- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. KOREA
Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
●Guidelines for budget preparation (Art. 25).
●Gross and net amounts of the revenue and expenditure budgets, and item by item explanations.
●Explanation of measures resulting in liabilities being borne by the Treasury. A statement of the actual redemptions of national bonds and borrowing funds at the end of year before the preceding year, the presumed present amount thereof at the end of the preceding year and current years, and the annual redemption schedules.
●For measures for which liabilities are borne by the Treasury, a statement of the estimated amount of expenditure by the end of the preceding year and the amount after the current year.
●For continuing expenditures, a statement of the estimated amount of expenditure until the end of the preceding year, the pre-determined amount of the expenditure after the current year, the overall project plans and the situation of progress thereof.
●The number of personnel in budget entities and the salary assumptions for the budget proposals.
●A statement of the value of State property at the end of the year before the preceding year, and the estimated value at the end of each of the preceding and current years.
●If the budgetary amount requested by an independent institution is reduced, reasons for such reduction and the opinions of the head of the independent institution concerned.
●Other documents needed to clarify the financial situation and contents of the budget proposal.
opinion of the constitutionally independent institution affected in the State Council (Art. 29), and attach any reason for the reduction in the draft budget submitted to the National Assembly.
4.2. Budget process in Parliament
4.2.1. The timetable for budget adoption and constraints on the budget debate in Parliament
The budget review by the National Assembly begins in early October, consistent with the requirement for the National Assembly to approve the draft budget within 30 days before the beginning of the fiscal year (Constitution, Art. 54). There is no legal restriction on the time spent on
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discussion and debate in the Budget Committee and in Parliament’s plenary session. However, the NAA provides general procedures for reviewing the draft budget (Art. 84).
●After the draft budget is submitted to the National Assembly, the President (sometimes the Prime Minister on behalf of the President) will make a speech at the plenary session on the next fiscal year’s economic and fiscal policy, and the basic direction for, and the major contents of, the draft budget.
●The draft budget is first required to be referred to the competent standing committees including the Finance and Economy Committee, the Education Committee, the Agriculture, Forestry, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Committee, the Health and Welfare Committee, and the Environment and Labour Committee. The standing committees will review the draft budget within their areas of jurisdiction and submit their reports to the Speaker.
●The Speaker is required to refer the draft budget to the Budget Committee with the reports made by the competent standing committee.
●The Budget Committee commences the examination of the draft budget by hearing an explanation of the draft budget by the MPB and by examining a report of an expert adviser in the Budget Committee. Following general and ministerial hearings, the Budget Committee will reduce or increase the budget estimates item by item.
●The Budget Committee is required to respect the contents of the preexamination report of the competent standing committees. In cases where any budget estimate is recommended to be reduced by the competent standing committee, the Budget Committee is required to seek the approval of the competent standing committee before it makes the final decision on the draft budget.
●After the Budget Committee’s examination, the Speaker calls the plenary session. The amended budget is approved by a majority vote.
The NAA (Arts. 84-2), as amended in 2001, stipulates general procedures for reviewing the Draft Fund Management Plan submitted pursuant to Article 7 of the FAFM. It requires the National Assembly to approve the draft fund management plan up until 30 days before the beginning of the fiscal year. The parliamentary review process for the public fund management plan follows the same procedures and timetable defined in the BAA.
4.2.2. Provisional budgets
The Constitution (Art. 54) provides for provisional budgets. If the draft budget is not passed by the beginning of the fiscal year, the government may, in conformity with the budget of the previous fiscal year, apportion funds for
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the following purposes until the draft budget is approved by the National Assembly: 1) the maintenance and operation of agencies and facilities established by the Constitution or law; 2) the execution of the obligatory expenditures as prescribed by law; and 3) the continuation of projects previously approved in the budget. The BAA specifies that expenditures or contracts based on the provisional budget are regarded as being based on the regular annual budget when the latter is approved by the National Assembly (Art. 34).
4.2.3. Powers of amendment
The Constitution states that the National Assembly shall, without the consent of the executive, neither increase the estimates of any expenditure item nor create any new expenditure items in the budget submitted by the executive (Art. 57). The National Assembly is only free to reduce estimates of expenditure in the draft budget. However, the National Assembly, in practice, has exercised a substantial power to amend the draft budget. In contrast, the National Assembly has unlimited powers to amend draft taxation bills, which can result in increases or decreases of the budget deficit proposed by the government.
4.2.4. Approval of resources
The Constitution states that the type and rate of taxes is determined by law (Art. 59). Therefore, new taxes are imposed or levels of existing taxes can be amended only when authorised by the National Assembly. Furthermore, the Basic Law on Managing Statutory Expenses (Quasi Taxes) 2002 requires that any new surcharges be levied only by an act. A revenue budget, prepared by the MOFE, is submitted to the National Assembly along with the expenditure budget. It shows projections of total national revenues including taxes, debt or borrowings, and other non-tax revenues. The National Assembly reviews and approves a draft revenue budget. Revenue is required to be classified by the nature of source (e.g. tax, public bond or borrowings, and other non-tax revenues). Within each category, revenue is further divided into chapter (“Jang”) and section (“Kwan”). These are required by the BAA to be on a gross basis.
Public funds have their own surcharges as one of their revenue sources. These revenues are included in the draft fund management plan and approved by the National Assembly.
4.2.5. The nature, structure and duration of appropriations
The nature and structure of appropriations are largely characterised by detailed line items. The BAA requires the draft budget (expenditure and
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revenue) to be classified by item (Art. 20). Expenditure is classified by function (e.g. economic, social welfare, defence), nature of expenditure (e.g. salary, capital investment), or institution (e.g. ministries, agencies). Within that category, expenditures are further divided into: chapter (“Jang”), section (“Kwan”), item (“Hang”), sub-item (“Se-hang”), sub-sub-item (“Se-se-hang”). The current classification shows 2 200 “Hang” and 6 000 “Se-hang”. The National Assembly approves expenditure by item (“Hang”).
The duration for the appropriation is usually for one year except for continuing expenditure which needs multi-year appropriations. There are no permanent appropriations. The continuing expenditure system, authorised by the Constitution (Art. 55) and the BAA (Art. 22), enables the government to make payment over a period of several years. The Constitution requires the executive to obtain the approval, in advance, for the total amount and periods of a continuing expenditure by the National Assembly when it is necessary. The BAA further specifies that a continuing expenditure should not be for more than five years from the fiscal year concerned and the extension of a continuing expenditure can be made only after approval of the National Assembly.
4.2.6. Carryover of appropriations and borrowing of future appropriations
The BAA allows end-year carryover of unspent appropriations under certain circumstances (Art. 38). First, carryover is allowed provided that approval is sought in advance from the National Assembly. Second, carryover is authorised where a contract is made in the fiscal year, but the actual payment is not possible in the same year due to unavoidable reasons. Third, line ministries may carry over up to 5% of certain operational expenditures defined by the MPB without having prior authorisation from the MPB.
4.2.7. Public debt approval
The Constitution provides that when the executive plans to issue public bonds or to make contracts which may incur financial obligations on the government, it needs the prior approval of the National Assembly (Art. 58). The Public Bond Act 1949 as amended governs the operation of the public bonds and the public debt. The act requires the MOFE to obtain prior approval from the National Assembly on the amount of public bonds to be issued. The government has a legal obligation to prepare a comprehensive report on the national debt and present it to the National Assembly. The BAA also requires the government to seek prior approval from the National Assembly when the government decides to guarantee bond issues by public corporations.17 The government is required to submit report to the National Assembly. The law does not restrict the amount of debt guarantees that the government may issue.
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