Bundesbank to be the federal government’s banker. In practice, however, nearly all federal government financial transactions are carried out via accounts managed by the Bundesbank on behalf of the Ministry of Finance.
4.4.3. In-year reporting to Parliament
For the annual budget debate (usually September). The legal requirements and actual information provided are discussed in above. Coverage of the Finance Report is extensive. Law does not explicitly state that Parliament must be provided with the fiscal strategy needed to meet its European commitments.
January. The federal and Länder governments are required to submit an annual economic report to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in January of each year (StWG, s. 2). This report must contain:
● comments on the Annual Report of the Council of Experts;16
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●the federal government’s economic and fiscal aims (annual projections) for the current year. This projection shall employ the same methods as the national accounts unless alternative accounts are necessary;
●a survey of planned economic and fiscal policy measures for that current year.
Other months. Law does not require regular (for example, quarterly) budget execution reports to be transmitted to Parliament and the public. However, in practice, the Federal Ministry of Finance publishes a monthly report (including a 15-page summary in English) on federal fiscal developments – revenues, expenditures, balance, federal borrowing, guaranteed debt. It includes an advance calendar of publication dates. The Federal Ministry of Finance also regularly provides data on fiscal developments for general government, especially to the EU and other international bodies.
4.4.4. Annual accounts and reports
The Constitution requires “the Minister of Finance, on behalf of the federal government, to submit annual accounts to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in order to obtain discharge; the accounts cover revenues, expenditures, property (assets) and debt” (GG, Art. 114). The law requires the Minister of Finance to set the date for closing the accounts (HGrG, s. 36). An explanatory report on the closed accounts is required (HGrG, s. 41).
To reach these legal requirements, the steps in preparing consolidated and nationwide accounts are embodied in law. “The responsible agencies shall render their closed accounts for each financial year. On the basis of the closed accounts, the Minister of Finance shall draw the consolidated budgetary account for federal government for each financial year” (HGrG, s. 37; BHO, s. 80). The HGrG specifies in detail the requirements for revenues, expenditures and financing (HGrG, ss. 38-40; BHO, ss. 81-83). Once the cash accounts and the budget have been closed, an explanatory report is required by law (HGrG, s. 41; BHO, s. 84). At federal level, additional summary information is required, including for excess and extrabudgetary expenditure, special funds and reserves, indirect federal agencies, revenue from asset sales not envisaged in the budget, and a “property” account (a balance sheet with certain assets and debt liabilities). The law does not include the date by which the minister must provide the consolidated annual accounts to the Federal Court of Audit for audit.
Federal entities whose accounts follow the rules of the Commercial Code (that is, who prepare annual accounts and reports using commercial doubleentry accounting standards), may be excused the Federal Ministry of Finance’s
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